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Abstract
This research is motivated by the National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of
Medicine's joint call for research in healthcare, promoting the application of principles,
tools, and research from engineering disciplines, and complex systems in particular. In
2005, the US healthcare expenditure represented 16% of its GDP, with hospitals
representing the largest source of expenditure, as is the case in the United Kingdom.
Consequently, the strategies and operations developed and implemented by hospitals
have a significant impact on healthcare. Today, it would be hard to find a hospital that is
not implementing a Lean initiative or who isn't familiar with its concepts. However,
more often than not, their approach has narrowly focused at a process level and inside
individual service units like an emergency department. This research seeks to elevate
traditionally narrow hospital definitions of lean and explore the broader concepts of lean
enterprise principles and Enterprise Architecture (EA) while enhancing our knowledge of
hospitals' socio-technical complexity and enriching an emerging EA Framework (EAF)
developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
Following an extensive longitudinal multidisciplinary literature review, a number of
expert interviews, and preliminary empirical findings, an exploratory inductive and
deductive hybrid study was designed to collect and concurrently analyze both qualitative
and quantitative empirical data from multiple hospital settings over two main phases:
* The first phase consisted of recorded interviews with the Chief Executive Officers
of seven leading Massachusetts hospitals, who also provided sensitive internal
strategy and operations documents. We explored how hospitals currently measure
their hospital performance and how their explicit and implicit practices may be
improved using lean enterprise principles.
e The second phase comprised two in-depth case studies of large leading
multidisciplinary hospitals, one located in the US and other in the United
Kingdom, and included a total of 13 embedded units of analysis. Multiple sources
of evidence were collected including electronic medical records, 54 interviews,
observation, and internal documents. Findings were categorized and sorted, as
phenomena of interest consistently emerged from the data, and enriched both the
EAF, and our understanding of hospitals' EA in particular.
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In both in-depth hospital cases we found that their EA consisted of multiple internal
architectural configurations, and in particular, those with an enriched understanding of
EA had made decisions which had improved not only their local performance, but also
enhanced their interactions with other service units upstream and downstream.
Conversely, worse performing configurations demonstrated a limited understanding of
their hospital's EA. We conclude that hospital performance can be improved through an
enriched understanding of hospital EA. Furthermore, whilst considering all hospitals
included in this study, we propose general and specific recommendations, as well as
diagnostic questions, performance dimensions, and metrics, to assist senior hospital
leaders in architecting and managing their enterprise.
Thesis Supervisor: Deborah J. Nightingale
Title: Professor of the Practice of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems
Director, Center for Technology, Policy and Industrial Development
Co-Director, Lean Advancement Initiative
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This thesis is dedicated in memory of my Grandfather Manuel Gomes Varela Fradinho,
MD, who passed away in 2006, early-on my PhD, and became the major influence that
steered my research towards healthcare. He was born in 1914, graduated in Medicine in
1938, and practiced General Surgery in Portuguese civilian hospitals and private clinics.
Furthermore, he was an athlete, an author, an artist, a philosopher, and most importantly,
he dedicated his life to the betterment of others.
Tenho saudades suas Pai Manel...
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1. Introduction
The United States (US) health care system is a critical system grappling with as much as
16% of the gross domestic product in its expenditures and unsatisfactory outcomes while
undergoing considerable public scrutiny (Kaiser Foundation 2007). High ranking officials
have both singled out the US healthcare system as the most expensive and among the
least effective in the developed world (NationalAcademies 2006). In fact, the president
of Johns Hopkins University was quoted: "Simply stated, the US does not have a health
care system" (Eastman 2007) as he alluded to the highly fragmented nature and variation
of billing, care provision, accountability, safety, etc, inherent in the delivery of care.
The key categories often referred to when assessing the performance of the health care
system are access, quality, and cost. In terms of access, an estimated 15% of the US
population is uninsured (Thorpe 2007), and as many as 75% of care providers practice
alone or in groups of five or fewer (Blumenthal and Glaser 2007). As for quality, adults
on average are said to only receive as little as 55% of the recommended care for many
common conditions (McGlynn, Asch et al. 2003), and between 44,000 to 98,000 annual
deaths are attributed to medical errors (Kohn, Corrigan et al. 2000). Finally, the US
spends 16% of its GDP on health care expenditures, including 30 - 40% of US health
care spending which is believed to be wasteful (Reid 2005), and the largest source of
expenditure, namely over 30%, is hospital expenditures (Kaiser Foundation 2007).
Similarly the United Kingdom's (UK) highest source of healthcare expenditures are
hospital services and infrastructure (National Health System 2008). Consequently, the
strategies and operations developed and implemented by hospitals have a significant
effect on access, quality, and cost of care (Devers, Brewster et al. 2003).
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Figure 1-1: Multilevel stakeholder decomposition of a healthcare system (Oliveira, Nightingale et al.
2010)
The provision of medical care entails a complex and technically sophisticated enterprise
that encompasses many different stakeholders (Robinson and Casalino 1996) which often
times are not aligned with one another (see Figure 1-1). For instance, a characterization
of the US health care system that has taken hold is that of it being a cottage industry,
largely because of the proliferation of autonomous physicians practicing in small groups
with limited oversight or coordination, who eschew standardization and deliver costly
lower quality care (Swensen, Meyer et al. 2010). Additionally, the Institute of Medicine
(IOM 2006) concluded in a high visibility report that current health care payment systems
don't recognize or reward the coordination of care, and both preventive care and the
treatment of chronic patients who move across various care settings are omitted. In
essence, the current payment system has been considered one of the primary reasons for
the US health care system's fragmentation, unreliability, and waste (Fisher 2006).
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However, it is also important to consider fragmentation of the regulatory system whereby
its effects, as expected of any complex socio-technical system, are such that changing
even the smallest of features of legislation can have major, and sometimes unintended,
impacts in the system's evolution (Butler 2010). Moreover, many agree the health care
system presents a complex problem for which the solution is neither obvious nor likely to
be painless (Chernew, Sabik et al. 2010). Specifically, "all savings represent lost income
for somebody, and affected stakeholders have successfully blocked, weakened, or
circumvented past attempts at cost control" (Hussey, Eibner et al. 2009).
Finally, US health care reform discussions have centered on insurance with standard
benefit packages (Cortese and Smoldt 2007) or deep-in-the-weeds debates over technical
details (Murray 2010), and little attention has been given to the care delivery itself
thereby undermining the ability to improve the quality of care and slow the growth of
spending (Rittenhouse, Shortell et al. 2009). However, the US is not alone in this
approach and both the UK and Canada, among others, have been found to mostly pursue
administrative fiscal interventions with little effect on the actual delivery of care
(Glouberman and Mintzberg 2001). Interestingly, almost two decades ago the medical
community had already urgently called for research on health care delivery organizations,
suggesting that a relationship existed between organizational performance and
organizational factors such as culture, coordination, and leadership (Flood 1994). As such,
some state that once the existing reform debates are over, hospital managers are once
again left with the task to design more effective and efficient approaches for delivering
health care (Bohmer 2009). Therefore, hospitals constitute the focal unit of analysis in
this research, whilst nonetheless including macro level contextual considerations (e.g.
regulation, payment models, etc) and micro level of care delivery (e.g. emergency
department, patient wards, etc).
Page 24 of 759
1.1 Healthcare's elusive "Toyota Way"
In the 90s, faced with a similarly turbulent and challenging environment in the US
automotive industry, researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
studied 52 assembly plants in 14 countries over a five year period to explore the
significant performance gap between Japanese and Western automotive organizations
(Womack, Jones et al. 1990). They coined the term lean when describing their finding
that Japanese companies had a manufacturing system in place that built greater customer
loyalty and strived for continuous quality improvement and doing so at a lower cost.
Since then several academics and practitioners have studied Japanese companies in detail
and developed recipes for lean success (e.g. "The Toyota Way" (Liker 2004)). As a result
other industries began to take notice and wondered about finding their Toyota way, so
much so, that today one would be hard pressed to find a hospital in the US which isn't
aware of lean principles and considering the implementation of some kind of lean
program (Liker and Morgan 2006).
Different experts vary in their enthusiasm when describing the success hospitals have had
so far in their lean improvement efforts. Table 1-1 below features some of the
experiences most consistently reported.
Table 1-1: Frequentl reported lean hospital success cases
Reference Case
(Kim, Spahlinger The Virginia Mason Medical Center decreased the number of
et al. 2006) ventilator-associated pneumonia from 34 cases with 5 deaths in 2002
to 4 cases with 1 death in 2004. They have also made space
utilization improvements in their cancer center and are now able to
see 57% more of patients in the same original space.
(Muto, Herbert et A cohort of hospitals in Pittsburgh reduced the amount of central line
al. 2006) associated blood stream infections by 68% on average
(Spear 2005) A pre-surgery nursing unit at Western Pennsylvania Hospital in
Pittsburgh reduced the time for registering patients from 12 to 60
minutes to only 3 minutes, and also reduced the number of
unnecessary blood bank reports issued from 10 to 11 a day to 0 a day
Despite these successes other experts note that the US health care industry has "No
Toyotas" given that generally the initiatives are limited in scope, duration, and impact
(Coye 2001). Such an assessment is similar to those made of other industries where the
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majority of lean and other improvement methodologies are reportedly unsuccessful
(Corboy and O'Corrbui 1999; Repenning and Sterman 2001; Baker 2002).
Various authors have offered different views to explain this lack of generalized
significant results. Some argue that one should not draw correlations from the automotive
industry to other industries as there are fundamental differences in conditions (Adler and
Cole 1993). Along those lines and in healthcare in particular, others have noted that there
isn't any single customer to focus the improvement on and that instead many 'customer'
communities exist and present a complex and fragmented scene, thereby hindering
improvement initiatives (Young and McClean 2008). Others point out that even though
organizational officials claim to implement lean, they are only implementing one or two
of the elements (Nancy 1999), while solely focused at the process level (Bhasin and
Burcher 2006) and often times within individual silos (Allen, Nightingale et al. 2004),
instead of adopting a broader mindset beyond the 'shop floor' and across the whole
enterprise (Murman, Allen et al. 2002).
Admittedly, the importance of considering multiple stakeholders as well as adopting a
holistic approach that cuts across hospital silos, has began taking hold in the healthcare
process improvement literature (Spear 2009). However, although the scope of hospital
interventions are beginning to be enlarged, they are still insufficient if one wishes to
strive for long term sustainability. With that in mind Liker and Morgan (2006) argue that
one needs "a true systems approach that effectively integrates people, processes, and
technology [and that what makes Toyota work] is that all the pieces fit together and
support each other." Moreover, Donald Berwick, former chief executive officer of the
Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), and recently appointed head of the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid, emphasized that the problem of healthcare redesign becomes
increasingly "harder and the evidence weaker as one moves from the microsystem to the
organization" 1 (Berwick 2002).
1 The microsystem refers to the care given at service unit level (e.g. emergency department), whereas the
organization is the care provider facility (e.g. hospital) that supports one or more microsystems.
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1.2 Motivation
The overarching motivation for this research is to respond to the National Academy of
Engineering and the Institute of Medicine's joint call to promote the application of
"principles, tools, and research from engineering disciplines associated with the analysis,
design, and control of complex systems" (Reid 2005). However, we do so with an
understanding that the adoption of isolated organizational factors and/or principles don't
automatically translate themselves in better hospital outcomes (Flood 1994). For instance,
under pressure to deliver concrete and actionable operational effectiveness, managers
have adopted a best practice mentality and sought the advice of business publications and
consultants that often ignore the need to have a strategy (Porter 1996) thereby lacking an
enterprise architecture perspective. Similarly, health care executives traditionally relegate
"lean" and "Toyota" to a process level discussion focused on efficiency gains, which
prevents them from "doing the right things and doing things right" (Drucker 1963). As
such, in adopting a systems thinking approach we hope to elevate the traditionally narrow
hospital definitions of lean health care and explore the broader concepts of lean enterprise
principles and Enterprise Architecture (EA) while enhancing our knowledge of hospitals'
socio-technical complexity and underlying performance.
To further understand our overarching motivation it is useful to refer to baseline
definitions which in turn gave rise to additional research motivating factors:
e "Lean enterprises are complex, highly integrated systems comprised ofprocesses,
products, organizations, and information, with multifaceted interdependencies
and interrelationships across their boundaries" (Nightingale 2002)
e "A lean enterprise is an integrated entity that efficiently creates value for its
multiple stakeholders by applying lean enterprise principles and practices"
(Murman, Allen et al. 2002)
" "[Enterprise Architecting is the application of] holistic thinking to conceptually
design, evaluate and select a preferred structure for a future state enterprise to
realize its value proposition and desired behaviors" (Nightingale and Rhodes
2007)
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The coding of best practices (e.g. value stream mapping, multi-disciplinary teams, etc)
and their organization into a framework has been considered an architectural design for
high performance enterprises (Stanke 2006). The organization element is particularly
important in that the individual principles aren't as relevant as their effective integration
and application, and although some principles may sound elementary, their application
throughout the enterprise is far from simple (Nightingale 2002). For instance,
management and social scientists have produced an extensive amount of literature in
understanding organizational behavior and designing organizations capable of deriving
higher effectiveness. However, a key problem has been that different schools of thought
have tended to focus on a single side of issues whilst using different logics and
vocabularies that aren't shared beyond the individual school (Astley and Ven 1983).
In the late 1990s, MIT, established the Engineering Systems Division (ESD), as a new
interdisciplinary unit within the School of Engineering with the proposal that new
approaches, frameworks, and methodologies were needed to design large-scale complex
systems that serve society's needs (Roos, de Neufville et al. 2004). One such framework
is the Nightingale-Rhodes Enterprise Architecture Framework (NREAF) (Nightingale
and Rhodes 2007), currently under development at MIT, which reflects preliminary
generalized results based on several years of empirical studies (Rhodes, Ross et al. 2009).
Figure 1-2: A Holistic Enterprise Architecture Framework (Nightingale and Rhodes 2007)
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Enterprise Architecture (EA) is a concept derived from general systems theory whereby
an organization is regarded as an open system comprising its context (e.g. external
environment), its processes (e.g. organizational characteristics), and its outcomes (i.e.
performance) (Katz and Kahn 1966).
Frameworks help define boundaries, specify dimensions or views and may also provide
initial intuitions into the relationships amongst views (Rouse and Putterill 2003).To that
effect the NREAF (Figure 1-2) adopts a holistic approach in the representation of
enterprises thereby not focusing only on one or two individual elements and opting to
study eight views (External factors/ Policy; Strategy; Process; Organization; Knowledge;
Information Technology; Product; Service). Secondly the framework is neither domain
specific nor information technology centric. Thirdly, the framework is holistic in the
several views it considers, but equally holistic in that it proposes to study them in a
congruent fashion so as to identify and study potential interactions amongst views.
In general frameworks have been found lacking if they are unable to develop beyond very
high level descriptions of variables with unclear operational definitions (Pugh, Hickson et
al. 1963), and neglect to build on well informed theory which allows to draw distinctions
and relationships of conceptual significance (Miller 1996). Contingency theorists in
particular have often used words such as fit, congruence, and alignment, which in the
absence of clear descriptive guidelines make it difficult to compare and operationalize
their contributions (Venkatraman 1989). An important recommendation for framework
development has been that researchers employ commonly accepted measures of
organizational constructs so as to allow for cumulative knowledge building (Rajagopalan
and Spreitzer 1997). The NREAF is in its nascent phase of development (Nightingale
2009) and accordingly the second main motivation in this research is to leverage the
NREAF2 while conducting exploratory research at multiple leading hospitals, and
iteratively theoretically enriching it with constructs from different bodies of literature
pertaining to the various EA views. Additionally, rich empirical holistic EA descriptions
2 Several alternative enterprise architecture frameworks will be examined in detail in Chapter 3 and
compared and contrasted with MIT'S NREAF, and we will describe strengths and limitations of each.
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that capture EA view interactions are also needed, so as to further enrich our
understanding of EA.
A final motivation of this research resulted from the adopted inductive - deductive cycle
research approach, whereby research questions were continuously refined so as to reflect
our gradual increased understanding of EA, and hospital enterprises in particular.
Specifically, at a more fundamental level, the notion of hospital improvement and leading
status implied a baseline understanding of hospital performance, which shouldn't be
dependent on any individual organization's perspective and/or mission. Such is consistent
with a group of health care experts, charged with setting a research agenda aimed at
improving the US health care system, who defined as their highest research priority the
understanding and improvement of hospital performance measurement and the
identification of key organizational characteristics from high-performing hospitals
(Fernandopulle, Ferris et al. 2003). The application of lean enterprise principles,
including among others an appreciation for the values of multiple stakeholders and an
organizational end-to-end view (i.e. beyond any individual hospital department and/or
service) will contribute with further insight into the characterization of high-performing
hospitals.
1.3 Contextualizing Hospital Enterprises
As previously referenced, today one would be hard pressed to find a hospital in the US
which isn't considering the implementation of lean. Equally frequent are the concerns of
many health care practitioners who say that "our hospital isn't like a Toyota assembly
line!" However, before hastily categorizing such statements as organizational resistance
to change, it is useful to briefly elaborate on some of the reasoning behind them and how
it in turn may affect our investigation of hospital performance and hospital enterprise
architecture.
The automotive industry is a mass production assembly-line environment where each
vehicle is built from thousands of parts that result from tightly connected processes which
upon failing may have a large visible effect (i.e. line stops) or may go unnoticed and
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generate future problems (e.g. product recall issued). Mass production is made possible
because a production sequence is defined for every day, where the cycle time for each
vehicle is calculated precisely according to the vehicle's specifications known ahead of
time (Sugimori, Kusunoki et al. 1977). Moreover, highly standardized processes allow to
determine the flow of resources from the time the raw materials enter a manufacturing
facility to the end of the assembly process (Morse, Gordon et al. 1974). In contrast,
hospitals are said to be neither able to predict their capacity requirements (Kellogg and
Nie 1995) nor to standardize their inputs since every patient is unique and therefore a
range of variation is present even in the most common procedures (Carroll and
Edmondson 2002). Furthermore, health care practitioners not only exercise a significant
degree of independence (i.e. a machine doesn't tell them what to do) (Drucker 1992) but
also require key social skills to explain treatments to patients (Donabedian 1966) while
keeping track of the continuous explosion of medical knowledge and technology
(Swensen, Meyer et al. 2010). Understandably, hospitals are considered to be among the
most complex organizations in modem society (Longest 1974).
A key distinction of hospital enterprises is said to be that a service is being delivered as
opposed to a product being manufactured (Douglas and Ryman 2003). Emphasizing this
distinction several researchers have considered inadequate and restrictive the direct
application of manufacturing theories and techniques to the realm of services (Thomas
1978; Anderson, Cleveland et al. 1989; Kellogg and Nie 1995). Tien (2008) offers a
baseline distinction between services and manufactured goods, as follows: services are
co-produced, heterogeneous in their production, physically intangible, perishable if not
consumed during production or by a certain time, customizable, focused in meeting
customer expectations; manufactured goods are pre-produced, standardized in their
production and use, physically tangible, can be built to inventory if not consumed,
focused on reliability, and recyclable.
Evidently comparisons of products versus services rely on one or more dimensions, and
tend to arrive at a continuum with considerable overlap over the two (Solomon,
Surprenant et al. 1985). In hospitals for instance there are elements of both products and
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services, when we consider that standardized surgical kits are assembled onsite ahead of
time (i.e. product with standard steps followed with no deviation), or when blood/tissue
sample is drawn from a patient and sent to the hospital's lab for analysis (i.e. service with
standardized steps and minor deviation), or finally when a patient is receiving care (i.e.
service which ideally follows evidence based medicine and involves considerable patient
interaction which contributes to variability). Recently scholars have noted that hospitals
have narrowly focused on process oriented lean tools, which amid less repetitive tasks
and work of intangible nature, aren't of straightforward application (Liker and Morgan
2006). As such, these authors argue that lean should be regarded as "a true systems
approach that effectively integrates people, processes, and technology" (Liker and
Morgan 2006) which is true for both service and/or product enterprises (Nightingale
2009)'.
1.4 An Interdisciplinary Approach
Research in the area of organizational design and performance is commonly regarded
more as an art or craft in that one has to learn by trial and error given the absence of any
process guidelines (Van de Ven and Ferry 1980). In the case of service organizations, a
recent analysis from a system's perspective (Tien 2008) recommended that a
multidisciplinary research approach is needed, including techniques from the social
sciences, management, and engineering, so as to tackle the critical aspect of human
complexity. Furthermore, systems thinking scholars have also recommended that
empirical studies and case based research be used in furthering our understanding of
contextual and workforce factors so as to derive more effective practices (Rhodes, Lamb
et al. 2008). Accordingly, in this research we are not only leveraging and enriching
MIT's emerging NREAF, but also our research approach is one that embodies different
techniques in continuous iterative inductive - deductive cycles. To that effect, enquiry
uses traditional analysis tools (e.g. value stream maps, patient flow statistical analysis,
etc) as well as techniques from social sciences and management (e.g. grounded theory,
case studies, etc), while guided by the emerging NREAF.
3 The architectural implications stemming from the similarities and differences of services versus products
are explored in detail in Chapter 3.
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In their influential paper, Edmondson and McManus (2007) synthesize the concept of
methodological fit as a key value attribute for high-quality field research in organizations.
Field research is defined as systematic studies that require the collection of both
qualitative and quantitative original data from real organizations. Methodological fit
addresses the internal consistency among the different elements of a research project (i.e.
research question; prior work; research design; and contribution to literature). The
authors discuss at length the relationship amongst each element and alert to the danger
that "all researchers are vulnerable to preferring those hammers that we have learned to
use so well" (Edmondson and McManus 2007). With that in mind the authors assert that
theory development falls across a continuum (i.e. mature, intermediate, and nascent) and
recommend that research designs reflect the theoretical maturity of the research at hand.
Mature theory includes well-developed constructs and models that have been consistently
studied over time by various scholars, resulting in broad agreement and reaching
cumulative knowledge gain. At the opposite side of the spectrum, nascent theory
proposed tentative answers to novel questions of how and why, often only suggesting
new connections among phenomena. Intermediate theory, as the name entails, lies
between mature and nascent theory, and presents provisional explanations of phenomena
by proposing relationships between established constructs and a new construct it may
introduce.
As previously noted, MIT's emerging NREAF reflects preliminary generalized results
based on several years of empirical studies and the general concept of EA is still in a
nascent phase. Accordingly, our exploratory research was at first situated in the nascent
phase of theory development but gradually entered an intermediate phase of theory
development as we associated the phenomena of interest with constructs that are
generally accepted in different literature domains (e.g. systems thinking; operations
management; healthcare management; organization theory; etc). Examples of specific
theories woven together in our research include, among others, coordination theory
(Lawrence and Lorsh 1967), strategic choice (Child 1972), information processing theory
(Galbraith 1974), knowledge-based theory (Grant 1996), information technology
architecture (Ross, Beath et al. 1996), and enterprise architecture (Nightingale 2002).
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The development of nascent theory traditionally employs an approach termed as
grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) whereby instead of following a sequential
process in which hypotheses are formed and data are collected and then analyzed, the
researcher alternates and iterates the data analyses with the data collection process
(Edmondson and McManus 2007). Over time intermediate theory development allows for
pattern descriptions which suggest both variance theories (i.e. an increase of X leads to an
increase of Y), and process theories (i.e. how a process unfolds). Ultimately, whereas
mature theory favors quantitative data methods, and nascent theory favors qualitative data
methods, intermediate theory favors a blend of both qualitative and quantitative data to
further strengthen evidence triangulation (Jick 1979). To that effect over the course of our
research we used the previously mentioned traditional analysis tools, as well as
techniques from social sciences and management, which also included an extensive
longitudinal literature review on the different organizational design and effectiveness
theories mentioned, as these informed the analysis of the empirical data collected. 4
1.5 Research Questions
In the course of our exploratory research an overarching motivating assumption emerged
in that an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture led to decisions that
were more likely to improve hospital performance. The following are the four main
research questions which were defined and gradually refined in the context of this
research whilst addressing the above described research motivation:
* RQ1: How is hospital enterprise performance currently measured?
* RQ2: How could hospital enterprise performance measurement be improved
using lean enterprise principles?
* RQ3: Can one create an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise
architecture?
* RQ4: Can hospital performance be improved through an enriched understanding
of hospital enterprise architecture and if so, how?
4 Chapters 2 and 3 describe in detail our longitudinal literature review, including an analysis of lean
enterprise principles and enterprise architecture frameworks, while Chapter 5 explains in-depth several of
the considerations and decisions in designing and refining our research designs.
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1.6 Thesis Outline
Given the undertaken continuous and iterative inductive and deductive research cycles,
which included revisiting our initial hospital exploratory cases in the light of our
enhanced literature knowledge and broader understanding from subsequent hospital cases,
it would prove difficult to organize this thesis in such a way as to mimic the sequence of
our methodological steps. Furthermore, different hospital samples were used to address
different research questions, which in turn entailed different research methods, thus
adding to the non-sequential nature of this research. Nonetheless, our writings on the
compare and contrast analysis, within and across hospital cases, reflect how key
phenomena emerged and underwent refinement, thereby offering further insight into our
research process and sequence.
Chapters 2-4 have a dual role in the dissertation: on one hand they introduce the basics
and nuances of enterprise performance measurement and the theoretical evolution of
enterprise architecture and how it applies to healthcare. On the other hand these chapters
form the knowledge-base on which the hospital empirical data collected is analyzed and
subsequently structured in terms of generalized recommendations for hospital executives
to improve their organizations.
With this in mind, in Chapter 2 we examine different theoretical perspectives on the
broader concept of organizational effectiveness as well as the inherent difficulty in
adopting a multi-stakeholder approach versus a profit maximization approach.
Subsequently we describe performance measurement practices and systems from a
multidisciplinary perspective (e.g. operations research, product development, etc) on
what are some of the most common pitfalls and best practices, including the learning
stemming from LAI's ongoing research on lean enterprise principles and how it can
improve hospital enterprise performance measurement. Finally, we introduce the key
issue of defining health care quality and performance and how these relate to an
individual hospital's mission in the context of their surrounding community and society
at large. We also conduct a detailed analysis on multidisciplinary literature focused on
hospital performance measurement and find that traditionally there has been a focus on
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one or two performance dimensions, and although most recent publications advocate
broader performance assessments, these are still at a conceptual level and lack empirical
data.
Along the same lines, Chapter 3 reviews additional bodies of literature applicable in our
research, namely the literature on organizational design and systems thinking. Several
organizational theorists have devoted considerable attention to the characterization of
organizations and how the inherent relationships amongst design elements may affect an
organization's effectiveness. Through our in-depth and longitudinal literature analysis we
intend to first account for some of the early narrow thinking and then present more recent
contributions that consider organizations in a more holistic way (i.e. gestalts). Such an
evolution is particularly evident in the maturation of organizational design frameworks
over time, of which we select ten of the most influential and compare and contrast them
in terms of the organizational elements they consider important, as well as the
relationships they study, and what they conceptualize as contributing to organizational
effectiveness (if indeed such propositions are offered). MIT's emerging NREAF is
confirmed as the most complete framework to inform our research. However, consistent
with its nascent phase we also confirm the need for its theoretical enrichment with clear
constructs and operational guidelines stemming from in-depth empirical study.
Furthermore, in the context of this research, we discuss the importance of adopting an
enterprise diagnostic mindset, which holds no pre-conceived notion of organizational
element interactions, as opposed to an architecting mindset.
Chapter 4 is the final chapter in this introductory and knowledge-base sequence. The
ailing US health care industry has often warranted a shared negative theme amongst
media and academic circles which focus on distinct aspects of the problem, mostly
concerning themselves with the institutional layer (e.g. regulation, payment models), and
neglecting technical and organizational layers regarding the delivery of care. Chapter 4
frames the health care literature to offer a systems perspective and that of hospitals in
particular. Furthermore, the chapter discusses key hospital characteristics and how these
in turn need to be reflected in this thesis' research design.
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Chapter 5 provides an overview of the research strategy rationale, the hospital samples
used for each research question, and the different data collection and analytical methods
used in each one of them. A review of pertinent literature is presented in support of the
reasoning behind the hospital sampling, including the convenience stratified sample of
Massachusetts hospitals. Additional methodology literature is reviewed to explain our
research approach (e.g. crossing organizational levels of analysis to improve validity;
using a hybrid research design; performing content analysis on interview transcripts; etc)
and share our insights from planning our EA research.
In Chapter 6 we first look closely at how hospital enterprise performance is currently
measured, and we do so by leveraging the learning from the detailed literature review
done in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. A stratified sample of seven hospitals based in the state
of Massachusetts was used in order to control for institutional layer effects. Two different
research instruments were used and both of them were informed by the relevant literature
described in Chapter 2. An 80 minute audio recorded semi-structured interview was
administered onsite to the Chief Executive Officer of each hospital, followed by a 40
minute quantitative questionnaire enquiring on specific performance measurement
preferences. Additional confidential documents (i.e. strategic and operational plans) were
gathered on a case by case basis. The results of the quantitative instrument are interpreted
in the context of the interview transcripts and publicly available data. In our analysis, we
coincide with the literature in terms of its characterization of the health care system as
fragmented, as well as in the description of narrow thinking induced upon hospitals by
payers and regulators. However, we also establish that the sampled leading hospitals were
exhibiting behaviors beyond those described in their explicit measurement practices as
well as beyond those used to characterize them in the literature. Finally, we also identify
areas for improvement and make 5 recommendations as to how hospitals can incorporate
and benefit from lean enterprise principles. In doing so, we introduce a core concept of
service architecture awareness. Additionally, we suggest diagnostic questions,
performance dimensions, and key metrics, to further inform hospital leaders.
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In Chapters 7-8 we describe two in-depth exploratory studies of leading multispecialty
hospitals, as we empirically and theoretically enrich MIT'S NREAF, and study whether
an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture can improve hospital
performance. In these chapters, we follow a hybrid research design which consisted of
qualitative and quantitative data collected from multiple levels of each organization, and
assessed multiple dimensions of performance, using both subjective and objective data.
One of the hospitals is based in the US and the other in the UK, and both have national
and international recognition. These cases not only provided a unique opportunity of
furthering our understanding of hospital complexity but also provided a lens beyond the
traditional healthcare high level country benchmarks (e.g. average life expectancy;
average healthcare spending per capita; etc) and yielded interesting insights such as the
similarity of operational and strategic issues faced by hospital executives despite the
fundamentally different institutional layer faced by each of the hospitals. Furthermore,
we find that a hospital enterprise may consist of multiple internal architectural
configurations which have different levels of understanding of the overall hospital's EA.
Finally, we suggest that an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture can
inform decision making in successfully improving hospital performance.
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter where we summarize our key findings, discuss how
future research can build off from this work, and provide senior hospital leaders with
additional specific recommendations on how to reconfigure their hospital enterprise
5architectures to derive improved hospital enterprise performance .
We now begin our journey with Chapter 2 where we discuss at length different
theoretical viewpoints on organizational effectiveness and performance, and how lean
enterprise principles are relevant for hospital management.
5 Chapter 9's recommendations are in addition to the general recommendations presented in Chapter 6.
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2. Enterprise Performance Measurement
The definition and measurement of performance at an enterprise level presents several
challenges to practitioners and researchers alike. For instance, an entity may have its
performance measured according to internally defined goals, which may or not be
consistent with its mission statement and or strategic objectives, and in turn may or not be
aligned with the evolving perspectives of influential stakeholders that reside beyond the
organization's boundary, wherever it may be defined.
Measuring the performance of a hospital enterprise is particularly challenging given the
varying definitions of healthcare (e.g. scope, value, human rights, etc) which are upheld
by different stakeholders (e.g. patients, physicians, nurses, hospital board, regulators,
employers, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, etc) and demanded of hospital leaders who
in turn attempt to set the direction and induce desirable behavior for their organization to
become and remain a high performing hospital. The complexity underlying this
observation was evident upon conducting the empirical exploratory hospital cases
(described in subsequent chapters) which prompted the elaboration of this chapter and
associated research questions to inform the overall research presented in this thesis.
This chapter is heavily grounded in multiple bodies of literature and can be organized in
three main parts, namely a multidisciplinary analysis of organizational performance
research, a detailed analysis of lean enterprise systems' thinking and principles, and
hospital enterprise performance measurement.
The first part begins with a multidisciplinary overview of organizational performance
research, including how it has been the object of criticism over the years, and how it
remains a central tenant of organizational theory and systems thinking. We then describe
the major approaches and key assumptions that researchers have developed and refined
when studying organizational performance (i.e. goal attainment; systems resource;
multiple constituency; reputational and emergent). Next we explore in detail the key
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issues of organizational performance assessments, including the existence of multiple
stakeholders, multiple levels of analysis, and multiple dimensions of performance,
followed by a description of published recommendations on how researchers can mitigate
these issues.
The second part adopts the published recommendation (Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1981;
Wagner and Schneider 1987) of leveraging the literature's convergence towards a theory
of organizational performance, and to that effect in the context of this thesis, we examine
in detail the systems thinking construct of lean enterprises. However we first begin by
sharing a multidisciplinary view on the issues of best practice definitions, so that our own
description of lean enterprise principles is as useful and supported as possible. We then
examine the origins of lean, followed by a listing of popular lean best-practice lists, as
well as a literature analysis on the reasoning behind failed implementations of lean.
Finally we examine the emerging lean enterprise principles stemming from MIT's Lean
Advancement Initiative (LAI) empirical research, which arguably represents the latest
development in lean thinking, and conduct an in-depth literature analysis to bolster their
theoretical underpinning.
The third part of this chapter addresses hospital enterprise performance measurement and
consolidates our literature review in terms of the first two research questions posited in
this thesis . Leveraging the issues identified in the first part of this chapter we analyze in
detail the challenges inherent in measuring hospital enterprise performance. Next we
conduct a longitudinal and multidisciplinary literature review focused on hospital
performance measurement and find that traditionally there has been a focus on one or two
performance dimensions, and although most recent publications advocate broader
performance assessments, these are still at a conceptual level and lack empirical data.
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6 Please refer to section 1.5.
2.1 Overview of Organizational Performance Research
The study of organizational performance has been considered of central importance to the
theoretical development of different disciplines spanning over decades of research (see
Table 2-1) and generating multiple definitions (see Table 2-2).
Table 2-1: Organizational performance central importance in different literatures
Reference Source Quote
(Goodman and Book "it is difficult to conceive of a theory of
Pennings 1977) organizations that does not include the
page 2 construct of effectiveness"
(Van de Ven Book "Organizational performance is the ultimate
and Ferry criterion and starting point in an assessment of
1980) page 9 organizations"
(March and Organization Science "Explaining variation in performance or
Sutton 1997) effectiveness is also one of the more enduring
themes in the study of organizations."
(Forbes 1998) Nonprofit and "Organizational effectiveness [...] is powerful
Voluntary Sector in the sense that it represents a useful tool for
Quarterly critically evaluating and enhancing the work of
organizations"
(Bourne, Mills International Journal "There is currently considerable interest in
et al. 2000) of Operations and performance management"
Production
Management
(Evans 2004) Journal of Operations "The analysis of organizational performance is
Management one of the more challenging criteria
requirements for an organization to address"
(Folan and Computers in "performance is perceived as being an
Browne 2005) Industry increasingly important field of research for
both organizations and academics alike"
Table 2-2: Organizati nal performance definitions
Reference Definition
(Pugh, Hickson et An organization's success is defined in terms of it "reaching its
al. 1963) stated goals [and] could be considered in the usual terms of
profitability, productivity, adaptability, market standing, morale, and
so on"
(Etzioni 1964) Organization effectiveness is defined in terms of the degree to which
a specific organization realizes its goals.
(Yuchtman and Organization effectiveness is defined in terms of the organization's
Seashore 1967) "bargaining position, as reflected in the ability of the organization, in
either absolute or relative terms, to exploit its environment in the
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acquisition of scarce and valued resources"
(Van de Ven and "performance is a value judgment on the results desired from an
Ferry 1980) organization at different levels of analyses [and which] often change
over time"
(Quinn and Organizational effectiveness is a value-based judgment about the
Rohrbaugh 1981) performance of an organization.
(Reimann 1982) "the ultimate, long term criteria of organizational effectiveness are
growth and survival. Moreover, the organization's competence in
maintaining favorable energy flows with its environment is assumed
to lead to this long term effectiveness."
(Quinn and "Organizational effectiveness is not a concept. It is a socially
Rohrbaugh 1983) constructed, abstract notion carried about in the heads of
organizational theorists and researchers."
(Shrivastava "Organizational effectiveness is thus determined by the quality of the
1983) knowledge base available to the organization for making the crucial
strategic choices."
(Lebas 1995) Organizational performance is defined as the ability to deploy and
manage well the components that lead to the timely attainment of the
stated objectives within the constraints specific to the organization
and its context.
(Neely, Gregory "organizations achieve their goals, that is they perform, by satisfying
et al. 1995) their customers with greater efficiency and effectiveness than their
competitors"
(Porter 1996) "Operational effectiveness means performing similar activities better
than rivals perform them [and] includes but is not limited to
efficiency"
Throughout the same period several authors have expressed their dissatisfaction towards
research practices and the general principle of studying organizational performance.
In the late sixties authors noted that organizational effectiveness studies showed
inconsistencies, mostly due to different conceptions of the "organizational effectiveness"
construct, which made comparisons across studies difficult (Yuchtman and Seashore
1967). Whilst reviewing effectiveness studies done on institutions of higher education,
Kim Cameron (Cameron 1978) made an early important contribution to the wider
community in identifying specific reoccurring problems such as the existence of different
constituencies with different value perspectives, the different levels of analysis applied
(e.g. individual, group, organization), the applicability (e.g. organization specific versus
universal truths), the timeline (e.g. static versus dynamic), and the overreliance on
specific types of metrics (e.g. quantitative versus qualitative).
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In the late seventies authors called for improved methodologies to measure organizational
effectiveness given the predominance of single variable studies (Hitt and Middlemist
1979) and the persistent elusiveness of a widely shared definition of effectiveness (Quinn
and Rohrbaugh 1981). Moreover, authors expressed frustration at attempting to define
performance given that not many people agreed on what it meant (Lebas 1995) and, in
doing so, induced variable results stemming from researchers' individual value
perspectives which ignored trade-offs with other concepts that weren't selected (Quinn
and Rohrbaugh 1983). Ultimately, given such difficulties, some authors considered
fruitless the search for a universal theory of effectiveness and even called for a
moratorium on empirical research on effectiveness (Kanter and Brinkerhoff 1981;
Goodman, Atkin et al. 1983).
More recently authors have continued to recognize a prevalent strong interest in
researching organizational performance, but also that a vast array of results have been
published in different functional silos (Neely, Gregory et al. 1995; Marr and Schiuma
2003) which have produced duplicate and/or contradictory results (Folan and Browne
2005) and continued to generate controversy and confusion (Au 1996; Smith and
Goddard 2002).
The listing of organizational performance definitions, together with the associated
research issues mentioned previously, can be further explained in the context of a set of
theoretical perspectives that have emerged over time.
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Organizational Performance
There are several major approaches that researchers have developed and refined when
studying organizational performance.
The goal attainment approach is one where effectiveness is defined in terms of goal
attainment or the degree to which an organization attains internally defined goals (Perrow
1961; Etzioni 1964). This approach presents several challenges in that the researcher
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relies on statements made available by administrators, annual reports, or other types of
written documents, which may be misleading should the source be distorting, omitting, or
misrepresenting the real purpose of an organization (Katz and Kahn 1966). Additionally,
goal attainment may be difficult to establish where organizations have multiple and/or
intangible goals (Warner 1967) which further complicates any attempts to conduct
comparative analysis across organizations (Molnar and Rogers 1976). Furthermore, this
approach invariably assumes that organizations are capable of internally selecting
adequate objectives which reflect their underlying performance. Such an assumption is
prone to produce erroneous pictures of performance in that an acceptable performance
may indeed exist hidden under inadequately selected goals that haven't been met (Folan,
Browne et al. 2007). Conversely, an organization may be attaining its internally defined
goals, but these don't necessarily reflect what is demanded by the organization's external
environment, thus poor performance is present.
The systems resource approach focuses on the interaction between an organization and
its environment, whereby effectiveness is determined by the organization's ability to
acquire scarce and valued resources from the environment (Yuchtman and Seashore
1967). As such, the organizations that receive the greatest amount of resources from the
environment are the ones considered to be the most effective. For instance, organizations
are said to increase their effectiveness if they engage and exploit other organizations
through joint projects (Aiken and Hage 1968). The systems resource approach includes
by definition an open systems perspective when it recognizes that an organization's
performance cannot be measured independently of its environment (Katz and Kahn 1966).
An advantage of the systems resource approach over the goal approach is that the
researcher no longer has "to solve the problem of identifying the ultimate goals of
complex organizations" (Yuchtman and Seashore 1967).
The multiple constituency approach addresses a shortcoming of the goal and systems
resource approaches which directly or indirectly consider an organization's owner or its
top management as the most relevant constituency (Tsui 1990). Several variations of the
multiple constituency approach exist (Zammuto 1984), but the common argument made
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is that several other constituencies may be as relevant or even more important for an
organization, and that its effectiveness may depend on satisfying one or more of those
constituencies. Mitchell et al (Mitchell, Agle et al. 1997) provide a valuable and
extensive literature review on identifying and prioritizing amongst the multiple
stakeholders within as well as beyond the boundaries of an organization. The following
are illustrative quotes from two early influential authors cited in Mitchell et al:
"[stakeholders] are depending on the firm in order to achieve their personal goals and
on whom the firm is depending for its existence" (Rhenman 1964); "[stakeholders are]
any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the
organization's objectives" (Freeman 1984). Freeman offers a distinction between two
categories of stakeholders whereby generic stakeholders are considered common to most
organizations (e.g. customers, employees, managers, and owners) whereas specific
stakeholders may be relevant to only specific organizations (e.g. unions, consumer
advocates).
The reputational approach constitutes a specific stream of the multiple constituency
approach where organizational effectiveness is measured according to the reported
opinions of key individuals (e.g. clients, staff, service professionals) who are familiar
with the organization under consideration (Jobson and Schneck 1982).
The emergent approach is yet another stream following the multiple constituency
approach and it focuses on definitions of effectiveness which are created by the
individual or organizational actors involved, and are specific to a particular context as
well as capable of evolving so as to reflect stakeholder interactions (Forbes 1998; Dunn
2010).
2.3 Operationalizing Organizational Performance Assessments
So far in this chapter we have referred to key issues in operationalizing and studying the
results of different approaches used in organizational performance assessments. What
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follows is a more detailed description of these issues as well as published
recommendations to guide researchers in their organizational performance studies.
2.3.1 Multiple stakeholders
The multiple constituency approach proposes that researchers need to take into account
multiple stakeholders who reside within or beyond the boundaries of an organization. In
the context of a hospital for instance, hospital administration may be particularly
concerned with efficiency and financial performance, whereas patients may value access
to care, quality, cost effectiveness, and satisfaction, and in turn physicians may seek
better administrative service or financial support as their affiliated hospitals undergo
internal changes or renegotiate contracts with insurance companies (Bazzoli, Dynan et al.
2004). Understandably, the value expectations of the multiple stakeholders involved may
or not be aligned with one another (Lewin and Minton 1986), which poses a question to
both researchers and practitioners alike as to how organizational performance should be
operationalized.
A similar argument was discussed previously with regards to the goal attainment
approach whereby an individual organization may have multiple goals and it isn't clear to
begin with which goals are more relevant to assess performance. Some constituency
theorists suggest that relevant constituencies "can be derived logicallyfrom an analysis
of the organization's business, the industry in which it operates, its production technology,
and its external labor and legal environments" (Tsui 1990). One influential author
advocated a baseline value judgment of social responsibility where "every organization
must assume full responsibility for its impact on employees, the environment, customers,
and whomever and whatever it touches" (Drucker 1992). More broadly, other authors
proposed that the multiple constituency perspective should be used as a general research
frame (Wagner and Schneider 1987). Ultimately, Van de Ven and Ferry (Van de Ven and
Ferry 1980) shared in their seminal work in measuring and assessing organizations that
"consensus [on effectiveness goals, criteria, and standards] may be an unrealistic
euphemism to attempt to achieve" (p. 9) and that the researcher and/or organization
analyst should firstly identify and make explicit the unique and conflicting definitions of
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performance and then make an explicit decision on whose value judgments to
operationalize and measure.
2.3.2 Multiple levels of analysis
The development of the multiple-constituency approach together with open-systems
thinking brought to bear important considerations in terms of the adoption of multiple
levels of analyses when assessing organizational performance7 . To begin with an
organization is comprised of multiple internal (formal and informal) units which compete
for both internal and external scarce resources (Thompson 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik
1978). As such the results from each unit's efforts need to be described in terms that are
relevant to their work as opposed to being buried in high-level aggregated goals (Maskell
1991). For instance, global financial performance measures are considered too aggregate
and far removed to provide guidance or feedback on the decisions of lower-level
employees (Malina and Selto 2001). However, measuring the performance of individuals
such as knowledge workers can be particularly difficult (Groysberg, Lee et al. 2008).
Furthermore, in order to build a complete picture of an organization's performance one
needs to combine both a macro and micro view (Grover, Jeong et al. 1996). Moreover, it
has been suggested that an organization's success may well depend on the compatibility
between the performance measures used at the different levels of the organization
(Lockamy Iii and Spencer 1998).
2.3.3 Multiple dimensions of performance
More often than not the definition of a stakeholder's value expectation needs to be
translated into multiple dimensions in order for it to be adequately evaluated (Rouse and
Putterill 2003). Venkatraman and Ranujam (1986) provide a useful review of the strategy
research literature with regards to business performance measurement, and in particular
their Figure 2-1 situates the predominant scholarly conceptions on performance
dimensions (Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986).
7 Chapter 5 will describe at length our research design's methodological considerations concerning the use
of multiple levels of analyses
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Domain of
Financial
Performance
Domain of Financial
+ Operational Performance
(Business Performance)
Domain of Organizational
Effectiveness
Figure 2-1: Common dimensions used in business performance measurement studies (adapted from
(Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986))
The narrowest and most dominant conception of organizational performance relies on
simple outcome-based financial indicators (e.g. sales growth, earnings per share, return
on investment, etc) that supposedly reflect the attainment of an organization's goals. A
broader conceptualization of organizational performance includes the financial
performance indicators as well as non-financial operational indicators (e.g. product
quality, technology efficiency, marketing effectiveness, etc) that are thought to reflect
key factors that might lead to financial performance. The outer ring and broadest concept
is that of organizational effectiveness which includes the two previous concepts and
recognizes the existence and importance of the multiple stakeholder values previously
discussed (e.g. a value proposition beyond financials and/or a single entity). A similar
conceptual framing can be observed from our review of other disciplines.
Traditional accounting performance measures relied exclusively on financial indicators
for two primary reasons (Maskell 1991). First, organizations need a common
denominator to allow for comparability across diverse product portfolios and multiple
production facilities. The second reason embodied the preference for objective criteria
and the assumption that an aggregated financial measure was capable of reflecting
multiple changes and/or strategies being implemented simultaneously within an
organization. Additionally more recent studies have noted that traditional financial
measures of performance are most useful in conditions of greater certainty and low
complexity (Malina and Selto 2001).
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Over time as the conceptualization of organizational performance became broader so did
the criticism of traditional performance measures drawn from accounting. The use of
financial measures is said to induce managers with myopic and short-term behavior that
jeopardize long term strategy and potential performance (Banks and Wheelwright 1979).
Long standing incumbents who mostly rely on financial measures are particularly prone
to ignore important qualitative data such as customer satisfaction and miss warnings of
incoming market shifts (Miller 1993). Similarly, organizations may be unable to
accommodate knowledge-based strategies such as human capital enhancement given that
these are inadequately recorded as current expenses (Malina and Selto 2001). Conversely,
others persist with the opinion that organizations exist for the sole purpose of long term
value maximization and that such benefits should be reported in financial terms (Jensen
2001). Finally, some authors warned that narrow financial reporting practices required by
external agencies, were in fact also driving the way organizations internally managed
themselves (Hayes and Abernathy 1980).
Having recognized the inherent limitations of adopting a one-dimensional view of
organizational performance, authors began developing performance frameworks which
allowed for a financial dimension as well as other key dimensions. For instance,
organizational culture began undertaking a more central role in studies aimed at
improving organizational effectiveness (Wilkins and Ouchi 1983). Three of the most well
known performance measurement frameworks are the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and
Norton 1993), the European Foundation for Quality Management Excellence Model, and
the Malcolm Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence. Such frameworks are
described as being able to provide a more balanced view of organizational performance
and to that effect include non-financial, external, and future looking performance
measures, together with the financial, internal, and past performance measures (Bourne,
Mills et al. 2000). In a way one could argue that the development of performance
frameworks followed the theoretical maturation process from the goal attainment and
systems resource approaches towards the multiple-constituency approach whereby
8 For a useful condensed literature review on the major inadequacies of traditional accounting measures
please refer to Bhasin, S. (2008). "Lean and performance measurement." Journal of Manufacturing
Technology Management 19(5): 670.
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different stakeholders can be, if needed, represented by entirely different performance
dimensions. However, as with the difficulties introduced with increasing the number of
stakeholders considered, the proliferation of frameworks has rendered impossible any
attempt to develop a single framework for performance measurement (Rouse and Putterill
2003).
2.3.4 Towards a theory of organizational performance
Despite the strong interest in the organizational effectiveness construct the scientific
community has struggled with attaining a widely shared definition of what it means and
even though several multidimensional frameworks have addressed some of the key
difficulties, these have nonetheless also introduced variants of the same problems they
were trying to address. Moreover, a baseline variation persists in the selection of the
previously described theoretical approaches (or some variation thereof) which different
researchers adopt to guide their evaluations of organizational effectiveness (Campbell
1977; Reimann 1982). Furthermore, performance measurement frameworks or scorecards
don't in themselves define the best strategy for an organization to adopt (Bhasin 2008)
and aren't necessarily rooted on any particular management practice (Chang 2007).
Nonetheless consensus has been established insofar as organizational effectiveness isn't a
singular tangible attribute to be agreed upon, but rather a theory about the performance of
organizations (Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1981). For instance, the multiple-constituency
perspective was proposed as a general research frame to guide studies in organizational
performance (Wagner and Schneider 1987), as have been other broader concepts such as
continuous improvement management philosophies (e.g. total quality management, lean,
lean enterprises).
Drucker (1994) proposed that every organization has a "theory of the business" which
embodies the assumptions that shape its behavior, determines what decisions to do or not
to do, and establishes what constitute meaningful results. Also, the performance
measurement literature generally converges on the recommendation that an
organization's performance measurement criteria should match its strategy and vision
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(Globerson 1985; Maskell 1991; Wisner and Fawcett 1991; Kaplan and Norton 1993;
Bourne, Mills et al. 2000; Folan, Browne et al. 2007). However, in our literature review
we also identified limitations inherent in evaluating performance using solely the criteria
set forth by a particular organization (i.e. goal attainment perspective). Consequently, the
literature recommends that researchers avoid situation specific performance criteria, and
instead adopt a theory of organizational performance which includes general criteria that
may be studied repeatedly from organization to organization, although requiring different
operationalizations depending on each organization's context (Quinn and Rohrbaugh
1981). Hence, in the context of this research, becoming a lean hospital enterprise is
proposed as a "theory of the business" which reflects general lean enterprise principles,
and is assumed to enable a hospital to reach higher performance. This assumption is
supported in our in-depth literature review presented in the next section where both
traditional lean and the latest lean enterprise thinking are examined in detail.
Next we intend to analyze these best practices of organizational performance but before
doing so it may be useful to remind ourselves of two observations made by influential
scholars. The first one was drawn earlier and from the narrower theoretical construct of
individual motivation, but provides relevant insight nonetheless: "a dismal ratio of
knowledge to speculation [exists and yet it doesn't dampen] the enthusiasm for new
forms of snake oil that are constantly coming on the market, many of them with academic
testimonials" (Herzberg 1968). The second observation is more recent and was made in
the context of organizational performance research: "Even though almost everyone knows
that the emperor has no clothes, few people talk about that fact, and many of the same
people who note the emperor's nakedness nevertheless discuss the tailoring of his suits"
(March and Sutton 1997).
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2.4 Lean Enterprise Principles
Drucker (1994) proposed that every organization has a theory of the business which
embodies the assumptions that shape its behavior, determines what decisions to do or not
to do, and establishes what constitute meaningful results. Similarly, Grant (1996) noted
that such theories of the firm are predicated on initial premises which form the basis of
propositions concerning a firm's structure, behavior, and performance. Moreover, a
theory, or philosophy, provides an overall vision which encompasses various best
practices that help guide an organization's redesign efforts (Glasgow, Goldstein et al.
2004; Reijers and Liman Mansar 2005). Notably, becoming a "Lean Enterprise" is a
theory which has been increasingly recognized as an important strategy to attain critical
strategic goals (Nightingale 2002).
Determining what constitutes a Lean Enterprise, or any theory of the business, may sound
deceptively simple but it involves several years of empirical experimentation before
reaching a clear, consistent, and valid theory for a given organization (Drucker 1994).
Along those lines, leading enterprise scholars have recognized that they are currently
capable "at best [to] cite heuristics and emerging principles on how enterprises should
be architected [so that they] can most effectively produce its desired outcome" (Rhodes
and Nightingale 2008). As such, in this section we first examine the general meaning of
best practices and principles, as well as some of their potential issues and how to mitigate
them. Our improved understanding of best practices and principles prompts us to
examine the literature in terms of the origins of traditional lean and how it progressed
towards the systems thinking approach of lean enterprises. To that effect we first examine
the traditional definitions of lean including its baseline principles and tools as developed
by Toyota. Additionally, we capture several lists of best practices suggested by different
authors on how to attain higher performance. Next we provide evidence of common lean
failures documented in the manufacturing literature. Finally we examine the emerging
lean enterprise principles stemming from MIT's Lean Advancement Initiative empirical
research, which arguably represents the latest development in lean thinking, and conduct
an in-depth literature analysis to bolster their theoretical underpinning.
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2.4.1 "Best Practice" definitions, issues, and recommendations
The term "best-practice" is akin to Taylor's management philosophy of finding the "one
best way" whereby a research field may strive to integrate large bodies of evidence
spanning multiple decades (Peters and Heron 1993) to enable a researcher (or
practitioner) to pick the best or the most successful practices independent of an
organization's particular context (Overman and Boyd 1994). When sifting through the
literature one often finds the assertion that best practices have commonly produced
bandwagon effects (Peters and Heron 1993; Abrahamson 1996; Benner and Tushman
2003) as organizations embrace the practices of highly visible companies in their given
market (or indeed across markets) with incomplete but convincing enough results that
may ultimately lead to ineffective or even harmful outcomes (Benner and Tushman 2003).
As a result a recommendation was made that best practices be subject to more scholarly
investigation (Bardach 1987).
Tasked with finding a common definition of best practice in the extant literature, Peter
and Heron (1993) neither found one nor did they come across any explicit criteria used in
identifying and/or determining best practices. As such, the same authors proposed that in
order to establish powerful and useful best practices, these must not only be the product
of expert opinion, but also have empirical support as well as some underpinning with
existing literature on that practice or related practices. Expert opinion, or that of leaders
in a given field, although useful is said to be insufficient as it only provides face validity
and may give rise to different opinions reflecting different guesses or values whilst
potentially supported by biased data. In some cases a value judgment precedes the need
for empirical support as with social justice, civil rights, and social access as these don't
depend on the power of a piece of evidence presented. Finally, the authors also note that
just like practitioners shouldn't mistake expert opinion as proof, they equally shouldn't
consider correlational evidence on its own as a cause-effect relationship.
Other recommendations concern the dissemination of best practices so that these aren't
derived with a "one best way" in mind but rather with an awareness of prevailing
conditions so that the proposed best practices may be adapted to each context (Reijers
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and Liman Mansar 2005) and in essence following "principles" that provide meaning and
direction (Bardach 1987). Similarly, Womack and Jones (1994) noted that principles
regulating value stream behavior will necessarily vary with the nature of the product (or
service) and the degree of familiarity amongst collaborating organizations. Yet another
conditioning contextual factor may be the particular phase an organization is going
through (e.g. start up vs. legacy) (Quinn and Cameron 1983) which may have a direct
effect on the relevance of a best practice. Lastly it is important to note that although the
operationalization of a principle may vary from one organizational context to the next,
such does not inhibit comparisons across studies as the principles themselves can be
studied repeatedly (Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1981).
With these recommendations in mind we next turn to the literature to examine the origins
of traditional lean and how it progressed towards the systems thinking approach of lean
enterprises.
2.4.2 The origins of lean
In the 90s, faced with a turbulent and challenging environment in the US automotive
industry, researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) studied at length
52 assembly plants in 14 countries over a five year period to explore the significant
performance gap between Japanese and Western automotive organizations (Womack,
Jones et al. 1990). They coined the term lean9 when describing their finding that Japanese
companies had a manufacturing system in place that built greater customer loyalty and
strived for continuous quality improvement and doing so at a lower cost. Several well
referenced volumes have been published where the origins of lean are already described
at length (Womack, Jones et al. 1990; Murman, Allen et al. 2002; Womack, Jones et al.
2003). Our purpose in this subsection is to provide a synthesis of the key lean principles
and tools set forth by Toyota whilst referring to several publications including one of the
earliest of its kind published by Toyota experts themselves (Sugimori, Kusunoki et al.
9 The term was coined by John Krafcik who was an MIT research assistant at the International Motor
Vehicle Program in the late 1980s and at the time of writing this thesis is the president and chief executive
officer of Hyundai Motor America.
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1977).
Jeffery Liker is an influential author who has studied and written extensively about the
success of the Toyota automotive company. On one of the author's earlier writings
Toyota's lean Production System (TPS) is described as "a philosophy that when
implemented reduces the time from customer order to delivery by eliminating sources of
waste in the production flow" (Liker 1997).
One of the earliest definitions of waste (or muda in Japanese) represented "anything other
than the minimum amount of equipment, materials, parts, and workers (working time)
which are absolutely essential to production are merely surplus that only raises the cost"
(Sugimori, Kusunoki et al. 1977). Subsequent refinement specified that waste constituted
any activity that added cost while not adding value as perceived by end-use customers
(Ohno 1988) where the end-use customer was not necessarily the entity who paid for a
product. Focusing on eliminating waste and adding value to customers became a common
reference for engineers tasked with improving processes (Liker and Morgan 2006). There
are seven types of waste most commonly referred to (Nightingale 2004), namely: over
production; waiting; transporting; inappropriate processing; unnecessary inventory;
excess motion; defects. Examples of these wastes include items that no one wants, costly
processes which aren't needed, employees/goods being transported without any purpose,
or people waiting to carry-out a downstream activity because an upstream activity has not
completed on time.
The benefits most commonly attributed to lean implementations (Bicheno 2004; Liker
2004; Womack and Jones 2005) include shorter cycle/lead times, faster response times,
less work in process, lower costs, higher quality, increased profits, and improved
customer service.
The first lean principles to be singled out (in equal measure) by Toyota experts were just-
in-time production (JIT) and respect for the human system (Sugimori, Kusunoki et al.
1977) and both were only focused at the process level. JIT was considered an especially
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important factor as it only manufactured the necessary products, at the necessary time,
and in the necessary quantity, which allowed for stock levels to be held at a minimum in
order to hold processes together. In order for JIT to work the authors list three key
requirements. Firstly, rather than a preceding process pushing its output onto the next
process, the following process pulls the parts from the preceding process, thus allowing
for processes to quickly attain accurate knowledge of timing and quantities required
without the need of issuing lengthy production orders to each process. Secondly, each
process produces only one piece at a time (i.e. small lot production), conveys one piece at
a time, and needs to be standardized. Thirdly, production must be leveled (or heijunka in
Japanese) so as to avoid either keeping preceding processes at peak capacity or building
excessive inventory.
The respect for the human system consisted in allowing workers to "display in full their
capabilities through active participation in running and improving their own
workshops "1 (Sugimori, Kusunoki et al. 1977). Moreover, it was understood that "the
only way to motivate the employee is to give him [or her] challenging work in which he
[or she] can assume responsibility" (Herzberg 1968). The full utilization of workers'
capabilities was particularly present in three ways. Firstly, unnecessary movement and/or
waiting of workers were eliminated by lessening supervision where possible and by
training workers to operate multiple machines. Secondly, worker safety was a priority
thus operations requiring hard physical and repetitive labor became mechanized and
automated. Thirdly, workers were empowered to stop equipment whenever they detected
an abnormal or defective part (i.e. called jidoka in Japanese). Jidoka prevented
unnecessarily making faulty parts and readily identified a problem area that needed fixing.
The two lean principles taken together comprise Toyota's production control system (i.e.
Kanban System) whereby workshops no longer needed to rely on a costly electronic
computer capable of production scheduling and real time monitoring/adjustment of both
the suppliers and assembly line (Sugimori, Kusunoki et al. 1977). However, in order for
o Please note that workshop in this context has the semantic connotation of a manufacturing cell where an
employee works on a given activity
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the Kanban System to work employees had to establish responsibility systems and engage
in spontaneous continuous improvement activities (or Kaizen in Japanese).
While striving towards upholding its principles Toyota uses several lean tools which
receive different levels of attention in the literature. Four lean tools that are frequently
highlighted are visual control, five Ss, value stream maps, and the problem solving A3
report:
* Visual control requires that all work be easily visible and thus manageable by
sight. As such, visual barriers should be removed whenever possible (e.g. closed
cabinets, walls, etc). The absence of unnecessary visual barriers also enables
easier access to resources (e.g. people, inventory). Furthermore, visual control
may also use on wall displays with trend charts, schedules, and troubleshooting of
known problems.
" Five S's is a lean tool that facilitates teamwork (Liker 2004) and helps organize a
workplace (Emiliani and Stec 2005). The tool's name is derived from five
Japanese words (i.e. seiri, seiton, seiso, seiketsu and shitsuke) which have been
translated into English in different ways by different authors. One version is sort,
stabilize, shine, standardize, and sustain (Liker 2004). The last 's' of sustainment
requires that the previous four 's's be in place.
" Value stream maps (VSM) represent the key people, material, and information
flows to deliver a product or service (Jimmerson, Weber et al. 2005) whereby
each step is characterized as non-value added, value added, or non-value added
but needed (Nightingale 2004).
" The Problem-Solving A3 Report fits in a single sheet of paper and includes
descriptions of a problem (from the customer's perspective), of the current
procedures (using a simplified VSM), of the specific root causes of the problem,
of a desired target condition to eliminate the problem (using a simplified VSM),
and an implementation plan with specific responsibilities and deadlines assigned
to individuals. The use of a single sheet dictates that problems must be small and
thus allow for rapid improvement.
Page 57 of 759
2.4.3 Proliferation of best practices lists for organizational
performance
The strong interest in the origins of lean gave rise to multiple lean best practices being
submitted by different authors in their attempt to explain Toyota's higher performance. In
general a trend exists whenever best practices are sought in that multiple differing lists of
guidelines are submitted with "obvious discrepancies [...] relative to the way in which
practices are characterized and to the degree of specificity used to describe defining
variables" (Peters and Heron 1993).
Our longitudinal literature review on higher performance inducing best practices reveals
a similar assessment. Ten influential publications with a combined citation count over
6000 were selected, and analyzed in terms of the best practices recommended for
organizations wishing to become lean and/or attain higher performance (see Figure 2-2).
Please note that unless indicated, we refrained from replicating detailed descriptions
should an author include a best practice we have previously described at length.
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Hackman and Oldham (1980)" suggested that organizations should follow five key
principles to attain higher performance, namely:
* Skill variety: workers should acquire different skills and apply them in different
tasks (e.g. quality, inventory management, fitting, etc).
* Task identity: the group task should be a meaningful piece of work which
provides a sense of a whole task being completed (i.e. seeing a finished product).
* Task significance: the outcome of the group's work has an impact on
others .inside and outside the organization.
* Autonomy: workers have substantial latitude in determining together how the
work is to be completed including timing and methods used.
" Feedback: workers should be able to trust and comprehend real time information
on how well they are doing their tasks and how they can improve.
Hanna (1988)1 suggested that organizations should redesign their work practices
according to the following six characteristics:
e Multiskills: workers should be skilled in more than one function to allow for
system flexibility (e.g. the same function can be performed by different workers).
* Variance control: workers are considered the first line of defense to detect
deviations from the ideal process at the point where they originate.
* Boundary location: interdependent roles (e.g. knowledge) should be placed within
the same departmental boundaries.
" Information flow: information systems should enable information at the point of
action and problem solving as opposed to merely supporting hierarchical authority.
* Support congruence: an organization's social system needs to reinforce desired
behaviors via rewards, hiring practices, training, and structure, so that these are
congruent with the basic work design and group structures in place.
* Design and human values: a high performing organization provides for its
workers high quality of work life and individual fulfillment.
3611 citations on google scholar as of 15 th September 2010
12 159 citations on google scholar as of 15th September 2010
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Wisner and Fawcett (1991)13 suggested that world-class manufacturers share four
characteristics:
* Long term preference: emphasis on long term factors over short term profitability
* High quality products: develop competitive advantage by producing higher
quality products whilst remaining innovative, flexible, and cheap.
* Continuous improvement: sustain competitive advantage through relentless
pursuit of continuous improvement at process and product levels.
* Training: fully integrate workforce into all aspects of the manufacturing process
Buenger, Daft et al. (1996)14 suggest that higher performing organizations are capable of
balancing the following four competing values:
* Human relations value: develop high morale among unit members and provide
them with the opportunity for growth and development, and ensure that everyone
gets along well with each other.
* Open systems value: enable flexibility to adapt to new demands and/or
organizational changes on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis.
* Internal process value: work should be organized and predictable so as to achieve
maximum efficiency at all times while minimizing disruptions and exerting
control over workers and activities.
* Rational goal value: motivate workers to innovate and improve their work
practices.
LAI (1996) developed the Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) which suggests the following
six core principles:
* Waste minimization: the elimination of non-value added activities is the ultimate
goal of a lean organization as it reduces the time and resources required to
produce a product or service that delivers value to the customer.
* Responsiveness to change: organizations need to be able to respond to market
opportunities so as to produce their product or service when needed.
13 120 citations on google scholar as of 15th September 2010
14 80 citations on google scholar as of 15th September 2010
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* Right thing at the right place, right time, and in the right quantity: every
organizational function should perform as needed to meet customer demands.
* Effective relationships within the value stream: efficient organizations require
mutual trust and respect, information sharing, and open and honest
communication throughout entire value chain (e.g. employees, customers,
suppliers, and partners).
" Continuous improvement: the organization as a whole should seek to
continuously improve towards perfection.
e Quality from the beginning: schedules and continuous improvement expectations
need to be balanced with building quality from the beginning.
Womack and Jones (1996)15 suggest that high performing lean organizations follow five
principles:
" Value: value is product specific and defined from the end-customer's perspective
(i.e. product delivered at the right time and at the appropriate price).
* The value stream: identify every step needed for each product family and
eliminate waste whenever a step doesn't create value.
* Flow: value creating steps should take place in tight sequence so that value flows
smoothly to the customer.
* Pull: allow the customer to pull value from the next upstream activity as required
as opposed to pushing product to customer.
* Perfection: lean is a never ending process which continuously seeks perfection
through the elimination of waste so that every value stream step creates value.
Murman, Allen et al (2002)16 suggest that high performing lean organizations follow five
principles:
* Create lean value by doing the right job right and by doing the right job
* Deliver value only after identifying stakeholder value and constructing robust
value propositions
15 1436 citations on google scholar as of 15th September 20 10
16 114 citations on google scholar as of 15th September 2010
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* Fully realize lean value only by adopting an enterprise perspective
* Address the interdependencies across enterprise levels to increase lean value
* People, not just processes, effectuate lean value
Liker (2004)"1 has arguably written the best-selling book series on Toyota and proposed
that Toyota derives its higher performance from applying the following 14 principles:
* Base your management decisions on a long-term philosophy, even at the expense
of short-term goals: grow and align the organization towards a common purpose
that is greater than making money and generates value to all stakeholders.
* Create a continuous process flow to bring problems to the surface.
* Use "pull" systems to avoid overproduction.
* Level out the workload (heijunka). (Work like the tortoise, not the hare)
* Build a culture of stopping to fix problems, to get quality right the first time.
* Standardized tasks and processes are the foundation for continuous improvement
and employee empowerment.
* Use visual control so no problems are hidden.
* Use only reliable, thoroughly tested technology that serves your people and
processes: the introduction of technology should be to support people rather than
to replace them. New technologies should be tested and rejected if not aligned
with company culture or if likely to disrupt stability and predictability.
* Grow leaders who thoroughly understand the work, live the philosophy, and teach
it to others: grow leaders from within rather than getting them from the outside,
and have them be role models in embracing the organization's philosophy.
e Develop exceptional people and teams who follow your company's philosophy:
create a stable and strong culture that supports the company values and beliefs,
and implement cross functional teams to improve quality and productivity.
* Respect your extended network of partners and suppliers by challenging them and
helping them improve: respect your partners and consider them as an extension of
your business.
17 487 citations on google scholar as of 15th September 2010
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e Go and see for yourself to thoroughly understand the situation: don't rely on
computers or on second hand information and instead personally verify data to
solve problems and improve processes
* Make decisions slowly by consensus, thoroughly considering all options;
implement decision rapidly: avoid moving down a particular path without having
first identified other alternatives. Once a path is chosen move quickly.
* Become a learning organization through relentless reflection and continuous
improvement: with a stable process in place (e.g. standardize best practices; slow
promotions) leverage continuous improvement and eliminate waste.
Bhasin and Burcher (2006)18 propose that organizations aspiring to become lean should
implement "most, if not all, of the following":
* Continuous improvement / Kaizen
e Cellular manufacturing
* Kanban system
* Single piece flow
* Process mapping of order fulfillment process
* Single minute exchange of dies in order to reduce the lead-time and improve
flows
* Step change (kaikaku in Japanese): make radical activity improvement to
eliminate waste
* Supplier development: develop close links with suppliers for mutual benefit
* Supplier base reduction
* Five S's and general visual management
* Total productive maintenance
* Value and the seven wastes: value should never be ignored and should be
delivered to the customer at the right time and at an appropriate price as defined
by the customer in each case
18 70 citations on google scholar as of 15th September 2010
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Oppenheim (2009) proposes that organizations adopt six principles in order to become
lean, and essentially offers the same five principles from Womack and Jones (1996) and
revisits the human respect principle we referred to earlier (Sugimori, Kusunoki et al.
1977):
* Value Principle
* Value Stream Principle
" Flow Principle
e Pull Principle
e Perfection Principle
" Respect-for-People Principle
2.4.4 Understanding lean failures
The expected benefit of implementing lean was that organizations could function with
"with half or less of the human effort, space, tools, time, and overall expense" (Womack
and Jones 1994). However, several authors have reported that lean often fails to deliver
on those expected benefits (Skinner 1986; Fry and Cox 1989; Garvin 1991; Corboy and
O'Corrbui 1999; Repenning and Sterman 2001; Baker 2002; Chalice 2005; Emiliani and
Stec 2005). The following list includes the most common explanations identified in the
literature.
Disregard for organizational context
Some authors argue that one should not draw correlations from the automotive industry
to other industries as there are fundamental differences in conditions (Adler and Cole
1993). Other authors advocate that organizational leaders should rely on Toyota's
principles as a starting point and develop principles that are right for their own
organization (Liker 2004). Organizational idiosyncrasies commonly include corporate
culture and human capabilities such as teamwork, leadership, and problem solving
(Bhasin and Burcher 2006). An often quoted example is that of General Motors who went
through a very slow and painful process in implementing lean because it lacked Toyota's
tacit knowledge and deeply culturally embedded routines (Grant 1996).
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Narrow lean implementation scope
Most studies that report organizational improvements from lean implementations exhibit
a typical focus in only one part of their business, namely operations (Emiliani and Stec
2005), also referred to as individual silos (Allen, Nightingale et al. 2004), instead of
adopting a broader mindset beyond the 'shop floor' and across the whole enterprise
(Murman, Allen et al. 2002). Such is akin to the organizational performance assessment
issues we previously highlighted in terms of the multiple levels of analysis. Furthermore,
most organizations tend to narrowly focus on a few lean tools applied to the process level
and typically exhibit the simplistic approach of identifying a repetitive process to
improve, subsequently conducting a VSM to identify waste in current-state and eliminate
it in future-state, eventually implementing the desired changes, and celebrating success
(Liker and Morgan 2006). However, as per the section on the origins of lean, lean
upholds different principles and relies on multiple tools which function together as a
system (see Figure 2-3). Should one of the house pillars and/or foundations weaken, the
system as a whole could become compromised. Moreover, "lean is not so much about the
individual principles and practices, but their effective integration and application to meet
the pull of customer demand, whether it be an external or an internal customer"
(Nightingale 2002). Similarly, Porter (1996) notes that a competitor gains little by merely
imitating some activities and not matching the whole. Finally, as Drucker (1995)
succinctly put it: "What is important is not the tools. It is the concepts behind them."
Best Quality - Lowest Cost - Shortest Lead Time - Best Safety - High Morale
through shortening the production flow by eliminating waste
Just-In-Time People & Teamwork JdkJust-In-Time id
Right pat, right amount, In-station uali
right time" "Stop to FLX Problems"
Reduce Continuous ImprovementReduce
in ven Make problems
surface p easte Reduction
Makeopoblem
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Figure 2-3: The Toyota Production System House (Liker and Morgan 2006)
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Disregard for the principle "respect-for the human system"
Early observations made by US lean experts implied that lean implementations meant
layoffs given that "lean immediately creates large numbers of excess workers and then
continuously reduces the amount of effort needed [and that jobs reduction was] a major
obstacle confronting any enterprise that is trying to make a performance leap" (Womack
and Jones 1994). However, layoffs due to productivity improvement were later
reassessed as a violation of lean's basic principle of "respectfor the human system" as
evidenced in diminished productivity improvements resulting from the remaining
people's unwillingness to participate in future improvement activities (Emiliani and Stec
2005). In fact, the assimilation of Toyota's Way implies a greater dependence on people,
not less (Liker 2004), as organizations rely on their employees to identify hidden
problems, reduce inventory, and fix problems. To that effect Drucker (1992) went as far
as advocating that every organization should assume full responsibility for its impact on
employees and not simply routinely say that people are our greatest asset. Such is akin to
the organizational performance assessment issues we previously highlighted in terms of
the existence of multiple stakeholders.
Disregard for enterprise strategy and inadequate performance measures
The disregard for enterprise strategy in the planning and execution of lean initiatives is
similar to the issue of narrow implementation scopes we just described. Porter (1996)
acknowledges that lean production has allowed for significant improvements in
manufacturing productivity and asset utilization, as managers became focused on
eliminating inefficiencies, improving customer satisfaction, and achieving best practice.
However, the author also warns that organizational effectiveness alone is insufficient for
companies to remain successful, and that they should first and foremost concern
themselves with their strategic positioning. Furthermore, often times traditional
accounting methods are inappropriately used in quantifying the benefits of lean as these
aren't always obvious (Womack and Jones 2005; Bhasin 2008). Such is akin to the
organizational performance assessment issues we previously highlighted in terms of the
multiple dimensions of performance.
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2.4.5 Understanding the lean enterprise and its core principles
Considering the previous subsection's highlighted factors it is understandable that most
organizations claiming to be implementing lean aren't really doing so (Bhasin 2008) and
that more often than not they implemented only a few tools and attended some classes
(Liker and Morgan 2006). To that effect lean experts offered broader definitions of lean
as it being "customer focused, continually improved through waste reduction, and tightly
integrated with upstream and downstream processes as part of a lean value chain" (Liker
and Morgan 2006).
Broader and clearer yet is the definition set forth by MIT's Lean Advancement Initiative
(LAI), namely that "a lean enterprise is an integrated entity that efficiently creates value
for its multiple stakeholders by applying lean enterprise principles and practices"
(Murman, Allen et al. 2002). This definition clearly adopts an enterprise perspective (i.e.
beyond process) and one which accounts for the existence of multiple stakeholders for
who value should be created and delivered (i.e. beyond a single customer and beyond
mere waste elimination). The same definition was more recently refined to include both
efficiency and effectiveness as follows: "An integrated entity that efficiently and
effectively creates value for its multiple stakeholders by employing lean principles and
practices" (Nightingale 2009). Notably the term Lean Enterprise had surfaced as early as
the mid 90's (Womack and Jones 1994) and the existence of multiple stakeholders
beyond any individual organization was recognized. However, at the time the proponents
of the term assumed that a Lean Enterprise implied the existence of a clear team leader
capable of unifying the enterprise towards a single customer, whereas the more recent
definition doesn't necessarily assume that one predominant stakeholder exists and, more
importantly determines that the enterprise should deliver value beyond a single end-
customer.
Becoming a lean enterprise has increasingly been recognized as an important enterprise
strategy to attain critical goals (Nightingale 2002) which attends to the concern of having
in place a mindset of both strategy and operational effectiveness (Porter 1996) and
ultimately enables organizations with their business theory (Drucker 1994). Nightingale
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(2009) presented the Seven Principles of Enterprise Thinking which leverage MIT's Lean
Advancement Initiative expert opinion, extensive empirical research and previous
publications, as follows:
1- Adopt a holistic approach to enterprise transformation: a holistic approach is
recommended at three levels. Firstly, organizations should find the balance between short
term success and achieving long term enterprise level benefits. Secondly, organizations
should avoid merely achieving islands ofsuccess and adopt an enterprise level lens.
Thirdly, organizations should look at their processes and beyond, namely strategy,
organization, knowledge, information technology, service/product architecture, and
external factors.
2- Identify relevant stakeholders and determine their value propositions: this principle
stems from LAI's Lean Enterprise definition which accounts for the existence of multiple
stakeholders for who value should be created and delivered (i.e. beyond a single customer
and beyond mere waste elimination). Enterprises should identify what each of their
stakeholders value, determine the value being delivered both by the enterprise to the
stakeholders and vice-versa.
3- Focus on enterprise effectiveness before efficiency: this principle warns of traditional
lean approaches that only seek process efficiency and in doing so may run counter to a
desired or needed strategy. As such enterprises should focus on "doing the right thing"
before "doing it right".
4- Address internal and external enterprise interdependencies: when analyzing
transformation efforts enterprises are advised to consider what they control and influence,
as well as what constraints they have. The desired transformation sets the scope to be
considered part of the enterprise boundary, and the enterprise needs to address the
interdependencies both internally and externally. Particular attention is recommended at
the boundaries of the enterprise as these may hold the greatest room for improvement.
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5- Ensure stability and flow within and across the enterprise: enterprise stability is
desired so that an enterprise may understand its current state and form a baseline for
improvement. At the enterprise level informational flow is the most significant entity,
rather than material flow. It is important to see end-to-end value delivery (i.e. within and
across the enterprise) in order to identify focal points for improving value delivery to key
stakeholders.
6- Cultivate leadership to support and drive enterprise behaviors: this principle
emphasizes the importance of communicating strategy across the various enterprise levels
and recommends to that effect that enterprises nurture grass root leadership who are
committed to the enterprise's mission and also financially support ongoing improvement
activities.
7- Emphasize organizational learning: this principle embodies the continuous
experimentation and knowledge gain at all levels of the enterprise with both top-down
and bottom-up orientation. A key aspect is that the enterprise as a whole must be able to
learn and benefit from localized improvement efforts, so that it in turn may improve the
effectiveness of the improvement efforts undertaken.
2.4.6 Theoretically bolstering LAI's Lean Enterprise Principles
At the beginning of this section we described the literature's assessment that proposed
best practices commonly lack the benefit of scholarly research and have produced at
times bandwagon effects which led to ineffective or even harmful outcomes. Then we
further identified how studies have negatively characterized the proliferation of best
practices lists, and we gave evidence that the same could be observed in the realm of best
practices for organizational performance. It is our opinion that the Lean Enterprise
Principles represent the latest development in lean thinking, and in line with that, they
were presented in 2009 at MIT's Engineering Systems Division 2 "d International
Symposium on Engineering Systems. Nonetheless we also value the earlier
recommendations we noted on how to establish powerful and useful best practices,
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namely that these must not only be the product of expert opinion, but also have empirical
support as well as some underpinning with existing literature on that practice or related
practices. Hence, what follows is the result of an in-depth literature analysis that bolsters
the theoretical underpinning of LAI's proposed Lean Enterprise Principles.
2.4.6.1 Literature review supporting Lean Enterprise Principles
Table 2-3 includes a total of 67 publications that span across different disciplines and
range from as early as 1958 to 200919. Some of the Lean Enterprise Principles could
arguably have a list of thousands of articles as their concepts have been independently
developed in multiple fields. For instance, principle 2 concerns the identification of
relevant stakeholders and determining their value propositions, which can be traced to the
established theory of stakeholders (Freeman 1984; Mitchell, Agle et al. 1997) and has
prominently featured in several masters and doctoral level theses (Davidz 2006; Stanke
2006; Haddad 2008; Sgouridis 2008; Glazner 2009).
Table 2-3: Literature review supporting Lean Enterprise Principles
Decade Reference Lean Enterprise Paper
Princi ale(s)
172 3 4 5 6 7
50s (March, Simon et al. 1958) X Org theory
60s (Drucker 1963) X Strategy
(Perrow 1967) X X Org theory
(Herzberg 1968) X Management
(Skinner 1969) 1 X I Manufacturing
70s (Miles, Snow et al. 1974) X Org theory
(Etzioni 1975) X Org theory
(Shortell 1976) X Healthcare
(Sugimori, Kusunoki et al. X X Lean
1977)
80s (Hayes and Abernathy 1980) X Management
(Van de Ven and Ferry 1980) XOr theo
(Iii and Leifer 1983) X Org theory
(Shrivastava 1983) X Org theory
(Freeman 1984) X Org theory
(Schein 1985) X Org theory
(Skinner 1986) X Manufacturing
19 For a detailed list of excerpts from each reference in Table 2-3 please refer to Appendix I
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Reference Lean Enterprise
Principle(s)
Paper
(Donabedian 1988) X X Healthcare
(Drucker 1989) X Strategy
(Fawcett 1989) X Lean
(Fry and Cox 1989) X X Perf.
measurement
(Ragin 1989) X X Research method
(Berwick 1989) X Healthcare
I (Venkatraman 1989) lX 11111
(Tsui 1990)
Strategy
Perf.
measurement
(Wisner and Fawcett 1991) X X Perf.
measurement
(Meyer, Tsui et al. 1993) X Org theory
(Ostroff and Schmitt 1993) X Org theory
(Peters and Heron 1993) X Best practice
theory
(Drucker 1994) X - X I X Strategy
(Fjortoft and Smart 1994) X Org theory
(Flood 1994) X Healthcare
(Womack and Jones 1994) X X X Lean
(Clarkson 1995) X Stakeholder
theory
(Denison and Mishra 1995) X Org theory
(Drucker 1995) X Strategy
(Neely, Gregory et al. 1995) X X Perf.
measurement
(Grant 1996) X X X Org theory
(Porter 1996) X X X X X Strategy
(Womack and Jones 1996) X X X X Lean
(Worley, Hitchin et al. 1996) X X Org theory
(Grant 1997) X X X Org theory
(Hauser and Katz 1998) X Perf.
measurement
(Lockamy Iii and Spencer X X Perf.
1998) measurement
(Nancy 1999) Lean
00s (Hauser 2001) j X - Management
(Richard and Amy 2001) X X X Org learning
(Carroll and Edmondson 2002) X X X X Org learning
(Drucker 2002) X Management
(Inamdar and Kaplan 2002) X X Perf.
measurement
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Decade
90s
Reference PaperLean Enterprise
Principle(s)
Decade
(Hussey, Eibner et al. 2009) I X I I [ [Healthcare
Similarly, principle 5 which concerns stability and flow within and across the enterprise
has benefited from in-depth study in multiple disciplines including organizational theory,
operations research, management, and beyond. Yet another example is that of principle 3
where Drucker already in the early 60s had noted on the "confusion between effectiveness
and efficiency that stands between doing the right things and doing things right. There is
surely nothing quite so useless as doing with great efficiency what should not be done at
all." (Drucker 1963). Indeed one could argue that the concepts supporting each of the
Lean Enterprise Principles aren't novel in themselves and in fact some of the publications
in Table 2-3 address several of them. However, as a counter argument one must consider
two important factors which are outlined next.
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(Murman, Allen et al. 2002) X X X X j _ Lean
(Nightingale 2002) X X X X I Systems thinking
(Needy, Norman et al. 2002) X Lean
(Benner and Tushman 2003) X X Org theory
(Rouse and Putterill 2003) X Perf.
measurement
(Bazzoli, Dynan et al. 2004) X Healthcare
(Liker 2004) X X X X X Lean
(Roos, de Neufville et al. 2004) X X Systems thinking
(Barki and Pinsonneault 2005) X Org theory
(Becker 2005) X X Org theory
(Emiliani and Stec 2005) X X X X X Lean
(Reijers and Liman Mansar X Lean
2005)
(Liker and Morgan 2006) X X X Lean
(Folan, Browne et al. 2007) X Perf.
measurement
(Bhasin 2008) X Lean
(Rhodes and Nightingale 2008) X Systems thinking
(Valerdi, Nightingale et al. X Systems thinking
2008)
,
1 2 3 5 16
2.4.6.2 Examining Toyota's recent widely publicized turmoil through the Lean
Enterprise Principles
Firstly, as previously noted in our analysis of lean failures, lean as with other
philosophies, is "not so much about the individual principles and practices, but their
effective integration and application" (Nightingale 2002). For instance, without an
appreciation for long-term results (i.e. principle 1) one may falter by focusing on short-
term efficiency gains that might compromise an enterprise's overall effectiveness in the
longer run (i.e. principle 3). Similarly, establishing where an enterprise boundary lies (i.e.
principle 1) is inherently related to the identification of the relevant stakeholders to be
considered (i.e. principle 2) which in turn affects the value interpretations of what
constitute efficiency gains versus effectiveness (i.e. principle 3) and how, where, and by
whom are these delivered (i.e. principle 4).
In fact, Toyota itself has recently undergone significant public scrutiny in light of high
profile accidents involving faulty breaking systems which tarnished what was regarded as
the immaculate quality standard stemming from its lean enterprise thinking. In early 2010
Toyota issued a recall of 8.5 million vehicles worldwide and halted U.S. sales of eight
models equipped with the faulty pedals, while its CEO Akio Toyoda20 underwent fierce
questioning at a hearing presided by the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform in the US. Peer reviewed publications with detailed evidence on what led to this
failure have yet to surface, however one can examine official public statements made by
senior Toyota officials (Greimel 2010; Greimel and Jackson 2010; Greimel, Treece et al.
2010) and infer that Lean Enterprise Principles were disregarded and might have led to
Toyota's worldwide crisis. As he addressed the committee Mr. Toyoda conceded:
e "I would like to point out here that Toyota's priority has traditionally been: first
safety; second quality; and third volume. These priorities became confused"
e "We pursued growth over the speed at which we were able to develop our people
and our organization and we should sincerely be mindful of that"
e "Quite frankly, Ifear the pace at which we have grown may have been too quick"
e "I regret that this has resulted in the safety issues described in the recalls and I
20 Mr. Akio Toyoda is the grandson of Toyota's founder Mr. Kiichiro Toyoda who named his enterprise
"Toyota" as he believed his new venture would be more successful that way.
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am deeply sorry for any accidents that Toyota drivers have experienced."
In a separate interview (Greimel and Jackson 2010) Mr. Akio Toyoda said "I don't think
we were wrong to expand, but we may have stretched more than we should have". The
same article quotes him as having said at a press interview that his father Mr. Shoichiro
Toyoda had been a "flag" around which the company traditionally rallied in tough times,
and that he felt he wasn't "yet that flag, but I intend to do my best so that maybe 20 or 30
years from now, people may look back and refer to me as a flag". Toyota's former North
American chief, Mr. James Press, is also quoted in the article as saying that "the root
cause of their problems is that the company was hijacked, some years ago, by anti-family,
financially oriented pirates". He was referring to Mr. Hiroshi Okuda who became the
first non Toyoda CEO in almost 30 years and who introduced more Western-style,
financially driven tactics such as listing Toyota in the New York Stock Exchange (which
forced it to adopt U.S. accounting principles and meeting its stockholder expectations)
and taking over ownership in suppliers (e.g. minicar specialist Daihatsu Motor Co) rather
than rely on its previous strategy of relying on informal ties.
Considering these statements one can suggest that Toyota disregarded several of the Lean
Enterprise Principles. To begin with it focused on growing to deliver financial results
with a short-term mindset (i.e. rather than Principle 1 long-term recommendation) whilst
sacrificing safety and quality (i.e. risking Principle 2 stakeholder values). The increase in
production and proliferation of car models also implied subjecting its production base to
a significant spike (i.e. disregarding the stability implied in Principle 5) and adopting
different tactics to manage those interdependencies (i.e. Principle 4). Furthermore, the
leadership of Mr. Okuda clearly didn't uphold the same values of its predecessors (i.e.
Principle 6) and placed Toyota as a whole at risk (i.e. Principle 3). Finally, given this
setting one can assume that Toyota was no longer able to continue its pursuit of
perfection as it did before (i.e. Principle 7). Ultimately, the seven Lean Enterprise
Principles can help guide the development and sustainment of a lean enterprise while
avoiding the previously described lean failures as well as Toyota's own recent turmoil.
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2.4.6.3 Rethinking the entire enterprise through the Lean Enterprise Principles
The second counter argument attesting to the Lean Enterprise Principles' contribution,
concerns principle 1 in particular (i.e. adopt a holistic view of the enterprise). Specifically,
although drafted in the context of deriving lean enterprises, principle 1 is equally
applicable on a recommended research approach informed by systems thinking. In other
words, when studying organizations it is important to adopt a holistic approach that
covers both short and long-term horizons within and across multiple departments and
organizations, and doing so with an awareness and appreciation of multiple
organizational characteristics . For instance, the richness of the literature review reveals
that scholarly publications on lean at first (and several of them still do) focus on the
process, tool, and individual levels, and over time gradually develop towards
understanding broader concepts of organizational learning culture and organizational
strategy. Nonetheless, catering for an enterprise systems thinking perspective is still
predominantly absent even when several of the Lean Enterprise Principles are being
considered. For instance, organizational learning (i.e. principle 7) indeed requires a
supportive leadership (i.e. principle 6) in order to nurture a culture of improvement
amongst employees, suppliers, etc (i.e. principle 2). However, such learning and
improvement is often described at the local level (e.g. individual at the assembly line
pulling a chord signaling a problem and thus triggering problem solving) instead of
maintaining an enterprise perspective (e.g. could this local improvement be standardized
and applied elsewhere in the enterprise? Is this local improvement going to hinder our
enterprise overall? Do we need to make a conscious decision of sustaining undesirable
performance locally for the betterment of the enterprise as a whole?).
All in all, the seven Lean Enterprise Principles embody the understanding that "thefull
benefits of lean can be realized only by re-thinking the entire enterprise" (Nightingale
2002). With this understanding in mind, in the next and final part of this chapter we
address hospital enterprise performance measurement. In doing so we consolidate our
literature review in terms of the first two research questions posited in this thesis.
21 To be explored in detail in Chapter 3.
22 Please refer to section 1.5.
Page 75 of 759
Specifically, we first analyze in detail the challenges inherent in measuring hospital
enterprise performance, and we then conduct a longitudinal and multidisciplinary
literature review focused on hospital performance measurement23 .
2.5 Measuring Hospital Enterprise Performance
Several developed nations around the world are grappling with high healthcare
expenditures and unsatisfactory outcomes. High level country benchmarks show that
there is wide variation in health outcomes for countries with similar levels of income and
education (Preston 1986; WorldBank 1993; OECD 2007), and the US healthcare system
in particular is often singled out as the least effective system amongst developed
countries (NationalAcademies 2006). A common US and UK characteristic is that the
highest source of healthcare expenditures are hospital services and infrastructure (Kaiser
Foundation 2007; UKDepartmentofHealth 2008). Consequently, the strategies and
operations developed and implemented by hospitals have a significant effect on access,
quality, and cost of care (Devers, Brewster et al. 2003). However, a universally accepted
definition of quality of care has yet to surface (Donabedian 1988; Blumenthal 1996;
Campbell, Roland et al. 2000) which not only hinders country level performance
benchmarks but also those comparing hospitals within the same country.
2.5.1 The challenge of measuring hospital enterprise performance
This section describes in further detail key challenges of measuring hospital enterprise
performance, whilst using the issues referred in section 2.3, namely the existence of
multiple levels of analysis, of multiple stakeholders, and multiple performance
dimensions.
23 For a broader analysis of the healthcare industry and hospitals in particular, please refer to the healthcare
literature review presented in Chapter 4.
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2.5.1.1 Multiple levels of analysis
Avedis Donabedian, who has been referred to as one of the founders of the modem
science of health care quality measurement (Romano and Mutter 2004), said that the term
health care was vague and "capable of many interpretations, since its meaning varies
with how narrowly or broadly health and the responsibility for health are defined, and on
how inclusive the level of assessment is [which] depend, in turn, on the overall context
for the assessment" (Donabedian 1988a). Donabedian further explained that "it makes a
difference in the assessment of our performance whether we see ourselves as responsible
for bringing about improvements only in specific aspects ofphysical or physiological
function or whether we include psychological and socialfunction as well" (Donabedian
1988b). For instance, the World Health Organization produced a report (World Health
2000) in which it identifies as overall health care system goals to achieve good health for
the population whilst ensuring that health services are responsive to the public and that
fair payment systems are in place. Around the same time, the Institute of Medicine stated
that "the purpose of the health care system is to reduce continually the burden of illness,
injury, and disability, and to improve the health status and function of the people of the
United States" (IOM 2001). As such, some have argued that medicine in itself doesn't
cover the full spectrum of health care as it only offers a specialized approach to disease
cure and that the greatest health advance of all time was cleaning up the water supply
(Glouberman and Mintzberg 2001), a feat which clearly resides beyond the responsibility
of an individual hospital and is representative of the danger of defining health care
quality too broadly (Donabedian 1993).
Notably a group of health care experts produced a research agenda aimed at improving
the US health care system (Fernandopulle, Ferris et al. 2003), and one of the highest
priorities for research identified was to develop more robust performance measures which
would allow identifying high performing hospitals and distinguish which of their
practices are more successful than others.
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2.5.1.2 Multiple stakeholders
The existence of multiple stakeholders in the health care system was recognized as a
complicating factor as early as the mid seventies when public opinion and experts alike
demanded greater organizational responsiveness and accountability from hospitals, who
often had to reconcile incompatible objectives (Shortell 1976). Similarly, and more
recently, the existence of multiple stakeholders in the health care system has made
unclear who the consumer is of any health improvement initiative (Schneider and Epstein
1996).
Specifically, a fundamental obstacle towards achieving consensus on who the consumer
is and what healthcare performance constitutes, is that health is a social construct (Turner
and Samson 1995) that reflects the views of medical professionals (Freidson 1970) as
well as those of other individuals and society at large (Nettleton 1995), including varying
expectations of client/provider relationships, valuations of health, and what constitute
"legitimate roles of the health care enterprise" (Donabedian 1988a). For instance,
organizations responsible for measuring hospital quality such as the National Committee
for Quality Assurance (NCQA) and the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Health
Care Organizations (JCAHO) have historically focused on what are commonly referred
as "process measures" (i.e. was evidence based medicine applied?), whereas consumer
and employer focused organizations have opted to reward hospitals for their outcomes
(e.g. mortality and length of stay) and structural measures (e.g. is a computerized
physician order entry system installed?) (Romano and Mutter 2004). Another perspective
is that of patients who emphasize factors such as access, communication, and kindness
(Wensing, Grol et al. 1994), as well as cost (Wicks and St. Clair 2007) and who amid a
poor experience may decide not to seek care in the future with a particular physician
and/or hospital (Murray and Corney 1990). Furthermore, insurance companies may
demand special prices in return for encouraging patients to use the specific hospital
(Flood 1994).
Moreover, measuring the performance of a hospital enterprise is particularly challenging
given the varying and potentially conflicting definitions of healthcare which are upheld
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by different stakeholders (e.g. patients, insurance companies, physicians, nurses, hospital
board, regulators, employers, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, etc) and demanded of
hospital leaders who in turn attempt to set the direction and induce desirable behavior for
their organization to become and remain a high performing hospital. Furthermore, it isn't
always easy to identify and distinguish stakeholder groups and coalitions within the same
hospital (Fennell and Alexander 1989). Hospitals may have salaried and/or non-exclusive
physicians who expect cutting edge facilities. In turn, hospital departmental managers
may each measure their departmental performance differently as they keep in mind their
own individual objectives (Parker, Charns et al. 2001), and the same could be said of the
remaining internal stakeholders. All the while, hospital management is monitored by the
hospital board to hopefully prevent and contain any self-interested action (Flood 1994).
2.5.1.3 Multiple dimensions ofperformance
As per our discussion, the existence of multiple levels of analysis and multiple
stakeholders necessarily implies that we consider multiple dimensions of performance. A
hospital that performs well on one dimension may not necessarily perform well on others,
and one may derive the wrong conclusion by focusing on a single measure or even
multiple measures of the same dimension (Romano and Mutter 2004). For instance,
quality and cost (i.e. finance) dimensions are often said to be in tension as per hospital
performance measurement studies (Eddy 1998; Bazzoli, Chen et al. 2008). Similarly,
hospitals that perform well on one medical condition have been found to perform poorly
for unrelated conditions (Rosenthal 1997).
Another important dimension is patient satisfaction (Feinstein 2002) which may be
considered a desired outcome of care since a satisfied patient is more likely to follow and
implement his or her designated treatment (Donabedian 1988a). However, most patients
are said to be unable to evaluate the technical quality of care (i.e. the appropriate use of
evidence based medicine) unless an adverse event takes place (Wicks and St. Clair 2007).
As such, health care professionals often discount the importance of patients' perspectives
(Blumenthal 1996) and additionally fear that patients may value more convenience,
waiting time, and physician availability (Blumenthal and Epstein 1996). Nonetheless,
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despite the potential validity issues of patient satisfaction as a measure of quality, experts
have argued that it is an indispensible dimension to improve health care systems
(Donabedian 1988b).
2.5.2 Literature review on hospital performance measurement
So far we have highlighted hospital performance dimensions of a financial, operational,
quality, and customer satisfaction nature, but there are others. As a means of identifying
the performance dimensions and associated metrics that are most commonly used by
scholars to assess hospitals, a review of relevant articles published over the forty eight
year time period of 1962 through 2009, was conducted. Forty influential articles with a
combined citation count over 4500 were selected from the most prominent health care
publications, including Health Affairs, New England Journal of Medicine, Journal of the
American Medical Association, Journal of Healthcare Management, Journal of Health
Economics, Medical Care, British Medical Journal, European Journal of Health
Economics, as well as the management publications of the Academy ofManagement
Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Operations Management, and
Harvard Business Review. Each study was examined to determine the dimensions used to
measure hospital performance, its level of analysis (hospital wide, hospital department,
system wide), its research contribution (conceptual and/or empirical), and whether
specific metrics were proposed. Our literature review findings are presented in Table 2-4
below.
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Table 2-4: Literature review on hospital performance measurement
F T I I I I T I I~I
Reference
C
IL
(Blumenthal 1996) Yes H
(Bazzoli, Chen et al. 2008) Yes
3 (McCue, Clement et al. 1999) Yes H Yes
4 (Kane 1991) Yes H Yes
(Mukamel, Zwanziaer et al. 2002) Yes
C iih ii aCC
-01
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10_0     
0( 0 0 0 0 0- - 0 1
-Mukamel, Z e et al. 2002) Ye . Yes(Clement, McCue et al. 1997)
(Jones and Sidebotham 1962)
Yes Yes~
IYes IH IYes I 0
8 (Becker and Sloan 1985) Yes H Yes
9 (Grosskopf and Valdmanis 1987) Yes H Yes
10 (Romano and Mutter 2004) Yes H
11 (Donabedian 1988a) Yes S
12 (Rego, Nunes et al. 2009) Yes H Yes
13 (Clement and McCue 1996) Yes H Yes
14 (Alexander and Rundall 1985) Yes H Yes
15 (Goldstein, Ward et al. 2002) Yes H Yes
16 (Hrebiniak and Alutto 1973) Yes U Yes
17 (Ashmos, Duchon et al. 2000) Yes H Yes
18 (Fisher, Staiger et al. 2007) Yes H Yes
(Gillies and Shortell 1993) H
20 1 (Spear 2005) Yes U / H Yes 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
o 0 0 0 2
o 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 2
o 0 0 0 0 2(*) Please read "Unit of analysis" as follows: "H" = Hospital ; "U" = Hospital Unit (e.g. emergency department) ; "S" = Health system wide
A table cell colored in red highlights that "No" data was present, whereas a table cell colored in green highlights that the dimension was
used.
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Note:
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............
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Table 2-4 (cont): Literature review on hospital performance measurement
a .0 0 rE c
# Reference 0
21 (Shortell, Gillies et al. 1994) Yes H Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
22 (Shortell Rousseau et al. 1991) Y t q 1 A 1 V A I
23 (Doty, Glick et al. 1993) Yes H Yes
(Arqote 1982)
(Pronovost, Jenckes et al. 1999)
Yes
Yes
26 J(Donabedian 1988b) j Yes S
(Griffith and Alexander 2002) Yes
28 (Ozcan, Luke et al. 1992) Yes H Yes
29 (Shortell, Zimmerman et al. 1994) Yes U Yes
30 (Cortese and Smoldt 2007) Yes H
31 (IOM 2001) No S
32 (Counte, Glandon et al. 1995) Yes H
33 (Maxwell 1984) No S
34 (Georgopoulos 1978) Yes U / H
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
5
35 (Wicks and St. Clair 2007) Some H 0 6
36 (Jonathan, Steven et al. 2000) Yes H 0 6
37 (Martin, Nelson et al. 2007) Yes S 0 6
38 (Veillard, Champagne et al. 2005) Yes H 0 0 6
39 (Campbell, Roland et al. 2000) No S 6
40 (Abernethy and Lillis 2001) No U Yes 0 0 6
Note: (*) Please read "Unit of analysis" as follows: "H" = Hospital ; "U" = Hospital Unit (e.g. emergency department) ; "S" = Health system wide
A table cell colored in red highlights that "No" data was present, whereas a table cell colored in green highlights that the dimension was
Used.
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Upon inspecting the above table, a trend is evident in that the number of dimensions
considered in published articles increased over time, which reflects the maturation of the
performance management literature that recognized the need for multi dimensional
performance measurement. However, Table 2-5 indicates that an inverse relationship
exists between the number of performance dimensions described and the inclusion of
empirical data in the studies (i.e. beyond a conceptual contribution on how to measure
hospital performance). Moreover, as the number of performance dimensions included in
the studies increased (i.e. table cells colored in green) the inclusion of data in such studies
decreased (i.e. table cells colored in red).
Table 2-5: Relationship of hospital performance dimensions and empirical studies
# dimensions # refs # w. data
1 9 8
2 16 14
3 4 3
4 2 0
5 2 0
6 7 1
A total of eight hospital performance dimensions were identified as follows: financial,
operational, quality, customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, strategy and operations
alignment, social equity, and organizational learning. Table 2-6 includes sample metrics
which were most commonly used in each performance dimension.
Table 2-6: Sample metrics used in each performance dimension
Performance Dimension Metrics
Customer Satisfaction Patient satisfaction. Patient likelihood to recommend
provider in the future. Responsiveness to community
expectations.
Employee Satisfaction Absenteeism. Turnover. Employee tenure. Nurse and
physician satisfaction.
Finance Market share. Total operating margin. Return on assets. Cash
flow to revenues ratio. Cost per discharge. Cost per patient
day. Net patient revenues.
Operations Length of stay. Bed occupancy. Number of ambulatory
visits. Number of emergency visits. Number of inpatient
days. Number of outpatient surgeries.
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Organizational Learning Training hours per employee. New technology investment.
Employee development programs.
Quality Mortality. Morbidity. Technical quality of care. Number of
patient readmissions. Quality of interpersonal relationship
with patient. Number of malpractice claims.
Social Equity Stratified measures in terms of patient age, gender, income,
race, payer, etc.
Strategy / Operations Service unit consensus on goal priorities. Inter service unit
Alignment cooperation.
An analysis of the distribution of dimensions used across the time period reveals the most
predominant dimensions as well as an indication of their theoretical maturity. Table 2-7
summarizes the analysis and indicates that "Operational" is the most common
performance dimension, followed by "Financial", "Quality", "Customer Satisfaction",
"Employee Satisfaction", "Social Equity", and finally "Strategy and Operations
Alignment" and "Organizational Learning". The sparse number of studies published with
data could be representative of the nascent phase of theoretical development of the
performance dimension(s), or indeed the inherent bias of the author(s) of each study.
Table 2-7: Hospital performance dimension predominance in the literature
Dimensions # refs # w. data
Operational 27 18
Financial 25 17
Quality 24 10
Customer satisfaction 12 0
Employee satisfaction 10 3
Social Equity 7 0
Organizational Learning 4 2
Strategy/operations alignment 4 1
Finally, as per Table 2-5, one of the articles (Abernethy and Lillis 2001) provides a
valuable contribution in that it offers the most multidimensional assessment of hospital
performance and also includes empirical data. However, the article only relies on
perceptual data from survey respondents and thus lacks external validity both in terms of
comparing and contrasting with other subjective sources of evidence (e.g. interviews,
observation, etc) and with quantitative data (e.g. archival records). Furthermore, the
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remaining articles that propose four or more performance dimensions are only at a
conceptual phase and don't yet include empirical data.
Ultimately, there is sparse empirical evidence as to what extent hospitals are adopting a
multidimensional perspective of performance. To that effect, in the context of this thesis
it is pertinent to ask: How is hospital enterprise performance currently measured?
Furthermore, as seen in this thesis section on Lean Enterprise Principles, the proposed
seven Lean Enterprise Principles embody the understanding that "thefull benefits of lean
can be realized only by re-thinking the entire enterprise" (Nightingale 2002). To that
effect, this thesis poses the follow-on research question: How could hospital enterprise
performance measurement be improved using lean enterprise principles?
2.6 Further Detail Concerning First Two Research Questions
Having defined this thesis' first two research questions we revisit the literature review
analysis presented earlier in this chapter, and provide further detail towards the intended
contribution concerning the abovementioned research questions. Also, we provide an
additional literature review specifically concerning widely published guidelines on how
to derive useful performance metrics, as well as known pitfalls to avoid.
2.6.1 Proposing systems thinking criteria, and metrics where
appropriate
Earlier in section 2.3 we reviewed the literature in terms of operationalizing
organizational performance assessments. In doing so, we established that it was
recommended that performance measurements reflect multiple stakeholders, as well as
multiple levels of analysis, and ultimately the use of multiple dimensions. Specifically,
we provided an overview as to how performance measurement evolved from traditional
accounting performance measures, towards multidimensional frameworks. The latter
were described as being able to provide a more balanced view of organizational
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performance and to that effect included non-financial, external, and future looking
performance measures, together with the financial, internal, and past performance
measures (Bourne, Mills et al. 2000). We also observed, as with the difficulties
introduced with increasing the number of stakeholders considered, the proliferation of
frameworks has rendered impossible any attempt to develop a single framework for
performance measurement (Rouse and Putterill 2003). Furthermore, performance
measurement frameworks or scorecards don't in themselves define the best strategy for
an organization to adopt (Bhasin 2008) and aren't necessarily rooted on any particular
management practice (Chang 2007). We partially address this limitation in adopting lean
enterprise principles as a recommended "theory of the business" for hospitals to follow,
as evidenced in the definition of this thesis' second research question.
Furthermore, our intended contribution isn't to add yet another performance
measurement framework to the existing arsenal available to senior hospital leaders.
Suggesting key criteria rather than proposing new performance frameworks, has been
regarded a preferable contribution by performance measurement scholars (Neely,
Gregory et al. 2005). Similarly, healthcare scholars (Martin, Nelson et al. 2007) have
recommended the definition of a small set of high-level metrics capable of bringing a
systems perspective, while complementing hospitals' traditional large sets of highly
specific measures (e.g. financial, operations, quality, etc).
All in all, in this research an attempt is made to characterize key criteria, informed by
lean enterprise principles, and from this suggest performance dimensions, metrics, and
processes where appropriate. Furthermore, in deriving our descriptions we specifically
take into account crucial features of hospital activity so as to further tailor our
recommendations to the context of senior hospital leaders.
2.6.2 Key guidelines for establishing useful metrics
At the core of any performance measurement system are its individual performance
measures, which if appropriately selected, "give a clear signal to all people in the
company about the priorities that are important to [a] senior manager" (Maskell 1991).
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The definition of what is appropriate is particularly important, given that "every metric,
whether it is used explicitly to influence behavior, to evaluate future strategies, or simply
to take stock, will affect actions and decisions" (Hauser and Katz 1998). Specifically,
inadequately designed metrics can result in dysfunctional behavior as individuals are
encouraged to pursue inappropriate courses of action (Neely, Richards et al. 1997).
Hence, it is important to keep in mind literature recommendations on how to derive
appropriate metrics (see Table 2-8), as well as to anchor them on an established "theory
of the business" (i.e. lean enterprise principles).
Table 2-8: Key guidelines for establishing useful metrics
Reference Recommendation
(Globerson 1985; Maskell 1991; Metrics should be derived from strategy
Wisner and Fawcett 1991;
Kaplan and Norton 1993;
Bourne, Mills et al. 2000;
Folan, Browne et al. 2007)
(Globerson 1985) Metrics should be measurable and relate to
competitive dimensions that are critical to the success
of the organization
(Globerson 1985; Neely, Metrics should be transparent and be simple to
Richards et al. 1997) understand
(Maskell 1991; Jonathan, A fewer number of pertinent metrics is preferable so
Steven et al. 2000; Melnyk, as to reduce potential for metric conflict, information
Stewart et al. 2004) overload, or myopia (i.e. overemphasizing one
criteria with many metrics)
(Neely, Gregory et al. 1995) The selection of a metric should take into account the
organization's culture in order to minimize erroneous
data (e.g. a culture of blame would purposefully
underreport the number of part defects for fear)
(Neely, Richards et al. 1997) Metrics should clearly specify their purpose and the
sources of data to derive them
(Hauser and Katz 1998) Metrics should not: induce narrow thinking; be costly
to measure (i.e. keep people from producing value);
be precisely wrong (i.e. "vaguely right is better than
precisely wrong"); deviate from organization goals;
be far from what individuals control (i.e. the link
between task and measure has to be clear); delay
rewards (i.e. individuals need short-term rewards
whereas organizations think long-term)
(Eddy 1998; Rouse and Putterill Metrics should define the area whose performance is
2003) to be measured (i.e. intended audience) and the
I appropriate level of detail should be used
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(Bourne, Mills et al. 2000) Design metrics that encourage behaviors that support
strategy
(Griffith and Alexander 2002) Metrics should reveal important and correctable
deficiencies in an organization's performance
(Melnyk, Stewart et al. 2004) Metrics should have well articulated guidelines so
that independent sources are able to derive the same
metric value from the same data and process
(Folan and Browne 2005) Metrics should be relevant to the level of the
organization they are being used
Finally, in general, in terms of academia versus practitioners some have noted that the
underlying different priorities of the two groups should be noted, namely that academia
values the definition and validation of measures that are generalizable albeit costly to
develop and/or collect, whereas practitioners operate under greater time pressures and
prefer a quick and good enough measure (Evans 2004). Thus it could well be that a
research question's potential answer may translate itself in value for domain practitioners,
but the process by which such an answer is derived does not necessarily lend itself to
day-to-day practices. Ultimately it is important to also keep in mind that "there is no
magic bullet" (Hauser and Katz 1998) in that some criteria may seem adequate and easy
to measure but have subtle implications, whereas other criteria might be more difficult to
measure but enable the enterprise (or the researcher) to focus on critical decisions and/or
factors for its success.
2.6.3 Framing research contribution on first two research
questions
The following are key considerations in the context of this research:
* Avoid proposing another performance measurement framework and instead
suggest key systems thinking criteria and metrics where appropriate, so as to
complement hospitals' traditional large sets of highly specific measures.
e Recommendations on key criteria and any metrics should be informed by lean
enterprise principles.
e The intended audience of our contribution is senior hospital leaders.
" Leverage existing performance measurement practices of leading hospitals, as
well as those published in the literature.
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2.7 Chapter 2 Summary
In this chapter we examined different theoretical perspectives on the broader concept of
organizational effectiveness as well as the inherent difficulty in adopting a multi-
stakeholder approach versus a profit maximization approach.
We also described performance measurement practices and systems from a
multidisciplinary perspective (e.g. operations research, product development, etc) on
what are some of the most common pitfalls and best practices, including the learning
stemming from LAI's ongoing research on lean enterprise principles and how it can
improve hospital enterprise performance measurement. Finally, we introduced the key
issue of defining health care quality and performance and how these relate to an
individual hospital's mission in the context of their surrounding community and society
at large. We also conducted a detailed analysis on multidisciplinary literature focused on
hospital performance measurement and found that traditionally there has been a focus on
one or two performance dimensions, and although most recent publications advocate
broader performance assessments, these are still at a conceptual level and lack empirical
data. Moreover, there is sparse empirical evidence as to what extent hospitals are
adopting a multidimensional perspective of performance. To that effect, in the context of
this thesis it is pertinent to ask: How is hospital enterprise performance currently
measured?, which in turn poses our follow-on research question: How could hospital
enterprise performance measurement be improved using lean enterprise principles?
Having reviewed the literature both in terms of the enterprise performance literature at
large, and hospital enterprise performance measurement in particular, we next examine
the enterprise architecture literature. In doing so we establish that MIT's emerging
NREAF is the most complete framework to inform this research. However, consistent
with its nascent phase we also establish the need for its theoretical enrichment with clear
constructs and operational guidelines stemming from in-depth empirical study.
24Ultimately, we formulate this thesis' the two remaining research questions
24 Please refer to section 1.5 for a summary of this thesis' four research questions.
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3. Enterprise Architecture
As shown in Chapter 2, the study of organizational performance is historically considered
to be of central importance as part of the theoretical development of different disciplines.
Despite the challenges described in terms of defining and measuring performance, it was
also noted that consensus exists in that rather than listing performance attributes, one
ought to derive a theory about the performance of organizations. One such theory, lean
enterprises, was examined in detail including a historical account of its origins, followed
by the derivation of a much needed theoretical underpinning for LAI's seven lean
enterprise principles. Finally, it was also noted that the adoption of such lean principles
implied that one rethink the entire enterprise (Nightingale 2002).
In this chapter we conduct a longitudinal review of the pertinent organizational design
and systems thinking literatures, so as to further understand what rethinking an entire
enterprise may entail. Furthermore, we examine evidence of the relationship between
performance and organizational design, including the works of Tushman and Nadler who
noted that: "A basic goal of organizational research has been to discover what kinds of
organizational designs or structures will be most effective in different situations"
(Tushman and Nadler 1978). We first begin with an appreciation of studies relating
organizational design and organizational performance, including healthcare and other
service domains. Next we provide an overview of different organization design
conceptualizations and discuss their limitations and advantages. Having identified the
greater value of one of the conceptualizations we explore in detail ten of its most
influential organizational frameworks to inform our research. We then introduce
Enterprise Architecture (EA) from a systems thinking perspective, describe its
predominant lenses, and provide a synthesis which leverages frameworks from both the
organizational science and systems thinking literatures. Finally we explore how the
"theory of the business" (or rather the Lean Enterprise Principles), is related to the
conceptualization of EA, and we explain our reasoning for this thesis' remaining two
research questions.
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3.1 Relating Organizational Design and Organizational
Performance
Both management theorists and practitioners alike are said to generally agree that an
organization's design and respective environment "make a difference in affecting
organizational performance" (Van de Ven and Ferry 1980). As such, scholars then
proposed that that organizational performance could be engineered (Lewin and Minton
1986). Healthcare theorists have made similar observations as early as the 1970's as well
as recently (see Table 3-1). Systems thinkers in turn have further noted that 2 1' century
organizations derive their performance advantage from their "ability to craft innovative
combinations of systems and organizations - enterprise architectures" (Dickman 2009).
Table 3-1: Examples of observations of design and performance relationship in healthcare
Reference Quote
(Longest 1974) "the results of this research show that hospital management practices
have an impact on patient care as well as cost"
(Shortell 1976) "what types of strategies and [organizational] configurations might
result in better performance than others?"
(Shortell, Becker "hospital efficiency and quality of care can each be viewed as a
et al. 1976) function of the hospital's external environment, technology, and
certain internal organization design variables"
(Pronovost, "Clinicians and hospital leaders should consider the potential impact
Jenckes et al. of ICU [Intensive Care Unit] organizational characteristics on
1999) outcomes of patients having high-risk operations."
(Fernandopulle, "there is convincing evidence that organizational factors can affect
Ferris et al. quality of care. This presumption is reinforced by recent studies
2003) linking nurse-to-bed ratios to hospital's mortality rates"
(Douglas and "a hospital's internal capabilities can be used to deliver strategic
Ryman 2003) competencies that result in competitive advantage [as] related to
hospital cash flow"
An interesting conclusion from scholars who studied service-based organizations is that
the organization as a whole has significant implications for the performance of
individuals. Notably the degree of implications is dependant on where each individual is
positioned within an organization's structure. For instance, in assessing performance,
senior level management is ideally cognizant of a broader number of factors and
implications, than those considered by front line employees.
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Flood (1994) summarizes as many as five studies that suggest that the quality of care
provided (i.e. a fundamental performance dimension identified in Chapter 2 Section 2.5)
is best predicted by the specific hospital where care is provided rather than the
qualifications and experience of the individual physician performing the work. Flood
clarifies that physician's qualifications are indeed important for quality of care, but that
organizational context (i.e. where the physician works) is far more important in setting
upper and lower limits of performance.
Groysberg, Nanda et al (2004) derived similar conclusions when conducting an in-depth
study that tracked the performance of over 1000 stock analysts as well as their career
movements (i.e. whether or not they changed organization). Essentially, the authors
advised organizations not to hire star performers from other organizations as these
experience a performance plunge which also jeopardizes the functioning of the group or
team they joined. As such, the authors emphasized that the performance of service-based
organizations is not only the result of an individual's personal competencies but also of
the organizational capabilities supporting the individual (e.g. systems and processes;
leadership; informal network; training; teams).
Huckman and Pisano (2006) conducted a similar study tracking surgeons performing the
same task (i.e. medical procedure) and determined that surgeon performance is not fully
portable across hospitals. The authors recognize the hospital's organizational capabilities
(e.g. systems and processes; leadership; culture; human resource policies) as a critical
element influencing a surgeon's performance. However, they further make the distinction
that a surgeon's own familiarity with a given organization is equally an important factor
influencing performance (i.e. knowing what the inherent limitations and capabilities are
and coping with them).
Ultimately, there is evidence that an organization's particular design and thus inherent
capabilities, has an impact on performance at both an individual and organizational levels.
Therefore, the construct of organization design may be examined from multiple levels of
analysis, as was the case with the construct of organizational performance in Chapter 2,
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and thus the relationship between the two constructs can mean different things to
different people. Understandably, a significant limitation of such studies pertains to
conceptual issues (Randolph and Dess 1984) and as a result, theories struggle with the
richness of the reality of the organizations they are attempting to describe (Hall and Saias
1980).
3.2 Overview of Different Organization Design
Conceptualizations
Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 described several major approaches that researchers have
developed and refined when studying organizational performance. The study of
organization design and its relationship with organizational performance has also
warranted different conceptualizations which will next be examined.
Colbert (2004) reviews the human resources and performance literature in his
characterization of three main conceptualization perspectives, namely the universalistic
perspective, the contingency perspective, and the configurational perspective. Although
the author derives these perspectives in the specific context of human resources (i.e. a
subset of the available organization design elements one can consider), his categorization
is nonetheless useful to describe theories at large.
The universalistic perspective follows the same "one-best way" mindset described in
Chapter 2's Section 2.4.1 where scholars defined organizational best practices
independent of an organization's particular context. An early criticism of this perspective
was that of Herbert Simon (1946) who warned of oversimplified organization
administrative principles (e.g. division of labor, hierarchy of authority, centralization,
span of control) which supposedly deliver organizational performance without
considering all the relevant organizational elements which might also have an effect (e.g.
environment, structure). Similarly, criticisms were targeted at studies that attempted to
study organizations by simply comparing them using a single parameter variable such as
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size, age, or geographic location (Perrow 1967)2. Still that didn't detract scholars from
pursuing universalistic theories. For instance, some human resource practices were
thought to create strategic leverage for all organizations regardless of their particular
context (Miles and Snow 1984). Moreover universalistic theories ignore the potential
interactions effects that may exist amongst organizational elements beyond the focal
phenomena of interest, and in some cases may even implicitly assume that effects of pair-
wise relationships are additive. Colbert (2004) goes on to say that contributions from a
universalistic perspective aren't necessarily useless, but rather of limited value.
The contingency perspective ascribes that relationships amongst organizational elements
don't follow "the simple, linear, causal relationships explored in universal theories and
allows for interaction effects and varying relationships depending on the presence of a
contingent variable" (Colbert 2004). Early examples of the contingency perspective
include the contribution by Burns and Stalker (1961) who noted that successful
organizations in stable environments tended to have mechanistic structures (i.e. highly
bureaucratic) and processes whereas those in uncertain environments tended to have
organic structures (i.e. flexible) and processes. The contingency consideration of an
organization's structure in relation to its environment was further examined by Lorsch
and Morse (1974) who propose that successful organizations exhibit a match (i.e.
congruence or fit) between their external environment and their internal environment (i.e.
degree of structural differentiation). Colbert (2004) provides a more recent example of
human resource management studies where human resource policies are related to
organizational performance outcomes while allowing for the moderating effects of
strategy. In particular, the resource based view of the firm (Barney 1991) states that
organizations develop competitive advantage over time by effectively combining
physical, organizational (e.g. processes, control systems), and human resources (e.g.
skills, behavior, knowledge) which add unique value and are hard for competitors to
2 Perrow (1967) was one of the first authors to argue for what would become the contingency perspective
and proposed that organizations should be compared whilst taking into account their underlying technology
(i.e. early denomination for "processes"). In other words, the tasks performed at an organization may be
completely different than those of another organization, and even though they might have the same number
of employees, their functioning and behavior is likely to be entirely different (e.g. a bank versus and R&D
organization).
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understand and imitate. However, the contingency perspective is said to favor the study
of external and/or vertical variables (e.g. strategy) as moderating variables, and largely
ignores the existence of interaction effects amongst internal system variables (e.g.
structure and processes). Additionally, several contingency studies are said to lack
specificity and clarity as to how they translate into higher organizational performance
(Argote 1982; Venkatraman and Camillus 1984), and that an overreliance on contingency
commonalities persists whilst ignoring the value of differences that may be the source of
competitive advantage (Ginsberg and Venkatraman 1985).
The configurational perspective26 adopts a holistic perspective of inquiry where patterns
of multiple interdependent organizational variables are identified and related to a given
dependent variable such as performance (Miller and Friesen 1977; Miller 1979; Miller
and Friesen 1980; Miller 1981; Drazin and Ven 1985; Miller 1986; Miller 1996). The
configurational perspective is different from the contingency perspective as noted by
Mintzberg (1980) in that the contingency perspective related organizational performance
to the fit of a given design parameter and a contingency factor, whereas the
configurational perspective requires an internal consistency among several design
parameters in order to derive performance or simply understand organization design.
Similarly, Meyer et al (1993): "researchers have been preoccupied with abstracting a
limited set of structural concepts-centralization and formalization, for example-and
measuring their relationships with a limited set of abstracted situational concepts, such
as size, and technological uncertainty". Moreover, the configurational perspective
attempts to characterize internally consistent wholes (i.e. reinforcing interaction effects)
and upon identifying patterns these are in turn related to organizational performance
(Doty and Glick 1994). Specifically, configurational theorists were at odds with the
multitude of bivariate statistics (i.e. pair-wise relationships between organizational
elements) which contributed to fragmented and irreconcilable findings as these often
failed to consider interaction effects from other obvious organizational elements (Miller
1981). As such, configurational theorists called for broader research scopes to better
26 The configurational perspective has also been referred to as the systems approach of organization design
(Drazin and Ven, 1985).
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understand organizational complexity and "abandon the assumptions of multivariate
linearity and [instead] isolate several common patterns among the [organizational
element] variables" (Miller 1981). Moreover, scholars argued that "a pattern analysis is
needed for the interactions of multiple contingencies and structural patterns on
organizational performance" (Drazin and Ven 1985). To that effect some authors
clarified that organization design should seek alignment (i.e. fit) between the organization
and its environment, as well as arrangement among internal structures and processes
(Venkatraman and Camillus 1984).
Table 3-2: Examples of studies of organizational element pair relationships
Pair Sample References
Environment and (Bums and Stalker 1961; Lawrence and Lorsh 1967;
Structure Galbraith 1974; Miles, Snow et al. 1978)
Process and Structure (Woodward 1965; Thompson 1967; Ven, Delbecq et al.
1976)
Strategy and Structure (Chandler 1962; Child 1972; Miller 1993)
Strategy and Information (Chan, Huff et al. 1997; Sabherwal, Hirschheim et al. 2001)
Technology
Ultimately, the key difference across these conceptualization perspectives is the level of
system complexity recognized by a given author. The universalist perspective is the most
simplistic where findings are derived from organizational elements in isolation of each
other, whereas the configurational perspective considers the organization as a whole and
postulates that interaction effects are of central importance towards understanding
organizational performance. Finally, it is important to note that studies from a
configurational perspective typically examine organizational performance for the whole
organization and define a single configuration (i.e. gestalt) to describe the organization as
a whole.
Two additional conceptualizations, although of a different nature, are important to
highlight, namely strategic choice and population ecology, as these underpin different
theoretical approaches in assessing the design and functioning of organizations. The
strategic choice view (Child 1972) asserts that the design of an organization isn't a
naturally occurring phenomenon but rather the deliberate result of strategic choices made
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by organizational administrators which ultimately determine an organizations' processes
and structure27. The population ecology view (Hannan and Freeman 1977) assert that
environmental factors directly influence an organization's overall structure, and a
manager has no choice but to adapt to cope with his or her environment. Organizational
managers who wish to survive must perceive and process their changing environments by
gathering correct information, and then respond through the rearrangement of internal
organizational structures (Astley and Ven 1983).
Similarly, Powell (1992) describes the differences between the organizational alignment
and competitive advantage approaches which are indicative as to how configurational
theorists may also present their own biases. The alignment approach focuses on the
environment and the organization's structure, and neglects strategic positioning. In turn,
the competitive advantage approach focuses on competitive strategy, and neglects the
organization's internal attributes. Notably, other authors have described similar
phenomena using different terminology (e.g. competitive positioning is externally
focused and resource-based view of organizational resources is internally focused
(Tippins and Sohi 2003)).
3.3 Leveraging Organizational Frameworks from a
Configurational Perspective
In the late 1990s, MIT established the Engineering Systems Division (ESD), as a new
interdisciplinary unit within the School of Engineering with the proposal that new
approaches, frameworks, and methodologies were needed to design large-scale complex
systems that serve society's needs (Roos, de Neufville et al. 2004). One such framework
is the Nightingale-Rhodes Enterprise Architecture Framework (NREAF) (Nightingale
and Rhodes 2007), currently under development at MIT, which reflects preliminary
generalized results based on several years of empirical studies (Rhodes, Ross et al. 2009).
27 An earlier influential publication was that of Alfred Chandler who professed that organizational structure
followed strategy (e.g. a diversified strategy implied a decentralized structure): "growth without structural
adjustment can lead only to economic inefficiency". Chandler, A. (1962). Strategy and structure.
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
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Enterprise Architecture (EA) is a concept derived from general systems theory whereby
an organization is regarded as an open system comprising its context (e.g. external
environment), its processes (e.g. organizational characteristics), and its outcomes (i.e.
performance) (Katz and Kahn 1966). Frameworks help define boundaries, specify
dimensions or views and may also provide initial intuitions into the relationships amongst
views (Rouse and Putterill 2003).To that effect MIT'S NREAF adopts a holistic approach
in the representation of enterprises thereby adopting a configurational perspective and not
focusing only on one or two individual elements and opting to study eight views (i.e.
External factors/ Policy; Strategy; Process; Organization; Knowledge; Information
Technology; Product, Service).
An observation that systems thinkers often make about the organizational science
literature is that it has been developed in a "stovepiped manner [..] highly balkanized
into narrowly scoped independent threads of research [and that such] is especially
evident in contingency theory, which exists as a collection of often-independent
observations of organizational structuring" (Glazner 2009). Already in the early eighties
some organizational theorists had called for integrative theory development given that
"different schools of thought tend to focus only on single sides of issues and use such
different logics and vocabularies that they do not speak to each other directly" (Astley
and Ven 1983). In fact, experts from the medical community had also called for more
integrative frameworks capable of providing an improved understanding and verifiable
account of medical care organizational functioning (Scott 1993). Recently such calls have
continued to surface and that "rich, integrated theoreticalframeworks will help focus and
organize research efforts" (Colbert 2004).
However, configurational theorists, who are after all also embedded in the organizational
science literature, have noted that "any research into the nature offunctional and
discordant response patterns to specific challenges and settings, must simultaneously
consider environmental, organizational, and strategy-making dimensions." (Miller and
Friesen 1980). Thus, the stovepipped metaphor isn't an entirely accurate characterization
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of the organizational science literature as a whole. Therefore, an opportunity exists to
identify and review key contributions that have adopted a configurational perspective so
that these may then inform our subsequent sections on EA.
3.3.1 Clarifying what is meant by organizational framework
When reviewing the literature it is common to see that authors often use interchangeably
the terms framework, model, and system (Rouse and Putterill 2003). Thus before
studying the contributions of configurational theorists it is important that one clarifies
what an organizational framework means in the context of this research.
Nadler and Tushman (1980) observed that the underlying complexity of the everyday life
of organizations presents mysteries and apparent contradictions for which the use of a
conceptual framework or model is essential to make sense of the terrain of organizational
behavior. A conceptual framework presents a theory which suggests how different factors
are related and how different combinations of factors can cause other factors to change.
Frameworks are thus critical in guiding both researchers and practitioners in their
analysis and action, including what information to collect (and consequentially what data
to ignore), and how to interpret that information to determine specific problem types and
causes, and ultimately support decision making in devising a course of action. Notably,
the authors observe that frameworks "vary in quality, validity, and sophistication
depending on the nature and the extent of the experiences of the model builder, his or her
perceptiveness, his or her ability to conceptualize and generalize from experiences, and
so on" (Nadler and Tushman 1980). Clearly, the authors emphasize the empirical
component in framework building and allude to the potential issue of generalization.
For instance, two different researchers independently examining the same organization
and studying a common problem (e.g. patient overcrowding in hospital emergency
departments) may have considerably different approaches and arrive at different results.
Whereas one researcher may choose to focus specifically inside a given service unit (e.g.
emergency department), another researcher may adopt a broader perspective and also
include adjacent service units that interact with the focal unit of analysis. Notably, as we
Page 99 of 759
learned in Chapter 2, the latter approach is more likely to produce a better
characterization of enterprise behavior. Similarly, researchers and often practitioners,
may rely on a narrow characterization of enterprises (e.g. focus on processes and
organizational structure) and fail to account for unique contextual aspects which may
allow for different phenomena of interest to emerge and explain observed system
behaviors.
Along similar lines, Clarkson (1995) considers frameworks a helpful tool for clarifying
theories and abstract concepts or constructs. However, the author equally notes the issue
of generalizability and calls for empirical testing to establish a framework's validity and
applicability beyond mere expert opinion.
Rouse and Putterill (2003) emphasize that a distinction does exist between modeling and
frameworks, in that frameworks are the essential starting point of theory development
where boundaries are clarified, dimensions or views are specified, and initial intuitions
into relationships among views are suggested. A framework is thus considered essential
in informing models that then attempt to predict the behavior of components of interest
rather than randomly selecting factors from a large pool of candidates and arbitrarily
defining interactions amongst them. Similarly, and specifically in the context of
healthcare scholars, frameworks are regarded as essential tools to "helpfocus attention on
key dimensions important for real-world application" (Glasgow, Goldstein et al. 2004).
Coincidently, others make the specific distinction between frameworks and models in
that, models are mathematical and executable, whereas frameworks are representations
that describe organizations or physical systems which may then lead to a model (Sussman
2010).
Reijers and Mansar (2005) offer a similar distinction between modeling and frameworks,
and emphasize that frameworks present an explicit set of factors, views, and relationships,
that help practitioners reengineer organizations.
An alternative framework definition is offered by Stanke (2006), a systems thinker, who
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says that "the codification of best practices and their organization into a framework can
be considered an architectural designfor high performance enterprises". Other system
thinkers have also alluded to frameworks facilitating the architectural design of
enterprises, but adopted a definition more akin to those of configurational theorists in
stating that the use of a "framework encourages discovery of the critical relationships
among elements in the enterprise [while] taking an engineering systems perspective to
result in a holistic understanding" (Rhodes, Ross et al. 2009)28.
In the next subsections we examine 10 well cited frameworks from the organizational
science literature to inform our EA research (see Figure 3-1).
Information
Conceptual Scheme Organization Processing 7-S Framework Organization
for Organizational Assessment Organization Design (Watenan et al Infonration
Analysis (Pugh, Framework (Ven (Tushman and 1980) Requirements (Daft
Hickson et al 1963) 1976) Nadler 1978) and Lengel 1986)
Comparative Multilevel Congruence Congruence Z Generalized Process
Organization Congruence Theory Framework for Perspective of Model of
Analysis Framework of Organization Organization Organization Design Organizations (Lewin
(Perrow 1967) (Nightingale and Analysis (Nadler and (Randolph and Dess and Minton 1986)
Toulouse 1977) Tushman 1980) 1984)
Figure 3-1: Overview of longitudinal review of organizational science frameworks
3.3.2 Early frameworks to support organizational comparison
One of the early concerns of organizational researchers was the ability to make valid
generalizations from their study findings and to that effect they began thinking beyond
single variable studies (e.g. comparing organizations on the basis of size determined by
the number of full time employees). Additionally different scholars adopted different
approaches in studying work organizations and behavior, and belonged to either of two
main theoretical camps, namely the administrative and management theorists, and the
empirically oriented sociologists and psychologists. The first camp is characterized as
studying organizations without people, whereas the second camp is characterized as
studying people without organizations, meaning that each camp had been traditionally
focused on a single aspect of organizations (i.e. either organizational structure or
individual interactions) without any regard for other factors. Recognizing these trends,
28 Nightingale and Rhodes are the authors of MIT'S NREAF which will be examined later in this Chapter.
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two influential publications produced the first efforts towards improving the basis of
organizational comparisons.
Pugh, Hickson et al (1963) observed that often times scholars used single case studies
and produced over generalizations from their findings as no account was given for
contextual factors. As such, the authors proposed "a conceptualframeworkfor analyzing
the structure and functioning of organizations [where they] conceptualize organizational
structure as being made up of a number of dimensions" (Pugh, Hickson et al. 1963).
Specifically six structural dimensions are examined: (1) specialization, (2)
standardization, (3) formalization, (4) centralization, (5) configuration 29, and (6)
flexibility. Furthermore, the authors emphasize that organizational processes (i.e.
whereby organizational functioning takes place) determine the organizational structure
construct across its six dimensions. As for contextual variables the authors examine an
organization's origin and history, its ownership and control, size, charter (i.e. ideology
and goals), technology 30, location, resources, and interdependence. Thus, rather than
advocating that organizational structure is primarily a function of one contextual variable,
the authors proposed that empirical studies look at a mix of contextual variables to better
understand the relationship between process and structure when comparing organizations.
Moreover, the authors presented one of the earlier calls for research that distanced itself
from universalistic theories, and instead adopted a contingency perspective which
accounted for contextual factors and adopted more than a single dimension of
organizational structure.
Similarly, Perrow (1967) considers that an organization's technology (i.e. equivalent of
today's processes denomination) are its most defining characteristic and that it defines
organizational structure. As such he proposes that first and foremost comparisons should
only be made amongst organizations with similar technology (e.g. although schools and
hospitals perform services of a professional nature, they are very different and such sheer
29 Please note that configuration in early writings referred to an organization's particular structure (e.g.
hierarchy, matrix, etc)
30 Please note that technology in early writings referred to the techniques used in workflow activities in
order to produce an organization's goods or services.
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organization size comparisons would be inadequate). Next he suggests characterizing
organizations' structure in terms of control (i.e. degree of discretion in completing a task),
coordination (i.e. planned vs. feedback), and non-task related interactions (i.e. social
identity such as communal values; instrumental identity such as pay and job security;
goal identification such as mission; and task identification such as technical satisfaction).
Finally, three types of goals are proposed to further characterize organizations, namely
system goals (i.e. organization wide), product goals (i.e. product characteristics), and
emergent goals (i.e. goals beyond organization's main goal and independent of any
product).
3.3.3 1976: Ven's Framework for Organization Assessment
The concepts of context, process, and structure were included in Ven's (1976) framework
(see Figure 3-2) intended to characterize organizations' internal functioning and
performance. The goal was not only to adequately characterize organizations but also to
understand how their design might affect organizational performance.
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Figure 3-2: Theoretical Framework for Organization Assessment (Ven 1976)
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To begin with, the author adopts a "strategic choice" view (Child 1972) which asserts
that the design of an organization isn't a naturally occurring phenomenon but rather the
deliberate result of strategic choices made by organizational administrators which
ultimately determine an organizations' processes and structure31. Moreover, an
organization's structure doesn't naturally occur and thus requires the intervention of a
stakeholder in a strategy role to design the structure. However, he also admits to some
extent to a "population ecology" view (Hannan and Freeman 1977) when recognizing
that environmental factors indirectly influence an organization's overall structure, as do
the inherent difficulty and variability of the organization's processes.
Next, the author observed that a "complex organization consists of multi-forms of
structurally differentiated but interdependent subsystems, each with its own structural
pattern for programming a cycle of activities" (Ven 1976). Also, he posits that "certain
patterns of structure and process of an organizational component will lead to higher
performance than other patterns" (Ven 1976). Such an hypothesis adopts an equifinality
view (i.e. different design patterns may be equally effective for a given contingency),
rather than "one best way". Therefore, when comparing organizations one needs to take
into account, and indeed leverage, the existence of multiple structural forms within each
individual organization as these may contribute to different levels of performance.
Specifically, performance is defined as a function of goal attainment (i.e. how well the
organization is meeting its internally defined objectives), morale (i.e. a function of job
satisfaction and employee absenteeism), and efficiency (i.e. cost per unit of output).
Furthermore, the author calls for research that "cuts across and links the macro (overall
organization) and micro (work unit or department) levels of analyses" (Ven 1976).
Specifically, the author suggests that the linkages between the multi-forms and the
macro-organizational layer allow for a greater understanding of an organization's
performance. He further suggests that such linkages should become observable upon
31 An earlier prominent publication was that of Alfred Chandler who professed that organizational structure
followed strategy (e.g. a diversified strategy implied a decentralized structure). Chandler, A. (1962).
Strategy and structure. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
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inspecting the direction and frequency of work and information flows between
organizational components, which in turn, may hold different design patterns.
3.3.4 1977: Nightingale32 and Toulouse's Multilevel Congruence
Theory of Organization
Nightingale and Toulouse (1977) proposed a theory of organization framework that not
only includes context (i.e. environment), process, and structure, but also specifically
details managerial values and the reactions-adjustments of organization members. The
authors recognize that the elements of their framework aren't new but offer that their
contribution is the analysis of congruency amongst the elements over time, rather than the
traditional pair-wise analysis (e.g. structure and process; values and structure; etc) which
they quote extensively. Additionally, similar to others (Pugh, Hickson et al. 1963; Perrow
1967; Ven 1976) the authors attest that processes are a key organizational element that
sets limits on the possible variations of the system. However, the authors also clarify that
such processes don't "necessarily impose a specific, given structure to the organization
[and that all elements may have] causal flows in the opposite direction" (Nightingale and
Toulouse 1977). Finally the authors' theory is that over time organizational elements
move towards a state of congruency. However no assertions are made as to whether such
congruency translates into enhanced performance results and no mentioning of
performance is present.
3.3.5 1978: Tushman and Nadler's Information Processing
Organization Design concept
Tushman and Nadler (1978) proposed a conceptual information processing model of
organizations where the congruency of organizational elements translates into
organizational performance (although no specific performance definition is offered). In
addition to the commonly used organizational elements of environment, processes, and
structure, the authors propose information processing requirements as another key design
32 Please note that the author in this reference isn't the same author previously referenced in this thesis with
the same surname. Specifically, the author in this reference is called Donald V. Nightingale, whereas the
author previously referenced is called Deborah J. Nightingale.
Page 105 of 759
element to consider. Notably the authors build on the work of Galbraith (Galbraith 1974)
which first proposed an information processing view of organizations.
Similar to Ven (1976) the authors adopt a macro level as well as a subunit level of
analysis and argue that multiple structural configurations may exist within the same
organization, and that each configuration may deliver different levels of performance. As
an example the authors explain that an intensive care nursing subunit is faced with
significantly greater information processing requirements than does a rehabilitation-
oriented nursing subunit which is presented with more routine tasks that aren't as
interdependent. Thus, different configurations are appropriate to accommodate different
levels of subunit uncertainty, task complexity, and inter-unit task interdependence.
Moreover, subunits with higher uncertainty and/or interdependence require more
complex coordination mechanisms (e.g. joint planning and troubleshooting) than do less
turbulent and/or isolated subunits that need only apply simple coordination mechanisms
(e.g. rules and hierarchy).
The authors argue that "high performing organizations are those which match
[information processing] capacity to [information processing] requirements [and that a]
mismatch in capacity and requirements should be associated with lower organizational
performance" (Tushman and Nadler 1978). However, contrary to Ven's (1976) top-
down approach (i.e. first examine macro organizational level and then subunit level),
Tushman and Nadler propose that analysis should begin at the subunit level, followed by
inter-unit level, and finally macro level.
3 MIT Professor Joel Moses has been quoted using the term "middle-out" in describing how managers
(top-down) and frontline employees (bottom-up) come together to deliver an enterprise's value proposition.
In: Costa, I. and P. Ferrao (2010). "A case study of industrial symbiosis development using a middle-out
approach." Journal of Cleaner Production 18(10-11): 984-992.
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3.3.6 1980: Nadler and Tushman's Framework for Understanding
Organizational Behavior
Nadler and Tushman (1980) published yet another influential article in which they
proposed a general framework3 4 for thinking about the organization as a total system
rather than to address a specific problem (e.g. how to motivate employees; how to
improve innovation; etc). The authors argue that systems thinking is a useful concept to
understand organizational behavior but that a specific and pragmatic framework is
needed. They identify as critical system characteristics: internal interdependence,
capacityforfeedback (i.e. output information can be used to control the system),
equilibrium (i.e. systems apply energy to reach a state of balance), equifinality (i.e.
different system configurations can lead to the same end), and adaptation (i.e. a system
must adapt to environmental conditions to survive and thrive).
Similarly to Nightingale and Toulouse (1977), the authors emphasize the internal
interdependence system property in that congruence (i.e. how well organizational
elements fit together) translates in enhanced performance results, and the lack of it leads
to problems, dysfunctions, or performance below potential (see Figure 3-3). Specifically,
performance is defined as a function of goal attainment (i.e. how well the organization is
meeting its internally defined objectives), resource utilization (e.g. are resources being
burnt-up or further developed?), and adaptability (i.e. is the organization improving its
market position?).
3 The authors use the terms framework and model interchangeably.
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Figure 3-3: Congruence Framework for Organization Analysis (Nadler and Tushman 1980)
As before the authors integrate the commonly used organizational elements of
environment, processes, and structure, however they also include an organization's
strategy (i.e. as defined by these authors: core mission, tactics, and performance
objectives), resources (e.g. human resource knowledge; stored information), and history
(i.e. past events greatly influence current organizational functioning). With regards to
structure an important distinction is introduced as the authors elaborate on the differences
between informal (e.g. leader behavior, unspecified relationships, etc) and formal (e.g.
hierarchy, rules, etc) organizational arrangements, which had traditionally been lumped
together in other scholarly work.
In reading the authors' assertion that "strategy may be the most important single input for
the organization" (Nadler and Tushman 1980) it is implicit that they follow the
previously described "strategic choice" view (Child 1972). However, worth also noting
is that they explicitly include a feedback mechanism whereby performance outputs, as
well as processes and structure, affect the organization's environment, resources and
history, and may imply that strategy be adapted to reflect these results and/or constraining
factors, and in turn once again adjust organizational structure and processes.
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3.3.7 1980: Waterman et al's 7-S Framework
Waterman et al. (1980), management consultants from a prominent firm, published an
interesting conceptual article35 that begins with the assertion that mainstream businesses
have an inadequate understanding of organization as they traditionally think of it only in
terms of structure. Notably, the frameworks described so far in this section were
published earlier and already ascribed that organizations should be analyzed beyond their
structural element. Similarly, the 7-S framework (see Figure 3-4) adopts the previously
noted ideas of examining multiple organizational elements and that these in turn are all
interconnected in such a way that significant progress in one element would require
making progresses in other elements as well (i.e. similar to the notion of
fit/alignment/congruency).
Figure 3-4: 7-S Framework for Organization Change (Waterman Jr, Peters et al. 1980)
3 The article was later expanded into a book format: Peters, T. J. and R. H. Waterman (1982). In search of
excellence : lessons from America's best-run companies. New York, NY, Harper & Row. Later Van de Ven
in his book review (1983) stated that the authors had "provided a rich and valuable source of qualitative
stories, vignettes, and paradoxes that administrative scientists need to begin to take into account. That
alone makes this book a significant contribution to advancing administrative science." Ven, A. H. V. d.
(1983). "Review: In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies. by Thomas J.
Peters; Robert H. Waterman, Jr." Administrative Science Quarterly 28(4): 621-624.
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Nonetheless, worth noting is the authors emphasis that the organizational elements have
no implied hierarchy or starting point for organizational analysis and/or change. Instead
the authors argue that depending on the organizational context one might have to start
with strategy (i.e. which would be in line with the "strategic choice" view) or that
systems or structure might be more important in driving organizational change. In fact,
the authors propose that organizational systems (processes and equipment as per their
definition) "threatens to dominate the other [organizational elements]" (Waterman Jr,
Peters et al. 1980).
Furthermore, the authors specifically introduce differentiated organizational elements of
style and staff which previously were lumped together as "individual" (Nadler and
Tushman 1980). Style is concerned with whether an organization's leadership style is
accepted by the underlying culture. Staff is assessed on a spectrum of variables ranging
from hard to soft, namely on one end, appraisal systems, pay scales, and on the other end,
morale, motivation, and behavior. Conversely, unlike previous frameworks, strategy and
external environment are lumped together as organizational decision makers make sense
of their markets and plan accordingly.
Additionally, the framework includes "Skills" as a means of capturing an organization's
core capabilities in delivering a product and/or service, which may present obstacles for
improvement initiatives (e.g. a prevailing manufacturing mentality versus an enterprise
perspective). Finally, the authors provide visibility to "superordinate goals" which
constitute the often unwritten guiding concepts of values and aspirations that go beyond
conventional formal statements of corporate objectives. Furthermore, the authors explain
that a manager's goal is to attajn organization effectiveness but they don't offer any
definition for it and instead caution that "the few at the top seldom agree entirely on the
goals of their enterprise, let alone on maximization against one goal" (Waterman Jr,
Peters et al. 1980).
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3.3.8 1984: Randolph and Dess' Congruence Perspective of
Organization Design
Randolph and Dess (1984) provided an organization design literature integrating
framework, which adopts a congruence perspective and explicitly includes both a
"strategic choice" view and a "population ecology" view whilst examining the
relationships among environment, strategy, process, and structure. The authors also
include feedback control loops not only in terms of a design's resultant organizational
performance, but also the potential resistance and/or difficulties in transforming
processes and/or structures (see Figure 3-5).
------------------------------------
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Figure 3-5: The Congruence Model of Organization Design (Randolph and Dess 1984)
In terms of performance the authors don't offer a specific definition but recognize the
need for a multidimensional construct which includes both financial and non-financial
measures, and recommend using if possible both objective and perceptual measures.
Finally, the article is a conceptual contribution but offers a recommendation for
operational izing a research study aimed at studying the relationship between congruency
of organizational elements and organizational performance, namely that it should be
empirically based given the richness of organizations' contextual data.
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3.3.9 1986: Daft and Lengel's Organization Information
Requirements
Daft and Lengel (1986) published a highly cited article36 in which they leveraged the
information processing organization design concept (Tushman and Nadler 1978) and
offered a higher granularity in examining information richness and structural designs.
Once again the conceptual article adopted the multi-organizational element and
congruency view of organizational design. However, in terms of structure, process, and
environment, it went beyond merely suggesting that a relationship existed, and did in fact
suggest specific alternative structural characteristics which should be used in different
settings.
To begin with, the authors argued that having more data available to managers does not
necessarily translate into less uncertainty given that the data may be unclear (i.e. degree
of equivocality). In other words they disagree with studies that regard structure and
process as congruent merely because a frequent data flow takes place between them. As
such the authors conceptualized the information role of structural characteristics for
reducing equivocality or uncertainty (e.g. the use of rules and regulations where
information needs aren't as rich and uncertain vs. the use of group meetings where a
significant degree of information equivocality may be present) and also examined the
impact of departmental characteristics (i.e. degree of similarity of processes and degree of
interdependence between departments).
Finally, although the framework also considers an organization's environment (i.e. higher
environmental turbulence requires an organic structure, whereas lesser turbulence can
leverage a mechanistic structure), as with Tushman and Nadler, no mention is made
regarding an organization's strategy or mission and how these might relate to the
remaining organizational elements. Additionally, a specific definition of organizational
performance isn't offered and any allusion to it is kept at a task level (e.g. did the process
meet the manager's expectations [whatever these may be]?).
36 4112 citations on google scholar as of 30h September 2010
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3.3.10 1986: Lewin and Minton's Generalized Process Model of
Organizations
Lewin and Minton (1986) "propose a research approach utilizing a strategy of
engineering organizational effectiveness" which is captured in their generalized process
model of organizations (see Figure 3-6). As before, the authors characterize organizations
as being comprised of multiple organizational elements, including environment,
processes, structure, and strategy. However, the authors additionally suggest some
specific constructs for all of the organizational elements (i.e. not just those associated
with structure such as division of labor, role definition, etc).
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Figure 3-6: A Generalized Process Model of Organizations37 (Lewin and Minton 1986)
37 Interestingly the authors are one of the first to use the term "architecture" in an organization design
context; however their description of architecture only includes the traditional components of structure.
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In adopting a contingency theory approach and in recognizing performance as a
multidimensional construct, the authors assert that different organizational designs
present different performance tradeoffs. As an example one can consider the different
design implications from the different requirements espoused by information processing
theories (e.g. organizational performance is a function of information processing
capacity) and the systems resource approach (e.g. organization's ability to acquire scarce
and valued resources from the environment). The former may require an assortment of
team meetings and standard rules, whereas the latter may require specific and/or
additional resources at scanning the environment for more resourcing opportunities or
potentially renegotiating existing contractual relationships.
As such the authors recommend that researchers adopt an empirical approach in
determining whether or not specific organization designs are indeed more appropriate for
certain organizational performance criteria. Furthermore, such an approach could address
"the relatively little published empirical work [on] the implied causality between
organization designs and effectiveness outcomes" (Lewin and Minton 1986). Others had
already expressed similar views and requested "very intensive and very thorough case
studies" (Campbell 1977) to explore the same relationship. Moreover, rich descriptions
made available through the case method would allow one to leverage the multi-
organizational element perspective on organization design while describing the
relationships amongst them in a holistic 38 fashion rather than adopting the predominant
pair-wise descriptions.
3.3.11 Summary Analysis of Organizational Assessment
Frameworks
By the mid eighties the organization design literature was converging on several fronts.
First, organizations should be conceptualized as open-systems comprised of several
organizational elements, which most commonly included structure, process, strategy, and
environment. Second, the alignment, fit, or congruency amongst organizational elements
translates into higher organizational performance, thus scholars should look beyond mere
38 Which is consistent with LAI's Lean Enterprise Principle 1 described in section 2.4.5.
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"pair-wise" relationships and explore organizational elements holistically. Third,
organization design should reflect the "strategic choice" and "population ecology" views,
as well as potential inertia emerging from existing organizational processes and structures.
Fourth, organizations are comprised of multiple internal configurations which may
generate different levels of organizational performance in different parts of the same
organization.
The reviewed organizational assessment frameworks also commonly share opportunities
for further theoretical and empirical development in that they are only conceptual in
nature and seldom specify constructs for each of their organizational elements. For
instance, the authors refer to similar theories when describing the interactions among
organizational elements but the reader is left with interpreting and defining constructs if
he or she were to attempt operationalizing an empirical study. Furthermore, although the
importance of congruence beyond "pair-wise" organizational element relationships is
noted, the authors fail to characterize, or even conceptualize, the implications of adopting
such holistic perspective. Finally, although these frameworks merit the relationship
between organizational design and organizational performance, most of them have
several of the limitations described in Chapter 2 (e.g. definition of performance in terms
of goal attainment) and/or adopt narrowly defined hypothesis of performance (e.g.
performance is described only as a function of information processing capability).
3.4 Enterprise Architecture
Over the course of the PhD, the author benefitted from the opportunity of being Teaching
Assistant for Prof. Deborah Nightingale's graduate course "Integrating the Lean
Enterprise" listed in both the engineering and management course catalogues at MIT.
The course is primarily focused on breaking traditional mindsets of lean and allowing
students to appreciate the requirements and benefits of following lean enterprise
principles39 . The last lecture of the course introduces the concept of Enterprise
39 Chapter 2's in-depth longitudinal literature review also reflects this approach, in that it describes lean
from its origins towards the latest thinking of lean enterprise principles.
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Architecture (EA) as the natural follow-on step. When asked about the meaning of EA,
without fail every year, students described EA from an Information Technology (IT)
perspective explaining that it is a way of relating data, systems, and software. This notion
isn't necessarily inaccurate, but it is incomplete and does speak to the existence of a
prevalent EA perspective which isn't the same as the one followed in this research.
As such, in this section we begin by examining the origins of EA from its IT perspective,
and we contrast it with the broader conceptualization of EA adopted by MIT's Lean
Advancement Initiative (LAI). However, in accord with what our review of the
organizational science literature uncovered in the previous section, we compare and
contrast MIT'S NREAF with the most influential frameworks proposed by
configurational theorists of the past four decades. Finally, an appreciation for the inherent
difficulties of EA research is provided along with specific research methods
recommendations offered by leading scholars in the field.
3.4.1 The IT lens of EA
Several systems thinkers (Rhodes and Nightingale 2008; Glazner 2009; Lankhorst 2009;
Rhodes, Ross et al. 2009) have attributed the beginnings of EA to John Zachman (1987)
who as an engineer at IBM developed a framework for information systems architecture.
Zachman recognized that information system implementations were increasing in size
and complexity, and along with the prevalent system failure and/or inefficiency rates the
author proposed a descriptive framework "for defining and controlling the interfaces and
integration of all the components of the system" (Zachman 1987). By system the author
refers to the underlying infrastructure (e.g. computers, servers, etc), software (e.g.
databases, applications, etc), programming languages, and data. Also, by the author's
own admission the framework's scope doesn't include business strategy as it is
considered an independent concept from that of information systems.
Interestingly, although the IT lens of EA revolves around information and information
infrastructure, no consideration is given to the earlier writings from organization
science's literature on the information processing view of organizations (Galbraith 1974;
Tushman and Nadler 1978). In essence, the two fields developed independently of each
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other.
Lankhorst (2009) presents one of the most recent EA contributions that still adopts an IT
perspective (e.g. describing object-oriented programming and modeling languages;
discussing the issue of semantics and shared ontologies in enabling data and system
interoperability; etc). However, the book's last chapter is duly entitled "Beyond
Enterprise Architecture" and the author recognizes that EA is fundamentally "a holistic
approach to the design of organisations [which include different domains of]
organisation, information, systems, products, processes, and applications [and that] we
have to look at this from both a business and technical perspective" (Lankhorst 2009).
Notably the author recognizes that the inclusion of components beyond IT is not only
complicated in terms of understanding each component individually but also in terms of
the potential interdependencies amongst them. Ultimately, the author explicitly notes that
EA "is progressively seen not just as a tactical instrument for designing an
organisation's systems and processes, but as a strategic tool for enterprise governance."
(Lankhorst 2009). Interestingly, the author offers an explanation as to why EA has
predominantly had its IT centric view, namely that the failures of applications and
systems are immediately visible (e.g. Microsoft's failures highly popularized by its "blue
screen of death" (Garfinkel 2005)) and it is easier to blame the computer rather than an
intangible business process.
3.4.2 The Strategic Advantage IT lens of EA
Around the same time that Zachman produced EA's IT lens framework several
researchers at MIT's Sloan School of Management were beginning to enlarge the
boundaries of their problem statement.
Notably, Madnick and Wang (1988) set the foundation for a theory of Composite
Information Systems (CIS) which argued for a mindset shift from designing IT merely as
a support function (e.g. code, databases, applications, systems) to one of strategic
importance. Successful organizations were those capable of carefully selecting the right
mix of strategic applications, technology, and organizational responses. Although the
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authors also mainly adopted an IT lens, they were one of the first to bring attention to the
need for linking strategy, IT, and organizational context when planning and managing
information systems.
The linkage between IT and organizational processes was further emphasized in an
influential article by Michael Hammer (1990), who identified himself as president of an
IT consulting firm. Hammer noted that IT investment was failing to meet expectations as
it was simply being used to automate and speed up existing processes thereby not
addressing their "fundamental performance deficiencies". Hammer brought into
perspective the need to consider reengineering an enterprise's processes, ridding them of
their inefficiencies, and only then using IT to automate the newly designed processes.
The need for linkage then progressed to a need for "alignment between the business and
IT strategies of organizations" (Henderson and Venkatraman 1999) thereby implying that
both a technical and overall enterprise strategy should exist. The authors state that no
single IT application, no matter how sophisticated it may be, can deliver an organization
with sustained competitive advantage. Instead, the authors follow a conceptualization
consistent with the strategic choice view of organization design and claim that value from
IT investments can only be enabled when strategic fit between market positioning and
administrative structure (i.e. skills, processes, organization) is in place. However, once
again the use of architecture is IT-centric as evident in the following definition: "portfolio
of applications, the configuration of hardware, software, and communication, and the
data architecture that collectively define the technical infrastructure" (Henderson and
Venkatraman 1999). Nonetheless, the authors make a useful distinction between strategic
integration (i.e. bidirectional alignment of business and technical strategies) and
operational integration (i.e. bidirectional alignment of business processes and
organization with IT infrastructure and processes). Finally, the authors emphasize that
there isn't a best alignment perspective (i.e. otherwise everyone would mimic it and it
wouldn't be strategic) and that there isn't a predefined starting point in designing an
organization.
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The next evolution in the strategic advantage IT lens was evident in the change of
terminology from IT Architecture to Enterprise IT Architecture (Ross 2003). The author
first begins by noting how infrastructure and architecture are often used interchangeably
as evident in Zachman's framework which "does not help distinguish the relative
importance ofprocesses. The output of the architecture process is often volumes of
detailed drawings that are overwhelming in their volume and scope [... as] a result of the
architecture function being buried in lower levels of the IT organization" (Ross 2003).
Such is a useful characterization of the traditional IT lens of EA but yet again it also
reveals that this contribution is concerned with the IT organization, albeit from a more
abstract level. Similarly to Madnick and Wang (1988) the author proposes that
organization design should begin with defining an organization's strategic objectives.
Also, similarly to Henderson and Venkatraman (1999) the author notes the need for the
mutually reinforcing alignment of key IT capabilities with business strategy in order to
enable the business strategic objectives. However, Ross introduces the concept of
organizational learning to describe how organizations' have different levels of
architectural maturity (i.e. application silo architecture -> standardized technology
architecture -> rationalized data architecture -> modular architecture) and that they must
continuously build their competency in order to sustain or evolve in their maturity.
Finally, the author briefly mentions an important observation that "complex organizations
have multiple architectures, which may be at different stages [of architectural maturity]"
(Ross 2003) and that these reflect different organizational structures and different
objectives. More recently Ross has adopted the term Enterprise Architecture but her
conceptualization still remains IT centric as evident in the following definition:
"Enterprise architecture is the organizing logic for business processes and IT
infrastructure, reflecting the integration and standardization requirements of the firm's
operating model" (Ross 2006).
3.4.3 The Lean Enterprise lens of EA
When examining both the Strategic Advantage and the traditional IT lenses of EA (i.e.
the two previous subsections) it is clear that several merits exist in their contribution to
the study of the relationship between organizational design and organizational
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performance. As with the frameworks from the configurational perspective, the Strategic
Advantage IT lens is holistic in examining organizations beyond a single element (e.g. IT,
strategy, organization) and also identifies the importance of fit or congruence amongst
mutually reinforcing elements in order to attain higher performance, or rather, better
outcomes from IT investments. Moreover, the arrangement among internal organizational
design elements, if done in a way that they reinforce each other, is thought to enable an
enterprise with higher performance. However, by applying the 1St lean enterprise
principle (described in Chapter 2 Section 2.4.5) it is also clear that although such lenses
are holistic they aren't holistic enough as they fundamentally remain IT centric and don't
allow, for instance, for organizations to be characterized without IT as an element. For
instance, earlier writings from organization science's literature on the information
processing view of organizations noted that "providing inappropriate information
sources to participants in work units [...] could lead to decision errors within the
organization" (Daft and Macintosh 1981) and suggested that different types of problems
may require different types of organizational structures (e.g. cross disciplinary teams;
face-to-face meetings; etc) supporting different processes (i.e. routine vs. non-routine)
which may or not have any use of IT.
Furthermore, the IT lenses exclusively focus on the processes and strategic objectives
that directly pertain to the IT capability, and ignore an organization's remaining
characteristics thereby lacking an enterprise management perspective. Understandably,
they have been adequately categorized as IT lenses of EA (Nightingale and Rhodes 2004;
Nightingale and Rhodes 2007; Rhodes and Nightingale 2008; Nightingale 2009; Rhodes,
Ross et al. 2009). Also, as previously noted, the work of Hammer (Hammer 1990) raised
the awareness of redesigning processes before attempting to introduce IT to automate
organizations. However, those following the school of Business Process Reengineering
(BPR) have also recently recognized that BPR efforts themselves have been narrowly
focused at the process level and that these should also include "organizational structure,
people, communication and technology" (Reijers and Liman Mansar 2005). A similar
observation was made by MIT systems thinkers who also explained that although
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numerous EA frameworks exist (e.g. DoDAF, TOGAF, etc40), these "frameworks are
overly complex and emphasize an aggregated rather than holistic architecture" (Rhodes,
Ross et al. 2009). Thus, the meaning of holistic pertains not only to an enlarged number
of views used in the framework but also to an "understanding of the interactions of the
views [which] becomes of increased importance" (Rhodes and Nightingale 2008).
However, the authors also emphasize that the framework should remain simple enough to
support effective decision making given the cognitive limitations of decision makers.
Such is akin to Porter's call for a clear intellectual framework capable of guiding strategy
and informing decision makers about choices and tradeoffs in organizations (Porter 1996).
Recognizing that an enriched view of EA was necessary, researchers at MIT adopted a
systems perspective and began conceptualizing a framework with eight views: Policy/
External factors; Strategy; Process; Organization; Knowledge; Information Technology;
Product, Service (see Figure 3-7 and Table 3-3).
.f
Figure 3-7: A Holistic Enterprise Architecture Framework (Nightingale and Rhodes 2007)
40 The authors quote Schekkerman, J. (2004). How to survive in the jungle of enterprise architecture
frameworks : creating or choosing an enterprise architecture framework. Victoria, B.C., Trafford.
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NP431cy External Facias
Upon inspection it is clear that the framework leverages the earlier definition of lean
enterprises as "complex, highly integrated systems comprised ofprocesses, products,
organizations, and information, with multifaceted interdependencies and
interrelationships across their boundaries" (Nightingale 2002). The framework itself
represents preliminary generalized results from several years of empirical studies and
should be adapted to the specific context of each enterprise under analysis (Rhodes, Ross
et al. 2009).
Table 3-3: Enterprise Architecture Views (Nightingale 2009)41
EA Views Description
Strategy Strategic goals, vision and direction of the enterprise including the
business model; enterprise metrics and objectives
Policy / The external regulatory, political and societal environments in which the
External enterprise operates.
Process Core leadership, lifecycle and enabling processes by which the enterprise
creates value for its stakeholders.
Organization The organizational structure of the enterprise as well as relationships,
culture, behaviors and boundaries between individuals, teams and
organizations.
Knowledge The implicit and tacit knowledge, capabilities, and intellectual property
resident in the enterprise.
Information Information needs of the enterprise, including flows of information as
well as the systems and technologies needed to ensure information
availability.
Product Product(s) developed by the enterprise; key platforms; modular vs.
integral architectures, etc.
Services Services(s) delivered and or supplied by the enterprise, including in
support of products.
MIT's NREAF is an abstract representation of an enterprise and provides an approach for
understanding and analyzing the "as is" state of an enterprise, as well as study various
alternative changes and proposed interventions (Rhodes and Nightingale 2008) in the
process of architecting the enterprise future state to attain its value proposition and
desired behaviors (Nightingale and Rhodes 2007; Rhodes, Ross et al. 2009).
41 By inspection, Nightingale's 2009 publication reflects a key theoretical maturation of one MIT'S
NREAF views. Specifically, Figure 3-7 illustrates a 2007 reference of MIT'S NREAF where one its EA
views is designated as "Information Technology", whereas in Table 3-3, a 2009 reference, it reads as a
broader concept of "Information".
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The relationships and associated directions amongst EA views reflect the EAF authors'
recommendations as to how enterprises should be architected or designed to reach their
desired future state. Specifically, "some views drive or determine the architectures and
the required attributes of other views" (Nightingale 2009). Notably, strategy is
considered to be the primary view and drives process, organization, and knowledge. In
turn, the process architecture is suggested as a driver in defining the organizational
architecture. The IT view is driven by almost all other views (except the Policy / External
Factors view) and indirectly influences the Knowledge view. Finally, reciprocal view
relationships are also suggested and explained in the case of Strategy and
Products/Services (i.e. strategy determines whether to follow a modular vs. integral
product architecture, and in turn, the product architecture may help the enterprise achieve
competitive advantage).
3.5 Leveraging EA Systems Thinking and Organizational
Science literatures
The EA Systems Thinking and Organizational Science literatures often allude to their
work being more of an art or craft rather than a science. For instance, Van de Ven and
Ferry (1980) noted that organizational assessment frameworks provide few process
guidelines on the different steps required in assessing an organization, and that a
researcher is forced to learn by trial and error. Similarly, systems thinkers have
considered the design of business enterprises more of an art than science given the
inherent difficulty of understanding and predicting enterprise behaviors stemming from
the various EA view interactions (Rhodes and Nightingale 2008; Glazner 2009).
Furthermore, systems thinkers have stated that there isn't a "universally agreed upon set
of [EA] views that can completely specify an enterprise, or even [agreement on] how
many views are required to describe it completely" (Glazner 2009).
Perhaps for these reasons, some authors have observed that frameworks "vary in quality,
validity, and sophistication depending on the nature and the extent of the experiences of
the model builder, his or her perceptiveness, his or her ability to conceptualize and
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generalizefrom experiences, and so on" (Nadler and Tushman 1980). However, in
general, frameworks have been found lacking if they are unable to develop beyond very
high level descriptions of variables with unclear operational definitions (Pugh, Hickson et
al. 1963), and neglect to build on well informed theory which allows to draw distinctions
and relationships of conceptual significance (Miller 1996). For instance, this chapter's
Section 3.3 already illustrated an example of a common mischaracterization of the
organizational science literature when systems thinkers have considered it to be
stovepipped as a whole, thereby neglecting the contributions of configurational theorists
mentioned in the same section. Furthermore, contingency theorists, configurational
theorists, and indeed systems thinkers have often used words such as fit, congruence,
alignment, and holistic, which in the absence of clear descriptive guidelines make it
difficult to compare and operationalize their contributions (Venkatraman 1989).
Notably, MIT'S NREAF is in its nascent phase of development (Nightingale 2009) and
its authors have noted that they are capable "at best [to] cite heuristics and emerging
principles on how enterprises should be architected [so that they] can most effectively
produce its desired outcome" (Rhodes and Nightingale 2008). As such, and as stated in
Chapter 1, one of the main motivations of this research is to theoretically enrich MIT's
NREAF . To that effect, what follows is a synthesis of Section 3.3's in-depth literature
analysis of organizational frameworks from a configurational perspective while
leveraging MIT's NREAF EA views.
Table 3-4 includes the ten organizational science frameworks described previously ,
44which ranged from as early as 1963 to 1986, and accumulated close to 8000 citations
While these authors don't necessarily list all of the EA views individually and/or give
them the same name, their framework descriptions warrant an interpretation as depicted
on Table 3-4. For instance, earlier authors refer to technology instead of process, and
similarly to structure instead of organization. Similarly, Tushman and Nadler's (1978)
42 As was the case with the theoretical enrichment of the 7 Lean Enterprise Principles (See Chapter 2
Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.6) which followed the recommendation of supporting expert opinion with both
empirical evidence and theoretical underpinning.
41 See section 3.3.
44 On google scholar as of 12h October 2010.
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organizational conceptualization does not include information in their visual
representation, but it is clearly embedded in their conceptualization as it derives from the
information processing theory. Ultimately, Table 3-4 allows one to clarify that these
contributions from configurational theorists don't warrant the stovepipped metaphor as
they aren't necessarily IT centric or centric on any other view for that matter, and they
equally call for holistic organizational designs to derive higher performance.
Table 3-4: NREAF Synthesis of Organizational Frameworks from a Configurational Perspective
NREAF Views
0 o
S 0
Reference P 4
(Pugh, Hickson et al. 1963) x x x x
(Perrow 1967) x x x
(Ven1976) x x x x x x
(Nightingale and Toulouse 1977) x x x
(Tushman and Nadler 1978) x x x x x
(Nadler and Tushman 1980) x x x x x
(Waterman Jr, Peters et al. 1980) x x x x
(Randolph and Dess 1984) x x x x
(Daft and Lengel 1986) x x x x x
(Lewin and Minton 1986) x x x x
Similarly, denoting the configurational perspective, several of the frameworks emphasize
the importance of studying interactions amongst organizational elements (i.e. EA views).
Unlike the NREAF which mainly adopts a "strategic choice" approach to enterprise
architecture, several of the frameworks on Table 3-4 adopt both a "strategic choice" and
"population ecology" views. For instance, they elaborate in detail on how an
organization's structure may resist or even invalidate a given strategy if it isn't supported
by adequate incentive mechanisms or if it clashes fundamentally with the underlying
culture, among other reasons. Similarly, they propose that an organization's structure
may directly influence its external environment without such an interaction being
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necessarily part of the organization's strategy (e.g. participation in professional societies;
regulatory boards; board of directors; etc). Likewise, they emphasize how regulatory
changes can have a direct impact on organizational processes and structure, which only
later become common knowledge to strategy planners (e.g. mid level management have
autonomy to adjust to environment changes without requiring detailed scrutiny or
execution plans from central headquarters). Others go as far as saying that all
organizational elements connect with each other and that the starting point of analysis
varies with each enterprise context. Also, looking back at the Strategic Advantage IT lens
of EA, Ross (2003) goes as far as saying that IT not only influences organization and
process, but may also shape strategy (i.e. as opposed to only being driven by other
organizational elements).
Notably, a key limitation from Table 3-4 is that none of the frameworks presents
empirical evidence and are thus only conceptual in nature and seldom specify constructs
for each of their organizational elements. Thus, although theoretical contributions have
been made suggesting how different organizational elements are interrelated and that
their congruence assumingly enables organizational performance, the question still
demands empirical study and additional theoretical refinement. Specifically, in the
context of this research this thesis poses the following research question: Can one create
an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture?; our follow-on and final
research question for this thesis then becomes: Can hospital performance be improved
through an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture and if so, how?
Ultimately, it is helpful to distinguish future contributions in terms of suggested
enterprise architecting interaction recommendations (i.e. which organizational elements
drive/are driven by other elements), or instead, reflect an enterprise diagnostic mindset
which holds no pre-conceived notion of organizational element interactions including
strength and direction. The latter is most appropriate in the context of this research given
the nascent phase of EA theoretical development and the intent to iteratively improve our
understanding and characterization of each of the EA views both individually and
holistically while comparing and contrasting empirical results and ultimately enriching
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our understanding of EA, and that of hospitals in particular. As such, another value of
Table 3-4 is that it shows a convergence in terms of organizational elements which allows
to mitigate the absence of a universally agreed upon set of EA views, and demonstrates
that MIT'S NREAF offers the most complete conceptualization and is thus the most
appropriate to inform this research.
Finally, as per the suggestion of Drucker's theory of the business (1994)5 one can begin
uncovering and articulating the relationship between Lean Enterprise Principles (Chapter
2) and Enterprise Architecture, and what is entailed in rethinking an entire enterprise
(Nightingale 2002).
Table 3-5: Summary of LAI's Lean Enterprise Principles (Nightingale 2009)
Lean Enterprise Description
Principle
1 Adopt a holistic approach to enterprise transformation
2 Identify relevant stakeholders and determine their value propositions
3 Focus on enterprise effectiveness before efficiency
4 Address internal and external enterprise interdependencies
5 Ensure stability and flow within and across the enterprise
6 Cultivate leadership to support and drive enterprise behaviors
7 Emphasize organizational learning
For instance, the following is a complementary analysis of Table 3-4's publications using
the 7 Lean Enterprise Principles (summarized in Table 3-5):
* 1St Principle: at a glance it is clear that no single framework is as complete as the
NREAF in terms of the individual organizational elements that are deemed
important. Such is similar to the previous assessment made on the IT lenses of EA.
0 2nd Principle: although almost all of the frameworks include organization and
policy/external they do so often times either from a customer (i.e. end-user) or
employee perspective, and neglect to consider the wider ensemble of enterprise
stakeholders (e.g. suppliers, regulators, unions, etc) which form a multiple
constituency value proposition for the enterprise.
* 3 rd Principle: those publications with no appreciation for strategy would be less
4 Described in greater detail in Chapter 2 Section 2.4
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likely to observe the tradeoffs between efficiency and effectiveness (e.g. empirical
efforts would be made to understand how all departments share information in a
given enterprise, when perhaps some departments aren't even included in the
enterprise's strategic objectives). Similarly, those publications mainly adopting an
IT lens fail to consider architecture solutions which don't necessarily include IT
(e.g. explore whether a process can be redesigned or even eliminated before
automating it with IT)
4th and 5 th Principles: none of the contributions include descriptions akin to the
systems thinking concept of service/product architectures. Although stability and
flow are desired behaviors emerging from a given enterprise design, they are
fundamentally linked to the essential design consideration of addressing internal
and external interdependencies (e.g. empirical efforts could benefit from a
structure and potential phenomena of interest stemming from following a patient
throughout a value stream, rather than simply observing the interdependence
amongst a random sample of departments). This is perhaps the primary limitation
of previous frameworks as it represents a fundamental systems thinking principle
without which characterizing and understanding system behavior is limited.
S 7th Principle: several of the frameworks don't include an explicit consideration for
knowledge and/or information which are essential enablers of lean enterprises.
3.6 Chapter 3 Summary
In this chapter we used the organizational science and systems thinking literatures in the
characterization of Enterprise Architecture. We introduced and gave several accounts of
studies relating organizational design and organizational performance, including
healthcare and other service domains. Recognizing that authors use different constructs of
performance and focus on different aspects of organizational design, we categorized and
discussed the advantages and limitations of three different types of conceptualizations,
namely the universalistic perspective, the contingency perspective, and the
configurational perspective.
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Having identified the value of the configuration perspective as a means of holistically
studying patterns of multiple interdependent organizational variables and relating them to
performance, we used as many as ten of its most influential organizational frameworks to
inform our research. To that effect we conducted a longitudinal review which discusses at
length the convergence towards a set of common organizational elements, and the
different theoretical considerations as to how they interrelate and ultimately affect
performance.
Finally, we introduced Enterprise Architecture from a systems thinking perspective and
first examined its predominant interpretation from an IT lens, followed by a broader Lean
Enterprise lens. In examining in detail MIT'S NREAF we noted its nascent phase of
development, but by comparing it in a synthesis of other frameworks, we selected it as
the most complete representation to inform this research. Furthermore, we not only found
support for its EA views, but also clarified its contribution beyond being holistic,
exploring EA view interactions, and being non-IT centric. To that effect, we also
articulated how the theory of the business, or rather the Lean Enterprise Principles, are
intimately related with how one conceptualizes EA and explores its EA view interactions.
Ultimately, we established the need to enrich MIT'S NREAF, and doing so in the context
set by this thesis (i.e. hospitals). Specifically, we posed our two remaining research
questions for this thesis:
* Can one create an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture?
e Can hospital performance be improved through an enriched understanding of
hospital enterprise architecture and if so, how?
In the next chapter we frame the health care literature to offer a systems perspective and
that of hospitals in particular. Furthermore, the chapter discusses key hospital
characteristics and how these in turn need to be reflected in this thesis' research design,
so as to adequately address our four research questions.
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4. Understanding the US Health Care System and
Hospitals in Particular
In the previous two chapters we presented the core of the knowledge-base used to inform
the data collection and analysis of the hospital exploratory research cases presented in
this dissertation. In Chapter 2 we reviewed the literature on enterprise performance
measurement and also included a multidisciplinary analysis on hospital performance
measurement in particular, having found that it traditionally has focused on one or two
performance dimensions, and although most recent publications advocate broader
performance assessments, these are still at a conceptual level and lack empirical data. In
Chapter 3 we conducted a multidisciplinary longitudinal literature review on the
theoretical evolution of enterprise architecture, and concluded that MIT's emerging
Nightingale-Rhodes Enterprise Architecture Framework (NREAF) offers the most
complete conceptualization of enterprise architecture and is thus the most appropriate to
inform this research.
This chapter is the third and final chapter of our knowledge-base where we specifically
examine the healthcare literature from a system's perspective. We begin by describing
how the US health care system is generally considered fragmented and referred to as a
cottage industry. Next, we examine the US health care system's performance both using
specific internal studies on various performance dimensions, and also using international
benchmarks conducted by reputable third party organizations. We then proceed with the
examination of the US health care system's regulatory and payment environment. Finally,
we investigate US hospitals in particular by first describing their key challenges,
followed by an analysis of their inherent complexity and heterogeneous characteristics,
and ultimately we identify the literature's recommendation for the preferred hospital
model given the US health care system's overall context.
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4.1 The US Health Care "Cottage Industry"
Today, one would be hard pressed not to find negative assessments of the US health care
industry. Politicians characterize a system with serious problems such as costs rising at
three times the inflation rate, an overwhelming number of uninsured Americans, sky
rocketing malpractice insurance fees, and low government reimbursement rates (Grassley
2009). Others, refrain from using the terms "system" and "health care" in the same
sentence given the dysfunctional fragmented payment layer comprised by public
programs, private markets, employer-based insurance, and special initiatives (Redlener
and Grant 2009). Similarly, the president of Johns Hopkins University was quoted:
"Simply stated, the US does not have a health care system" (Eastman 2007) as he alluded
to the highly fragmented nature and variation of billing, care provision, accountability,
safety, etc, inherent in the delivery of care.
Truth be told, the negative publicity surrounding the US Health Care system isn't a
product of today. For several decades there have been debates and a series of piecemeal
reforms which have left the system fundamentally the same (Porter 2009). In fact, already
in the 1970s, one of today's most prominent health care systems thinkers was observing
the beginning of a worrisome trend:
"Public concern over the rapid increase in hospital costs and the quality of services
delivered has been a factor in the increase in regulation of the hospital industry."
(Shortell, Becker et al. 1976)
A characterization of the US health care system that has taken hold is that of it being a
cottage industry, largely because of the proliferation of autonomous physicians practicing
in small groups with limited oversight or coordination, who eschew standardization and
deliver costly lower quality care (Swensen, Meyer et al. 2010). Ultimately, many agree
the health care system presents a complex problem for which the solution is neither
obvious nor likely to be painless (Chemew, Sabik et al. 2010). Specifically, "all savings
represent lost income for somebody, and affected stakeholders have successfully blocked,
weakened, or circumvented past attempts at cost control" (Hussey, Eibner et al. 2009).
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For these reasons, our research stands to benefit from a systems perspective that
examines the US health care's complex socio-technical characteristics from multiple
enterprise perspectives.
4.2 US Health Care System Performance
The key categories often referred to when assessing the performance of the health care
system are access, quality, and cost. In terms of access, an estimated 15% of the US
population is uninsured (Thorpe 2007), as much as 75% of care providers practice alone
or in groups of five or fewer (Blumenthal and Glaser 2007). Furthermore, as many as
50% of the US bankruptcy filers in 2001 stated that their medical related expenses led to
their financial downfall, and as many as 75% of them had insurance at the onset of illness
(Himmelstein, Warren et al. 2005). As for quality, adults on average are said to only
receive as little as 55% of the recommended care for many common conditions
(McGlynn, Asch et al. 2003), and between 44,000 to 98,000 annual deaths are attributed
to medical errors (Kohn, Corrigan et al. 2000). A medical error can consist of a planned
action not being carried out or the wrong plan being executed altogether for a given need.
Specific errors may include adverse drug events, surgical injuries, wrong side injury, falls,
mistaken patient identities, etc. To put things into perspective, one should consider that
even by the lowest estimate, medical errors are the 7th leading cause of death in the US,
which is worse than motor vehicle accidents (43,458), breast cancer (42,297), or AIDS
(16,516) (Chalice 2005).
The Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health System evaluates
the US Health Care system at 66%, where 100% refers to the top known performers
(Berwick, Nolan et al. 2008). Said study found that although US health expenditures are
considerably higher than those of other developed nations, the health outcomes aren't any
better. A recent study from the World Health Organization (2010) reported that the US
ranked 36th in terms of life expectancy at birth, 40th in terms of neonatal mortality rate,
42 "d in terms of infant mortality rate, and 3 3rd in terms of healthy life expectancy, despite
being the 4th country to spend the most per capita on health related expenses (see Table
4-1).
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Table 4-1: World Health Organization Health Economic data per country(adapted from WHO 2010)
Country
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Japan 1 2 15 1 23 8 81.3
San Marino 2 1 1 2 17 7.1 85.5
Andorra 3 6 13 6 21 7.6 69.8
Australia 4 23 26 9 16 8.9 67.5
Iceland 5 3 6 5 6 9.3 82.5
Italy 6 7 16 7 20 8.7 76.5
Monaco 7 8 11 13 3 4 74.8
Switzerland 8 24 28 3 5 10.8 59.3
Canada 9 38 36 20 12 10.1 70
France 10 9 10 12 8 11 79
Israel 11 10 25 18 28 8 55.9
New Zealand 12 39 35 19 22 9 78.9
Norway 13 11 14 14 2 8.9 84.1
Singapore 14 4 4 11 36 3.1 32.6
Spin 15 12 23 8 24 8.5 71.8
Sweden 16 13 5 4 11 9.1 81.7
Austria 17 25 21 25 10 10.1 76.4
Belgium 18 14 19 24 15 9.4 74.1
Cyprus 19 15 27 32 30 6.6 45.6
Finland 20 16 8 21 19 8.2 74.6
Germany 21 26 20 15 14 10.4 76.9
Greece 22 17 12 22 25 9.6 60.3
Ireland 23 27 22 16 9 7.6 80.7
Luxembourg 24 5 3 10 1 7.1 90.9
Malta 25 18 46 27 33 7.5 77.5
Netherlands 26 28 24 17 13 8.9 82
Republic of Korea 27 19 34 30 34 6.3 54.9
United Kingdom 28 29 33 26 18 8.4 81.7
Denmark 29 30 18 23 7 9.8 84.5
Portugal 30 20 9 29 27 10 70.6
Slovenia 31 21 2 28 29 7.8 71.5
Chile 32 45 43 34 55 6.2 58.7
Costa Rica 33 56 59 37 66 8.1 72.9
Kuwait 34 51 53 36 43 2.2 77.5
United Arab Emirates 35 46 44 39 35 2.7 70.5
United States of America 36 40 42 33 4 15.7 45.5
Cuba 37 31 31 35 57 10.4 95.5
Page 133 of 759
A useful exercise is to cross-reference the data of the World Health Organization with
that of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2009) and
determine how countries compare in terms of the number of their practicing generalist
and specialist physicians, as well as the number of medical graduates (see Table 4-2)46.
Notably, the US is amongst the countries with the lowest ratio of practicing physicians as
well as the lowest ratio of medical graduates, per capita. Furthermore, the US is below
average in terms of the ratio of generalist and specialist physicians per capita, as well as
the gap between generalist and specialist physicians.
Table 4-2: OECD Physicians (practicing/graduates/general/specialist) (adapted from OECD 2007)
CountJa an 2.09 #N/ #N/
c.6 0 0 0
Ital .65 1 .6 0.9 .
Frnc 3.3 5.5 1.6 1.734
New Zeln 2.3 6.7M 0.7 0.79
Norwa~~. 3.6 106 082 21
Swde 3.5 10 0. 2.56
B. 2) 2.0
Finan 2.9 6.95 0.7 1.56
Country IL CLN1 IO DCLC4M ) '
Japan 2.09 6 #N/A #N/A
Australia .81 10.1 1.43 1.35
Iceland 3.72 11.6 0.64 2.28
Italy 3.65 11.6 0.92 2.04
Switzerland 3.85 8.1 0.53 2.78
Canada 2.18 6.2 1.04 1.13
France 3.37 5.5 1.64 1.73
New Zealand 2.31 6.7 0.76 0.79
Norwar 3.86 10.6 0.82 2.16
Spain 3.65 8.7 0.86 2
Sweden 3.58 10 0.6 2.56
Austria 3.75 19.4 1.53 2.22
Belgium 4.03 6.9 2.01 2.02
Finland 2.95 6.9 0.73 1.56
Germany 3.5 11.6 1.48 2.03
Greece 5.35 13.3 0.31 3.39
Ireland 3.03 16.5 0.53 1.06
Luxembourg 2.87 #N/A 0.82 2.04
Netherlands 3.93 12.3 0.47 1.01
United Kingdom 2.48 10.2 0.72 1.77
Denmark 3.17 21.7 0.77 1.16
Portugal 3.51, 7.7 1.82 1.69
United States of America 1 2.431 6.3 0.96 1.461
46 The available OECD dataset presented in Table 4-2 is ranked using the same rank featured in Table 4- 1.
Specifically, Japan being ranked I"t by the WHO, is placed 1st in OECD's table, and so on.
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Further inspection of Table 4-1 reveals that in 2007 the US spent 15.7% of its GDP on
health care expenditure. Specifically, 30-40% of said expenditures are thought to be
wasteful (Reid 2005) and for that reason the US health care system is said to be "larded
with inefficiency"(Chernew, Sabik et al. 2010). For instance, in 1999, as much as 31% of
health care expenditures in the US were attributed to administrative costs (Woolhandler,
Campbell et al. 2003). Also, with the government's spending nearing 50% of all health
care expenditure, some argue that the most important force shaping the US health care
system may be federal debt (Chernew, Baicker et al. 2010). Ultimately, US health care
reform discussions have centered on insurance with standard benefit packages (Cortese
and Smoldt 2007) or deep-in-the-weeds debates over technical details (Murray 2010), and
little attention has been given to the care delivery itself thereby undermining the ability to
improve the quality of care and slow the growth of spending (Rittenhouse, Shortell et al.
2009). However, the US is not alone in this approach and both the UK and Canada,
among others, have been found to mostly pursue administrative fiscal interventions with
little effect on the actual delivery of care (Glouberman and Mintzberg 2001).
A closer examination of the US's healthcare spending is provided by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid (2009) in Figure 4-1.
Government
Dental Services and Administration and Net
Other Professionals Cost of Health Insurance Nursing Care Facilities
7% 7% investment' and Continuing Care
e ii Drg Retirement Communities
6%
Medic I Goods
5  Home
Health Care
Figure 4-1: US Health Dollar, Where it Went in 2009
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The largest source of expenditure, namely over 30%, is hospital expenditures. Similarly
the United Kingdom's (UK) highest source of healthcare expenditures are hospital
services and infrastructure (National Health System 2008). Consequently, the strategies
and operations developed and implemented by hospitals have a significant effect on
access, quality, and cost of care (Devers, Brewster et al. 2003) and are considered the top
priority for improvement (Chalice 2005).
With regards to spending patterns there are different ways of examining US health care's
expenditure. To begin with, 10% of the patients account for 70% of the total health care
expenditures. Said patients traditionally have multiple chronic conditions, are admitted
frequently to hospitals, take many medications, and have difficult in independently
performing their daily functions (Bodenheimer and Berry-Millett 2009). In terms of
Medicare, whose patient population is comprised of beneficiaries 65 years and older, a
total of 98% was spent on patients with one or more chronic conditions. Additionally, in
general, on "average per capita spending on people with one or more chronic conditions
is more than five times greater than spending on people without any chronic conditions"
(Anderson 2007).
Finally, when considering the US health care system's performance it is important to
mention that some states, at least in terms of Medicare, spend considerably more than
others and don't deliver higher-quality care or generate greater patient satisfaction (Fisher,
Wennberg et al. 2003; Sutherland, Fisher et al. 2009). Figure 4-2 led some authors go as
far as saying that "states with higher Medicare spending have lower-quality care"
(Baicker and Chandra 2004). In terms of overall quality without regards to spending, one
of the key benchmarks of America's health rankings concluded that in 2010 the top 3
states in the US were Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, which have steadily
remained in the top 10 for the past 10 years (AHR 2010).
Page 136 of 759
Overall quality ranking
1
3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000
Annual Medicare spending per beneficiary (dollars)
Figure 4-2: Relationship between quality and Medicare spending as expressed by overall quality
ranking 2000-2001
Ultimately, the US health care system is faced with serious challenges in terms of
expenditures and the resulting poor performance. However said performance varies
considerably from state to state. Overall a significant amount of health care spending is
thought to be wasteful, and hospitals representing the largest source of expenditure are
necessarily considered the priority for research and improvement. With that in mind, the
remaining sections examine the health care system while using hospitals as the focal unit
of analysis.
4.3 US Health Care System Regulation
The effect of regulation on the US Health Care system, as expected of any complex
socio-technical system, is such that changing even the smallest of features of legislation
can have major, and sometimes unintended, impacts in the system's evolution (Butler
2010). An example commonly referred to in this regard is President Lyndon Johnson's
concession to the American Medical Association in 1965 that physicians charge
Medicare the "usual and customary charge" and hence they had no concern towards
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saving costs where possible (Starr 1982; Stevens 1989; Tolnay, Berkowitz et al. 1993).
As such, it is important to describe an overview of the system's regulatory environment.
Some of the key organizations involved in the regulation of the US Health Care system
include the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), the Joint Commission
for the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO), the National Forum for
Health Care Quality Measurement and Reporting (NQF), and the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS). When considering Figure 4-3, the regulatory environment
for hospitals in particular is generally regarded as cumbersome and confusing (AHA
2005).
Federal Supreme Court State
Survey &| m_ .__. | Certification
Figure 4-3: US Hospital's Regulatory Overview (AHA 2005)
Specifically, different types of regulators focus their attention on different types of issues,
and in turn, pressure hospitals to improve from their isolated perspective. For instance,
whereas NCQA and JCAHO have historically focused on process based measures (e.g.
evidenced-based-medicine guidelines such as taking an aspirin within 15 minutes of a
patient presenting chest pain in the ED), other organizations such as the Leapfrog Group,
and state based agencies, have focused their attention on outcome (e.g. patient
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satisfaction) and structural measures (e.g. patient to nurse ratios) (Romano and Mutter
2004). The end result for hospitals is that "the number and variety of different quality-
reporting systems is a source of increasing confusion and irritation" (Blumenthal and
Epstein 1996).
The following is a description of key legal Acts often referred to in the health care
literature as having a significant effect on health care providers in particular:
" Antitrust Sherman Act (1890): the act regulates interstate commerce and
declares illegal every contract or other vehicles which restraints interstate and
foreign trade. In a hospital context, the concern is to have oversight of potentially
damaging health care provider market power, which could translate into price-
fixing or raising prices above competitive levels (AHA 2010).
" Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (1982): in response to the
problematic rise of health care expenditure's, the TEFRA act mandated the
development of a prospective payment system for Medicare hospital
reimbursements. As such, hospitals could no longer charge on the basis of "usual
and customary charges" (otherwise known as retrospective model47), and instead
were paid a fixed amount calculated on the basis of nationwide provider averages.
Said payments had no bearing on a hospital's actual costs in providing its services,
and weren't open to negotiation.
" Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (1986): the act requires
hospitals and ambulance services to provide care to anyone needing emergency
care regardless of their ability to pay (Murray 2010).
* Stark Law (1989): the act prohibits physicians from making referrals for certain
designated health services payable by Medicare to a provider with whom said
physicians (or immediate family members) have a financial relationship
(compensation, investment, or ownership). The rationale is to prevent physicians'
potential self-serving behavior of ordering unnecessary tests or selecting
providers based on a personal financial reward for doing so
(CentersMedicareMedicaidServices 2010).
47 For a detailed explanation of the different payment model types please refer to section 4.4.
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" Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996): HIPAA created a
framework for defining patient privacy, breeches of privacy, and penalties. The
act had a direct impact on electronic medical records in particular (Shea and
Hripcsak 2010).
* Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (2008): the act
requires the secretary of health and human services to evaluate methods for
ongoing data collection and the measurement and evaluation of disparities in
terms of patient race, ethnic background, and gender (Siegel and Nolan 2009).
Ultimately, hospitals are not only embedded in a fragmented care delivery cottage
industry, but also presented with a regulatory environment which further contributes to
the industry's fragmentation, and poses additional challenges in reconciling the demands
of the multiple stakeholders.
4.4 US Health Care System Payment Structure and Influence
In 2006 the Institute of Medicine (1M) produced a study on the US health care payment
system and found that "the current Medicare payment system is broken. It provides few
disincentives for overuse, under use or misuse of care and does not reward efficiency"
(IOM 2006). Moreover, the IOM committee concluded that current payment systems
don't recognize or reward the coordination of care, and both preventive care and the
treatment of chronic patients who move across various care settings are omitted. In
essence, the current payment system has been considered one of the primary reasons for
the US health care system's fragmentation, unreliability, and waste (Fisher 2006). Next
we examine several aspects contributing to this assessment, and demonstrate how these
aren't once again a product of today, but rather a continuous systemic issue from before.
To begin with, once again we find that negative assessments about the US health care
system, and its payment system in particular, aren't a product of today. Already in the
late eighties there were calls for the integration of health care's financial system, and that
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it recognize that "clients are whole human beings, and providing them with integrated
services necessitates some integration ofpayment sources" (Vladeck 1987).
4.4.1 Overview of key US health care payment models
The following is an overview of the key payment models that exist either in isolation or
in some combination for any hospital in the US:
" Retrospective payment model: as noted, prior to 1983, Medicare made
payments based on "usual and customary charges" otherwise known as the
retrospective payment system (RPS). Essentially, hospitals would charge
Medicare their baseline costs plus some percentage to cover their services. In
some specific circumstances, the RPS is still in place today (e.g. critical access
hospitals located in remote areas).
" Medicare prospective payment model: Medicare introduce the prospective
payment system (PPS) in 1983 which became the inpatient hospital services
standard for over 90% of US providers (Younis and Forgione 2009). With the
shift to PPS hospitals were paid a fixed predetermined amount based on a
patient's principal diagnosis and treatment code which would fall under a specific
diagnose related group (DRG). Said amount is based on the average price of all
hospitals in the US, and isn't subject to negotiation. Therefore, for each inpatient
stay, hospitals are only reimbursed on the basis of a single DRG, regardless of the
costs incurred whilst providing their services. As a result, in some cases hospitals
make a profit or a loss per DRG. Furthermore, if an outpatient visit results in an
inpatient admission within 72 hours, the hospital is only reimbursed on the basis
of the single DRG (e.g. the services provided in an emergency department aren't
billed separately, and are instead considered part of the overall cost of services
rendered).
* Fee-for-service payment model: with the generalized pressure to control costs
while maintaining reasonable levels of quality, managed care systems such as
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) began to emerge (Douglas and Ryman
2003). Much like Medicare attempted to curb costs incurred by the government,
HMOs did the same for the patient enrollees sponsored by employers who
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contracted (or indeed emulated) their services (Dranove and White 1994).
Furthermore, large employer purchasers in particular required that health plans
include specific performance metrics and collect and report data on them (Eddy
1998). Fee-for-service (FFS) represents one of the contractual vehicles between
providers and private insurers, and can also be used with Medicare in special
circumstances (i.e. negotiated carve-outs for specific services). FFS is different
from RPS in that the prices charged by providers are negotiated ahead of time
with payers. Conceivably, the same provider will negotiate with different payers,
different prices, for the same service. Conversely, the same payer will negotiate
with different providers, different prices, for the same service. Hence, service
pricing is arguably more a function of bargaining power rather than the quality
and efficiency of services provided (Porter 2009).
e Capitation payment model: the incentive structure of the traditional FFS
reimbursement evolved towards the incorporation of risk-sharing, otherwise
known as the capitation payment model. The capitation payment model
introduces control mechanism to curb health care services utilization, and
whereby a provider is paid a fixed amount per month and per patient included in
its risk pool. As such, regardless of what a hospital spends in caring for its patient
pool, it receives the same amount whether or not patients underwent care (Zinn
and Mor 1998).
" Pay for performance model: pay for performance (P4P) 48 is the most recent
health care payment model whereby payers (private and public) pay providers for
achieving predetermined goals considered to be a priority by each payer. As
previously noted, some organizations focus on evidence-based-medicine
processes, while others focus their attention on medical outcomes or structural
measures.
48 Although it may seem inconsistent to abbreviate fee-for-service as FFS and pay-for-performance as P4P,
such reflects the practices denoted in the literature and mainstream media.
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4.4.2 Overview of specific effects from each payment model
Each of the previously described payment models has induced both similar and distinct
behaviors amongst providers, as evidenced in the following overview:
e Medicare effects: Bazzoli et al (2008) provide a useful review of the effects of
Medicare changes, on the behaviors of providers as measured by their services
rendered. The literature's consistent finding is that the introduction of DRG's
lowered both service intensity and hospital lengths of stay (i.e. how long a patient
remained as inpatient in a hospital). One study found that hospital occupancy
rates dropped 12% nationally and that they suffered a dramatic downward shift in
the their operating profit margins (Guterman and Dobson 1986). Some evidence
was also found in terms of specific adverse impacts on patient health outcomes
(e.g. acute myocardial infarction patients had worse outcomes than before the
introduction of DRGs). Finally, others have noted that Medicare's DRG
introduced weighting factors to adjust payments to the specific markets
characteristics of a given provider (e.g. wage prices, patient case-mix, provider
geographic location, etc). However, said adjustments were said to account for
only a modes percentage of the variation in costs, thereby forcing underpaid
providers to either exit the market or being to avoid high-cost patients (Robinson
2001).
" Specific HMO effects: the rationale behind managed care (e.g. HMOs) was to
increase buyer power relative to healthcare service providers like hospitals. As
with other industries, the effect of HMO buyer power varied within and across
states as these had significant differences in the total number of patients enrolled
in their programs, versus the total number of patients covered by Medicare. In
general, HMOs stimulated intense competition with and between hospitals
(Douglas and Ryman 2003). Furthermore, the nature of the risk sharing contracts
was also shown to lead physician's to reduce their service offering (Zinn and Mor
1998). For instance, one study found that increases in HMO market share led to a
lower number of cardiac catheterizations, angioplasties, and coronary artery
bypass graft procedures (Volpp and Buckley 2004). However, HMO participation
was also associated with greater adherence to evidence-based-medicine (Brook,
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Kamberg et al. 1990).
* Fee for service effects: FFS allows for physicians to exercise a higher degree of
freedom which in itself has been one of the US health care system's defining
characteristics (Fisher 2006). Furthermore, despite efforts to improve payment
risk adjustments between payers and providers, it remains that health risks have
yet to be sufficiently defined so as to allow hospitals to bear the full risks of
caring for high-risk patients in a non FFS environment (Wang, Conroy et al.
2009). Such an assertion is understandable if we remind ourselves of the
expenditure weight that patients with multiple chronic illnesses today represent
(e.g. 98% of Medicare's expenditures were spent on beneficiaries with one or
multiple chronic diseases; 10% of the patients account for 70% of the total health
care expenditures). Additionally, FFS also supports the introduction of the latest
innovations which ultimately drive technological evolution and set new clinical
excellence practices (Kerr and Scott 2009). However, FFS also has the perverse
financial incentive for physicians to maximize the elective services they provide,
or to introduce unnecessary expensive technologies (Relman 2009). Also, FFS is
also said to pressure physicians into dedicating less time with their patients and to
refer them to the emergency department, who in turn recognizes that it doesn't
have enough time to treat the patient and admits them to the hospital (Gawande,
Fisher et al. 2009). Moreover, there is a cascading effect amongst physicians
referring patients that they could themselves treat if they had the incentive to
spend more time with them. Ultimately, FFS is associated with a health care
system that pays for volume rather than value (Swensen, Meyer et al. 2010).
* Capitation effects: whereas FFS incentivizes volume (i.e. more surgeries, more
admissions, more tests), capitation incentivizes hospitals to keep their patients
healthy and to treat them in the most cost effective manner (Shortell, Gillies et al.
1994). Furthermore, capitation was found to promote the integration between
physicians and hospitals with regards to administrative and practice related
management services, as well as financial risk sharing, the creation of new
services, the investment in computerized integration, and hospital physician
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integration overall (Bazzoli, Dynan et al. 2000)49. On the downside, capitation
also creates incentives for hospitals to use less services which could potentially be
harmful for patients (Shortell, Gillies et al. 1994).
* Pay for performance effects: Pay for performance is recognized as a potential
driving force to improve quality of care, but it also induces fear amongst
physicians in that P4P will focus on the efficiency aspect of care (i.e. the cost of
care) and neglect the overall quality of care (Fisher 2006). Specifically, P4P has
the potential consequence of misaligning the goals of patients and physicians, as
physicians "will be financially motivated to pressure patients into accepting a
mandated treatment, regardless of whether it is compatible with their values or
preferences, or to avoid caring for patients who refuse the mandated treatment".
(Hartzband and Groopman 2009). A recent study received approximately 1000
physician survey responses where 54% of them reported having a fundamental
moral objection to using cost-effectiveness data "to determine which treatments
will be offered to patients" (Antiel, Curlin et al. 2009).
Given the pros and cons presented above, some authors have argued that hospitals should
operate under multiple payment models, as opposed to a single control system, so as to
find the right combination according to the specific economic incentives confronting a
particular stakeholder (Flood 1994). However, while acknowledging the theoretical sense
of such mixed models, more recent publications have noted that most compensation
systems are relatively simple (Robinson 2001). Essentially, the greater the number of
models in operation for a single hospital, the greater are its administrative costs in
negotiating, implementing, and disputing payments with the various payers. Furthermore,
the complexity of mixed models only increases with the existence of multiple
independent payers for a single hospital, who is ultimately undermined in any efforts to
be compliant while facing different incentives from multiple payers (Robinson 2001).
49 It is important to keep in mind that hospitals in general may have different arrangements with the
physicians that practice in their premises. A simplified description is that hospitals may either contract
physicians to work for them, or they may be contracted by physicians in order for them to practice. As such,
the outlined capitation benefits were specifically in the context of contractual relationships between
independent physicians and hospitals.
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In between the lines however, lies a larger discussion to do with the possibility of a single
payer system which has fueled many public and political debates without a clear
conclusion as of yet. If anything, it represents yet another uncertainty factor for hospitals
that will have to once again adjust their service offering to how the payment system
evolves around them.
4.4.3 Overview of the general effects of the US Health Care System
Payment Structure
The following are additional key behaviors induced by the health care system's payment
structure:
e Payers set the direction: the payment system is not only considered fragmented
but also responsible for contributing to "very significant changes in patterns of
health care when payments change"(Gawande, Fisher et al. 2009).
" Managed care induced conflict between hospitals and physicians: while using
data from the late eighties, the existence of managed care organizations, which
came to be with the intent of coordinating care and reducing provider costs, was
associated with increased conflicts between hospitals and individual or group
practice physicians (Bums, Andersen et al. 1993).
" Payer metrics are costly to collect: in general, the public-reporting requirements
set by both regulators and payer organizations aren't not only prohibitive for the
fragmented cottage industry providers, but also for the hospitals and large medical
groups themselves (Fisher 2006). More often than not, providers have to collect
data by hand and review paper-based medical records, or make significant
investments in electronic medical records (Fisher 2006).
e Payer metrics may scare cautious physicians: concerning the metrics
themselves, physicians are said to be largely unfamiliar of how evidence-based
information can guide them towards cost-effectiveness practices, and are hence
fearful of change and potentially resistant to any change in that direction (Antiel,
Curlin et al. 2009).
e Payer metrics reinforce narrow thinking: insurance companies drive
physicians "deeper into their own pigeonholes, on which the measurements are
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based, which further discourages the needed coordination" (Glouberman and
Mintzberg 2001). Similarly, hospitals are rewarded for volume and while
interested in higher local efficiency, they are fearful of systemic efficiencies
which would reduce their revenues or admission rates, and hence threaten their
profitability (Berwick, Nolan et al. 2008).
All in all, the US health care system payment structure doesn't incentivize patient-centric
behavior, and instead rewards providers who cost shift, bargain better margins, and bill
for more services, rather than reward those who deliver the most value (Porter 2009).
More simply, some have argued that "as long as doctors are paid morefor ordering and
doing than for listening and talking, the zest for procedures will regularly exceed the
quest for caring" (Feinstein 2002).
Finally, it is important to note the payment structure's influence on patients themselves,
as their cost sharing has been shown to affect their use of health services (Rosko and
Broyles 1988). Notably, the lowering of patient copayments on specific categories, which
induce higher usage of said categories, isn't necessarily inefficient system use when
considering the patient disease management as a whole (Hussey, Eibner et al. 2009).
Specifically, in the case of patients with chronic diseases, their adherence to drug
regiments may lower their use of hospital services. Also, amid calls for consumer driven
health care (Porter 2009) it is important to note that studies have shown that patients do
not always make the right decisions about the use of services when they are faced with
high cost sharing, and their behavior may hence lead to suboptimal clinical outcomes
(Chernew, Sabik et al. 2010). Ultimately, payment systems affect both health care service
providers, and those who use those services, and hence, further evidence of potential
fragmentation.
4.4.4 Additional sources of physician financial incentives
When considering the health care system's financial incentives for providers, it is
important to also consider that said incentives exist beyond the payer organizations that
procure services for patients. One example is that of health care suppliers such as
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equipment manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies who contract hospitals for their
clinical trials, or even physicians themselves. So much so that physician earnings
stemming from pharmaceutical sources are tracked by the local media of where said
physicians practice. For instance, The Boston Globe published a report of the top five
physician earners in payments from pharmaceutical companies, and specify where they
graduated from, what their specialty is, and where they practice (BostonGlobe 2010).
Notably, two of the physicians resigned from pharmaceutical company speaking bureaus
shortly after the report was published.
4.5 US Hospitals
The previous sections have shared a common theme, namely that of fragmentation. The
US health care system's delivery infrastructure is characterized as a cottage industry.
Similarly, health care's regulatory environment has a proliferation of stakeholders who
focus on different values and demand different things from hospitals and providers in
general. Furthermore, health care's payment system presents not only a series of
administratively heavy models with potentially conflicting effects, but also induces
narrow thinking amongst hospitals. As noted previously, hospitals represent the largest
source of health care expenditure and are considered the top priority for improvement.
Having characterized hospital's external environments, in this section we turn towards
further understanding US hospitals.
4.5.1 US Hospitals core challenges
The American Hospital Association (AHA 2008) provides a fact sheet on hospitals which
includes the following information:
e Over 35 million people are admitted to the hospital each year.
" Hospitals treat nearly 118 million people in their emergency departments (EDs)
and provide care to 481 million other outpatients each year.
e Hospitals employ more than 5 million people. Behind restaurants, hospitals are
the second largest private sector employer. When also accounting for hospital
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purchases of goods and services from other businesses, hospitals support one of
every 10 jobs in the U.S and $1.9 trillion dollars of economic activity.
e Together Medicare and Medicaid represent 55% of care provided by hospitals.
Medicare pays only 91 cents for each dollar spent caring for Medicare patients.
Hospitals receive an average of 86 cents for each dollar spent caring for Medicaid
patients. When Medicare and Medicaid fail to cover their share of hospital costs,
hospitals are forced to make cutbacks that affect the whole community and/or
look to the privately insured to make up the difference.
" In 2006, hospitals provided care to people in need at a cost of over $31 billion of
care for which no payment was received (approximately 5.5% of total costs)
Almost a decade ago the key foundational issues threatening US hospitals were defined
as follows (AHA 2002):
e Worker shortages that will reach crisis proportions in the coming decades without
action now
e Rising demand and constrained capacity that cause emergency department
overcrowding and ambulance diversion
* Regulatory burden that takes caregivers away from the bedside and diverts
financial resources away from patient care
* Rapidly rising costs that, if not matched with increases in payment, threaten the
financial stability of hospitals
" Growing number of uninsured people which threatens access to timely and
appropriate care for more than 40 million Americans and strains the financial
resources of the hospitals who care for these individuals
" Decreased access to capital-capital that's required to meet rising demand, keep
up with advances in technology, and maintain facilities
e Payment shortfalls for Medicare and Medicaid.
A 2010 survey of hospital CEOs, with 525 respondents, asked respondents to rank 13
issues affecting their hospitals in order of importance (see Table 4-3). For five
consecutive years financial challenges have ranked first on the list of this annual survey
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sponsored by the American College of Healthcare Executives. Notably, the uncertainty of
the health care reform legislation was introduced as a new top concern. Interestingly,
capacity and technology were ranked 9th and 10th respectively. Similarly, patient
satisfaction only scored 15% as a top concern amongst respondents. However, patient
safety and quality scored 32%, while physician-hospital relations still score as high as
25%.
Table 4-3: Hospital CEOs top issues in 2009 (ACHE 2010)
Rank Issue 2009 2008 2007
1 Financial challenges 76% 77% 70%
2 Healthcare reform implications 53% NA NA
3 Care for the uninsured 37% 41% 38%
4 Patient safety and quality 32% 43% NA
5 Governmental mandates 30% 26% 22%
6 Physician-hospital relations 25% 32% 35%
7 Patient satisfaction 15% 22% 17%
8 Personnel shortages 13% 30% 30%
9 Capacity 7% 16% 11%
10 Technology 7% 9% 8%
11 Governance 2% NA NA
12 Disaster preparedness 1% 1% 1%
13 Issues about non-profit status 1% 2% 4%
A closer examination of the reasons behind the financial challenges include Medicare and
Medicaid's reimbursement rates, the increasing costs for staff and supplies, and the
emergency department. A 2004 survey found that as many as 48% of all US hospitals
have their emergency department (ED) operating either at capacity or over capacity.
Teaching hospitals were the ones struggling most with their ED, with as many as 77% of
them reporting to be at capacity or over capacity (AHA 2005). ED overcrowding can be
defined as "a situation in which the demand for emergency services exceeds the ability of
a department to provide quality of care within acceptable time frames" (Rowe, Channan
et al. 2006).
The concern towards ED overcrowding is related to patient safety and quality, given that
the longer a patient remains in the ED the more the quality of care is compromised and
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contributes to the delay in the evaluation of other patients (Herring, Wilper et al. 2009).
Furthermore, a longer ED length-of-stay (LOS) has been found to contribute to increased
LOS for the hospital as a whole, to a greater number of patient complications (i.e.
morbidity), and an increased mortality rate amongst critically ill patients (Cowan and
Trzeciak 2005; Chalfin, Trzeciak et al. 2007). A recent study by Press Ganey Associates,
a healthcare quality improvement company, determined that the average ED LOS in the
US was 4 hours (PressGaney 2010)50.
A 2004 benchmark on the cost components for all hospitals found that salaries and wages
represent over 50% of the cost structure, and that supplies are approximately 18% (see
Figure 4-4). The same benchmark recognizes that a description of the 'average hospital'
is inherently difficult given the existence of different patient case-mix indexes (i.e.
patient acuity), different service offerings (e.g. cardiology, neurosurgery, obstetrics, etc)
and case volumes (i.e. the more cases a hospital does the higher the variable cost
categories and potentially the fixed costs also).
Rent and Utility and
maintenance insurance
3% 2.9%
Capital \
7.2%
Benefits Salaries
10. 3% 40.5%
Supply
17.8%
All other
18.3%
Figure 4-4: Operational Trends for the 'Average Hospital' (Solucient 2004)
50 The same study mentioned that the LOS varied considerably by US. Additionally, having contacted a
Press Ganey Associates representative they further clarified that the data is based on patient satisfaction
surveys and does not include patient boarding time (i.e. admitted patients who remain in the ED awaiting to
be transferred to an inpatient location).
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4.5.2 Understanding hospital complexity and heterogeneous
characteristics
Over the course of the previous sections we have highlighted different sources of
heterogeneity when characterizing health care, and hospitals in particular. To begin with,
the amount of health care spending and the resulting performance varies from state to
state. Then, the payer landscape varies from state to state, and so do the bargaining power
relationships between providers and payers within each state, thereby generating a wide
range of prices for the same medical services provided by both different and the same
hospital. Finally, different hospitals have different patient case-mixes, service offerings,
and service volumes. Moreover, hospitals have a significant degree of heterogeneity both
in terms of their environment as well as their internal characteristics. In research
contexts' such as these, authors have noted the importance of typologies in supporting
theory development (Doty and Glick 1994). With that in mind, in this section we proceed
with the examination of typological hospital characteristics, and a more detailed
characterization of the research limitations inherent in them.
To begin with, we discuss a framework for strategic service management (Kellogg and
Nie 1995) which analyzes the relationship between service processes and service
offerings, and uses specific hospital examples (see Figure 4-5).
Service Package Sttuere
Service Process Unite Service Selecive Service Restricted Service Generic Service
Stnctuce Package Package Package Package
Expert Service
Mayo Clinic
service Shop
ational Jewish Center for lmmunolog)
mid Respiratory Medicine
Service Factory
Shouldice Hospital
Figure 4-5: Hospital service process/service package matrix (adapted from (Kellogg and Nie 1995))
The service process structure describes the degree of customer influence. An expert
service manages a high level of customer influence (e.g. consulting), whereas a service
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shop has a medium level (e.g. education), and a service factory has a low level (e.g. fast
food restaurants). In turn, the service package structure described the degree of service
customization. In a unique package there is full customization and the customer has
considerable discretion in defining the hows, whats, and wheres of the service. The
selective package introduces some standardization, but a considerable part of the services
still reflect the customer's discretion. The restricted package has most of the services
standardized and allows for customer's to select them from a limited list of choices.
Finally, the generic package has the least amount of service customization, where most if
not all the services are standardized.
The authors go on to characterize the Mayo Clinic as a hospital that customizes its
treatment on a one-of-a-kind basis, and where the patient has a considerable influence
over the system in terms of scheduling appointments, and agreeing to various treatments
plans, as well as in responding to treatment and showing additional symptoms. The
National Jewish Center for Immunology and Respiratory Medicine is characterized as a
center for the treatment of asthma and other respiratory illnesses, whereby a smaller
service offering is presented, and patients have less of an influence in their treatment.
Finally, Shouldice Hospital has been the object of several studies for its efficiency and
quality in doing hernia repairs, whereby services are standardized to the point that several
patients may go through the same process at the same time. Notably, the authors explain
that a service firm's positioning on the matrix isn't static and that it may move to respond
to a market opportunity. Ultimately, the main value of the author's contribution is that
they relate service customization to degree of customer influence, which is a good start
towards characterizing different providers.
Additionally, in our health care literature review we found some convergence with
regards to criteria to help distinguish hospitals that are more alike than those that are
different insofar as their structural characteristics are concerned.
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The AHA in particular publishes an annual survey which characterizes hospitals and
health organizations in general in terms of:
e Primary service offering: a list of 27 possible service types including general
medical and surgical, psychiatric, acute long term, rehabilitation, etc.
" System affiliation: whether a hospital belongs to a system of hospitals with a
non-unified asset ownership structure (e.g. a prominent system in Massachusetts
is the Partners Healthcare System, Inc).
* Bed size: the total number of staffed patient beds
e Control: an organization may be classified in one of four types of control, namely
federal government, state government, non government not-for-profit, and non
government for-profit
* State: the state where the provider is located
Zinn and Mor (1998) offer a useful review of healthcare's literature findings with regards
to the relevance of different hospital structural characteristics. Specifically:
* For-profit status has not been significantly related to outcomes. Similarly, more
recent studies have determined that for-profit hospitals have virtually the same
level of patient health outcomes as other types of hospitals (Kessler and
McClellan 2002).
* Teaching hospitals have been associated with a clear lower patient satisfaction but
not so with regards to other outcomes. Notably, hospitals characterized as major
teaching hospitals is an important distinction to be made as it signals the
difference between community hospitals (i.e. simpler patient cases) and
specialized hospitals (i.e. more complex patient cases). Furthermore, it is common
to see major teaching hospitals at the top of non-academic rankings such as "The
US News".
* Hospital system membership has no clear association with outcomes. Similarly,
other authors have noted that system membership is primarily a mechanism to
create bargaining power and that hospital service offerings remain largely
independent from one another (Luke 2006).
e Hospital size has no clear association with outcomes.
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We value the usefulness of the above referenced studies which set forth typological
characteristics to inform hospital research in general. However, we also refined our
awareness of hospitals' significant degree of heterogeneity, both in terms of their
environment as well as their internal characteristics, which ultimately compromise efforts
to generalize results as evidenced by the persistence of conflicting study results. Table
4-4 comprises a selection of publications which highlighted hospital characteristics that
compromise research designs and the generalizability of their results.
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Table 4-4: Hospital characteristics that compromise research generalizability
Characteristic Description Reference
Comparability of hospital Different organizations process the same environment differently and make different types of decisions, (Weick 1969)
strategies in the same choosing to ignore and focus on different aspects of said environment.
environment
Comparability of hospital Different hospitals are engaged in different missions (e.g. teaching, research, patient care) and the costs (Tompkins,
strategies in the same other than direct patient-related care are combined in the accounting system and allocated across billable Altman et al.
environment services, thereby raising the total costs and introducing hospital-specific variation. Even hospitals with 2006)
similar mix of services and patients, may differ greatly in efficiency and revenue generated.
Comparability of "hospitals differ in the facilities and services they offer to patients. Some have emergency rooms, intensive (Morse, Gordon
performance across hospitals care units, outpatient units, etc., while others have none of these facilities. This complicates the et al. 1974)
comparative process"
Comparability of payer mix Hospitals are engaged with multiple managed care plans which makes provider - insurance studies (Weiner and
across hospitals difficult Lissovoy 1993)
Comparability of payer mix The same hospital may apply a mix of payment contracts with the same HMO. For instance, primary care (Berwick 1996)
across hospitals visits and associate laboratory tests may be capitated, whereas referrals to specialists aren't.
Comparability of bargaining Different sets of hospitals and insurance companies exhibit different power relationships which vary (Douglas and
power across hospitals significantly across the industry. Ryman 2003)
Comparability of procedural Comparing outcomes across hospitals even on specific procedures (e.g. bypass operation) is difficult (Cutler,
outcomes across hospitals because it depends on physician and hospital characteristics and on the underlying health of the patient. Huckman et al.
2004)
Comparability of procedural Different hospitals design different systems of care for different procedures. Comparing hospital outcomes (Blumenthal and
outcomes across hospitals by procedure says nothing about the root causes of variation in quality. Epstein 1996)
Comparability of accounting Difficult to compare service units across hospitals because each hospital has its own accounting system for (Tompkins,
systems across hospitals allocating its various costs by department, type of service, and eventually individual line items in the Altman et al.
charge master 2006)
Comparability of control The scope and control of medical departments and hospital wide governing bodies varies from hospital to (Sloan 1980)
structures across hospitals hospital. Furthermore, each hospital varies in both the extent to which physicians are members of specific
departments and, more importantly, the authority of department heads
Comparability of hospitals in Hospitals differ in terms of their organizational climate, the size of their operations, the technologies that (Lawler 1981)
general they use, and the level of sophistication of their performance measurement system. There isn't an easy
prescription as to what level of analysis to use when studying hospitals. In general, it calls for careful study
of the situational factors of each hospital.
Difficult to establish One single organization may operate multiple organizational arrangements (e.g. participatory decision (Miles, Snow et
dominant structural making; reporting structure; etc) which make it difficult to establish what is the dominant influence on al. 1974)
characteristics structure.
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"Will the 'real'American hospital please stand up? [...] No other country has such a
heterogeneous collection of institutions comprising its hospital 'system. 'In no other
country is it as difficult to generalize about hospitals or to analyze their strengths and
shortcomings."
(Shortell and Brown 1976)
Ultimately, given the heterogeneity amongst hospitals, some have questioned research
and policy approaches that "assume that health care organizations are equally competent
to carry out the particular treatment" (Flood 1994). Specifically, widespread
implementation of policies is said to be hindered by the "heterogeneity ofpractice
settings, with their varying data systems, organizational forms, and degrees of readiness
to change" (Hussey, Eibner et al. 2009). Similarly, "the evolving organizations are too
different to put forward any isolated techniques as uniform resolutions to management
problems" (Evashwick and Weiss 1987).
Furthermore, others have acknowledged that hospital specific organizational structures
may be relatively efficient and/or more conducive to higher performance, however, in the
absence of the necessary in-depth data it has remained impossible to "gauge impacts of [a
hospital's] organization on various dimensions ofperformance" (Sloan 1980). Such is in
line with a recent group of health care experts, charged with setting a research agenda
aimed at improving the US health care system, who defined as one of the highest research
priorities the identification of key organizational characteristics from high-performing
hospitals (Fernandopulle, Ferris et al. 2003).
As a result, on one hand we are further reminded of the importance of the research
questions this thesis posed in Chapter 3, namely: Can one create an enriched
understanding of hospital enterprise architecture? and Can hospital performance be
improved through an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture and if
so, how? On the other hand, considering hospitals' fragmented environment (i.e.
regulation, payment, delivery), and their heterogeneous characteristics, we determined
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that our research design would have to consist of an in-depth exploratory case study of a
high-performing hospital.
4.5.3 Identifying hospital candidates for in-depth case study
In the previous subsection we identified a call for research targeted at studying in-depth
high performing hospitals. In chapter 2 we conducted a longitudinal multidisciplinary
literature review of hospital performance measurement studies, and while informed by
lean enterprise principles, we defined eight performance dimensions according to which
hospital performance should be evaluated5 1 . Thus, with regards to performance we will
leverage these performance dimensions to sample hospitals for our research. However,
given the issues identified regarding hospital heterogeneity, including differences in
service customization and degree of patient influence, we returned to the literature to
further refine our hospital sampling. Table 4-5 describes 18 publications from 1933 to
2010 which essentially support large multispecialty group practices as the preferred
model.
Table 4-5: Evidence supporting large multispecialty group practices as a preferred model
Recommendation(s) Reference
Medical service should be more largely provided by groups of physicians (Falk, King et
and related practitioners, and organized so as to maintain high standards al. 1933)
of care and to retain the personal relations between patients and
physicians.
An effective hospital is one that is able to treat the whole patient without (Morse,
need of transferring a patient to receive emergency treatment or in the Gordon et al.
event of complications associated with a particular disease. Furthermore, 1974)
a hospital should be able to invest in medical innovations as per
evidence-based-medicine so as to deliver high-quality care.
The ideal system would allow for financial integration, common or (Vladeck
shared data records, a case manager responsible for overseeing each 1987)
patient's care, and more importantly, effective multidisciplinary
teamwork so as to deliver effective, comprehensive, and integrated
ongoing services.
More integrated systems have better financial performance and score (Shortell,
better overall relative to competitors (e.g. the greater the degree of Gillies et al.
51 The eight hospital performance dimensions were identified as follows: financial, operational, quality,
customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, strategy and operations alignment, social equity, and
organizational learning.
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Recommendation(s) Reference
overall perceived physician-system integration, the greater the system's 1994)
inpatient productivity).
Group practice allows for better physician coverage, more physician (Bums 1995)
interaction, increased access and ease of specialty referrals, a wider array
of ancillaries, use of nonphysician providers, and the convenience of one-
stop shopping.
Middle sized organizations are best suited for prospective payment (Berwick
models as they are neither too small (i.e. prone to spend less given 1996)
inability to change system significantly) nor too large (i.e. too
bureaucratic and unable to trace performance).
The benefit of larger group practices is beyond the increased complexity (Blumenthal
of medicine. Group practices aggregate human resources and capital that 1996)
physicians increasingly need. These include access to specialists, support
staff, and complex services, such as outpatient surgical & diagnostic care.
Large group practices are able to curb physician behavior by increasing (Zinn and
formalization and specialization, as manifested in formal monitoring and Mor 1998)
peer review.
An integrated healthcare delivery system that is more integrated has more (Lin and Wan
potential to provide accessible coordinated care across the continuum and 1999)
appears to be associated with higher levels of inpatient productivity,
greater total system revenue, and greater total system operating margin
than are found in a less integrated system.
Physician group practices can provide the scale, incentives, and (Coye 2001)
information platforms to support a more rapid penetration of clinical
practice improvements.
Hospitals can reduce the power of buyers by integrating with physician (Douglas and
groups that possess strategic competencies. Ryman 2003)
Focused factory settings (e.g. carveout facility providing heart care) are (Cortese and
inadequate for patients with complex, multisystem health problems. Smoldt 2007)
There is evidence suggesting that large physician groups have better (Fisher,
performance, and would thus be more appropriate to accommodate a Staiger et al.
shared accountability environment. 2007)
Hospitals that are more fully integrated provide higher quality and more (Tollen 2008)
efficient care than do smaller hospitals in the context of capitation.
Prospective payment models work well with multispecialty group (Crosson
practices, as opposed to individual physicians or smaller practices. Group 2009)
practices can shield physicians from ethical issues of personal financial
gain and enable them to focus on quality of care.
The health system should move towards integrated hospitals that (Porter 2009)
encompass all the skills and services required across the full continuum
of each medical condition, including patients with multiple chronic
conditions. Such hospitals should offer outpatient and inpatient care,
testing, education, and rehabilitation.
Provider-led organizations should align incentives and accountability for (Rittenhouse,
providers along the continuum of care (i.e. multiple services and patient Shortell et al.
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Recommendation(s) Reference
populations). To that effect, multiple forms are adequate, including large 2009)
integrated systems and multispecialty practice groups that own a hospital.
In reforming healthcare's delivery system, integrated organizations are (Chernew,
proposed as the preferred model to reduce costs and improve patient Sabik et al.
outcomes. 2010)
Several of the authors in Table 4-5 are contemporary prominent healthcare academics,
policy makers (e.g. Donald Berwick) and/or practitioners (e.g. the former CEO of the
Mayo Clinic, Denis Cortese, and the Executive Director of The Permanente Foundation,
Jay Crosson), and management academics (e.g. Michael Porter). Throughout the
approximate 80 years of publications there was the consistent recommendation that care
ought to be delivered in group practice environments so as to reduce coordination
complexity, increase the adoption of evidence-based-medicine, allow for financial
integration, and data integration.
Over time, the concept of a larger group practice evolved to qualifying the need for
facilities capable of delivering multispecialty services that covered the whole patient
lifecycle from primary care to specialist care, so as to once again facilitate coordination
and improve care, but also improve access, convenience, and the ability for providers to
become accountable for all of a patient's care. Moreover, multispecialty care as opposed
to thefocusedfactory concept, is better equipped to address the needs of those patients
suffering from one or more chronic diseases.
Furthermore, larger multispecialty group practices are considered better able at curbing
physician behavior, and also capable of shielding them from perverse financial incentives
by instituting a salaried model, which allows them to focus on patient care. Finally,
multispecialty group practices that own or are closely related to a hospital are better able
to negotiate with insurance companies.
All in all, our review of the literature concluded that large multispecialty group practices
are considered more capable of higher performance given health care's environment and
therefore constitute the preferred care delivery model.
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4.6 Chapter 4 Summary
In this chapter we described how the US health care system is commonly characterized as
a cottage industry not only because of the proliferation of providers in its delivery system
but also because of the fragmented regulatory and payment environments. Figure 4-6 is a
summary representation of the multiple levels of analysis and multiple stakeholders
inherent in the provision of medical care which embodies a complex and technically
sophisticated enterprise (Robinson and Casalino 1996). As noted, different stakeholders
have different value propositions and are presented with different value requirements
which aren't necessarily aligned with one another and thus present considerable sources
of system inefficiency as well as pressure for hospitals in particular.
Figure 4-6: Multilevel stakeholder decomposition of a healthcare system (Oliveira, Nightingale et al.
2010)
We identified that hospitals represent the largest source of health care expenditure both in
the US and elsewhere, and are considered to be a top research priority. However, our
literature review also found that hospital comparability studies have been hindered by the
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heterogeneous characteristics of hospitals themselves as well as the external
environments they are embedded in. As such, there have been calls for research
specifically targeting high performing hospitals so as to identify their key organizational
characteristics and doing so in the context of in-depth studies. Therefore, hospitals
constitute the focal unit of analysis in this research, whilst nonetheless including macro
level contextual considerations (e.g. regulation, payment models, etc) and micro level of
care delivery (e.g. emergency department, inpatient service units, etc). All in all, we
found further evidence of the importance of the research question posed in this thesis, and
the last two questions in particular, namely:
e Can one create an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture?
e Can hospital performance be improved through an enriched understanding of
hospital enterprise architecture and if so, how?
Finally, we examined the literature so as to identify which type of hospitals to include in
our in-depth case sampling, and concluded that large multispecialty group practices are
considered more capable of higher performance given health care's environment and
therefore constitute the preferred care delivery model.
The next chapter describes in further detail the research design for each of the research
questions posed in this thesis.
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5. Research Roadmap
This chapter is a review of the research strategy used to collect and analyze data from
multiple hospitals so as to address our research questions, whilst informed by extensive
literature pertaining to research methodology. Figure 5-1 provides an overview of the
thesis' research map.
Embedded Units
Questionnaires
Documentaewn
Research Questions
RQ1 How is hospital enterprise performance currentlymeasured?
RQ2 How could hospital enterprise performance oflAnalysis
measurement be improved using lean enterprise I
principles?
I Observatien
RQ3 Can one create an enriched understanding of hospital Denterprise architecture?
RQ4 Can hospital performance be improved through anI enriched understanding of hospital enterprise
architecture and if sor how?
Figure 5-1: Research Roadmaps52
We begin by describing the construct of methodological fit and how it was adopted as an
overarching design criterion for this research. Next we discuss our research strategy
which includes the selection of health care as the domain of interest, followed by a brief
overview of the preparatory research phase, and the sampling of seven Massachusetts
hospitals, and two in-depth cases of high performing multispecialty hospitals located in
the US and the UK respectively. Several recommendations to strengthen case study
research are discussed, and detailed information is shared in terms of the sampling
12 All hospitals included in this research are referred to with pseudonyms to protect the identity of the
enterprises in each case study. In particular, much of the in-depth cases analysis is sensitive, so measures
were taken to protect Hospital XYZ and Hospital ABC's identity and disguise any identifying data.
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rationale for each of the four research questions posed in this thesis. Finally, the data
collection and analysis techniques used in this thesis are described at length.
5.1 Designing for Methodological Fit
Edmondson and McManus (2007) defined a framework for assessing and promoting
methodological fit as an overarching criterion for ensuring quality field research.
Methodological fit results from the consistency among research question(s), prior work,
research design, and contribution to literature. Notably, several other scholars have set
forth very useful contributions in research design and field research methods in particular
(Campbell and Fiske 1959; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Yin 1981; Eisenhardt 1989; Ragin
1989; Yin 1994; Hackman 2003) and these were also included in the definition of this
thesis' research strategy. For instance, two field research methodology schools of thought
that lie at opposite ends of the spectrum are those of case-study research and grounded
theory. Proponents of the latter (Glaser and Strauss 1967) advocated a blank slate
approach, whereby the researcher entered the field with no prior knowledge and allowed
phenomena of interest to emerge from the data. Conversely, proponents of the former
(Yin 1994) advocated that a preliminary literature review and theoretical framework
should be devised prior entering the field, and that it should cover most if not all the key
propositions to be studied. However, while on one hand a blank slate is both difficult to
ascertain and potentially resource intensive to develop worthwhile research (Ragin 1989),
on the other hand relying solely on the literature ahead of time to identify a research
problem may also be restrictive. Nonetheless, both schools of thought offer methods
which were contemplated and integrated in this research design, as prescribed in criterion
of methodological fit.
The criterion of methodological fit proposes as necessary an alignment between the
theoretical maturity of the phenomena of interest at hand and the data evidence and
methods embedded in a research design. Specifically:
"theory lies across a continuum, from mature to nascent. Mature theory presents well-
developed constructs and models that have been studied over time with increasing
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precision by a variety of scholars, resulting in a body of work consisting ofpoints of
broad agreement that represent cumulative knowledge gained. Nascent theory, in
contrast, proposes tentative answers to novel questions of how and why, often merely
suggesting new connections among phenomena. Intermediate theory, positioned between
mature and nascent, presents provisional explanations ofphenomena, often introducing a
new construct and proposing relationships between it and established constructs"
(Edmondson and McManus 2007).
In reviewing articles that produced original data collected in real organizations, the
authors determined that there is a tendency in terms of the alignment of theoretical
maturity and the type of data evidence collected (see Figure 5-2). Whereas mature theory
enables precise, quantitative research design, intermediate theory leverages hybrid
designs of both qualitative and quantitative data, and finally, nascent theory explores
phenomena through qualitative data.
Nascenrt hte_ miE- LOle Moature
Figure 5-2: Methodological Fit Tendency (adapted from (Edmondson and McManus 2007))
Notably, other systems thinkers have recommended the use of hybrid research designs in
the study of complex systems. For instance, some advocate the use of case based research
to understand the context in which enterprises operate as well as their inner workings
while flexibly leveraging both quantitative and qualitative data derived from in-depth
engagements with real organizations (Rhodes, Lamb et al. 2008). Moreover,
organizations "are neither purely objective nor purely subjective phenomena" (Astley
and Ven 1983) as they are populated with individuals who may behave in unpredictable
ways, and the structure of said organization may give rise to emergent phenomena.
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Similarly, healthcare researchers have recommended the use of both quantitative and
qualitative methods to evaluate differences in hospital performance (Williams, Schmaltz
et al. 2005) Finally, Rhodes et al (2008), also note that grounded theory leads to a more
accurate process of discovery given its systematic and concurrent process of data
collection and analysis. Other scholars, although only in the context of organizational
theory (as opposed to systems thinking) had already expressed similar views and
requested "very intensive and very thorough case studies" (Campbell 1977) to explore the
relationship between organization designs and effectiveness outcomes (Lewin and
Minton 1986).
Determining what constitutes a Lean Enterprise Architecture, or any theory of the
business, may sound deceptively simple but it involves several years of empirical
experimentation before reaching a clear, consistent, and valid theory for a given
organization (Drucker 1994). Hence, given the nascent phase of development of
enterprise architecture from a lean enterprise perspective (Nightingale 2009) a key
motivation for this research was to empirically and theoretically enrich MIT's emerging
Nighintgale-Rhodes Enterprise Architecture Framework (NREAF). As such, this thesis is
situated between enterprise architecture's nascent theoretical maturity and that of lean
enterprise thinking intermediate theory. Therefore, our research study was primarily
designed to be exploratory and inductive (i.e. point A), but also was deductive in
leveraging existing literature (i.e. point B). For instance, our theoretical proposition that
an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture can improve hospital
performance, emerged from the empirical data. Finally, the iteration between inductive
theory development and deductive theory testing wasn't the product of a sequential
progression (i.e. literature review -> research question -> data collection -> analysis ->
publication) but rather a series of iterative and cyclical steps, that allowed for the
methodological fit to be adjusted as new findings emerged from the data (see Figure 5-3).
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Figure 5-3: Engineering systems research as an iterative and cyclic process (adapted from
(Edmondson and McManus 2007))
5.2 Research Strategy
The case study is a research strategy that neither implies a particular type of evidence nor
a particular type of collection method (Yin 1981). Data evidence can be both quantitative
and qualitative, and may result from multiple collection methods (e.g. interviews,
observation, archival records, etc). As a research strategy the case study allows for us to
study a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context where the variables under study
are both difficult to quantify and beyond our control (Yin 1994). However, the purpose of
a case study research strategy is not to provide for statistical generalization, but rather
analytic generalization whereby case selection criteria are of paramount importance (Yin
1981). Furthermore, a case study treats an organization as a whole entity rather than a
collection of parts, and in doing so, explores the relations between the parts of a whole
within the context of the whole (Ragin 1989).
5.2.1 Selecting health care domain
In Chapter 1 we described that the overarching motivation for this research is to respond
to the National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine's joint call to
promote the application of "principles, tools, and research from engineering disciplines
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associated with the analysis, design, and control of complex systems" (Reid 2005).
Furthermore, we explained how health care executives traditionally relegate lean to a
process level discussion focused on efficiency gains, which prevents them from "doing
the right things and doing things right" (Drucker 1963). As such, we also set ourselves to
help elevate the traditionally narrow hospital definitions of lean health care and explore
the broader concepts of lean enterprise principles and EA while enhancing our knowledge
of hospitals' socio-technical complexity and underlying performance. Ultimately, the
healthcare domain is the domain of focus for this research.
The focus on a single domain has direct implications in establishing cross-domain
validity53 . However, several scholars also point to the potential limitations of studying
multiple domains in a single research study. To begin with, studies across domains may
reflect industry differences and their impact on organizations rather than the specific
influence of an organizational phenomena of interest (e.g. process) (Galbraith 1974).
Similarly, much of the variation in comparative studies has been attributed to differences
in organizational domain (Van de Ven and Ferry 1980). Also, attempts to address
multiple domains tend to address extremely grand categories, and while adopting a
relatively universal view, ultimately undermine the value of the resulting findings
(Hambrick 1984). Ultimately, organizational theories (and indeed systems thinking
theories) would appear to be enhanced if generalized across domains, but given the
enunciated problems scholars suggest that researchers first examine organizations in a
single domain, and also carefully sample using key factors within the chosen domain
(Ginsberg and Venkatraman 1985).
With that in mind we underwent a preparatory research phase, and devised two different
case sampling approaches to address our research questions. These are described in detail
in the next subsections.
5 Research validity is discussed in further detail in section 5.2.5
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5.2.2 Preparatory research phase
As illustrated in Figure 5-1 an initial preparatory research phase took place so as to gain
additional insight into the health care domain and enterprise architecture systems thinking.
Over the course of the author benefited from the opportunity of being Teaching Assistant
(TA) for Prof. Deborah Nightingale's graduate course "Integrating the Lean Enterprise"
listed in both the engineering and management course catalogues54 . Already as a masters
student he had taken the course himself and leveraged it in his master thesis which
studied two hospitals' vendor managed inventory systems, and he was first introduced to
hospital enterprises. As a TA he helped establish and supervised semester long class
projects with Massachusetts health care organizations, which included three different
hospital sites in the first semester alone, followed by an additional eight throughout the
remainder of this thesis' duration. Often times he would engage directly with the senior
leadership of said hospitals and discuss research ideas beyond class materials.
Furthermore, he took healthcare graduate classes at Harvard's School of Public Health,
JFK School of Government, and Harvard Business School. Additionally, he participated
at healthcare workshops held at the MIT where several industry leaders discussed
prominent issues they were facing, and different solutions they were attempting. Finally
he conducted in-depth longitudinal literature reviews on various disciplines as featured
throughout this thesis' chapters. Notably, the literature reviewing and engaging with
industry leaders, were continuous exercises throughout this research, as described in the
previous section.
5.2.3 Sampling of seven Massachusetts hospitals
In Chapter 4 our healthcare literature review found that hospital comparability studies
have been hindered by the heterogeneous characteristics of hospitals themselves as well
as the external environments they are embedded in. For instance, to compare hospitals
and draw conclusions about their effectiveness "without taking into account possible
differences in environment or goal structures is of dubious value" (Shortell and Brown
54 The author was awarded MIT's Graduate Teaching Award in 2010 for his role as a TA in this class.
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1976). In particular, hospital competition is said to be regional, and healthcare scholars
recommend that one select a geographic region within which the studied hospitals
compete for similar resources (Ketchen, Thomas et al. 1993). Notably, healthcare
hospital studies have commonly focused in a single state to avoid regulatory, payment,
labor, and patient environment variations (Grosskopf and Valdmanis 1987; Shortell and
Hull 1996; Ashmos, Duchon et al. 2000). As a result, our first two research questions
have a hospital sample primarily55 drawn from the US state of Massachusetts.
Three main reasons support the decision to sample hospitals from Massachusetts. First,
Massachusetts was the first state to require all residents to have some form of health
insurance coverage, and hence diminishing the likelihood of uninsured patients affecting
hospital performance. Second, as noted in Chapter 4, the state of Massachusetts is one of
the top three states in the US for the quality of its healthcare, and indeed comprises
several nationwide provider leaders on various medical and surgical specialties. Third,
Massachusetts also represented a convenience sample given that MIT is here located.
Having focused on Massachusetts, we next took into account the different characteristics
of health care organizations. Specifically, health care organizations (e.g. ambulatory care,
psychiatric, long term care, acute care, etc) differ in their goals, tasks, services, as well as
in their patients, physicians, and payer mix (Donabedian 1988; Flood 1994). These
differences can, in turn, lead to different interpretations and definitions of performance.
Notably, in chapters 1 and 4 we determined that hospitals would constitute the focal unit
of analysis in this research.
The American Hospital Association (AHA) Hospital Guide (AHA 2008) characterizes
hospitals and health care organizations in general in terms of their primary service
offering, system affiliation, bed size, control, and state. Also based on the literature we
further added as a characteristic whether or not a hospital has a major teaching hospital
status. Table 5-1 below is an overview of the analysis made on the AHA Hospital Guide
5 The two in-depth case studies were initially devised to address the third and fourth research questions.
However, phenomena of interest emerged pertaining to the first two research questions as well, and hence
the in-depth case findings also inform the first two research questions.
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in terms of Massachusetts. Upon inspection one determines that the prevalent type of
hospital in Massachusetts is "General Medical Surgical" with a total of 69 hospitals,
which represents 57.5% of all MA hospitals. Table 5-2 is an overview of the "General
Medical Surgical" hospitals characterized in terms of the hospital typology mentioned
previously.
Table 5-1: Massachusetts primary service offering distribution (calculated from (AHA 2008))
Control
Primary service offering For Non federal - non profit Total
profit Federal local
state private church gov. # %
Cancer 1 1 0.8%
Children's general 1 1 0.8%
Children's chronic disease 1 1 0.8%
Children's other specialty 2 2 1.7%
Children's orthopedic 1 1 0.8%
Children's rehabilitation 1 1 0.8%
Eye, ear, nose, and throat 1 1 0.8%
General Medical Surgical 7 2 2 52 5 1 69 57.5%
Hospital unit of institution 1 3 4 3.3%
Long Term Care 6 3 5 1 15 12.5%
Orthopedic 1 1 0.8%
Psychiatric 5 1 5 4 15 12.5%
Rehabilitation 4 1 5 4.2%
Other specialty 1 1 2 1.7%
Alcohol I I 1 1 0.8%
Subtotal 22 4 13 74 6 1 120
Table 5-2: Massachusetts general medical surgical distribution (calculated from (AHA 2008))
Hospital Bed Size System Affiliation No System Affiliation
teaching no teaching teaching no teaching Total %
Small Hospital (<= 99 beds) 1.5% 19.7% 0.0% 7.6% 28.8%
Medium Hospital (100 to 399
beds) 7.6% 15.2% 4.5% 31.8% 59.1%
Large Hospital (400+ beds) 7.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 12.1%
Subtotal 17% 36% 6% 41% 100.0%
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Upon inspection of the most predominant hospital types it was determined that the
hospital sample to be drawn would include one hospital from each of the following types:
e Small hospital with system affiliation and no academic teaching status
e Small hospital without system affiliation and no academic teaching status
" Medium hospital with system affiliation and academic teaching status
" Medium hospital with system affiliation and no academic teaching status
" Medium hospital without system affiliation and with academic teaching status
e Medium hospital without system affiliation and no academic teaching status
* Large hospital with system affiliation and academic teaching status
The seven hospital sample constitutes 10% and is representative of 93.9% of all general
medical surgical hospitals in Massachusetts. Notably, hospitals with 1.5% or less
representation weren't included in the sample (i.e. 6.1% of all hospitals in total). All
seven hospitals had a positive operating margin in 2005 and were accredited by the Joint
Commission. Finally, hospitals were also selected on the basis of their Chief Executive
Officer being available to be administered the research instruments face-to-face.
5.2.4 Sampling of two in-depth cases
In Chapter 4 we identified calls for research specifically targeting high performing
hospitals so as to identify their key organizational characteristics and doing so in the
context of in-depth studies. Therefore, hospitals constitute the focal unit of analysis in
this research, whilst nonetheless including macro level contextual considerations (e.g.
regulation, payment models, etc) and micro level of care delivery (e.g. emergency
department, inpatient service units, etc). Furthermore, we concluded that large
multispecialty group practices are considered more capable of higher performance given
health care's environment and therefore constitute the preferred care delivery model.
Earlier in section 5.1 we noted that both systems thinking and healthcare scholars have
recommended the use of in-depth case based research with real organizations whilst using
a hybrid research design, so as to better understand complex enterprises in terms of their
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context and inner workings. We also noted that the nature of our research questions
requires a mix of methods used in the development of nascent and intermediate theory,
namely allowing for phenomena of interest to emerge from the data, but also leveraging
existing theoretical constructs to guide decisions in terms of case sampling and
interpretation of data (i.e. inductive and deductive iterative cycles).
5.2.4.]Strengthening in-depth case study feasibility and generalizability
A single case study is deemed appropriate "when the case represents an extreme case or
unique case" (Yin 1994). Also, a single case controls for broad contextual factors and
allows one to focus on the differences among units within the same organization (Tsai
and Ghoshal 1998). Finally, the purpose of case study research isn't to provide statistical
generalization, but rather analytic generalization (Yin 1994). However, it is also true that
single case based research is prone to generalization limitations (Pugh, Hickson et al.
1969; Etzioni 1975; Eisenhardt 1989; Leonard-Barton 1990; Yin 1994; Edmondson
1999). In turn, the conduct of in-depth case studies requires extensive resources and time
both in terms of the researcher and the organization being studied, and hence even more
so in the context of multiple case studies, which can be beyond the means of a single
student (Yin 1994). Additionally, access to performance data on privately-held firms is
severely restricted and senior leadership may be reluctant to share sensitive information
which isn't publicly available (Dess and Robinson 1984). To address these issues several
authors have set forth different recommendations which were contemplated and adopted
in this thesis' research design:
e Theoretical sampling and literature comparison: One of them we have already
mentioned, namely the use of existing theoretical considerations to guide
decisions about sampling and variables to include in a study (Hambrick 1984;
Edmondson and McManus 2007). Such not only addresses the issue of reducing
unnecessary data collection efforts but also allows the researcher to develop
middle range theory whereby propositions are formulated concerning
subcategories of organizations (Etzioni 1975). Similarly, the ongoing comparison
of findings with the literature allows to sharpen construct definitions as well as
generalizability (Eisenhardt 1989). Moreover, as the number of reinforcing
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propositions increases so does the degree of a theory's confirmation (Lee 1989).
* Explore organizational units variation: Another stream of recommendations is
to fully explore the diversity that an in-depth case has to offer and theoretically
sample different organizational units according to distinctive characteristics (e.g.
function, size, etc) and in particular those that exhibit phenomena of interest
(Krackhardt and Brass 1994; Edmondson 1999). Moreover, units should be
sampled on the basis of variation in the independent variables rather than
randomly and hence test whether or not a proposition is valid (Daft and
Macintosh 1981)
e Explore organizational units interaction: Others also recommend that
organizational units should be studied in the context of the macro level (e.g.
whole organization) while identifying and assessing unique design patterns of
each unit, and determining how different units are linked together to contribute to
overall performance of the organization (Van de Ven and Ferry 1980). In
particular, both formal and informal ties between units should be carefully studied
to better understand information and resource flows (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998;
Hansen 1999). Finally, the ability to study organizational units interaction makes
the analysis of complex system's behavior more manageable, as one needs not
study all possible interactions (Glazner 2009).
e Explore three adjacent levels of analysis: Furthermore, the use of constructs at
adjacent levels of analysis (e.g. individual, department, organization) allows "to
begin the process of bootstrapping to ever-better explanations of one's
phenomena" (Hackman 2003). Specifically, the interest in phenomena at a
particular level of analysis doesn't provide guarantees that the most dominant
variables to shape said phenomena will be found at the same level. Therefore, it is
recommended that the researcher collect data from higher and lower levels of
analysis to identify factors which would otherwise remain hidden from view.
However, the author also notes that "to try to handle more than three
simultaneously is almost certainly to enter upon an analytic nightmare"
(Hackman 2003), but also warns against skipping levels of analysis, as such
replaces explanation with speculation.
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* Explore polar cases: Yet another recommendation is that of using organizational
units that exhibit polar behavior. In other words, the researcher divides the
sample of organizational units into low and high performing, whereby the high
performing unit is expected to reveal relationships closer to the emergent theory
than the lower performing unit (Drazin and Ven 1985; Eisenhardt 1989).
The use of multiple levels of analysis, multiple organizational units, and polar cases,
ascribe to a useful representation of the different types of case study research designs (see
Figure 5-4). Yin (1994) distinguishes case studies in terms of the number of case studies,
but also whether they use a holistic or embedded design. The former studies an
organization(s) as a whole, whereas the latter incorporates more than one unit of analysis
of the organization(s).
single-case designs multiple-case designs
Hosp~al MYZ
Hospital XYZholistic
(single
units of
analysis) Hospial ABC
HosptHl sp a Y
embedded Emergency spaft
(multiple Department
units of Inpatient
analysis) Service Unit optraig Rom 7
Figure 5-4: Case Study Design Types (adapted from (Yin 1994))
All in all, the listed research design recommendations improve research validity of a
single in-depth case study. However, the fact still remains that a better scenario is one
where the same recommendations are applied with similar rigor to two or more in-depth
case studies, so as to test whether literal replication occurs across cases (i.e. phenomena
of interest is found under similar conditions) (Yin 1994). In the context of this thesis in
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particular, the case study design followed was the one in the lower right corner in the
above figure. Next we describe in more detail each of the in-depth cases, as well as the
initial embedded units considered. Notably, as data collection and analysis progressed,
and phenomena of interest emerged, additional embedded units were added to each
hospital's case study.
5.2.4.2 Sampling of Hospital XYZ and Hospital ABC
In line with the health care literature's recommendations both Hospital XYZ and Hospital
ABC are multispecialty hospitals, ranked in the top 1% of medical surgical hospitals in
the US and UK respectively, with positive operating margins, and regarded as leaders in
several publicly reported clinic process measures (see Table 5-3). Furthermore, they
scored highly in terms of publicly available data on four of the performance dimensions
defined in the context of our first two research questions, namely finance, operations,
quality, and patient satisfaction.56
However, both organizations were beginning to struggle with distinct nationwide issues
and were unsatisfied with the results of their traditional lean solutions. Having been
introduced to the core concepts from this thesis' Chapter 2 (and to some extent Chapter
3), senior leaders of Hospital XYZ and Hospital ABC were very supportive of conducting
in-depth exploratory case studies. The intent was not to compare the hospitals to one
another but rather to explore and further our understanding of the inherent complexity of
high performing hospitals, to demonstrate the benefits of a systems thinking research
approach, and determine to what extent literal replication across both cases could be
established. Notably, Hospital XYZ's unique characteristics, including electronic medical
records, which were integrated with a billing system, together with its closer proximity,
57
allowed for a deeper exploration of our phenomena of interest
56 Data on the remaining four dimensions became available as part of each in-depth case study (i.e.
employee satisfaction, social equity, organizational learning, and strategy/operations alignment). Notably,
performance data which is publicly reported is done so at a high level (e.g. hospital annual reports) and
only through in-depth analysis is one able to disaggregate said data and begin understanding and assessing
actual enterprise performance.
57 For further detail on the data collection for each in-depth case please refer to section 5.3.2
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In line with case study guidelines (Yin 1981), and together with senior leaders of both
organizations, we sharpened our research projects by asking two preliminary central
questions as follows:
e Hospital XYZ: How to speed patient flow in the Emergency Department?
* Hospital ABC: How to increase productivity in the Main Operating Rooms?
As noted both central questions reflected the nationwide issues that each organization in
particular was facing. In the US it was the case of emergency department overcrowding,
whereas in the UK it was an overarching concern with a new National Health Service
(NHS) policy called 18 Weeks. Essentially, 18 Weeks increased demands upon hospital
operations as it represented the maximum wait time from a patient referral to definitive
treatment, and in the event of it not being met, the hospital wouldn't be paid for treating
that patient, and would have to face an audit and additional potential penalties. As a result
58they were looking for ways to maximize the throughput of their Main Operating Rooms
Table 5-3: Hospital XYZ and Hospital ABC Key Characteristics (2006 data)"
Characteristic Hospital XYZ (US) Hospital ABC (UK)
Ownership Non-profit physician owned Non-profit National Health
group practice Service (NHS) Foundation
Trust
Type Multispecialty tertiary Multispecialty tertiary
urban hospital urban hospital
Total beds 300 850
Total staff 4000 5500
Emergency department 36,000 140,000
visits
Total income $700,000,000 $750,000,000
Operating income $50,000,000 $20,000,000
Major teaching hospital Yes Yes
Salaried model Yes Yes
58 Operating Rooms in the UK are called Theaters and will be referred to as "Operating Rooms" throughout
the remainder of this thesis. Furthermore, hospitals organize their operating rooms (ORs) differently, but
generally tend to cluster them in some fashion. At Hospital ABC, the Main ORs were the largest cluster.
s1 Some of the values were approximated so as to further protect the identity of the organizations. Similarly,
information pertaining to their geographic location within the US and UK has been withheld.
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Hospital XYZ
Hospital XYZ is a unique case in the US which gathers several characteristics favored by
health care experts for future health care delivery models. Beyond being a multispecialty
organization, it is one that is led and owned by physicians, and was founded as a
physician group practice that then built its own hospital. Additionally, all care
practitioners are Hospital XYZ employees and are salaried. Furthermore, Hospital XYZ
offers integrated health care services where patients are treated in a team based care
practitioner environment, and can have the necessary ancillary tests done onsite, as well
as see both primary care and specialist physicians, thus effectively covering the patient's
lifecycle, and making Hospital XYZ a recognized leader in caring for patients with
multiple chronic diseases, as well as those needing highly specialized care (e.g. liver
transplant, open heart surgery, etc).
"[Hospital XYZ] is sort of a real duck. It is the exception, not the rule, where you have a
provider organization that includes physicians, includes hospitals, includes ancillary
services, all in one organization. There are lots and lots ofphysician organizations out
there, anywhere from single physician group practices to large multispecialty group
practices like flarge group A], that don't have their own hospital, they have some
ancillaries, but basically they have a large outpatient practice, so there is quite a range
out there, and you also have stand alone ancillary providers"
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
"it really is a physician led group practice, and the group practice decides what it needs
to take care of the patients that it wants to take care of and the hospital is an extension
of the group practice, as opposed to all the other places in [city centre] where the
hospital existed and individual physician practices developed to support the hospital"
Hospital XYZ Chief Operating Officer
Finally, Hospital XYZ was fully committed to this research in multiple ways. Extensive
access was granted to senior leadership, operational managers, physicians, nurses, as well
as supporting services, and sensitive operational and financial data systems.
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Hospital ABC
Hospital ABC leads by far performance assessments from the UK's National Health
Services (NHS) and as a Foundation Trust is allowed to reinvest any profits stemming
from its operations (as opposed to returning the surplus to the NHS). As noted in Table
5-3, Hospital ABC is a multispecialty tertiary urban hospital associated with a leading
university and providing comprehensive local services to an economically challenged and
ethnically diverse population, whilst at the same time building clinical excellence in a
portfolio of specialist services (e.g. liver transplants, neurosurgery, etc).
Access to Hospital ABC included senior leadership and extensive access to operational
managers, physicians, nurses, as well as supporting services. Notably, all patient medical
records were in paper format and all workflow heavily relied on paper, and although data
access had been granted, its underlying infrastructure limited our ability to collect such
data and prompted alternative data collection and analysis methods.
5.2.5 Designing for validity
This thesis' research design reflects a concern towards establishing both validity (i.e.
construct, internal, and external) and reliability.
With regards to construct validity we used multiple sources of evidence (more so in our
in-depth cases of Hospital XYZ and Hospital ABC, as per Figure 5-1) to triangulate our
data (Jick 1979) and establish our chain of evidence (i.e. detailing how findings were
derived from the analysis of evidence). In terms of internal validity, the analysis of
Hospital XYZ determined that different service units had different performance in their
interactions with the emergency department, which prompted the pattern matching of
emergent conditions of each unit so as to explain the performance variability. External
validity to domains beyond healthcare was sought through the in-depth longitudinal
literature reviews presented in chapters 2 and 3. Within healthcare, and hospitals in
particular, we conducted two in-depth case studies of leading multispecialty hospitals
(one based in the US, and another in the UK), and we interviewed senior leadership of 7
hospitals in Massachusetts, and shared our findings with domain experts. All of the
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hospitals included for study were selected on the basis of health care literature
recommended criteria (i.e. chapter 4) and supplemented primarily with third party
publically available data.
Finally, reliability was established in the study of the 7 Massachusetts hospitals whereby
the same interview protocol and quantitative instruments (i.e. three questionnaires) were
administered in largely similar settings and subsequently analyzed using the same
techniques. Similarly, the qualitative data collection and analysis from both in-depth
cases allows for reliability. However, in the case of Hospital XYZ's archival records
analysis, reliability may have been compromised as it required specialized information
systems integration skills, given the existence of highly fragmented systems. Nonetheless,
extensive efforts were made to clearly outline in this thesis how said systems were
integrated and how their data informed our analysis and subsequent findings.
5.3 Data Collection
Different data collection methods were used for each sample of hospitals as required by
the research questions they were primarily meant to address.
5.3.1 Data collection of seven Massachusetts hospitals sample
In the sample of seven Massachusetts hospitals we administered our research instruments
to the CEOs as these are "in a position to be extremely knowledgeable about conditions
in their particular industry" (Lawrence and Lorsh 1967). Furthermore, CEOs are "most
likely to be key decision makers and to determine organizational policy" (Aiken and
Hage 1968). Notably, several scholars have also specifically targeted hospital CEOs in
their studies of organizational strategy and organizational effectiveness (Ashmos, Duchon
et al. 1996; Bazzoli, Shortell et al. 1999; Abernethy and Lillis 2001). Finally, others
concluded that senior executive self-evaluations of overall organizational effectiveness
are reliable, and go as far as saying that the dominant coalition of senior executives can
adequately predict the future success or failure of their organizations (Reimann 1982).
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All in all, CEOs were purposefully sampled as they would be closest to our phenomena
of interest (i.e. How is hospital enterprise performance currently measured?) and would
provide the richest information to help address our research question.
Scheduling of interviews was done via email and over the phone. All seven CEOs from
the sampled hospitals were interviewed on-site and allowed for audio recording. Each
interview lasted 120 minutes. The first 80 minutes were dedicated to administering the
interview protocol, and the remaining 40 minutes were used for three quantitative
questionnaires 60. The interview protocol was sent to the subjects via email one week prior
to the interview, thus each subject had an opportunity to review the protocol in advance
and ask clarification questions. Publicly available information was gathered for each
hospital so as to provide background information to the interview (e.g. news articles,
hospital website, Medicare's hospital compare website). Additionally, several of the
subjects voluntarily provided documentary evidence, to support their answers, including
hospital brochures, mission statements, and in some cases strategic plans. The subjects
weren't made aware of the quantitative questionnaires until the actual interview, and
were assisted in filling them out as required.
Both the interview protocol and the quantitative questionnaires reflect literature insights
both in terms of content and data collection method. Chapter 2's insights and deductions
from the literature were used to devise the questions on the interview protocol, as well as
populate the performance dimensions and performance metrics used in the quantitative
questionnaires. Additionally, the quantitative questionnaires incorporate a pair-
comparison technique as well as a simultaneous comparison technique and both assign
relative weights to performance criteria (i.e. Chapter 2 performance dimensions)
(Globerson 1985).
60 For a copy please refer to Appendix II.
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5.3.2 Data collection of Hospital XYZ and Hospital ABC
At Hospital XYZ and Hospital ABC data was collected from multiple stakeholder groups
including and beyond senior leadership. As with the sample of seven Massachusetts
hospitals, interviews were conducted with senior leaders so as to understand
organizational strategy and organizational effectiveness. However, the in-depth case
studies were designed to explore whether an enriched understanding of hospital
enterprise architecture can improve hospital performance, and hence necessarily implied
collecting data throughout each enterprise as well as probing senior leadership on
additional themes. Several studies of hospital organization and/or effectiveness have
adopted a similar approach (Longest 1974; Argote 1982; Gillies and Shortell 1993;
Abernethy and Lillis 200 1). Furthermore, this approach allowed for the research design to
incorporate the previous recommendation of exploring organizational unit variation and
interaction across adjacent levels of analysis (see section 5.2.4.1). Moreover, a core
interest in this thesis is to approach hospitals as complex socio-technical systems and
evaluate the extent to which lean enterprise principles are being followed by high
performing hospitals (e.g. including relevant stakeholders; holistic understanding of
operations; etc) and in turn describe their underlying enterprise architecture.
Table 5-4: Hospital XYZ and Hospital ABC data collection overview
Case Study Interviews Non-Participatory Walkthroughs Research Site
Meetings Visits
Hospital XYZ 34 8 5 37
Hospital ABC 20 7 4 1 month onsite
Total 54 15 9 1 
_J
All qualitative data collection described in Table 5-4 was conducted in person by the
author. Data collection at Hospital XYZ took place in 2006 and throughout 2007,
whereas at Hospital ABC it consisted of a one month long onsite visit in 2008 (i.e.
Hospital ABC was located in the UK and hence less adequate for sporadic visits). At both
sites the author underwent the necessary human resource training (e.g. videos on how to
handle an emergency; how to be mindful of patients; etc) and medical exams (e.g.
vaccinations, tuberculosis test, etc). At Hospital XYZ he was introduced to the
organization via an internal memo circulated by senior leadership to the various
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department heads, and wore a badge with the designation of "Research Assistant". At
Hospital ABC he was integrated into the in-house lean department that reported directly
to the Director of Strategy and was created by the CEO to conduct lean transformation
projects throughout the hospital. He wore a badge with the designation of "Change
Leader", had his own desk and telephone at the hospital, and was always introduced as a
PhD student working on an independent research project.
The number of listed interviews in Table 5-4 pertains only to the interviews where an
interview protocol was followed and audio recording was attempted (81% of
interviewees consented audio recording). Qualitative data was collected in many other
informal settings (e.g. over lunch at the cafeteria; at the after work pub; etc) as well as
formal (e.g. meetings; walkthroughs; observation). In terms of walkthroughs, these were
hosted by senior nurses who had been at their respective hospital for at least 10 years, and
were knowledgeable of the various information systems (if available), key processes,
people, etc, and hence hosted the walkthroughs at their specific service units as well as
those with which they interacted most with. In terms of non-participatory meetings, these
were day-to-day operational meetings where the author was introduced at the beginning
of each meeting as a PhD student, and remained a silent observer throughout said
meetings.
A total of 54 interviews were carried out with 43 individuals spanning multiple functions
(e.g. senior leadership, administrative support services, and clinical support services) and
multiple service units (e.g. emergency department, inpatient units, operating rooms) for a
total of 60 hours of interviews. The distribution of the interviews by in-depth case study
and respective stakeholder group is shown in Figure 5-5.
The strategies and procedures for selecting interview respondents, meetings, and
walkthroughs were guided by the general principles of grounded theory research and in
accordance with sanctioned practices for qualitative data collection (Glaser and Strauss
1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990). In line with grounded theory practices, data collection
and analysis were done simultaneously, so as to allow for the selection of interview
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respondents, as well as the inclusion of the most relevant questions to further explore and
shape emerging phenomena of interest.
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Figure 5-5: Interviews by Stakeholder Group per Hospital
For instance, as research progressed at Hospital XYZ, data collection efforts focused on
inpatient service units that exhibited either worse or highest performance (i.e. polar cases
recommended in section 5.2.4.1) in their interaction with the emergency department.
Notably, data collection efforts at Hospital ABC benefited from the preliminary findings
at Hospital XYZ, as we added precision to our targeting of relevant respondents,
observation locations, meetings, etc. Additionally, data collection at Hospital ABC also
benefited from the research participation of a Harvard Medical School (HMS) student
doing a surgery rotation at Hospital ABC during the same period. By design, only the
CEO of Hospital ABC was aware that the author and the medical student were
collaborating on the research project, and hence additional valuable insights were
obtained from Hospital ABC's physicians as collected by the HMS medical student.
Specifically, the HMS student collected observational and internal document data
pertaining to her interactions with different surgeons while assisting them on different
patient procedures performed in different ORs. Furthermore, the HMS student logged her
data daily (i.e. within 24 hours from phenomena occurring) so as to preserve its contents
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and readily share them with the author, who then added it to his overall data collection
and analysis.
Finally, additional types of data were collected either in person (e.g. direct access to a
software system) or over email (e.g. excel sheets sent by process improvement engineers).
The information architecture at Hospital XYZ included an electronic medical record
system partially integrated with other systems, including the billing system, which
allowed for a richer dataset to be collected. Conversely, at Hospital ABC, despite being a
leader in the UK, all patient medical records were in paper format and all workflow
heavily relied on paper, therefore its underlying infrastructure limited our ability to
collect such quantitative data. Pertinently, health care scholars have noted that "the cost
of collecting data depends on each hospital's information capabilities, which vary among
hospitals and over time at any given institution" (Mehrotra, Lee et al. 2003).
Figure 5-6 provides an overview of the different types of evidence that were collected
during each in-depth case study. With the benefit of full organizational access (and within
the limits of the information architecture), evidence was collected on each of the
performance dimensions defined in the context of our first two research questions.
Additionally, four types of data are specified in terms of their source (i.e. archival,
internal documents, public documents, subjective). Finally, a distinction is made in terms
of unit of analysis for said data, namely hospital wide (i.e. aggregated metrics) and
service unit level (e.g. emergency department; inpatient service unit).
Page 185 of 759
Finance * 0 0
D Operations 0e 0000 0 00
M Quality * 0
N Patient Satisfaction 00 10 a
Employee Satisfaction
0 Social Equity
N
S Organizational Learning
Strategy / operations alignment 0@) 09
Types of data legend:
= Archival data (i.e. EMR)
Internal document data (e.g. internal strategic plan)
= Public document data (e.g. annual report, 3rd party assessments, etc)
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Figure 5-6: In-Depth Cases Data Evidence Overview
Data collection efforts ended when no new categories of insights were being generated
from further research, which is known as theoretical saturation in grounded theory.
Succinctly, "theoretical saturation is simply the point at which incremental learning is
minimal because the researchers are observing phenomena seen before" (Eisenhardt
1989).
5.4 Data Analysis
Early in this chapter we noted that determining what constitutes a Lean Enterprise
Architecture, or any theory of the business, may sound deceptively simple but it involves
several years of empirical experimentation before reaching a clear, consistent, and valid
theory for a given organization (Drucker 1994). Hence, given the nascent phase of
development of enterprise architecture from a lean enterprise perspective (Nightingale
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2009) a key motivation for this research was to empirically and theoretically enrich
MIT's emerging Nightingale-Rhodes Enterprise Architecture Framework (NREAF).
As noted in section 5.1, this thesis is situated between enterprise architecture's nascent
theoretical maturity and that of lean enterprise thinking intermediate theory. Therefore,
our research study was primarily designed to be exploratory and inductive, but also was
deductive in leveraging existing literature. For instance, our theoretical proposition that
an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture can improve hospital
performance, emerged from the empirical data, was compared with the literature as well
as across embedded units of analysis, and guided subsequent data collection and analysis.
Several of the previous sections in this chapter already describe examples as to how
literature and emergent phenomena of interest guided theoretical sampling, analysis, and
eventually reached theoretical saturation.
In essence, the iteration between inductive theory development and deductive theory
testing wasn't the product of a sequential progression (i.e. literature review -> research
question -> data collection -> analysis -> publication) but rather a series of iterative and
cyclical steps, that allowed for the methodological fit to be adjusted as new findings
emerged from the data. Finally, it is important to emphasize that our research design and
associated data collection and analysis methods, neither exclusively followed grounded
theory's traditional practices (Glaser and Strauss 1967) nor those of case study research
(Yin 1994), but rather a blend that leveraged the best of each (Eisenhardt 1989;
Edmondson and McManus 2007).
51 of the 61 interviewees allowed for audio recording (i.e. considering both in-depth case
studies and the seven Massachusetts hospitals) which were recorded and transcribed by
the author. During the remaining 10 interviews, notes were taken by hand during the
interview, as well as immediately after the interview, and then transferred to electronic
format within 24 hours. In the case of Hospital ABC audio recordings were transcribed
within 24 hours and analyzed with grounded theory cording methods. The interviews of
Hospital XYZ and those of the seven Massachusetts hospitals were revisited, transcribed
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and coded. Such reflects the need for alternative analysis methods that were acquired
when Hospital ABC revealed significant deficiencies in terms of its information
architecture, and prompted the use of grounded theory analysis methods on interview
transcripts, and other qualitative data (e.g. operations observations, non-participatory
meetings). Having acquired the expertise in such rigorous qualitative analysis methods
the decision was made to revisit the previous datasets and apply the same rigor. Moreover,
as scholars have noted, grounded theory is "a practice learned largely through
apprenticeship" (Charmaz 1983), and to that effect the author participated in two doctoral
seminars on field research methods, in 2006 and 2008, from Sloan and Harvard Business
School, and gradually learned throughout the research. Notably, this decision was also
aligned with the research design of exploring the interrelatedness of this thesis' research
questions, and further strengthens the findings pertaining to each one of them.
Coding of qualitative data constitutes the initial phase of the analysis and comprises what
is termed the categorizing and sorting of the data. Such codes are shorthand devices that
allow the researcher to label, separate, compile, and organize qualitative data. Whereas
some scholars promote the use of completely free-coding unconstrained by prior theory
other scholars advocate the strict use of codes based on existing theoretical constructs.
Yet another approach, and indeed followed in this thesis, is that of Miles and Huberman
(1994) who argue that when theory guides inquiry, it is more efficient and realistic to
begin with a conceptual framework, and gradually modify, eliminate, or add codes as
these emerge from the data. In essence, the approach leverages theoretical guidance and
allows for empirical flexibility (or theory revision) (Malina and Selto 2001).
A more granular explanation of coding is one that describes the difference of initial
coding andfocused coding. Initial coding precedes focused coding and allows the
researcher to interpret and discover the data. Codes may pertain to contextual factors and
role descriptions, or more subtle matters such as what stakeholders ignore, are unaware of,
or place particular emphasis on. Focused coding uses a limited set of the codes that were
developed during initial coding, and then applies them to large amounts of data.
Gradually, focused codes can merge with other codes, or be replaced by more relevant
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codes, or finally become part of a category. Notably the use of the literature may help
identify a construct that adequately characterizes phenomena of interest, or offers an
alternative interpretation, but in either case helps the researcher further define and probe
the data. An example would be a senior nurse from an inpatient service unit attempting to
describe a process from the emergency department (ED), and wholeheartedly believing
that what he or she is saying is correct, and yet it is a very inaccurate description of the
process as verified by observation, internal documents, and ED interviews. Similarly,
senior leadership may describe a given service unit as a low performer and not
contributing to the hospital mission, and yet quantitative data determines otherwise,
which prompts the question as to why senior leadership said at first what it did. Was it
due to a lack of information and honest misrepresentation, or was it something else?
Moreover, what factors could be at play that were inducing such behavior and how did
the underlying enterprise architecture mitigate/exacerbate said behavior? Also, when
comparing the behaviors of senior leadership with those of the senior nurse (and other
stakeholders) what are the similarities and differences?
Addressing each of these questions with qualitative evidence (as well as quantitative),
together with the literature, allows for the next step, namely the writing of memos.
Memos centralize evidence that has been interpreted and related to observed (and/or
measured) phenomena. The writing of a memo may prompt revisiting of a category, or
underlying focused coding and hence further refinement of a code, or other memos. Next
memos are sorted and then integrated which increases analytic precision over categories
that are insufficiently defined. Also, the integration of memos allows the researcher to
identify relationships that might have remained elusive until then. Notably, sharing the
resulting integrated memos, or rather, describing them to members of the organization, is
a useful way of validating and further refining findings.
The process of coding, categorizing, writing memos, sorting, and integrating, gradually
allows the researcher to progress towards more abstract analytic levels (Ghauri 2004).
Finally one eventually reaches theoretical saturation in the presence of emergent data, of
both qualitative and quantitative nature, as well as the literature. A key potential pitfall to
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be aware of is the use of categories that are too small and too numerous, as it gives rise to
an analytic landscape that is hard to manage, and potentially further obscures phenomena
of interest (Yin 1981). An analogy in systems thinking would be that of merely focusing
on the interactions between nurses and physicians inside a single service unit, or studying
a single service unit's patient flow and associated processes to its utmost detail. Moreover,
such an analytic approach would contradict the very lean enterprise principles that we are
wanting to study in the context of hospital enterprises.
Although coding efforts first began on paper, and then progressed to Microsoft Excel
sheets, they ultimately evolved to the use of a specialized tool for qualitative data
analysis, namely MAXQDA1 061. The use of said software allowed for a manageable,
searchable, and visual theory building exercise. Notably some of the features of the
software were disregarded (e.g. some stakeholders referred to the emergency department
as "ER", others as "ED", "emergency care", etc, which rendered lexical frequency counts
useless). Also, as evidenced throughout this thesis, leveraging of multidisciplinary
literature was a key component of the research strategy, and perhaps in an innovative way,
MAXQDA10 was used to code each and every single article or book referenced in this
thesis. Theoretical saturation was obtained within the literature itself and several times
doing so beyond an individual body of knowledge. Furthermore, the above mentioned
process that gradually moves towards more abstract analytic levels, was also applied to
the literature, hence further strengthening our findings. In total over 8000 coding
instances were recorded in MAXQDA10.
Finally, descriptive statistics were derived from the three questionnaires collected from
the seven Massachusetts hospital senior leaders, identifying which performance
dimensions as well as metrics are the most and least prevalent. Also, as previously noted
Hospital XYZ's information architecture allowed for a richer dataset comprising one
year's worth of inpatient discharge data (totaling 24,200 patient discharges), including
several properties of interest (e.g. length of stay, diagnostic related group, acuity level,
arrival date, discharge date, origin, etc). Notably, an additional dataset at Hospital XYZ
61 MAXQDA is short for Maximum Qualitative Data Analysis (www.maxqda.com)
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was made possible through the integration of disparate information systems, and enabled
the quantitative analysis of throughput for each key process within the emergency
department, as well as interacting inpatient service units. The resulting datasets were
analyzed using descriptive statistics, regression analysis, and extensive use of data
manipulation SQL queries with graphic visualization. Quantitative data analysis was
often guided by emergent phenomena of interest (e.g. What is the financial contribution
of the emergency department? Does the quantitative data validate anecdotal evidence that
inpatient service unit X is fastest in its interaction with the ED? Etc). Finally, results were
summarized in graphical format so as to visually identify trends in the data, facilitate the
triangulation with other analysis, and also convey emerging findings to hospital
stakeholders.
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6. Seven Massachusetts Hospitals
Our initial exploratory research at a leading US hospital yielded that despite the
hospital's favorable external ranking, there were system dysfunctionalities that were
neither captured by the metrics of the external entities nor by those of the hospital itself.
To that effect, the literature reviews in chapters 2 and 4 were conducted to build our
understanding of hospital enterprise performance measurement, and hospital
environments and operations in general, so as to inform our research. Specifically, the
longitudinal analysis on the hospital performance measurement literature identified a
trend in that the number of performance dimensions considered in published articles
increased over time, following the maturation of the performance management literature
that recognized the need for multidimensional performance measurement. However, the
literature review also characterized an inverse relationship between the number of
performance dimensions considered and the inclusion of empirical data in the studies (i.e.
beyond a conceptual contribution on how to measure hospital performance). Moreover,
as the number of performance dimensions included in the studies increased, the inclusion
of data in such studies decreased. Furthermore, while informed by lean enterprise
principles we defined a total of eight performance dimensions to assess hospital
performance measurement, namely customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, finance,
operations, organizational learning, quality, social equity, strategy/operations alignment.
In analyzing the literature through our eight dimensions we found that hospital operations
was the one most often used, followed by finance, and quality of care, while the
remaining dimensions had little or no expression.
Ultimately given the sparse empirical evidence as to what extent hospitals are adopting a
multidimensional perspective of performance, this chapter presents findings concerning
our first research question: How is hospital enterprise performance currently measured?
Furthermore, the chapter also addresses the follow-on research question: How could
hospital enterprise performance measurement be improved using lean enterprise
principles? As described in Chapter 5, these research questions were addressed with the
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exploratory and inductive study of seven Massachusetts hospitals that were theoretically
sampled according to a literature informed hospital typology (see Table 6-1), which also
informed the qualitative and quantitative research instruments administered to the
hospital CEOs.
Table 6-1: Seven Massachusetts hospitals sample
System Affiliation No System Affiliation
Hospital Bed Size no
teaching teaching teaching no teaching
Small Hospital (<= 99 beds) Hospital D Hospital A
Medium Hospital (100 to 399
beds) Hospital F Hospital E Hospital C Hospital B
Large Hospital (400+ beds) Hospital G II
In line with case study research guidelines (Yin 1994) this chapter organizes our findings
in terms of key themes which characterize similarities and distinctions resulting from the
qualitative and quantitative hospital analysis. Furthermore, our findings are compared and
contrasted with the literature. Finally, we elaborate on how lean enterprise principles can
improve hospital enterprise performance measurement and, in doing so, hospitals are
more likely to progress towards becoming lean hospital enterprises.
6.1 Overview of MA Hospital Environment
In describing their external environment and health care industry in general, all seven
hospitals were consistent in characterizing it as low financial margin, fast moving, and
highly prone to value misalignments induced by external entities such as payers and
regulators. Furthermore, several references were made describing the heterogeneity of
hospitals, beyond typological considerations, and how it in turn affected hospital
competition and attempts at conducting performance comparisons.
All of the senior leaders described financial viability as one of their key responsibilities,
and that in Massachusetts those hospitals performing in the black had thin operating
margins from 1% to 3%. The highest financially performing hospital in Massachusetts (as
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measured by its operating margin) shared that the US economic recession was posing
significant challenges that it felt were beyond its control, as these pertained specifically to
losses incurred from the financial system at large (i.e. debt bonds).
The evolution of medical science has made possible CAT scanners which weren't
available 20 years ago, and today even the smallest of hospitals have this technology.
Patients that used to require a hospital admission, no longer do so, and are treated instead
in outpatient settings. So much so, that even the most advanced hospitals were concerned
with the technology commoditization trend where referring physicians, insurance
companies, and eventually patients themselves, pressured them into lower bids for simple
lab tests today, and perhaps complex procedures (e.g. bypass) tomorrow. However, the
evolution in medical science has impacted hospitals beyond care provision alone, as
evidenced in billing related observations. The underlying complexity of charge capture
while treating patients is such, that ideally hospitals have in place the necessary
information systems to manage said data and populate insurance claims data.
Additionally, although hospitals invest considerably in billing related human resources
and technology, they reported that they still incur expenses that go unaccounted for.
As for payers, both commercial and governmental, these were generally held accountable
for the major value misalignments in the health care system. Hospitals' relationship with
commercial payers was described as mostly adversarial, and contributing to the high
administrative costs that currently exist within hospitals.
Table 6-2: Evidence of hospital adversarial relationships with payers
Hospital Interview quote(s)
F "[Stakeholder] misalignments generally don't occur because of inside forces.
They generally occur because of outside forces.[...] Cuts to reimbursements
create challenges [which] if not managed well the employees become.. .things
become unstable, the employees become restless, the physicians become
restless, so anything to do with financials usually throws a monkey wrench
into the alignment."
C "Let's start with the payers. They are awful. They are impossible. They bully
us. They have tremendous leverage that we don't have. [...]They create an
incredible administrative burden for us. They talk about their 15% of
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administrative cost of health insurance, but they don't factor in what our
administrative cost is to deal with their administrative regulations, which are
30% in our end. We find them very difficult to deal with because of the
imbalance in power."
Several of the hospitals felt that they were at a disadvantage in their negotiation
relationship with insurance companies, and commonly referred to the example of a
prominent health care partnership in Massachusetts (i.e. Partners HealthCare) which was
able to negotiate considerably better contracts with insurance companies because of the
combined clout of its hospital members (e.g. Massachusetts General Hospital and
Brigham and Women's Hospital). Such negotiation clout is well depicted in a report
issued by the Massachusetts Attorney General: "Price variations are correlated to
market leverage as measured by the relative market position of the hospital or provider
group compared with other hospitals or provider groups within a geographic region or
within a group of academic medical centers "(Coakley 2010).
From a related perspective, the smaller hospitals coincided in their concern towards
referring patients to larger hospitals as these tended to refer them back to different lower
acuity providers with whom they shared more beneficial contractual relationships.
Essentially, in seeking specialist care for their patients, smaller hospitals are faced with
the prospect of no longer being able to care for such patients in the future.
Yet another impact of payer entities is that they require hospitals to measure and report
their performance on specific process based measures, which ultimately are meant to
represent the quality of care being provided. Stroke was a common diagnose example
referred to by the interviewees, where the hospital measures whether an aspirin was
administered within a given time frame, and whether the patient underwent a CAT scan
exam. In essence, quality of care is mostly managed at a process level as these are easier
to track than measuring a quality outcome that may only express itself at a later point in
time.
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Looking forward, CEOs converged in their concern towards the atmosphere of payment
reform and how it is going to affect their individual operations in Massachusetts.
Table 6-3: Evidence of payment reform concern
Hospital Interview quote(s)
A "I tried to read as much of the Federal health care reform proposals as I
could, not the 2500 staked pages, but the bullets so that we could see where
we would going to be focusing our attention."
B "We have a chaotic financial environment. For any hospital to try to project
right now what Medicare is going to pay, private insurers is going to pay,
Medicaid is going to pay, beyond the current year we are in and maybe next
year, they are just making it up. Because until the federal government figures
out what it is doing, health reform or no health reform, and even though most
of it doesn't kick in for later years, you have got to know if there is a reform
or not. Until the commonwealth of Massachusetts figures out what the hell it
is doing. Even for this hospital between Medicare and Medicaid, you know it
just close to 50%, you know, when you have a chaotic environment out there,
you can't forecast dollars three years out."
C "The other driver is global payments, capitation, if we get to that, and we will
eventually, we need a very, very robust network of primary care doctors."
F "Right now we have to figure it out because the way that the world is going
with the continual cutting of rates, and continual ratcheting back based on
cost of the commercial payers, and I am sure that Medicare is going to reduce
their reimbursement as well..."
Upon considering how they would respond to the impending health care reform, senior
hospital leaders expressed concern towards the existing shortage of primary care
physicians. Indeed, some of the hospitals were already experimenting with some forms of
capitation and expressed difficulty in being able to recruit more primary care physicians.
Hospital leaders offered that it was a reflection of payment incentives, as recent medical
school graduates were selecting higher paying specialties62 (see Figure 6-1). Notably,
primary care physicians are essential in a global payment environment where hospitals
are rewarded a fixed fee per month per patient regardless of any expenses incurred, and to
that effect, hospitals have the incentive of keeping patients healthy and administering
preventive care.
62 A targeted literature review search confirmed that an association exists between physician salary and
residency fill rate in the US. Rising student debt was offered as an explanation to the observed behavior
(e.g. a Harvard Medical School education typically costs $300K which is in addition to any debt related to
a graduate's pre-med education, thus commonly totaling $500K in student debt).
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Figure 6-1: US Medical Residency Position Fills vs Mean Overall Income by Specialty (from (Ebell
2008))
As for the regulatory environment, several observations were made concerning its impact
on Massachusetts hospitals. Examples included the amount of documentation required in
order to remain accredited by The Joint Commission and eligible for Medicare
reimbursements. Other examples were process specific such as keeping inefficient
processes (e.g. 24 hour staff member in a given service unit regardless of patient volume),
hiring a chief nursing officer, or answering hospital complaints within a week. Mid-size
and smaller hospitals went as far as saying that unless something is a regulatory
requirement, they wouldn't consider expending resources to implement and maintain an
initiative.
"Unless it is required by regulations we aren't going to know about it because we don't
have to know about it. We are not truly a learning organization, which frankly I would
love to be, but I am just trying to keep my head above the water."
Hospital A CEO
Additional consideration was given to the issue of physician shortage and associated in
turn to a nationwide regulatory requirement that had come into effect in 1996. Some of
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the leaders attributed their difficulty in managing contractual relationships with physician
groups that operate in their facilities to the shortage of physicians (across medical and
surgical specialties) that results from the capping of available medical residencies 63.
"So I think the docs have been extremely difficult to manage, and it is a supply and
demand issue ever since the Pew commission in 96 capped the number of residencies
there aren't enough docs to go around so they are naming their tune. [...]So it is a
downward spiralfor community hospitals...
Hospital E CEO
Finally, several hospital leaders described the heterogeneity of hospitals, beyond
typological considerations, and how it in turn affected hospital competition and
performance comparisons (see sample in Table 6-4). To begin with, hospitals configure
their departments differently (e.g. dedicated vs shared resources) and even use different
definitions in characterizing their inpatient and outpatient services, thus compromising
market share calculations. Similarly, hospitals differ in their definition of common
metrics (e.g. patient falls) and also in their behavior in reporting them (i.e. sentinel events
are tracked with voluntarily reported data and not everyone reports the data).
Additionally, hospitals vary in their organizational arrangements with physicians and
employees at large. Some of these are salaried, and may or not be unionized, while others
are part of independent organizations. Furthermore, different hospitals offer different
services. The smaller hospitals tend to offer less specialized care due to resources
constraints, while some of the larger hospitals strategically elect not to offer certain
services (e.g. pediatrics, obstetrics). Similarly, some hospitals offer more routine care,
while others in offering their specialized care, attract sicker patients, and the existing
case-mix adjusters are thought to be insufficient to properly reflect the different patient
populations (and hence the costs incurred by hospitals in caring for them). Lastly, and as
63 A targeted literature review search confirmed that a health commission recommended that US medical
classes substantially reduce their size (i.e. 20% to 25%) and the number of residencies. Pew Health
Professions, C. (1995). Critical challenges : revitalizing the health professions for the twenty-first century:
the third report of the Pew Health Professions Commission. San Francisco, Calif., UCSF Center for the
Health Professions.
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mentioned previously, different hospitals are able to negotiate different contracts with
insurance companies and are paid differently for the same services.
Table 6-4: Evidence of hospital heterogeneity beyond typological considerations
Hospital Interview quote(s)
B "I have no idea what rates are being charged. I know what I pay for my
employees but I have no idea what everybody else pays. And I have contracts
with insurance companies as a provider. I don't set the prices for insurance
contracts."
D "Well inpatient market share now is so messed up because some people are
very aggressive about calling things observation and some aren't, and it is
hard to tell what your real market share is"
E "You know [patient] falls are even defined differently from hospital to
hospital. If you are holding the patient when they fall, is that a fall? Some
people call it a fall and some people don't. Medication errors you know until
you get physician order entry in place, you know, medication errors are self
reported, and there is different levels of self reporting by hospital. It is very
hard to get good benchmarking in a series of cottage industries."
F "It is very hard to benchmark in hospitals because the departments from
hospital to hospital are configured differently"
All in all, our overview of the Massachusetts Hospital environment as described by the
studied seven hospitals is largely consistent with our literature review.
6.2 Comparing Hospital Missions and Strategic Visioning
In assessing what businesses in general could learn from best performing non-profit
organizations, Drucker observed that they "devote a great deal of thought to defining
their organization's mission. They avoid sweeping statements full of good intentions and
focus, instead, on objectives that have clear-cut implications for the work their members
perform" (1989). Drucker also observed that said missions began with an external focus
in the surrounding community and the "customers" to be, rather than internally with
organization or financial related matters. Ultimately, he observed that starting with an
organization's mission is the first and foremost lesson that businesses can learn from
successful non-profits.
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What follows is an analysis of the missions of the seven hospitals included in the sample.
Notably, the data analyzed pertains purposefully to the qualitative answer provided by the
hospital CEOs (see Table 6-5)64. Overall, eight core hospital mission elements emerged
from the data, whereby four of them were consistently featured in the majority of the
sample.
Table 6-5: Hospital mission elements
Hospital Mission Elements
-1 0 c
- .- U V- V-U * ~ a
Hospital *U * * * _*__
A x x x
B x x x x
C x x x x x
D x x x
E x x x x
F x x x x x x
G x x x x x x
By inspection all seven leaders feel responsible for any patient that seeks care at their
65facility regardless of ability to pay, residence location, ethnicity, etc . Similarly almost
all of the respondents reflected a specific concern towards meeting the expectations and
supporting their surrounding community. Hospitals C and G didn't make a specific
reference to their surrounding community, and instead mentioned a regional, national,
and international orientation. In the case of Hospital G, the CEO referred to the public in
general, and most likely so, given that the hospital is in the center of Boston and
64 An analysis of internal hospital documentation (e.g. Strategic Plan) and/or hospital websites (e.g. Mission
Statement) supported the CEOs answers and didn't introduce new hospital mission elements. However,
some of the hospitals had written documentation that went beyond the CEOs answers. The interview
protocol included multiple questions which broached the same topic, and hence gave respondents the
opportunity of providing a more accurate answer that reflected their perspective and concerns as CEOs of
their organization (i.e. findings emerged from multiple questions answered by each respondent).
65 Such is in line with the regulatory requirement previously identified in Chapter 4, namely the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Labor Act (1986).
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surrounded by other healthcare providers of similar stature. Hospital C is a tertiary care
hospital with two community hospitals close by, which might have explained why its
leader didn't refer to the surrounding community specifically.
Related to the provision of care to the surrounding community is the delivery of a broad
array of services so that the community has ready and convenient access to care. As many
as five of the seven hospitals, included the breadth of services in their hospital mission
description. The two hospitals that didn't do so, namely Hospitals A and D, are small
hospitals (see Table 6-1) and specifically see themselves as supporting remotely located
communities needing primary care services or basic internal medicine inpatient care,
which are then transferred to other hospitals if need be.
Interestingly, all respondents also included as part of their mission the requirement to
deliver optimum care whilst remaining viable organizations. In doing so, hospital leaders
made the distinction between delivering the care that their surrounding community wants,
versus the care that they need, which ultimately is what is considered when planning and
maintaining services. Furthermore, some of the hospital leaders specifically referred to
requiring their technology enthusiastic physicians present them with procedural volume
projections whenever they sought hospital investment to implement said technologies. As
such, hospital viability was managed both internally and externally. Such is in line with
the responsibility that senior leaders alluded to when describing their hospital
environment, and may partly explain why they have been part of the select few that have
maintained financial viability and consistently remained in the black in Massachusetts.
The remaining four hospital mission elements were more idiosyncratic and reflected
typological characteristics in the sample. For instance, Hospitals C, F, and G, are
registered as major teaching hospitals and hence have a concern towards delivering
excellent specialized care. Interestingly, although Hospitals F and G specifically included
teaching in their mission descriptions, Hospital C admitted that teaching wasn't one of its
core focuses. However, Hospital C distinguished itself by emphasizing its core value and
culture of delivering excellent team based care whereby patients with multiple illnesses
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can be treated efficiently and effectively. Finally, Hospital G, the largest hospital in the
sample, described what is often referred as the triple mission, namely, patient care,
teaching, and research. Notably, both Hospital C and F mentioned at times an interest
towards research, but such interest accrued specifically from individual physician leaders
in specific specialties, rather than representing an overall hospital mission element.
Next we examined the strategic visioning for each of the seven hospitals included in the
sample and we found corroborating evidence of the hospital missions as well as specific
strategic considerations for each hospital (see Table 6-6).
Table 6-6: Evidence of hospital strategic visioning
Hospital Interview quote(s)
A "we want to be the healthcare provider for our 9 towns, we serve nine towns
here in Massachusetts predominantly" "We do the basic things very very
well" "Historically, we went at it alone [but now we want to]approach and
develop an affiliation with a larger system"
B "We are a community hospital and we are here to continue to meet the
healthcare needs of the residents of our service area."
C "The strategic vision is dependent upon growth. It is dependent upon
expansion of our current excellence. It also depends upon improving teaching
and research. But probably the real focus is growth and excellence."
D "it doesn't mean that we want our picture on the cover of modem healthcare.
It means that we score well against benchmarks for similar institutions or
services"
"really be a viable resource for this community into the future. That is a
challenge for a small community hospital these days"
E "maintain the health and healthcare of our inhabitants, while maintaining the
economic sustainability of the [hospital E]"
F "To really benefit the patient, the family, and the communities we serve by
achieving benchmark levels of performance in quality and safety, clinical
metrics, and financial metrics."
"We also strongly believe that employee and physician satisfaction are
strategic imperatives, that enabling the workforce and creating a culture that is
positive for physicians and the employees results in tremendous payback in
terms of patient satisfaction"
"ties in with financial is the strategy of creating a network where the
hospital's bricks and mortar become the center of care, but that there are many
spokes, a hub and spoke approach to business development"
G "[our vision is to] do all [our mission] very very well and in particular with
regard to clinical care, set a standard of care that encompasses the elimination
of harm to patients and that provides excellent patient experience."
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Hospitals A, B, D, E, and F, described their strategic vision as continuing to support and
care for their surrounding communities. Both Hospitals A and D, the smallest hospitals in
the sample, described difficulties accruing from their smaller size and that a system
affiliation was a requirement in order to continue viable. Specifically, Hospital D had
recently successfully negotiated its inclusion in a hospital system, whereas Hospital A
was actively pursuing a system affiliation. Notably, although only Hospital F specifically
mentioned enabling a satisfied workforce as part of its strategic visioning, several of the
other hospitals provided evidence of a similar leadership prerogative66.
Finally, having analyzed the hospitals' missions and strategic visioning, we specifically
probed senior leaders for whom they considered to be their key stakeholders (see Table
6-7). In the words of one of the respondents:
"I think it would be easier to say who aren't your stakeholders."
Hospital D CEO
Table 6-7: Hospital key stakeholders
Hopi alIKey Stakeholders _________
* ni
Hospital
-A x x x x x x x
-B x x x x x x x
C x x x x x x x x
-D x x x x x x x
-E x x x x x x x
F x x x x x x x x x
-G x x x x x x x x
According to Table 6-7 senior hospital leaders share a multiple constituency view of their
enterprise, and are concerned almost entirely with the same set of key stakeholders,
which speaks further to the comparability of the hospital enterprise environment, at least
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66 Please refer to section 6.4.
from the perspective of senior leadership. Interestingly, all respondents regarded
"physicians and surgeons" as independent from "employees" (e.g. nurses, supply
technicians, etc) even when salaried models were in place (i.e. every care provider was in
the hospital's payroll). Also, although there were few distinctions amongst the key
stakeholders referenced, it is important to briefly elaborate upon them. First, Hospitals C
and G were consistent in not mentioning the surrounding community as a key stakeholder
(i.e. unlike the remaining hospitals, they didn't include serving the surrounding
community as a core mission element). Also, Hospital C didn't refer to patients at large
but rather inpatients specifically (i.e. patients admitted to the hospital). Then, Hospitals C,
F, and G, which are medium and large hospitals that regard the delivery of excellent
specialized care as a core mission element, emphasized a concern towards physicians that
referred patients to them, as well as for donors and philanthropic activities in general.
All in all, we determined that despite the heterogeneity commonly described in the
literature, and indeed in previous sections and chapters of this thesis, leading hospitals in
Massachusetts share several mission organizational elements, as well as a concern
towards a similar set of key stakeholders. Notably, such insight is particularly important
when considering two lean enterprise principles, namely the identification of relevant
stakeholders (i.e. Principle 2) and to some extent the consideration of hospital enterprise
interdependencies (i.e. Principle 4). Finally, unlike the characterization prevalent in the
healthcare literature (see Chapter 2), our analysis began uncovering senior leaders'
consideration towards performance as a multidimensional construct (e.g. offering patients
as broad as services as possible whilst remaining financially viable). Additionally, we
captured initial evidence that senior leaders had as an objective to become and/or remain
amongst the highest ranked hospitals in external benchmarks conducted by third party
organizations (e.g. US Department of Health & Human Services)(HHS 2011). Having
characterized the Massachusetts hospital environment, as well as the missions and
strategic visioning of each of the seven hospitals included in the sample, we proceeded to
probe further into their hospital enterprise performance measurement construct.
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6.3 Hospital Internal and External Performance Measurement
Practices
During the interviews participants were asked specific questions concerning their
definition of hospital enterprise performance, what it meant to perform, and how said
performance was measured. Furthermore, participants filed out three quantitative
questionnaires probing specifically on performance dimensions and their relative
importance to each other. The responses to these research instruments gave further
insight into whether hospital CEOs had a lean enterprise perspective and whether they
were indeed adopting lean enterprise principles in their measurement of hospital
performance. What follows is a description of key themes that emerged consistently from
the data both across the hospital sample and across research instruments.
6.3.1 Hospital multidimensional appreciation of performance
In describing their multiple constituency view of their enterprise, senior hospital leaders
highlighted the multidimensional nature of the hospital performance construct. To begin
with, different stakeholders may have different values expected from the hospital
enterprise and hence enterprise value misalignment may exist. For instance, non-salaried
hospitals commonly referred to Medicare's payments inducing tension between hospitals
and physicians, in that physicians are paid on a per-diem rate, whereas hospitals are paid
a flat rate. Moreover, physicians don't have an incentive to discharge patients sooner,
whereas hospitals do. Similarly, physicians may have incentives to conduct specific types
of surgeries where the hospital doesn't make money. Additionally, although patient
expectations were considered important, senior leaders also noted that some of them look
at things "from a keyhole" and satisfying their views could compromise the hospital as a
whole. Ultimately, in an unprompted fashion interviewees consistently enumerated
several performance dimensions which they tried to manage concurrently (see Table 6-8).
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Table 6-8: Hospital performance dimensions (unprompted responses6 7)
Performance Dimensions
Quality Financial Patient Operations Employee Education
Hospital Satisfaction Satisfaction
A x x x
B x x x x
C x x x x
D x x x x x
E x x x x x
F x x x x x
G x x x x x x
Clearly, senior hospital leaders had a multidimensional appreciation of hospital
performance. All seven hospitals enumerated quality, finance, and patient satisfaction.
All of the non-system affiliated hospitals (i.e. A, B, C) didn't enumerate employee
satisfaction as a core dimension. Finally, Hospital A was the only one not to mention
operations, whereas Hospital G was the only one to mention education (which is in line
with its previously identified distinctive interest in training medical professionals and
research).
When defining what high performance meant respondents were consistent in emphasizing
the importance of scoring well in multiple, if not all the performance dimensions they
enumerated. Three respondents offered insight that particularly captures this
characteristic, as follows:
"Patient satisfaction Iput it rung down just because we could do terrible clinical care
but ifwe are nice to the person they might rate us highly."
Hospital D CEO
"Again poor performance, I think, throws a monkey wrench into the alignment, if the
institution isn't doing well, on a number of categories, whether it is patient satisfaction,
67 By unprompted we mean that respondents were openly asked about the performance dimensions they
consider when measuring their hospital performance, and we purposefully didn't prompt them on the use of
specific dimensions. Prompting was designed to only take place during the quantitative questionnaires, so
as not to bias the qualitative responses.
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or letting the facilities not get the attention they need, or not being able to give raises, or
all those kinds of things, will create a misalignment."
Hospital F CEO
"ifwe have very high income and very poor patient care, we are not succeeding. What
would constitute high performance is doing well on all of the dimensions. I can't think of
one dimension that if it were well that we as a hospital would have higher performance.
All the dimensions that I mentioned are required to be high if I am to have high hospital
performance"
Hospital G CEO
In Chapter 2 we determined that the majority of influential articles which studied hospital
performance only included one or two dimensions in their data analysis. Furthermore, we
asserted that as the number of performance dimensions included in the studies increased
over time, the inclusion of data in such studies decreased. Evidently, the senior leaders of
the hospital sample in this research reveal a multidimensional appreciation of
performance which isn't captured and/or followed in the current literature.
6.3.2 Hospital multidimensional assessment of performance
Having determined that respondents had a multidimensional appreciation of performance,
and indeed strived towards attaining high performance on multiple dimensions
simultaneously, we next probed respondents with quantitative instruments that prompted
them on the relative importance of the performance dimensions given existing practices
in their respective hospital. For instance, a respondent might have an appreciation for a
performance dimension which (s)he deems important, however, its hospital performance
measurement system (e.g. dashboard) has little or no representation of it, and hence it
scores lower against the better represented dimensions 68. Additionally, in the case of
performance dimensions that were indeed similarly tracked in a given hospital, the
respondents were asked to assess their relative importance to each other (e.g. generally,
68 Each hospital provided internal documents as additional evidence of their hospital performance
measurement practices. Such documents were a combination of Strategic Plans, Operational Plans, Board
of Trustees Meeting Minutes, Dashboard printouts, etc.
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the finance and quality dimensions had a considerable list of metrics being tracked at
each hospital, but senior leaders placed different relevance on each of them).
Table 6-9 summarizes the data analysis performed on the quantitative instruments and
compares it to the literature review analysis from Chapter 2. As explained in Chapter 5,
two data collection techniques were used to capture the relative importance assigned to
performance dimensions, namely the pair-wise comparison (i.e. distribute 100% across
each dimension pair, 28 pairs in total) and the simultaneous comparison (i.e. distribute
100% across all eight dimensions).
Table 6-9: Hospital performance dimension prioritization69
Seven Massachusetts Hospitals Chapter 2
Pair-wise Simultaneous Literature
companson comparison review
Performance dimension Average Rank Average Rank Average Rank
Customer satisfaction 11.70% 5 13.50% 3 10.62% 4
Employee satisfaction 9.82% 6 8.33% 6 8.85% 5
Finance 15.74% 2 19.67% 2 22.12% 2
Operations 14.52% 3 12.58% 4 23.89% 1
Organizational learning 9.23% 7 7.17% 7 3.54% 7
Quality 17.02% 1 24.33% 1 21.24% 3
Social equity 8.63% 8 4.33% 8 6.19% 6
Strategy / operations
alignment 13.33% 4 10.08% 5 3.54% 7
The data show that respondents assigned similar relevance to each performance
dimension in both quantitative comparison techniques. However, the simultaneous
technique had the strongest discriminating power (i.e. highest scores scored higher and
lowest scores scored lower) which is consistent with the observations of the
methodological literature (Globerson 1985).
Overall the respondent data is consistent with the healthcare literature insofar as the
designation of the top three dimensions (i.e. Operations, Finance, and Quality) and two of
69 Rank was calculated in terms of the relative importance assigned to each performance dimension (i.e.
highest percentage was ranked as 1, whereas lowest percentage was ranked as 8). In the case of a tie both
dimensions were awarded the same rank.
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the lower ranking dimensions (i.e. Organizational Learning and Social Equity). However,
a closer examination reveals key departures from the literature. First, the senior leaders of
the hospital sample unanimously regarded quality of care as their most important
performance dimension, averaging close to 25% in relevance, whereas the literature
predominantly uses operations to characterize hospital performance. Second, strategy and
operations alignment was regarded considerably more important by the sampled leading
hospitals, than how the literature regards it. Finally, it is important to emphasize once
again that, whereas each hospital respondent demonstrated varying degrees of usage of
each of the eight performance dimensions, the majority of the empirical literature only
characterizes hospital performance from one or two performance dimensions.
Ultimately, the seven hospitals included in the sample would seem to have incorporated
some lean enterprise principles in their hospital enterprise performance measurement.
The values of multiple stakeholders were reflected (i.e. principle 2), a balanced concern
towards operations, finance, and quality was present (i.e. principle 3), and a monitoring
of strategy and operations alignment was followed (i.e. principle 1). However, further
probing was necessary to interpret the lower scoring of key dimensions (e.g. social equity,
organizational learning) and also inquire further about existing performance measurement
practices.
6.3.3 Hospital benchmarking of performance
Further inquiry into the meaning of higher performance revealed that senior hospital
leaders continuously benchmarked themselves using both internal and external data. To
perform meant not only to increase their standing in terms of historic internal
performance, but also to do so in relation to other comparable hospitals70 . The most cited
benchmark was "Hospital Compare" by the US Department of Health & Human Services
(HHS 2011). Meanwhile, some of the hospitals used commercial benchmarks to measure
70 While the use of external benchmarks was acknowledged, respondents emphasized the previously
mentioned limitations in attempting to compare themselves with other hospitals. Furthermore, they
unanimously clarified that their chief concern was that regulators and payers alike used such benchmarks to
evaluate their performance, and hence they felt obligated to improve their standing in such benchmarks
even though they had issues with their comparability limitations.
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themselves against other hospitals in terms of their patient satisfaction (i.e. Press Ganey
Associates).
Four key limitations were apparent in the external benchmarking of hospital performance.
First, hospitals consistently relied on different benchmarks to measure themselves on
different performance dimensions. Moreover, benchmarking instruments didn't allow for
holistic performance measurement, therefore even if an effort was made to cross-
reference two or more benchmarks, their analysis was derived from different baseline
data. Furthermore, respondents promptly referred to their good results in specific
benchmarks (and hence specific dimensions) and neglected to mention other benchmarks
where they didn't perform as well. Second, quality of care was primarily measured with
process based metrics (e.g. administering X within Y minutes in the presence of Z) and
the little outcome based metrics used were basic (i.e. mortality and readmission rates).
Third, metrics were aggregated at hospital level which lacked the granularity of specific
service units (e.g. emergency care vs. inpatient care). Notably, gathering data at a lower
granularity and at such magnitude (i.e. across all Medicare enabled hospitals) would
imply a considerable cost and potentially an additional administrative burden. Finally, all
hospitals were consistent in characterizing an overwhelming number of metrics being
tracked at any point in time, and largely because of external stakeholder requirements
(see Table 6-10). For instance, medium to large hospitals tracked as many as 300 to 400
quality of care related metrics in order to remain eligible for payment by various payers,
including Medicare.
Table 6-10: Evidence of extensive list of externally required metrics
Hospital Interview quote(s)
B "We have a very long set of clinical targets." "The external ones tend to be
more of reporting requirements." "I have to answer you with thousands of
bullet points."
C "We have no shortage of metrics! [chuckles] Some of them under care would
be mortality index, readmission rates, CMS [Medicare] core measures for
heart disease and pneumonia, HEDIS measures [which are for outpatient care]
for diabetes and asthma, CMS surgical measures, NISQIP (surgical measures
of performance and infection rates), performance of accreditation by the joint
commission, etc"
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D "Oh we look at everything! [dismay voice][...] We have been measuring that
forever."
E "on the quality side as you know there is AHRQ and Quality Forum there is
probably 350 outcomes you are looking for, from medication errors, to falls,
to prevention, core measures... we lump all those core measures and
everything together... attacking all of them at once..."
"There are too many organizations out there demanding healthcare to do
this... [...] These organizations come at you, be it CMS, be it AHRQ Quality
Forum, and huuuumf! They overwhelm you! And they are all voluntary in a
way, except for JACHO, and you know, so you are chasing your tail..."
F "all of that data, very complex, complete... I shouldn't say complete... large
set of data, [is] publicly reported for the most part."
"I think anything that was below some sort of state or national average would
be considered to be unacceptable or poor performance."
G "I only keep track of very few metrics. The ones I just told you about. I know
we track all the others, we have to for regulatory reasons"
Interestingly, the dimensions which scored lower in the previous subsection (i.e. social
equity and organizational learning) aren't required by external entities and are absent
from hospitals' external benchmarks, whereas those that scored higher (i.e. operations,
finance, quality, patient satisfaction) feature prominently in said benchmarks. Therefore,
despite the limitations of external benchmarks, these arguably also prompted senior
hospital leaders towards improving and maintaining their performance at least above
national averages.
6.3.4 Hospital internal measurement practices
Having established the considerable influence of external entities in hospitals' external
benchmarking activities, we next probed further into their internal performance
measurement practices.
To begin with we determined that the number of externally demanded metrics
significantly outweighed the internal metrics, and in some cases comprised the whole
dashboard for a given hospital. Additionally, several of the hospitals defined as strategic
objectives the implementation of externally demanded metrics, and the improvement on
the specific processes measured by said metrics. One of the respondents particularly
conveyed this practice, as follows:
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"A strategic objective would be to optimize patient satisfaction, and there is a series of
process improvement steps under that. A strategic objective would be to be as safe as
possible in terms of the 350 outcomes set by AHRQ [Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality]."
Hospital E CEO
In describing their internal performance measurement practices, all seven hospitals were
consistent in characterizing a cost center based analysis of each service unit (e.g.
emergency department, operating room per specialty, laboratory, etc)(see Table 6-11).
Different hospitals had different levels of sophistication and depth in their cost center
analysis practices. For instance, Hospital A expressed difficulty in keeping track of
expenses as it couldn't afford an electronic medical record system capable of effectively
capturing item charges (i.e. services and materials administered to each patient).
Similarly, Hospital B also didn't have the benefit of a sophisticated billing system, but it
instituted a line-by-line monthly analysis of each cost center with the senior leadership
team. Furthermore, there was a specific focus on volume per service unit and volume per
procedure. One CEO went as far as instituting a DRG level of focus in order to improve
on each individual DRG and reach specific targets. Ultimately, each hospital had in place
mechanisms to determine the contribution margin of each service unit.
Table 6-11: Evidence of cost center management practices
Hospital Interview quote(s)
A "we look at the financial reports that provide levels of contribution to the
bottom line by department. We have revenues, net revenues, expenses [...]
each department is measured on its contribution."
B "I am a pain in the neck because I also go over every line item, in every cost
center, with every senior manager every single month, and budget variance
reports, so you can always see opportunities to get more efficient" "I really
know where people are spending their money [shows me her folders with
detailed line items]. So if we find that there are areas that we can get more
efficient, we will definitely go about doing that"
C "[performance is tracked] primarily through variations from budget, we track
all the different departments and units, and they all have budgets. We track it
weekly in terms of encounters, how many operations you do... more volume
based. And then monthly we use aggregate numbers and calculate financials."
D "every department had to develop a dashboard"
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E "We look at every DRG on mortality and complications and we are trying to
stay above the 75% on every one, so anything that falls below that would be a
missing objective"
F "We are able to see the ratio of revenue to expense for each department on a
monthly basis."
"We typically have what we call a statistic... if it is the OR we look at cases
per month against revenue and expense... or we might look at lab tests... so if
someone has got a metric in terms of lab tests or x-rays, then we would look at
their FTEs measured against that statistic, and their expenses against that
statistic... Once you do that then you can look the next month and say "Okay,
their volume was up but their expenses were the same, and their revenues
were the same" That means that they perhaps are more efficient but also that
their revenue is not as good as it might be. So it helps to kind of give you a
point to measure both volumes, revenue, and expense on an ongoing basis.
And therefore you can then look at other departments and then say "so, if your
cost per statistic was X, and someone else's cost per their statistic was Y",
you can kind of look at the department and see which managers are managing
the tightest."
"We look at contribution margin to services on a rotating basis... not probably
as much as we should, but we do look at those, or at least we can look at
those."
G "we have a budget to meet for next year and that we have to decide where to
cut expenses. And if people say "well I am not ready to cut expenses" then
you say "I am sorry, we need to cut them, because the bottom line is the
bottom line, so you have 30 days to come up with a conclusion". And if you
I can't come up with it then I will decide."
In general, the smaller or non-teaching hospitals observed that they made the most
revenue from outpatient services, whereas the teaching hospitals regarded inpatient and
procedural services as more profitable (see Table 6-12).
Table 6-12: Evidence of contribution margin awareness
Hospital Interview quote(s)
A "Small hospitals or critical access hospitals have the majority of their revenue
in outpatient"" Radiology is the single largest contributor." "Rehab is next
because there is very little supply cost... it is all people. And if you keep their
schedules busy there is a good return"
C "I think it is the procedural ones and they perform better for a couple of
reasons. Obviously because the reimbursements are better. And they are more
predictable." "it would be inpatient surgeries. More the high end surgeries:
transplant surgeries, cardiac surgery, neurosurgery, urology."
D "Probably oncology and endoscopy right now, and those are actually
individuals, two doctors who bring the most money into this place. We do
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have some better paid services like digital mammography, sleep studies and
so forth"
"70% to 75% of your business is outpatient"
E "The OR contributes to our bottom line substantially. Cardiac services. Those
would be the major ones. I would tell you also that outpatient services
contribute. We lose money in inpatient services. Outpatient services is what
drives our bottom line."
F "Pretty much all of the interventional procedures, so that would be surgery,
radiology, certain oncology procedures, there is a pretty good margin for the
lab, gastroenterology, so it tends to be procedure driven, cardiology, you
I know anything to do with stenting and interventional cardiology"
It is important to note however, that although cost center practices were indeed in place
they weren't following an activity based costing approach whereby a focus is given to
high profit margin services with the intent of lessening or discontinuing other services
(see Table 6-13). Follow-on questions determined that CEOs were consistent in their
mission value of delivering a viable and broad array of services. For instance, a hospital
wouldn't close a service unit (e.g. emergency department) that had a negative
contribution margin, if it was deemed essential to the surrounding community.
Furthermore, some of the respondents noted that cross-costs existed whereby one service
unit could in essence be supporting another service unit and they may lie at opposite ends
of the contribution margin spectrum (i.e. residual contribution). However, the fact still
remained that performance was being measured by cost center and in some case line-by-
line.
Several reasons were identified to justify the cost center approach adopted by the
hospitals. Several argued that said practices were to identify the efficiency opportunities,
or any deviation from historic volumes. Additionally, some hospital leaders noted their
need to know as precisely as possible how much each DRG would cost so that they could
cost shift if need be in their negotiations with commercial insurance companies (i.e. cost
shifting occurs when Medicare's reimbursements are insufficient to cover all of a
hospital's expenses in a given DRG, hence prices charged to private insurance payers are
increased for those specific DRGs). Similarly, the negotiation of capitation based
contracts requires hospitals to be particularly knowledgeable about their underlying costs
in administering care, so as to make sure that they negotiate adequate payments per
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patient member per month. Moreover, hospitals had in place mechanisms to determine
the contribution margin of each service unit, but they were aware, to some extent, of the
limitations of such an approach, and didn't adopt a traditional activity based costing
mindset.
Table 6-13: Evidence of non-activity based costing mindset
Hospital Interview quote(s)
B "if I discover the emergency room does not contribute to the bottom line, am I
going to close it? Of course not! If I discover that orthopedics doesn't
contribute to the bottom line, what am I going to tell a patient that shows up
with a broken leg? So we budget the entire institution and we don't introduce
services here [that can't pay for themselves]"
C "the analysis that we currently do which is a relatively siloed analysis of
revenues and expenses" "it is completely reimbursement driven: the
reimbursements are pretty good given the amount of energy expended within
each silo"
F "we have to provide medicine for dermatology, or gastroenterology services,
pretty much whether they are profitable or not, those are services that we
wouldn't let go..." "the real trick for hospitals is to figure out how to mix the
services and mix the paying patients so that you can make a margin. But it is
not as though you can eliminate a particular service."
G "on its face you would say that surgery provides more income to the bottom
line. However, if you don't have a medicine department which is the intake
for the patients in the first place, who then get referred to the surgeon, surgery
can't contribute to the bottom line. So it is the integrated service that makes it
work."
"I am not sure that I could break down the service units in terms of each of the
performance dimensions. I don't have enough knowledge of the various units
to tell you how I would rank them in terms of efficiency, productivity,
financial results"
Despite realizing the limitations of the cost center approach, it is also important to note
that there were nonetheless secondary effects followed in the hospitals' performance
measurement practices which didn't lend themselves to lean enterprise principles (see
Table 6-14). For instance, despite recognizing the potential residual contribution amongst
service units, some hospitals would refuse a service unit's improvement (e.g. add a robot;
enlarge the emergency department; etc) if said service unit couldn't attract sufficient
increased volume in order for the improvement to pay for itself. Another example was
that all seven hospitals had in place productivity reward systems whereby the managers
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of each cost center would receive a bonus for reaching a pre-defined target, and said
bonus was specific to a service unit and did not account for potential service unit
interdependency. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the nature of the lean
improvement initiatives in place were narrowly focused either inside a service unit (e.g.
reduce ventilator associated infections in ICU; reduce time to be seen upon arrival in the
emergency department; etc) or an isolated clinical support process (e.g. making a
pharmacy drug available on an inpatient service unit). Moreover, hospitals were defining
as strategic objectives the implementation of externally demanded metrics, and
subsequently focusing on the improvement of the specific processes measured by said
metrics.
Table 6-14: Evidence of less desirable effects of hospital performance measurement practices
Hospital Interview quote(s)
A "laboratory are best performing. The reason is because it is more of an
automotive assembly line. They can reduce their steps in the laboratory to
achieve better throughput. They can line up the equipment to get the most of
their process. X-ray is probably second in that people come in usually for one
test, you get them in, you get them to the test, you get them out."
B "I had a group of clinicians think "can I have a robot", and I said okay, go out
there and find out how many cases you would have for your robot, and then
come back and let me know. People from Burlington Massachusetts aren't
going to come here for that. You guys tell me how many cases you currently
do that you would need to have a robot for, and if it is a lot of cases I will buy
a robot because I've got money, and they didn't come back, and I knew they
wouldn't come back because they don't have cases"
C "I think that the ones with the most room for improvement are already the
highest functioning ones. The ones with less room for improvement are those
where we need more improvement. For instance, we might have a department
that is very successful and we may have one which is less successful, so
where should we invest in improvement? I think it is probably better to invest
in the successful ones because they already have a track record at being
successful."
E "the emergency department. It is a process rich environment that lends itself
to performance improvement" "When I got here we had 90,000 visits which is
high, top 3 or 4 in the state, 70% of the people went to the waiting room,
nothing good ever happens to you in the waiting room, probably 80% of
patients weren't seen in 40 minutes upon arrival, now 90% are seen in 40
minutes upon arrival, 10% are in the waiting room or change hospital. So we
have a whole series of PI [performance improvement] initiatives that may be
more related to hotel function, or process innovations, many of them are
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related to quality outcomes, such as, ventilator acquired pneumonia we have
zero, we have central line infections we have zero when we used to have 3 to
5%. I am not saying that we are great in every area, but we have very specific
measures that we track and define high performance. And we are in evolution
to continue to define even more as we go."
F "our medication efforts have reduced the time from the ordering of the med to
the delivery of the medicine to the floor from 90 minutes to 9 minutes, so that
emphasis was great for patients because it is reducing error, but it is also
creating efficiencies. The same thing in the operating room. The same thing in
radiology. Typically those services tend to be more efficient whereas other
services tend to be less efficient. Medicine for example is definitely not as
efficient as overall as the other services."
Overall, lean improvement initiatives didn't cut across service units and were focused on
externally set requirements, rather than internally defined strategies. For instance, the
improvement of patient flow between two separate service units wasn't contemplated (i.e.
principle 4 addressing interdependencies). Similarly, improvements targeted at specific
isolated processes would improve efficiency within a given service unit, but potentially
compromise overall effectiveness of said service unit, or those of others (i.e. principle 3
of focusing on enterprise effectiveness before efficiency). Ultimately, such practices were
in line with the traditional interpretation of lean improvement (e.g. narrow process level),
and indeed prevalent in the health care literature, and did not accommodate the broader
considerations inherent in lean enterprises.
Finally when asked about their measurement practices of interactions with external health
care providers, respondents consistently referred to the inflow of patients (i.e. patient
referrals) and mentioned once again the existence of weekly and monthly volume based
objective data tracking. Respondents proceeded with the characterization of outflow
interactions (e.g. nursing homes, rehab facilities, etc) only after specific probing to that
effect. Notably, only the two smallest hospitals have an annual face-to-face meeting
scheduled with the two or three external providers they interact with. However, none of
the hospitals had specific processes in place to rate an external interaction on an
individual and systematic basis, nor are there any volume based metrics (e.g. external
facilities that receive the most patients from them). External interactions are measured
with perceptual data in sporadic reactive occasions whereby a hospital is informed by a
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complaining external provider either directly or through an officially filed complaint.
Ultimately, when asked for a scenario for when hospitals would indeed measure outflow
in a systematic and rigorous way, respondents mentioned that payment models as a whole
would have to value integrated care (i.e. global payment). In the words of one particular
respondent:
"Well, over time ifyou think that we are going to have more integrated care across the
spectrum of care, it will be more important to have better communication there for sure.
Hospital G CEO
6.4 Hospital Enterprise Capabilities
Our analysis this far has specifically discussed both direct and indirect consequences of
explicit performance measurement practices, and in doing so, both positive and room for
improvement opportunities were identified. Notably, an influential performance
measurement paper proposed that enterprise performance measurement practices,
whether "used explicitly to influence behavior, to evaluate future strategies, or simply to
take stock, will affect actions and decisions [to the point that] The firm becomes what it
measures" (Hauser and Katz 1998). However, our analysis also established that senior
hospital leaders followed implicit practices (i.e. neither captured in their performance
measurement practices nor in their mental models of performance measurement) which
further explored to what extent hospital enterprise performance is currently being
measured. Moreover, beyond performance measurement practices, "lean enterprises are
complex, highly integrated systems comprised ofprocesses, products, organizations, and
information, with multifaceted interdependencies and interrelationships across their
boundaries" (Nightingale 2002). What follows is a description of key enterprise
capability themes that emerged consistently from the data across the hospital sample.
6.4.1 Hospital enterprise scale considerations
While describing the hospitals performance measurement practices, specific phenomena
of interest emerged pertaining to the scale of the different hospitals.
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Information technology (IT) capability related to hospital scale: in general, larger
hospitals had greater information technology capability. Smaller leading hospitals
compensate for their constrained IT environment with alternative human intensive
processes (see Table 6-15). Specifically, hospitals A, B, and D, classified their underlying
information technology capability as constrained at best. Hospital A doesn't have a
sophisticated electronic medical record (EMR) system and instead relies on its CEO
single handedly calculating and guesstimating the costs of each DRG with a calculator.
Similarly, the hospital had recently significantly improved its accounts receivable and it
attributed the improvement to the implementation of electronic billing. In the case of
Hospital B, the CEO followed a cumbersome monthly line-by-line cost center review
with its leadership team. Specifically, Hospital B didn't have the sophisticated billing
systems and had to rely instead with the familiarity and commitment of its team.
However, said process also helped in the planning activities as the key stakeholders were
present and would readily negotiate and derive consensus as to which service unit(s) to
invest in. Interestingly, Hospital B's CEO also noted that the process would only most
likely work in an organization her size, and that a bigger organization would have
difficulty in doing the same. The remaining hospitals were of medium to large size and
relied on multiple information systems to capture, manage, and process data. For instance,
Hospital D used a data warehouse to manage inpatient data (i.e. McKesson Horizon
Performance Manager), and managed its emergency department with a different solution
(i.e. Cardinal Health Pyxis), and yet another one to do run specific DRG financial
analysis. Such systems were said to enable Hospital F to function in an efficient manner
whilst supported with adequate performance measurement. However, Hospital C also
alerted to the potential drawback of having highly expensive staff spending a significant
amount of time clicking through different computer systems.
Table 6-15: Evidence of IT capability related to hospital scale
Hospital Interview quote(s)
A "it is almost a joke because sometimes payers will say " well what is your cost
from doing this type of surgery?", I just start chuckling [...] It is me and my
calculator when it comes to negotiating contracts. That is where we are at
because we don't have those technologies or those sophistications, we know
that we need to get it but I don't have the money to go buy it [...] everything is
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paper"
B "if I told you how we budgeted here you would just die" "Now in a bigger
organization this would be tough, but we have been doing this for so long that
we can complete each other's sentences. We go over every line item and every
cost center [...] So we do it together. It makes us all crazy but we do it
together"
C "IT is supposed to be an enabler to do the work. We haven't quite figured that
out. We sort of dropped IT onto the practice. It is helpful in some ways
because you get access to a lot of information quickly, but there are a lot of
administrative clicks that have to happen."
F "I think that the other thing that really bears a huge degree of importance
around efficiency and measurement for that matter is the information system
I technology that you have, and we have a whole suite of products"
Smaller hospitals positioned as referral sources: hospitals A and D described that they
had a smaller spectrum of services that they could offer to their surrounding communities,
and that their positioning was to refer the more complicated cases to larger hospitals.
Larger hospitals not only offered the broader spectrum of services, but also provided the
back-office capability of electronic medical records and overall stability that the smaller
hospitals felt they needed.
Smaller hospitals capable of managing outflow interactions more closely: hospital A, B,
and D, described that they were able to hold bi-annual meetings with all the external
health care providers which received most, if not all, of their patient discharges (e.g.
nursing homes, skilled nursing facilities, rehabilitation centers, etc). Furthermore, given
the smaller patient outflow network, these hospitals have high frequency interactions with
each external provider, and hence there is closer proximity to discuss the performance of
an interaction. Additionally, while the state of Massachusetts requires that hospitals
respond within a week from receiving a formal written complaint, these hospitals had
internal practices to do so within 48 hours and in some cases would offer for plaintiffs to
meet with the CEO face-to-face.
Smaller hospitals tracked performance with absolute numbers: the smaller scale of
operations at hospitals A and D was such that metrics were mostly tracked with absolute
numbers, rather than using percentages. It may sound like a logical assertion however,
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hospitals reported instances where they felt misrepresented by external benchmarks and
consequently had to issue statements to manage public perception (e.g. explain seemingly
high patient fall percentages or staff turnover).
Degree of CEO involvement in operations related to hospital scale: the CEOs of smaller
hospitals reported to be closely involved with operational issues and in some cases there
wasn't even a need for a Chief Operating Officer (see Table 6-16). Specific examples
were requested and respondents were indeed able to discuss at length various issues of
patient flow or emergency department improvements. As for the largest hospital its CEO
readily referred to its COO in order to discuss operational matters in greater detail.
Table 6-16: Evidence of CEO Involvement in hospital operations
Hospital Interview quote(s)
A "In this smaller organization, I am knee deep in operations because of our
size. We have no chief operating officer. I am it."
B "I have been here a long time now. I really know what is going on here on any
given day, so I don't micro manage, but I can get into the details really
quickly, because the best ideas and strategies in the world, the cliche is right
in that the devil is in the details, so I muck in the details if I need to, to get a
big problem solved" "I really know where people are spending their money
[shows me her folders with detailed line items]. So if we find that there are
areas that we can get more efficient, we will definitely go about doing that"
D "I describe my role as a hybrid of CEO and COO"
F "Our size is such that we are big enough to teach and train and have great
equipment and all, but we are also small enough that we have much less room
between the CEO and the managers and the real operations. So we stay pretty
close to the action."
G "No one knows where the ship is going. Their problem is that they think we
have to know. You can't know where the ship is going, this is health care.
[chuckles]"
6.4.2 Leadership mindful and supportive of hospital enterprise
behaviors
While describing the hospitals performance measurement practices, specific phenomena
of interest emerged pertaining to senior leaderships' involvement in nurturing enterprise
environments akin to those of lean enterprises (i.e. lean enterprise principle 6).
Page 221 of 759
Senior leadership raising community awareness: previously we described how all
respondents included as part of their hospital mission the requirement to deliver optimum
care whilst remaining viable organizations. Several hospital leaders referred to their
concern towards generating community awareness about the baseline challenges and
opportunities that affect their hospital (see Table 6-17). To that effect, leaders considered
essential to try to explain in simple terms the reasoning behind difficult decisions such as
discontinuing a service unit, or resisting a service upgrade demanded by the surrounding
community. Moreover, leaders attempt to explain basic concepts such as higher
procedural volume being correlated with higher quality (and hence the issue of
maintaining a low volume service unit), or the considerable investments required to
acquire new technology. As a result, leaders said that the majority of their surrounding
communities were themselves aligned with their hospital's mission, and were also better
informed as to how they could do their part to help fulfill said mission (e.g. donations,
volunteering, etc).
Table 6-17: Evidence of CEO management of community awareness
Hospital Interview quote(s)
A "The community would like to see cardiac caths, but as soon as we explained
the reality, we advise them to go do it elsewhere because we don't have the
numbers to have the quality. So we explain it to them and so they understand
it."
B "Employers in this community by association understand that we will
discount but we will never discount, to insurance companies, to the point that
we will go into the red. Because if we start going into the red then we can't
deliver optimum quality care because we won't have the resources to do that"
"And if they [the community] started making unreasonable demands of us,
shame on me for not educating them better about what would be reasonable
demands. But we maintain the distribution of a lot of literature within the
community, we deliver a lot of benefits to the community, we interact with the
community on a regular basis.
D "Where we run into trouble is where they just don't understand how healthcare
works, and we barely understand it ourselves, so it is hard to explain to them
I things"
Senior leadership disseminating mission across enterprise levels: several respondents
described a concern towards engaging their employees, both clinical and otherwise, and
enlightening them as to how their individual role relates to the overall hospital's mission.
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CEOs of both small and large hospitals met with new groups of staff at orientation and
explained what their hospital's mission was about and how they could contribute to it.
Interestingly, one respondent shared his continued amazement at how non-clinicians were
better able at identifying their contribution to the hospital mission. Specifically, the CEO
would ask people "tell me how what you do everyday relates to our mission?". As an
example, a non-clinician such as housekeeping was said to have answered that she kept
rooms clean which helped avoid infections and allowed patients to go home sooner.
Conversely, nurses were said to be unable to do the same and were hence coached by
nursing leadership to better understand the connection between their role and the hospital
mission. Similarly, another CEO considered as a key responsibility to clearly and
constantly disseminate the hospital's mission (and vision) so that staff had it in mind
while going about their daily work. Finally, one respondent noted her ongoing effort in
establishing at least one metric and/or improvement initiative involvement, in order to
clarify and sustain the connection between an employee's role and the hospital mission.
Senior leadership nurturing a safe and productive work environment: in describing how
they derived higher hospital enterprise performance, several respondents converged in
their mindfulness towards establishing and supporting desired enterprise behaviors (see
Table 6-18). One CEO purposefully sought a balance in its middle management team
such that some people were very data driven, while others were more relationship
building oriented. Other CEOs noted the importance of empathy and creating and
maintaining collegial relationships with medical staff both at a personal (i.e. respectfully
listening to concerns and issues) and structural level (i.e. sustaining medical referral
channels). Interestingly, the senior leaders of the teaching hospitals shared a concern
towards shaping an enterprise environment conducive of higher performance. To that
effect they outlined the importance of communication, culture, keeping employees
satisfied, and ultimately focused in providing excellent patient care. One of the senior
leaders went as far as studying the cultural fit of new physician hires so as to maintain
alignment. Finally, several respondents emphasized the importance of being able to
communicate with physicians in particular, in order to better manage their needs and also
attain better receptivity of any planned change initiatives.
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Table 6-18: Evidence of CEO nurturing and supporting hospital enterprise behaviors
Hospital Interview quote(s)
A "the single most important thing once you're inside the walls of a hospital, you
have to know how to work with the doctors."
B "I have incredible collegial relationships with the medical staff here both at
personal and structural levels. It is personal in the sense that I am a real
straight shooter who deals with people openly and fairly" "Where do the
medical subspecialists docs get all of their referral from... primary care docs.
So we have created structurally a very cohesive system"
C "for the colleagues and physicians is primarily to create an environment where
they are able to provide that excellent care and service" "Once you get in the
door you can work some magic and that magic again depends upon the
provider becoming an enabler by calling a colleague. There is something
about willingness to see a patient when you are asked in a way that makes you
feel good about it or you know that you are helping. It is a little different when
you put something on your schedule, and you are told"
D " you have to balance in a management team is that you have people who are
very data driven, and people who are much more relationship building, when
my balance gets off we are not as effective"
F "the leadership that I provide goes a long way in creating an environment of
accountability, and one of initiative and empowerment. So, I really try to
create an environment that allows people to grow and is a great place to work"
"the integration through good communication and culture, all of those things
make a big difference. We look for physicians that will work well with one
another" "our goal is to try keep the employees satisfied, and keep them
focused on the bed side."
G "I think that my job is to try to create an environment where they [clinical and
non-clinical staff] are happy but as much as possible their being happy is
consistent with what the hospital needs" "Empathy is the key. Having an
understanding where individuals and groups of people and the organization as
a whole are. In essence, what they are feeling about how things are going.
Because then I can adjust the process for that it becomes more informative,
more open, more whatever it needs to be, in response to that."
6.4.3 Hospital organizational learning capability beyond what is
measured
While describing the hospitals performance measurement practices, specific phenomena
of interest emerged pertaining to senior leaderships' understanding and concern towards
enabling organizational learning characteristics (i.e. lean enterprise principle 7). The
analysis in this subsection ascertained that hospital enterprises may be beyond what they
measure (i.e. as opposed to being only what they measure).
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Hospital leaders' misinterpretation of organizational learning construct: when describing
their organizational learning practices, all of the respondents consistently referred to their
employee training at a technical knowledge level (e.g. teaching medical students how to
conduct a patient medical exam; teaching nurses how to clean a patient's wound; etc)(see
Table 6-19). Further analysis of the respondents' remaining answers, as well of their
hospitals' internal and public documents, established that the leading hospitals weren't
measuring their organizational learning capability.
Table 6-19: Evidence of misinterpretation of organizational learning construct
Hospital Interview quote(s)
A "You can tell I have less emphasis on organizational learning... because we
should get the people already learned... they should already be here ready to
do their job"
D "One of the things that scares me the most [about organizational learning] is
just the aging workforce and the knowledge drain that is going to happen
when these people leave, and don't have things written down, it is going to be
very hard on a lot of organizations including our own"
E "The whole learning organization concept... we are focused so much on
survival here... when I came in we were losing $25M. We do have a
corporate university, and we do have 10 training hours per employee per
year."
F "[Organizational learning] We don't do well here..."
However, it is also true that some of the hospitals had evidence of concern and
predisposition towards organizational learning, although they neither interpreted it as
such, nor did they measure it (see Table 6-20). For instance, while Hospital F's CEO self-
assessed its enterprise organizational learning as poor, the senior leader espoused
continuous improvement as its definition of high hospital enterprise performance.
Similarly, Hospital A's CEO said he didn't emphasize organizational learning (i.e. the
opposite of lean enterprise principle 7) and yet he espoused continuous improvement.
Table 6-20: Evidence of organizational learning phenomena
Hospital Interview quote(s)
A "Our objective is to continuously improve. Constantly moving forward is the
key."
B "Part of my speech to employees is "given what we do, we can never be too
__ good at it""
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D "You know, the really strategic goal of quality is perfect care. Not too many
people have dared to put that down in their public documents yet, but that
really is the goal. And you know, I used to think that it was high in the sky,
but you know, there was a day where we used didn't think you could have no
ventilator associated pneumonia, no bed sores, and things like that, and today
we don't!"
F "Number one it means beating our own best score so we often measure
ourselves against our past performance of the hospital. We think that we get
better that way. The second is that we always try to find a benchmark where
we can, where we believe it is apples to apples, so we always try and show
our data with a benchmark. That is what it means to perform, so that we are
I constantly improving."
Clarifying what is meant by organizational learning in this research: given hospital
leaders' unfamiliarity with the academic organizational learning construct, we next revisit
what is meant by organizational learning in the context of this research. Organizational
learning scholars often refer to an early study by Hayes et al (1988) which attributed the
higher performance of manufacturing plants to each enterprises' ability to learn, thereby
deriving sustained improvement in performance over a long period of time. Since then,
considerable territory has been covered on the subject, and given rise to different
interpretations of organizational learning amongst scholars themselves. Edmondson and
Moingeon (1998) provide a useful literature review on organizational learning using a
2x2 matrix. Research contributions are essentially described at two different levels of
analysis (e.g. organization vs. individual) and using two different research approaches
(e.g. descriptive vs. interventionist). For instance, the seminal book by Senge (1990) is
classified as an interventionist research approach focused at an individual level. It is
interventionist in that the researcher prescribes specific policies that allow an
organization to adopt organizational learning practices and become a learning
organization as an outcome. It is considered at an individual level as Senge is said to
focus on individual level characteristics such as mental models (e.g. deeply engrained
assumptions), and personal mastery (i.e. individuals who seek to continuously learn).
However, Senge could conceivably argue with said classification as he defined learning
organizations as "organizations where people continually expand their capacity to create
the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured,
where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning to see
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the whole together" (Senge 1990). Moreover, an organization as a whole is clearly
referred to in the preceding definition. Similarly, from our own literature review one
could argue that another relevant dimension would be the source or trigger of the
observed phenomena (i.e. external environment vs. internal to the organization). For
instance, whereas Edmondson and Moingeon (1998) focus on an organization's
adaptability (i.e. learning occurs when addressing an external challenge and/or
opportunity), Senge (1990) explicitly designates adaptive learning as well as generative
learning (i.e. internal learning stimulus) as necessary for organizations to survive and
thrive.
Ultimately, our purpose here isn't to agree with a particular characterization of a
scholar's research contribution, but rather to explain how organizational learning can
generate different opinions amongst scholars themselves, thereby prompting us to further
clarify its meaning in the context of this research. As per Chapter 2, the lean enterprise
principle of emphasizing organizational learning, embodies the continuous
experimentation and knowledge gain at all levels of the enterprise with both top-down
and bottom-up orientation. A key aspect is that the enterprise as a whole must be able to
learn and benefit from localized improvement efforts, so that it in turn may improve the
effectiveness of the improvement efforts undertaken. Furthermore, our research design is
primarily descriptive of existing organizational learning practices of leading hospitals, as
well as prescriptive, whilst informed by our literature review and empirical expertise with
lean enterprise principles. All in all, this thesis' research design covers both axis of the
organizational learning matrix described above. As such, it is important to also note that
this thesis' research questions are addressed in the context of Chapter 6, 7, and 8, thereby
also including the required in-depth exploratory study of leading hospitals (see Chapter
5's Research Roadmap).
Hospital capabilities beyond what is measured: as noted earlier, analysis established that
hospitals had evidence of concern and predisposition towards organizational learning,
although they neither interpreted it as such, nor did they measure it. What follows is a
description of enterprise practices shared by some of the hospital leaders and which lend
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themselves to those of organizational learning (see Table 6-21).
Table 6-21: Evidence of unmeasured organizational learning practices
Hospital Organizational Learning Practice(s)
A Leverage and appreciate employee driven process deviations that are
reasonable and improve patient satisfaction with hospital services rendered.
B Empower knowledgeable employees to tackle problems locally while mindful
of the whole hospital, and doing so effectively, efficiently, clearly, and
swiftly.
D Invest in people's betterment and training so that they remain engaged,
productive, and motivated.
H Encourage accountable, objective, and participatory decision making amongst
all employees, whilst investing in their personal and professional
I development, and appreciating their contribution.
The CEO of Hospital A shared that he and his managers systematically engaged top
performing employees who had been worthy of direct reference by patients in feedback
surveys. First, the CEO wanted to understand what the particular employee did that
deserved the positive feedback. Second, if the employee deviated from existing processes,
and did so in a reasonable manner, managers studied how to incorporate it into their
existing standard protocols. Third, top performing employees were recognized by the
CEO both via a personal letter and a semi-annual staff party where they were appreciated
in front of everyone. Moreover, the CEO recognized that employees could change
processes in a reasonable manner and help the hospital fulfill its mission of keeping its
patients healthy and satisfied.
The CEO of Hospital B, the best financially performing hospital in Massachusetts (as
measured by its operating margin), emphasized the importance of empowered
knowledgeable managers and quick turnarounds. Specifically the CEO referred to an
enterprise policy of "not processing things to death". An operational problem identified
on a Monday would be notified to the manager of the respective service unit, who would
then work on it on Tuesday, and develop and implement a prototype solution within a
single week. Alternatively, if the problem wasn't considered a priority, managers were
instructed to communicate clearly when and how the problems would be addressed, and
in doing so, they would manage potential employee frustration and orchestrate their
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involvement in a potential solution. Additionally, the CEO noted that any problem being
addressed is done so in the context of the whole hospital and the wider health care system.
Finally, the CEO stressed the importance of recognizing the professional contribution that
each and every employee provided either directly or indirectly to patients.
"People who work here understand health care, they understand the broader dynamics of
what is going on, they understand the nitty gritty aspects of operations, they can quickly
see through the core of a problem or issue. You'll pardon the expression, but none of us
are bullshitters... we are just really efficient and effective at getting stuff done"
Hospital B CEO
The CEO of Hospital D shared that she and her senior managers not only focused on each
service units' resources and local leadership, but also on its personality. Specifically, it
was noted that some service units would consistently rate the hospital poorly on different
internal surveys (e.g. diversity; engagement; facility; etc). The primary factor said to
contribute to a negative service unit personality was the career prospects of its respective
employees whofelt trapped in their positions. As such, senior leaders instituted the
practice of engaging employees and asking them "ifyou really want to get out of this
service unit, how are you going to do it?". The rationale is to keep employees engaged
and motivated about their prospects, and support them in their development if need be.
The CEO of Hospital G, the largest hospital in the sample, made the interesting
distinction between process and content when describing how he steered the enterprise
towards its high performance status. Specifically, the CEO didn't force upon others his
particular point of view on a given problem (i.e. content), and instead focused on
facilitating meetings with stakeholders from multiple service units, and encouraging them
to openly and objectively discuss potential solutions (i.e. process)7 1. In doing so, the CEO
71 Notably, the distinction between process and content is commonly used in the strategic management
literature when studying organizational decision making and performance (Ketchen, D. J., J. B. Thomas, et
al. (1996). "Process, content and context: Synergistic effects on organizational performance." Journal of
Management 22(2): 231-257.). Process research focuses on the activities that led to and supported strategic
decisions (i.e. how strategy is formed) whereas content research focuses on the nature of decisions (i.e.
what is decided).
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mentioned his baseline trust in employees' willingness to do well and to do good, while
feeling themselves accountable (as opposed to being made accountable) in conducting
systematic analysis of stakeholder values and potential barriers to implementation.
Finally, the CEO also noted the hospital's commitment to recruit, retain, and provide
personal and professional development for employees throughout the organization, while
at the same time valuing and recognizing their distinguished contribution towards the
hospital mission.
"part of my job is to help ensure that that knowledge bubbles up through the
organization and that it is actually used in a productive way [...]. From my style of things,
in addition to having trust with people, you also have to have real great comfort with
ambiguity as to where the place is going to go and how it is going to get there. This is not
hierarchical top down management in that sense. It is in the sense that I'm creating the
construct that we are working in. That is the only top down thing that I am doing. The
process.[...] What I care about is that the group ofpeople who are knowledgeable about
[a problem], have worked well together, and have come up with a rigorous decision that
makes sense to the organization."
Hospital G CEO
Hospital practices inconsistent with those of learning organizations: although in the
previous subsection we identified hospital capabilities absent from their performance
measurement practices, here we also note that some of the respondents described
practices were inconsistent with those of learning organizations. Earlier we noted the
literature's distinction between organizational learning research and learning
organizations research. Whereas organizational learning research is said to encompass
descriptive research, learning organizations research prescribes policies to continuously
improve organizations. Specifically, "given the variety ofphenomena labeled
organizational learning, the learning organization rubric can be used to separate
research aimed at developing strategies to improve organizational adaptiveness from the
larger body of work [which includes descriptive research]" (Edmondson and Moingeon
1998). We find this distinction useful in that it explicitly denotes that organizational
learning practices alone are insufficient to confer an organization with a learning
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organization capability. Moreover, a learning organization is one which follows policies
that encourage a combination of organizational learning practices. As such, our analysis
of the seven Massachusetts hospital senior leaders, also identified practices that weren't
consistent with those of learning organizations:
" Organizational learning concerns all levels of the enterprise: in describing their
improvement objectives and associated practices, most senior leaders exclusively
focused on their senior leadership team and service unit managers. However,
organizational learning also concerns, and indeed depends on, the individuals who
are in non-management /leadership positions (e.g. nurses, physicians, supply techs,
pharmacy techs, etc).
* Organizational learning stems from external and internal stimuli: in describing
their internal measurement practices, all respondents consistently referred to the
adoption of externally demanded metrics and subsequent process improvement
initiatives targeted at said metrics. However, organizational learning not only
concerns adaptability (i.e. external stimuli) but also internal generative learning
(e.g. figuring out how to improve a process even though said process isn't directly
monitored/demanded by external entities).
" Local improvement efforts with an enterprise level mindfulness: in describing
their improvement practices, and indeed as delineated in internal hospital
documents, several respondents narrowly focused inside service units (e.g. reduce
ventilator associated infections in ICU; reduce time to be seen upon arrival in the
emergency department; etc). However, a learning organization is one able to learn
and benefit from localized improvement efforts whilst being mindful towards
enterprise level effects and potential opportunities to replicate results.
6.5 Towards Lean Hospital Enterprises
At the beginning of this chapter we referred back to our assessment of the literature's
sparse empirical evidence as to what extent hospitals are adopting a multidimensional
perspective of performance, hence this thesis' first research question: How is hospital
enterprise performance currently measured? As evidenced in our analysis in the previous
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sections, although the sampled leading hospitals were following practices beyond those
characterizing them in the performance related literature, they also exhibited
dysfunctionalities from a lean enterprise perspective, and hence the second research
question: How could hospital enterprise performance measurement be improved using
lean enterprise principles? Notably, our phenomena of interest emerged within and
beyond each hospitals' explicit performance measurement practices, which is in line with
the understanding that "the full benefits of lean can be realized only by re-thinking the
entire enterprise" (Nightingale 2002).
This section is structured in two parts. First, we summarize our findings pertaining to the
leading Massachusetts hospitals' performance measurement practices. Second, we
propose specific practices and metrics where appropriate, informed by lean enterprise
principles, so as to assist hospitals in improving their performance measurement practices.
6.5.1 Findings summary
The seven leading Massachusetts hospitals' external environment was found to be
consistent with that of the health care literature reviewed in Chapter 4. Succinctly,
hospitals grappled with low financial margin, medicine's continuous evolution, and are
highly prone to value misalignments induced by external entities such as payers and
regulators. Similarly, we found that the respondent data is also consistent with the health
care literature reviewed in Chapter 2 insofar as the designation of senior hospital leaders'
most measured performance dimensions (i.e. Operations, Finance, and Quality) and two
of the lesser ones (i.e. Organizational Learning and Social Equity). However, we also
identified key departures from the literature which led us to conclude that, unlike the
literature's characterization, hospitals do have a multidimensional appreciation of
performance.
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Observed Key Practices
Leaders feel responsible for any patient that seeks care at their facility regardless of
ability to pay, residence location, ethnicity, etc
Hospital mission elements address multiple stakeholders (Table 6-5, Table 6-6 and
Table 6-7)
Hospitals define performance in terms of doing well on multiple dimensions that
address different stakeholders (Table 6-8)
Leaders understood potential stakeholder value misalignments and felt the need to
explain the hospital's value proposition & how everyone could contribute (Table 6-17)
Hospitals define as mission elements offering broad array of services while delivering
them in an optimum manner and remaining viable (Table 6-9)
Leaders use cost-center accounting and are unable to measure residual contributions
amongst service units, but are aware that they do exist (Table 6-11 and Table 6-13)
Leaders demanded that service unit investments had to either attract additional patient
Volume or capture higher revenue, and essentially pay for itself (Table 6-14)
Leaders used internal and external benchmarks. However, different benchmarks were
used for different dimensions, precluding holistic characterization of performance
External demanded metrics outweigh by far internal metrics (Table 6-10). Internal
metrics focus on patient inflow (e.g. volume) and disregard patient outflow interactions
Hospitals adversarial relationship with payer (Table 6-2)
Leaders greatly concerned with payment reform and global payments (Table 6-3)
Process level payer demanded metrics trigger proliferation of lean initiatives to
implement & improve metrics, without clear overarching integrated plan (Table 6-14)
---- 
--
I Multiple stakeholder value expectations and
contributions were being considered.
--------------------- 
--
--------------------------
Senior leadership were aligning stakeholders
with hospital mission.
Effectiveness was (partially) considered before
efficiency.
(Service unit interdependencies were being
accounted for despite cost center analysis.
Service unit interdependencies were not evident
in transformation plans.
Performance benchmarking process was
fragmented.
Outflow interactions were minimally accounted for'
External stakeholders were predominant
influence in hospitals' strategic and operational
direction.
--- 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- -
Leaders focused in providing a safe and productive work environment, with an -1 Senior leadership supported and drove
emphasis on communication, culture, and employee satisfaction (Table 6-18) enterprise behaviors.
Although unmeasured and poorly self assessed, leaders upheld some management Hospitals had an organizational learning
practices consistent with organizational learning (Table 6-19, Table 6-20,& Table 6-21) predisposition, albeit unmeasured.
Leaders described organizational learning practices focused on external stimuli, with a Hospital practices were predominantly
process level impetus, and primarily anchored at middle and upper organization levels inconsistent with those of learning organizations.,'
Figure 6-2: 7 MA Hospitals Evidence Summary and Observed Key Practices
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7 MA Hospitals Evidence summary
Figure 6-2 above provides an overview of the key findings stemming from the studied
seven leading Massachusetts' hospitals. The detail pertaining to the evidence listed on the
left side of the figure has already been presented and discussed in this chapter's previous
subsections.
Meanwhile, a description of the key findings listed on the figure's right is provided in
Table 6-23. These findings were generated from the hospitals' explicit and implicit
performance measurement practices and are assessed in terms of one or more relevant
lean enterprise principles (summarized in Table 6-22 and explained in detail in sections
2.4.5 and 2.4.6). Furthermore, the key findings are grouped according to five themes
which form the basis of the recommendations, diagnostic questions, and metrics
presented next in section 6.5.2.
A simple coloring scheme is used in Table 6-23 to help readily visualize the alignment of
hospital enterprise practices with lean enterprise principles (i.e. green denotes good
alignment, whereas yellow denotes some alignment, and red indicates poor alignment and
most room for improvement).
Table 6-22: Summary of MIT LAI's Lean Enterprise Principles (Nightingale 2009)
Lean Enterprise Description
Principle
1 Adopt a holistic approach to enterprise transformation
2 Identify relevant stakeholders and determine their value propositions
3 Focus on enterprise effectiveness before efficiency
4 Address internal and external enterprise interdependencies
5 Ensure stability and flow within and across the enterprise
6 Cultivate leadership to support and drive enterprise behaviors
7 Emphasize organizational learning
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Table 6-23: Summary of leading hospitals lean enterprise practices
Lean Description
Enterprise
Principle(s)
Multiple stakeholder value expectations and contributions were being considered: senior hospital leaders share
 a
2 multiple constituency view of their enterprise, and are concerned almost entirely w
ith the same set of key stakeholders.
These include patients, their families, the surrounding community, the hospital's Board of Trustees, physicians,
regulators, employees, and payers. Furthermore, hospitals' performance measurement practices included differ
ent
performance dimensions that catered specifically, or on aggregate, to different stakeholders. For instance, "pat
ient
satisfaction" pertains to patients, whereas "quality" mostly concerns regulators and payers, and "employee
satisfaction" addresses employees.
2, 6
Senior leadership were aligning stakeholders with hospital mission: Externally, several of the leaders felt the n
eed to
engage with their surrounding community so as to generate awareness about their hospital's baseline challen
ges and
opportunities, and in doing so, explain potentially difficult decisions about to be taken, and/or clarify how 
the
community could help the hospital fulfill its mission (e.g. volunteering, donations, expectation management, etc).
Internally, several respondents described a concern towards continuously walking the floor and engaging 
their
employees, both clinical and otherwise, so as to enlighten them as to how their individual role relates to the 
overall
hospital's mission.
2, 3
Effectiveness was (partially) considered before efficiency: senior hospital leaders emphasized their concern towards
balancing the needs of different stakeholders as well as performing well in multiple dimensions. For ins
tance, an ailing
critical service unit wouldn't be closed if the surrounding community didn't have a reasonable alternative. However,
leaders also recognized that patients (as well as other stakeholders) may at times look at things from a keyhole and
satisfying their individual needs could potentially comprise the hospital's viability as a whole. Converse
ly, those that
value employee satisfaction noted that investing towards a satisfied workforce was critical for the hospit
al to succeed
as a whole.
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MENNIMMEMOM
Lean Description
Enterprise
Principle(s)
4 Service unit interdependencies were being accounted for despite cost center analysis: previously we mentioned that
senior leaders wouldn't close a critical service unit if the surrounding community didn't have a reasonable alternative
(i.e. external interdependency concern). Senior leaders verbalized a similar concern towards internal interdependencies
in recognizing that some service units are tightly integrated with each other, hence a negatively performing unit may
have a residual contribution towards other positively performing units. However, even the most sophisticated
measurement systems in place didn't account for the recognized service unit interdependencies, and the fact still
remained that performance was being measured by cost center and in some cases line-by-line. Furthermore, hospitals
had a focus on volume per service unit and volume per procedure (i.e. reflects their payment model incentive) and
were also concerned in improving on specific DRG's (i.e. increase their Medicare profit margin) which invariably
implied focusing on service units as independent entities (i.e. managers rewarded on an individual service unit basis).
Ultimately, senior leadership had a theoretical sense of service unit interdependencies but their performance
measurement systems only adopted a cost center based analysis.
1, 3, 4 Service unit interdependencies were not evident in transformation plans: most likely a reflection of external
stakeholders setting the direction, the lean improvement initiatives described by senior hospital leaders, as well as
those within internal hospital documents, not only didn't cut across service units but also failed to consider beyond the
process level. Notably, such neglect is in line with the traditional interpretation of lean (e.g. narrowly focused on the
process level) which is prevalent in the health care literature. Additionally, some hospital leaders emphasized that
service unit improvements would have to pay for themselves, which in the context of the previously mentioned cost
center analysis, would further neglect potential service unit interdependencies. Ultimately, hospitals were missing the
opportunity of architecting improvement efforts such that they would benefit from cumulative benefits both at an
enterprise level and in the long run.
Performance benchmarking process was fragmented: senior hospital leaders benchmarked themselves using both
internal and external data, and defined performance in relation to their historic performance, as well as that of similar
hospitals. As such, leadership made a consistent effort towards evaluating their performance in the context of theQ overall health care system. However, it did so in a fragmented manner given that it used different benchmarks for
different performance dimensions. Moreover, benchmarking instruments used different baseline data which precluded
the holistic characterization of hospital enterprise performance.
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Lean Description
Enterprise
Principle(s)
1, 2, 4 Outflow interactions were minimally accounted for: when elaborating on their interactions with external health care
providers, senior hospital leaders consistently only referred to inflow of patients. Targeted probing revealed that
patient outflow interactions were only managed with perceptual data and mostly in sporadic reactive occasions.
Notably, smaller hospitals were able to hold annual face-to-face meetings with the external providers (e.g. nursing
homes, rehab, etc). However, the fact still remains that no specific processes were in place to rate external interactions
on an individual and systematic basis. Additionally, senior leaders shared that they would improve their outflow
interactions management, only if payment models would value integrated care (i.e. global payment). Arguably, a lean
hospital enterprise would seek to manage its inflow and outflow interactions in equal measure, and a positive outflow
interaction would potentially translate itself into fewer resources spent in said interactions, and also increase overall
enterprise public perception (i.e. support and increase patient inflow).
1, 2, 3 External stakeholders were predominant influence in hospitals' strategic and operational direction: the number of
externally demanded metrics significantly outweighed the internal metrics, and in some cases even comprised the
whole dashboard for a given hospital. Notably, one component of this behavior is that different payers demand several
different metrics and outright deny payments if hospitals don't report on said metrics. Hence, unless factors change in
hospitals' institutional layer, such will likely continue to take place. However, it shouldn't preclude hospital efforts
towards adopting sound lean enterprise practices. For instance, senior leaders defined as strategic objectives the
implementation of externally demanded metrics, and the improvement on the specific processes measured by said
metrics. As a result, hospitals' transformation strategies were not only set by external stakeholders but also tended to
lack a clear overall rationale (if any). As such, improvement efforts focused on efficiency (i.e. improve at external
metric X) and potentially compromised overall hospital effectiveness.
6 Senior leadership supported and drove enterprise behaviors: in describing how they derived higher hospital enterprise
performance, several respondents converged in their mindfulness towards establishing and supporting desired
enterprise behaviors. Senior leaders shared a concern towards shaping an enterprise environment conducive of higher
performance by keeping employees satisfied, communicating clearly, nurturing and sustaining the desired culture, and
ultimately focusing on the delivery of excellent patient care. To that effect, senior leaders used a series of different
practices, including a mix of quantitative and relationship driven managers, and nurturing collegial relationships with
medical staff in particular. Ultimately, respondents were sensitive and committed in their support of enterprise
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Lean Description
Enterprise
Principle(s)
behaviors, as well as in encouraging others to do so.
7 Hospitals had an organizational learning predisposition, albeit unmeasured: several senior leaders were concerned and
had a predisposition towards organizational learning and continuous improvement, although they neither interpreted it
as such, nor did they measure it. To that effect, senior leaders used a series of different practices targeted at different
aspects of their enterprise. Examples included the empowerment of knowledgeable employees to tackle problems
locally while mindful of the whole hospital, and doing so effectively, efficiently, clearly, and swiftly. Others
encouraged accountable, objective, and participatory decision making amongst all employees, whilst investing in their
personal and professional development, and appreciating their contribution. Ultimately, senior leaders' negative
organizational learning capability self-assessment did not adequately reflect their capability (i.e. respondents reference
model inaccurately interpreted what organizational learning meant). However, albeit an unmeasured capability, the
capability that they did have in place wasn't consistent those of learning organizations (see practice below).
1,3,4,6,7
Hospital practices were predominantly inconsistent with those of learning organizations: although hospitals had
organizational learning capabilities they had inconsistencies that prevented them from behaving as learning
organizations. Firstly, senior leaders targeted their senior leadership team and service unit managers, hence they didn't
engage all levels of the organization (i.e. top-down and complete bottom-up orientation). Secondly, improvement
effort descriptions mainly stemmed from external stimuli (i.e. adaptive learning) and didn't include generative learning
(i.e. figuring out how to improve a process even though said process isn't directly monitored/demanded by external
entities). Thirdly, improvement efforts and transformation plans tended to be narrowly focused inside service units,
and didn't have a description of potential enterprise level effects and opportunities to replicate results.
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In reviewing the summarized analysis in Table 6-23 one can establish that the sampled
leading hospitals were following different lean enterprise principles to different levels.
Senior hospital leaders, together with the cross-validation of their hospitals' internal
documentation, were well aligned in terms of principles 2 and 6, and to some extent
principle 7 also. Conversely, respondents had critical areas with room for improvement in
terms of principle 1, 3, and 4. Furthermore, although the 5th lean enterprise principle (i.e.
ensure stability and flow within and across the enterprise) wasn't dominant in the
analysis, one could argue by inference from principles I and 4 in particular, that the
sampled hospitals, very likely weren't well aligned with principle 5 either.
In Chapter 2, while analyzing lean failures described in the literature, we referenced that
lean is "not so much about the individual principles and practices, but their effective
integration and application" (Nightingale 2002). With that in mind, our analysis in Table
6-23 suggests how multiple principles may interconnect in explaining the characterized
hospital enterprise practices. For instance, said interconnections have common themes
(e.g. external stakeholder influence) which contribute to different enterprise behaviors.
Also, although some principles may be well reflected in a hospital's characterized
practices, they may also have opposite readings when considering another set of practices
for the same hospital. Moreover, respondents didn't consistently follow lean enterprise
principles in measuring and managing their hospital.
All in all, the analysis established that senior hospital leaders did well on some lean
enterprise principles, but had to improve so as to do so consistently, as well as in other
critical areas.
6.5.2 Lean Enterprise Principle recommendations for hospitals
Having summarized our findings of leading hospitals' performance measurement
practices, we next provide recommendations based on lean enterprise principles and in
terms of key criteria and metrics where appropriate, as to how senior leaders could
improve hospital enterprise performance measurement. As per our findings in the
previous section, the sampled hospitals weren't consistently following lean enterprise
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principles, as evidenced by their different measurement practices. Figure 6-3 provides an
overview of each one of our recommendations and how it stems from the key findings
from our analysis of the seven leading Massachusetts hospitals 72. Notably, although using
a different set of research instruments, the exploratory research of the two hospital in-
depth cases presented in Chapters 7 and 8 also provided further evidence in the definition
of our recommendations' key criteria and metrics.
Given the degree of fragmentation in the health care industry (e.g. regulatory
requirements; payment models; health care providers; etc), and the associated effects
observed in the previous section's characterized hospital enterprise practices, it is
remarkable that the researched hospitals remain steadfast in pursuit of their mission, as
well as operating in the black. However, the senior leaders of said hospitals also shared
their concern in that they didn't know for how much longer they could remain as such,
and were hence appreciative of lean enterprise principle recommendations that they could
themselves implement. As such, the proposed recommendations necessarily take into
account what is generally controllable by hospital enterprises, what they can influence,
and ultimately the constraints set upon them7 3.
A different focal unit of analysis (e.g. non-acute care provider; an insurance company;
etc) would have implied a different research sample and most likely a different set of
recommendations. Moreover, in line with this thesis' research motivation, the following
recommendations recognize hospitals' difficult environment and specifically address
practices which senior hospital leaders can readily work towards implementing or seek to
influence others in their implementation. While doing so, we were also cognizant of how
our analysis established that leading hospitals in Massachusetts share several mission
organizational elements, as well as a concern towards a similar set of key stakeholders.
Nonetheless, an effort is also done in using specific examples that refer to both hospitals
in general, as well as to those hospitals with specific typological characteristics.
72 Figure 6-3 uses the same coloring scheme used in Table 6-23 to help readily visualize the alignment of
hospital enterprise practices with lean enterprise principles (i.e. green denotes good alignment, whereas
yellow denotes some alignment, and red indicates poor alignment and most room for improvement).
73 Said approach (i.e. control, influence, and constraints) is espoused by one of the lean enterprise principles
themselves, namely in the need to address both internal and external enterprise interdependencies (i.e. lean
enterprise principle 4).
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Observed Key Practices
Multiple stakeholder value expectations and
contributions were being considered.
------------------
Senior leadership were aligning stakeholders
with hospital mission.
Effectiveness was (partially) considered before
efficiency.
Service unit interdependencies were being
accounted for despite cost center analysis.
Service unit interdependencies were not evident i
'in transformation plans.K)
Performance benchmarking process was
fragmented.
\Outflow interactions were minimally accounted foy'
-----------------
External stakeholders were predominant
influence in hospitals' strategic and operational
direction.
Senior leadership supported and drove
enterprise behaviors.
j Hospitals had an organizational learning
predisposition, albeit unmeasured.
Hospital practices were predominantly
inconsistent with those of learning organizations.,I
-----------------------
Our Recommendations
/----------------------------------------------------------
Adopt a multidimensional performance construct that considers
value expectations and contributions of relevant stakeholders
within and beyond hospital infrastructural boundaries
/----------------------------------------------------------
N
Measure performance dimensions holistically while adopting
practices that manage and influence relevant stakeholders within 1
and beyond hospital infrastructural boundaries
~-~----~----~-~--~-----------~~-----------
Develop, manage, and nourish service architecture awareness
across the hospital enterprise
Attend to payer demands and opportunities in enterprise
transformation and lean improvement plans that are coherent i
and aligned with hospital strategy and service architecture
Communicate and empower organizational learning practices
across the hospital towards becoming learning organizations
Figure 6-3: Lean Enterprise Principle Recommendations for Hospitals
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Adopt a multidimensional performance construct that considers value expectations and
contributions of relevant stakeholders within and beyond hospital infrastructural
boundaries
Hospital enterprises deliver a value proposition which involves multiple stakeholders that
may have values that aren't necessarily aligned with one another. A lean hospital
enterprise is one which doesn't focus on a single final patient, or a set of insurance
companies, but rather on multiple stakeholders. These include patients, their families, the
surrounding community, the hospital's Board of Trustees, physicians, regulators,
employees, payers, as well as others.
For instance, patients are active participants in the care that they receive, both within and
beyond a hospital's infrastructural boundaries. A patient that is readmitted to a hospital
within 30 days of an inpatient discharge and presents himself with similar symptoms, is
by definition a patient stay which isn't reimbursed by payers, hence it is in the hospital's
best interest to improve the care processes as well as communication with the patient, so
that (s)he receives and follows the best treatment available. Furthermore, a happy patient
is one more likely to recommend the hospital in the future to someone else.
In turn, physicians are critical in several dimensions, including the care that they provide
to patients as well as the patient flow control that they have (i.e. the power of the pen).
Physicians appreciate their autonomy, but increasingly work in multispecialty teams, and
are ultimately the ones held responsible for the care that is provided (e.g. they are
targeted in negligence lawsuits). Hence, being able to attract and retain great physicians
is essential for a hospital to function and sustain operations. The mechanisms that rule the
contractual relationship between a hospital and a physician are varied (e.g. salary model,
physician organization contract, etc), and what is important is to have a baseline
understanding of where everyone stands (e.g. payer incentives, technology requirements,
faculty affiliation, etc) and take that into account when defining and executing the
hospital's strategy.
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Finally, payers (e.g. insurance companies, Medicare, etc) also control the patient flow as
they specify which physicians are included in a health plan's network, and consequently
control which hospitals they can refer patients to. Payers are characterized as extremely
demanding of hospitals in terms of what they should track and report on, as well as in
their contractual negotiations (e.g. designing a fee schedule; determining the monthly
payment per member in a capitated plan; etc). Payers leverage their information of
multiple provider operations and attempt to institute best practices in hospital operations
as well as minimize their payments for specific services.
Ultimately, the realization that there are multiple stakeholders that contribute and expect
value to and from hospital enterprises, isn't new for senior hospital leaders. There may be
hospital leaders that favor one particular stakeholder group, but in general they are aware
of multiple stakeholders. However, a hospital's performance measurement system should
necessarily include different performance dimensions that cater specifically, or on
aggregate, to different stakeholders. To that effect we propose eight performance
dimensions and identified the specific metrics which consistently ranked highest amongst
the sampled hospitals (see Table 6-24)74.
Table 6-24: Samp ed hospital highest ranking metrics per performance dimension
Dimension Metric(s) Metric(s) definition
Customer Patient intent in recommending Would you recommend this hospital
Satisfaction facility in the future to your friends and family?
Patient satisfaction survey Using any number from 0 to 10,
where 0 is the worst hospital possible
and 10 is the best hospital possible,
what number would you use to rate
this hospital during your stay?
Employee Employee satisfaction survey Using any number from 0 to 10
Satisfaction where 0 is the least satisfied possible
and 10 is the most satisfied possible,
what number would you use to rate
1 Please refer to Appendix II for the full list of metrics which were presented to all CEO respondents and
derived from the literature. Please note that respondents were allowed to add additional metrics if they felt
necessary, and only in the case of "days of cash on hand" did they add the metric and also consistently
regarded it as one of their highest ranked metrics within the Finance dimension. All remaining metrics in
Table 6-24 were derived from the literature and consistently ranked highest by CEO respondents.
Page 243 of 759
Dimension Metric(s) Metric(s) definition
your satisfaction at this hospital?
Nursing turnover Total nurses who left / (total nurses -
new nurse hires)
Service unit harmony Perceptual assessment of employee
satisfaction and overall service unit
climate
Finance Total operating margin (total revenues - total costs) / total
revenue
Operating expenses Total
Days of cash on hand Cash/ ([operating expenses -
depreciation expenses]/365)
Operations f# ambulatory visits Total
# emergency visits Total
# inpatient days Total
# inpatient surgeries Total
# outpatient surgeries Total
Organizational Employee training expenditure Total
Learning Proportion of new technology New technology investments/ Total
investment investment (equipment, real estate,
technology, etc)
Quality Effectiveness of clinical care Series of evidence based medicine
process checks [e.g. % children
immunized, % mammography in
target population, etc]
Mortality rate per type of Total number of deaths per type of
procedure procedure / total number of patients
per type of procedure
Complications and/or adverse Total
events
Rate of patient readmission Total number of readmissions / total
within 30 days of discharge number of patients discharged
Social Equity Patient mix by payer group Patients grouped by payer type (e.g.
Medicare, Medicaid, Blue Cross, etc)
Patient mix by geography Patients grouped by zip code
Strategy/ Balanced physician incentives Detect overuse or underuse of
Operations specific procedures, pharmaceuticals,
Alignment etc, per physician
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Once again, upon inspecting Table 6-24 it is evident that the sampled hospitals were
using a multidimensional performance construct which considered the value expectations
and contributions of relevant stakeholders within and beyond infrastructural boundaries.
Some of these metrics are further evidence of the strong influence that payers have in
hospital operations. For instance, the customer satisfaction metrics are derived from a
required survey called HCAHPS (Hospital Care Quality Information from the Consumer
Perspective 75). Similarly, three of the four quality metrics are required by payers.
Furthermore, the higher ranking metrics for the operations dimension illustrate the
sample hospitals concern with carefully tracking patient volume, which in most cases
reflected their fee-for-service payment arrangements 76. Finally, it is also evident that the
metrics used for Organizational Learning are representative of the semantic gap
previously described in section 6.4.3. Notably, each our remaining recommendations
includes criteria and metrics where appropriate, to assist senior hospital leaders in
improving their hospital performance measurement practices, and Organizational
Learning is one of them.
Ultimately, in line with the performance measurement literature guidelines reviewed in
Chapter 2, the following diagnostic questions are suggested for hospital leaders to
evaluate their performance measurement practices in terms of our first recommendation:
e Does the hospital performance measurement contemplate the 8 performance
dimensions of quality, finance, operations, patient satisfaction, employee
satisfaction, organizational learning, strategy/operations alignment, and social
equity?
* Are stakeholders within and beyond hospital boundaries contemplated in the
hospital's performance measurement?
* Are short-term and long-term objectives reflected in each performance
dimension?
" Is there a balance of financial and non-financial metrics in place?
75 See http www.hcahopsonlinerghne.aspx
76 See Chapter 4 for definitions on payment models.
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Measure performance dimensions holistically while adopting practices that manage and
influence relevant stakeholders within and beyond hospital infrastructural boundaries
Adopting a multidimensional performance construct with appropriately selected metrics
and recognizing the existence of multiple stakeholders in a hospital enterprise
environment are necessary but insufficient conditions. Senior hospital leaders' actions
and their underlying performance measurement systems and practices stand to benefit
from embodying said conditions. Specifically, performance dimensions and metrics
shouldn't be considered in isolation but rather, in relation to each other, so as to identify
necessary tradeoffs and opportunities for reinforcing values. Ideally, tradeoffs are
avoided and win-win performance dimension relationships are established.
To that effect, senior hospital leaders should engage in dialogue with physicians, nurses,
and other employees, so that they understand existing challenges and why a particular
demand has remained unanswered. Examples include encouraging employees to propose
ideas, or make requests, but always in the context of wider implications (i.e. beyond the
individual stakeholder's perspective). For instance, a physician who has recently attended
a conference and saw the latest innovation in his field, and who wants to encourage
hospital leadership to adopt it, should do so with a sound business model behind it.
Conversely, senior hospital leaders are advised not to continuously rely on the good will
of dedicated employees in order to maximize the throughput of an existing plant.
Attaining higher throughput, and effectively reducing the cost per treated patient, may
also imply a gradual deterioration of employee satisfaction, which sooner or later has a
knock-on effect on patient satisfaction (e.g. poor relationships between care givers and
patients and/or family members) and other performance dimensions (e.g. tiredness
increases the probability of medical error; dissatisfied nurses leave).
Similarly, senior hospital leaders should also engage with their surrounding communities,
and not only with their Board of Trustees and internal stakeholders, so as to explain the
key challenges faced by the hospital and how the community can help in overcoming
them. Specifically, engaging with the surrounding community isn't limited to patient
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wellness programs (e.g. exercise, diet, etc) or fund raising activities. A community
hospital in attempting to offer as broad array of services as possible must be cognizant of
the quality of care it can provide, and whether it can amortize its capital investments. To
that effect, it is critical that the community understands the relationship between case
volume and quality of care (i.e. the more cases a physician does the better the outcome).
Also, the community must be made aware of the costs of technology, training, etc, so as
to understand the hospital's decisions in managing its service portfolio.
Ultimately, high hospital performance implies performing well in multiple performance
dimensions simultaneously. Focusing on a single dimension is likely to jeopardize the
effectiveness of the hospital enterprise as a whole (e.g. keeping surrounding community
happy at the cost of financial stability; efficiently discharging patients earlier at the risk
of inferior quality of care; etc). To that effect we propose that performance measurement
practices explore the relationship amongst performance dimensions, and have senior
leadership engage with relevant stakeholders to explain and reinforce said relationships.
Once again, the following diagnostic questions are suggested for hospital leaders to
evaluate their performance measurement practices in terms of our second
recommendation:
" Are hospital leaders aware of both the tradeoffs and complementing values
inherent in the 8 performance dimensions?
e Does patient centeredness strongly influence the interpretation of the values of
each performance dimension?
* Are external stakeholders fully leveraged and informed in terms of the value that
they can deliver and expect to and from the hospital?
" Are physicians fully engaged with the hospital in jointly negotiating service
contracts with insurance companies?
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Develop, manage, and nourish service architecture awareness across the hospital
enterprise
A hospital's service architecture is comprised of several service units (e.g. emergency
department, operating rooms, laboratories, etc) which function with varying levels of
interdependence amongst them. Such interdependence may imply sharing scarce
resources and/or producing services to support another service unit. As such, either a cost
center based performance measurement, or a mere theoretical appreciation of service unit
interdependence, are insufficient approaches to adequately characterize and manage a
hospital's service architecture. Moreover, a hospital's performance measurement and
management practices should help develop and maintain service architecture awareness.
However, a hospital's service architecture shouldn't end with a consideration for its
internal service units. Recognizing that external health providers are essential should be
reflected not only in a concern towards measuring patient inflow volume, but also that of
systematically measuring patient outflow (i.e. interactions with nursing homes, hospital
transfers, rehab facilities, etc). For instance, measurement shouldn't only concern itself
with patient volume but also include other factors such as physician satisfaction (e.g.
primary care physician content with the information exchange about his or her patient)
and timeliness (e.g. patient seen within a reasonable timeframe).
Furthermore, planning and executing lean improvement initiatives requires service
architecture awareness, so as to avoid improvement plans that look disjointed and risk
merely optimizing processes at a localized level. Moreover, when describing high
performance or strategic objectives, senior leaders wouldn't only focus on a given service
unit, or worse yet on an individual metric, and would instead elaborate on an end-to-end
view as to how one improvement initiative connects with other initiatives and influences
other interdependent service units.
Additionally, senior leaders would be able to devise improved reward systems such that
the joint efforts of two or more service units are taken into account, rather than
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potentially incentivize a divide and conquer mentality amongst their managers. Similarly,
senior leaders should encourage every employee not only to understand how their
individual role contributes to the hospital's mission, but also how their activities may
impact those of others upstream and downstream in the service architecture.
Ultimately, developing service architecture awareness across the hospital enterprise is a
core capability that will help elevate hospitals from traditionally narrow lean health care
definitions, as well as from less favorable performance measurement practices. To that
effect, it is key to have integrated electronic information systems capable of tracking
workflow. However, existing state-of-the-art electronic medical records are generally
only focused in providing clinical related data, as well as financial charge capture
information.
Over the course of the in-depth exploratory hospital cases described in Chapters 7 and 8
the phenomenon of service architecture awareness also emerged from the data and was
found to be instrumental towards hospitals providing patient centered care while
maximizing throughput across multiple service units. Each of the studied hospitals had
different electronic information systems capabilities and such affected our ability to
readily measure the service architecture awareness. In both in-depth cases the suggested
diagnostic questions were prototyped, refined, and replicated, and functioned as a proxy
to measure the service architecture awareness. However, key metrics (see Table 6-25)
were also developed while leveraging the state-of-the art (albeit fragmented) electronic
information systems of one of the in-depth cases (i.e. Chapter 7).
To the author's knowledge the suggested metrics aren't recommended in the literature
and weren't in use at any of the hospitals studied in the context of this research 77. Notably,
both of the hospitals featured in the in-depth studies have now adopted as regular
measurement practices both several of the suggested metrics, as well as the diagnostic
questions.
" Sampled hospitals include the seven Massachusetts hospitals and the two in-depth exploratory hospital
cases described in Chapter 7 and 8.
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Table 6-25: Hospital service architecture awareness metrics
Metric Description
Average emergency Patient boarding occurs whenever a patient is admitted in the ED,
department (ED) but remains in the ED because of a lack of inpatient resources
boarding time (e.g. beds, nurses, etc).
Average ED This metric identifies inpatient service units which admit ED
boarding time per patients faster/slower.
inpatient service unit
Ratio of operating This metric keeps track of the OR cases which were cancelled
room (OR) cases because of issues residing beyond an ORs boundary (e.g.
cancelled for non- recovery bed not available; ancillary tests not available; patient
OR issue not consented; etc).
Ratio of OR cases This metric keeps track of the OR cases which were delayed
delayed for non-OR because of issues residing beyond an ORs boundary.
issue
Average consult Consult refers to inter-specialty advice requested on a patient (i.e.
response time per patient in location X, seen by specialty Y, is consulted by
specialty specialty Z). In general hospitals have policies in place for
consults requested from the ED in terms of the maximum
allowable time between a request and service rendered.
Traditionally consults are only tracked in terms of volume (i.e. for
billing purposes) and not in terms of timeliness. Beyond the ED it
is common not to have any consult policy in terms of maximum
allowable time.
Inpatient service unit Centralization of patient types in specific inpatient service units
patient specialty increases coordination efficiency (i.e. patients belonging to a
density specific specialty are grouped together), improves quality of care
(e.g. nursing staff care for higher volume of patients of a given
type), and has the potential to improve staff communications.
Ideally each inpatient service unit has one or two predominant
specialties (three at most). The metric may deteriorate as patient
flow worsens and patients are no longer being grouped together.
(total revenue, total This set of metrics allows senior leaders to be cognizant of the
expenses, total ED's contribution to inpatient operations (i.e. patients that were
patients, total admitted from the ED). Traditionally, ED services in the USA
inpatient days) per aren't reimbursed if a patient is admitted to the hospital, hence the
admission source ED's contribution is unknown.
Total new patient per For each patient visit determine whether he or she had already
admission source been a patient in the previous 24 months. If not, how many were
patients who first came into contact with the hospital through the
ED? This metric recognizes that an ED may be the first point of
contact for a patient and may indeed serve as a means of
enlarging the hospital's market share.
Primary care This metric actively seeks to determine whether a PCP was
physician (PCP) satisfied with the care provided to his or her referred patient, as
satisfaction well as with the post-treatment communication.
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Once again, the following diagnostic questions are suggested for hospital leaders to
evaluate their performance measurement practices in terms of our third recommendation:
" Have end-to-end patient value streams been mapped from all points of entry (e.g.
emergency department, clinic, internal)?
* Do lean improvement plans reach beyond the boundaries of individual service
units and contemplate end-to-end patient flow?
" Are employees from different service units asked to rate each other's service unit
performance?
* Are employees aware of how their local activities are affected or may affect other
upstream and downstream service units?
* Do information and materials flow transparently in a standardized, tracked, and
timely fashion within and across service units?
* Are there incentives in place to promote and support cooperation amongst service
units?
* Is performance assessed across the service architecture as opposed to individual
cost centers?
* Are outflow interactions (e.g. nursing homes, hospital transfers, etc) tracked
systematically and objectively?
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Attend to payer demands and opportunities in enterprise transformation and lean
improvement plans that are coherent and aligned with hospital strategy and service
architecture
The difficult relationship between hospital providers and payers is well documented and
was consistently present across the leading hospitals included in this research. In an ideal
world, the demands of different payers would be aligned therefore enabling hospitals to
report on fewer metrics and to focus their transformation efforts in a less fragmented
fashion. However, it is fair to say that more often than not, hospitals don't have the
required bargaining power in order to adopt practices to manage and influence the
behaviors of those paying for their services. There are some exceptions, for instance
when hospitals have a monopoly of a geographic region, or have forged sufficiently
strong strategic alliances (e.g. Partners Healthcare in Massachusetts) that enable them to
reportedly negotiate better prices with payers. However, regardless of a hospital's
negotiating position with payers, its leaders should attend to their demands and
opportunities while executing enterprise transformation and lean improvement plans that
are coherent and aligned with a core strategy and service architecture.
To begin with, negotiating fee-schedules or even global payments necessarily implies an
adequate understanding of the true costs and capabilities required in providing care to
each individual patient. Hospitals are increasingly being required to do more with less,
and to accept greater risks when negotiating their contracts with payers. Hence, a service
architecture awareness and measurement would better inform decision makers throughout
their negotiations with payers and mitigate risks (i.e. related to our 3 recommendation).
Similarly, a closer relationship between hospitals and physician organizations allows for
an improved bargaining position next to insurance companies (i.e. related to our 2 "d
recommendation).
Similarly, a decision to increase the offering and/or performance of a given service unit
(e.g. invest in marketing plan to attract new patients; build new operating rooms;
implement electronic medical record; etc) whilst responding to an external stimuli, should
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take into account the existing service architecture and study whether other areas will also
be affected and hence also need to be included in both the transformation and lean
improvement plans. Moreover, strategic and operational planning should evaluate and
focus beyond what is required or offered by external payers.
At a more granular level, the implementation and improvement of operations in terms of
an externally demanded metric, ought to be considered in relation to the hospital's long-
term strategy, and other improvement initiatives underway. It wouldn't be advisable to
invest on implementing and improving upon a costly metric if the underlying process has
very little representation in terms of patient flow for the given hospital. As an example
consider a hospital that responding to a payer incentive, hired external lean consultants,
and committed a 10 element team of physicians and nurses over one week, in order to
specifically improve the process of emergency department (ED) patients that required a
contrast scan, when less than 2% of the ED's patients needed to go through that process.
Ultimately, despite the high degree of influence from payers, senior hospital leaders
should consider their core strategy and service architecture whenever making a decision
on how to respond to an external stimuli, and indeed when hopefully executing in
accordance to their own internal stimuli.
Once again, the following diagnostic questions are suggested for hospital leaders to
evaluate their performance measurement practices in terms of our fourth
recommendation:
* Does patient centeredness strongly influence the strategic direction?
" Are lean improvement plans directly linked with transformation plans and in turn
with specific external challenges and/or opportunities?
* Are lean improvement plans mapped and coordinated across the hospital's service
architecture?
* Do strategic plans make allowances for anticipated gains of lean initiatives?
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Communicate and empower organizational learning practices across the hospital towards
becoming learning organizations
In Chapter 1 we noted that today one would be hard pressed to find a hospital in the US
which isn't aware of lean principles and considering the implementation of some kind of
lean program (Liker and Morgan 2006). However, often times said hospitals focus on one
or two lean tools and their approach narrowly focuses both at a process level and within
individual service units. Additionally, and particularly in the case of larger hospitals,
organizations institute internal lean courses where they teach both senior leaders and
middle managers about the core concepts of the Toyota Production System. In fact, it
isn't uncommon for hospitals to measure their lean adoption in terms of the number of
people, and the number of hours, dedicated undergoing lean training. Ultimately, as
argued in Chapter 2, to become a lean hospital enterprise senior leaders need more than a
lean training program or a reduced set of tools targeted at individual silos. "The journey
to world class status is made up of thousands of small steps in which each improvement
opens up the possibility of more improvement" (Maskell 1991).
However, our analysis of the hospitals included in this research also determined that
hospitals had an unmeasured organizational learning predisposition which enabled their
respective organizations with key elements that were aligned with lean enterprise
principle 7 (i.e. Emphasize Organizational Learning). As with the measurement of service
architecture awareness, we developed a set of diagnostic questions to measure/
characterize the in-depth studied hospitals learning organization capability. Notably, a
literature review on organizational learning capability measurement reveals a similar
approach where diagnostic questions are asked on a scale of 1 to 10, and an aggregate
result assesses the surveyed organization. Three particularly useful publications provide a
detailed literature review and propose similar multidimensional organizational learning
capability surveys with a total of 60 scales shared between them78-
78 Please refer to Appendix III for further details on each of the multidimensional organizational learning
capability surveys.
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" (Goh and Richards 1997): Clarity of purpose and mission; Leadership
commitment and empowerment; Experimentation; Transfer of knowledge;
Teamwork and group problem solving
* (Hult and Ferrell 1997): Teams orientation; Systems orientation; Learning
organization; Memory orientation
" (Jerez-G6mez, C'spedes-Lorente et al. 2005): Managerial commitment; Systems
perspective; Openness and experimentation; Knowledge transfer and integration
Upon reviewing the literature and the analysis of the hospitals sampled in this research
we recommend that senior hospital leaders should shape an enterprise environment that is
conducive of higher performance by keeping employees satisfied, communicating clearly,
nurturing and sustaining the desired culture, and ultimately focusing on the delivery of
excellent patient care. Senior leaders and managers alike need to engage and nurture
collegial relationships with employees in order to have an understanding of their
organization beyond statistics. Conversely, management should benchmark themselves
using historic data as well as comparable external benchmarks, while cognizant of the
limitations of said benchmarks.
Organizational learning should occur top-down and bottom-up within the hospital
enterprise, and beyond improvement projects that were devised to adapt the hospital to
external challenges and/or opportunities. Moreover, whether originated in internal or
external stimuli, knowledgeable individuals should be empowered to swiftly tackle
problems locally while mindful of the hospital's service architecture and doing so in an
effective, efficient, and clear manner. To support such efforts, active participatory
decision making is to be encouraged, whilst at the same time nurturing a sense of
accountability and rigorous analysis that further reinforces self-learning and service
architecture awareness. Finally, individuals and service units should be recognized for
their efforts, and called upon in championing and sharing their learning to other parts
within the hospital.
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Ultimately, for a hospital to work towards becoming a learning organization it needs to
be cognizant that organizational learning practices are necessary but insufficient by
themselves. This observation specifically takes into account a lean enterprise perspective
and explicitly goes beyond the three publications referenced earlier. Hence, we further
suggest that the lean enterprise principle 7 be reworded to "Emphasize becoming a
learning organization", as opposed to only emphasizing organizational learning in its title.
Once again, the following diagnostic questions are suggested for hospital leaders to
evaluate their performance measurement practices in terms of our fifth and final
recommendation:
" Have hospital leaders developed an internal compelling case for lean enterprise
transformation?
* Have hospital leaders disseminated throughout the enterprise a common vision
from the envisioned transformation and lean improvement plans?
* Are lean champions identified throughout the service architecture and visibly
supported by senior leadership?
* Are cross-specialty and multiservice unit employee teams jointly engaged in
respectful and trusting collaborations while devising and executing lean
improvements?
* Have resources been made available to support initial momentum building lean
improvements?
* Is there a process in place to leverage localized learning at a hospital enterprise
level?
6.6 Chapter 6 Summary
In this chapter, we coincided with the literature in characterizing hospitals' difficult
enterprise environment, whereby external stakeholders, mostly payers, have significant
influence in hospital operations. Examples include the incentives that insurance
companies present to unsalaried physicians, as well as the extensive list of metrics which
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hospitals have to report and improve upon if they wish to remain eligible for
reimbursement.
In studying how is hospital enterprise performance currently measured, we established
that the seven leading Massachusetts hospitals not only adopted a multidimensional
performance construct but also defined hospital enterprise performance as remaining
viable organizations whilst scoring well in as many performance dimensions as possible.
Clearly, the sparse empirical evidence in the healthcare literature with regards to
hospitals considering performance as a multidimensional construct isn't representative of
their actual practice. Moreover, all hospitals in our sample provided empirical evidence
that they had a multidimensional performance construct in place. Also, we determined
that the sampled leading hospitals were consistently following some lean enterprise
principles in their explicit and implicit performance measurement practices. Interestingly,
senior hospital leaders were exhibiting behaviors beyond those described in their explicit
measurement practices.
However, we also noted how hospitals were adopting some performance measurement
practices which encouraged narrow thinking as well as a focus on inflow operations, as
opposed to the whole patient value stream (e.g. including outflow). Similarly,
improvement initiatives and enterprise transformation plans generally reflected a narrow
focus on either an individual service unit or the process layer, and were only adaptive/
reactive as opposed to also being generative (i.e. internally driven). Moreover, there was
evidence that some of the hospitals' performance measurement practices weren't aligned
with lean enterprise principles.
Broadly speaking, today one would be hard pressed to find a senior hospital leader who
wasn't familiar with terminology such as continuous improvement andjourney towards
perfection, and who wouldn't use said terminology in describing his or her own practices.
However, how one goes about pursuing improvement and perfection, and how one
measures performance, ultimately serves as a proxy as to whether or not they are indeed
progressing towards becoming a lean hospital enterprise. With that in mind we made 5
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general recommendations as to how hospitals can incorporate and benefit from lean
enterprise principles. In doing so, we introduced a core concept of service architecture
awareness which should be embedded at all levels of the hospital enterprise and inform
the planning and execution of lean improvement initiatives, transformation plans,
organizational learning, and performance measurement in general. A total of 26
diagnostic questions were suggested for senior hospital leaders to evaluate whether or not
they are currently following our 5 recommended practices. Additionally, we identified 22
specific metrics for the 8 performance dimensions previously recommended. Furthermore,
9 new metrics were suggested specifically to measure service architecture awareness in a
hospital context.
In the next chapter we present the first of our two in-depth exploratory studies of leading
multispecialty hospitals, as we empirically and theoretically enrich MIT's Nightingale-
Rhodes Enterprise Architecture Framework (NREAF) whilst exploring in detail whether
an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture can improve hospital
performance.
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7. US Hospital In-Depth Case Study
As noted in the introductory chapter, a key motivation for this research was to address the
joint call of the National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine's to
promote the application of "principles, tools, and researchfrom engineering disciplines
associated with the analysis, design, and control of complex systems" (Reid 2005). To
that effect the previous chapters included an in-depth literature review of enterprise
performance (Chapter 2), lean enterprise principles (Chapter 2), and enterprise
architecture (Chapter 3), as well as our answers to the first two research questions
(Chapter 6).
In Chapter 3 we determined that MIT's emerging Nightingale-Rhodes Enterprise
Architecture Framework (NREAF) offers the most complete conceptualization of
organizations and was thus selected to inform this research. We also highlighted the need
to empirically study and theoretically enrich MIT'S NREAF while studying hospital
enterprises in particular.
What follows is the first of two in-depth exploratory studies of leading multi-specialty
hospitals in the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) respectively. Despite
being ranked at the top 1% acute hospitals by various third party agencies in their
respective countries, both hospitals were facing increasing pressure in specific functional
areas. The US based hospital was grappling with a nationwide problem of Emergency
Department (ED) overcrowding, whereas the UK based hospital was readying itself for
an increased governmental pressure to shorten elective treatment waiting lists. Both
burning platforms served as different entry exploratory questions which is consistent with
the case study research strategy 79. Additionally, and consistent with the nascent phase of
EA's theoretical development, each case study comprised a series of inductive -
deductive cycles that leveraged both quantitative and qualitative evidence while
continuously comparing and contrasting analysis with the relevant literature. Furthermore,
79 For further detail please refer back to section 5.2.4.2.
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research cycles occurred within each case as well as across cases, which not only
bolstered the case findings but also further refined the contributions to all four research
questions posed in this thesis.
This chapter starts out by introducing US Hospital XYZ and presenting its history
followed by a description of senior leadership's initial problem statement. The
subsequent five subsections describe in detail different embedded units of analysis, both
individually and in relation to each other, namely the ED, Clinical Support Services (i.e.
pharmacy, labs, housekeeping, and bed board admissions), Administrative Support
Services (i.e. process improvement engineers, performance and planning managers),
Senior Leadership, and Inpatient Service Units. Each subsection analyzes qualitative
and/or quantitative evidence as these became available from building a trust based
relationship with the organization and identifying additional data sources. In essence,
inquiry was informed by and reflected both lean enterprise principles and the MIT's
NREAF. The latter part of this chapter provides an overview analysis of Hospital XYZ's
enterprise architecture, while discussing the resulting enriched NREAF, and whether an
enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture can improve hospital
performance.
7.1 Hospital XYZ Enterprise and its History
Hospital XYZ is a non-profit physician led medical center and teaching hospital"0 with a
longstanding culture of specialized teams directly available to individual patients from
the local community and elsewhere.
Hospital XYZ began in the 1920s as a physician group practice similar to that of the
Mayo Clinic or Cleveland Clinic and equally had its origins in surgical leadership. The
practice started as a for-profit organization with a single surgeon who quickly made a
name for himself and attracted an increasing number of patients and soon after, other
surgeons wanted to join him. As the surgeries became more complex he hired medical
80 Hospital XYZ is classified as a "Major teaching hospital", as it is a member of the Council of Teaching
Hospitals and Health Systems (COTH). Hospital XYZ has a total number of 130 FTE interns and residents.
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physicians to help support the surgical practice. When the surgeon founder passed away a
board of overseers was formed and the group practice remained for-profit and was
essentially run by a lawyer. However, the lawyer's tenure was short lived as the
physicians felt that the practice was being poorly run, and was neither meeting their
needs nor those of patients, thus they decided to overthrow the leadership and incorporate
themselves as a foundation under a not-for-profit model.
Over time, the group practice tried to engage in joint ventures with surrounding hospitals
so as to improve its contractual relationships but was consistently rejected. As such, in
the late 1970s the group practice decided to build its own hospital, but such an effort was
also initially unsuccessful as it was unable to purchase its intended prime real estate.
Coincidentally, one of the board members worked in a company that had some land to
sell and even though it wasn't in an ideal location at the time, given that all other options
had already been exhausted, they decided to build their hospital 30 miles from the nearest
major city. In the end it turned out to be the best location possible as the highway system
evolved and the city center became further congested and less accessible to surrounding
communities. Notably, the state's planning commission approved the hospital's
construction only on the condition that primary and emergency care components be
added to its services. Nonetheless the group practice leadership continued to perceive
itself primarily as a tertiary diagnostic center, and to this day it is the reputation that they
strive for and identify themselves with.
"Our character is specialized care and not to be a community hospital [..] the hospital is an
extension of the group practice, as opposed to all the other places where the hospital existed
and individual physician practices developed to support the hospital."
Hospital XYZ Chief Operating Officer (COO)
In the early eighties Hospital XYZ's CEO decided to retire and in the advent of the
capitation payment model8 l being introduced, his replacement decided to pursue it and
gear the organization towards it. In principle, under capitation, providers are given an
81 Under a capitation model a provider is paid by a health plan a fixed amount each month for each member
in its patient panel, regardless of the actual expenses incurred in caring for those patients (see section 4.4.1).
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incentive to keep patients healthy and out of the hospital, but they also bear an increased
risk of patients becoming ill and thus need to reach a larger patient population to
distribute that risk.
"You get so many dollars per member per month to help take care ofpeople, and you need to
have a large number of lives, because if you just take care of sick people you lose your shirt,
and ifyou don't keep growing and adding people you risk your population just getting older
and sicker. So covered lives became important and geography became important. Because
when you go to insurers you want to take care of a geographic area, [and] the larger that
area the more you can try to generate from the insurers because they need you to take care of
people. So geographic spread and covered lives was how you made your money."
Hospital XYZ COO
Therefore the capitation model prompted Hospital XYZ to acquire existing physician
practices in the region and in doing so increase its geographic spread and number of
covered lives. The ultimate goal however was to feed the hospital's tertiary care services
in order to sustain the number of specialists that were needed to continue to meet their
growth aspirations. In the end the model failed for them for three main reasons. Firstly,
although care givers were said to be oblivious of a particular patient's health plan, the
organization described itself in a schizophrenic state as senior leadership was well aware
that it got paid less money the more resources that were spent taking care of capitated
patients. Secondly, the organization felt that the health plans meddled too much in their
affairs and demanded extensive utilization reviews which often resulted in unpaid
insurance claims. Thirdly, although the health plan said the organization was responsible
for managing the capitated patients, it allowed patients to seek care elsewhere and
Hospital XYZ was ultimately responsible for any costs incurred by them at any other
facility.
The alternative to capitation was to continue to grow in a fee-for-service model whereby
any procedure is reimbursed at a previously negotiated price, and in the process avoid the
perverse incentives of cutting patient care costs. In doing so the value of the primary care
network was to strictly feed the hospital's tertiary care services and ancillary services
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such as radiology, laboratory, and so forth. Realizing that patients were only willing to
drive 10 to 20 miles to their point of care, leadership decided not to renew their contracts
with any community care practices beyond that range from their hospital. Furthermore,
the current COO devised a growth strategy centered around key specialties or service
lines which were epidemiologically aligned with the needs of the surrounding patient
population, and where Hospital XYZ could build a strong reputation of excellence.
For the past 10 years the hospital has been successful in fulfilling its aggressive growth
strategy as illustrated in their growth margins over the same period, namely in surgeries
(45%), patient discharges (36%), and outpatient encounters (24%). In 2006 the hospital
derived close to $700 million in operating revenues which translated into an operating
income of $50 million, and at a time when most hospitals in the region were struggling to
breakeven. With over 4000 staff and close to 300 patient beds, they have national and
international recognition in particular for their Cerebrovascular Disease Center, Liver
Transplantation Team, and Heart & Vascular Center. Furthermore, Hospital XYZ also
plays a significant role in clinical trials for new diseases therapies, and hosts residency
and fellowship programs.
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7.2 Senior Leadership Initial Problem Statement
The overcrowding of emergency departments (ED) has become an increasing national
problem in the US as well as in Canada, Australia, and elsewhere (Derlet and Richards
2000). Hospital XYZ was no different and in 2006, having registered 36,000 patient visits
to its emergency department, it was visibly struggling with patient overcrowding. As such,
when senior leadership was approached in the context of this research they specifically
requested that analysis focus inside their ED as evidenced in an internal memo circulated
to ED staff which was entitled "Moving Forward: MIT Student" and described the intent
to devise "a plan to redesign work and care processes to streamline and improve patient
flow, reduce waste, and improve safety and quality of care, the patient experience, and
quality of work hifefor colleagues" (XYZChief_ofStrategy 2007). Leadership's
proposed initial exploratory question was "How to speed patientflow in the ED?"
When asked for their own perception as to why the ED was experiencing such difficulties
senior leadership provided two main reasons and suggested some solutions ahead of time.
Firstly, only one other hospital remained open in the immediate vicinity and it too was
struggling with ED overcrowding stemming from fewer emergency beds being available
in the area. However, unlike the clear strategic imperative to grow the number of elective
surgeries, the hospital had no desire to have a larger ED.
"We want to do 5% more surgeries. We want to do x% more of admissions. We sort of plan
for volume and growth and you accomplish that by opening up schedules, hiring more
doctors, freeing more capacity, marketing, etc, in the emergency room you don't take that
approach. You might do work to make better use of the capacity that you have, but our goal is
not to have "THE BIGGEST EMERGENCY ROOM AROUND!" and "Treat the most
emergency room patients!", that is not the goal. The goal is community need, sort of.."
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
Secondly, clinical staffing at Hospital XYZ follows a salaried model which was said to
exacerbate an existing shift mentality in emergency services (i.e. ED physicians don't
keep ongoing care delivery oversight and/or relationship with patients and leave at the
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end of each shift). In other words, leadership thought that additional throughput could be
attained with the same level of ED resources.
"We track ED physician productivity by the number of encounters per FTE. People work by
the hour, they do their time, and then go home. They are salaried and don't have the incentive
to do more. ED and anesthesia are similar in that they do shift work. You work what you have
to while you are there, but when you leave you are no longer responsible. You don't have a
patient panel"
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
Finally, leadership mentioned its plans to empower the ED patient so that he or she could
advance their own care through technology such as self-check in kiosks and vital signs
monitoring.
"We want to try to get the patient to do as much work... let me change that... we want to
empower our patients. [..] ifyou took the same technology and while the patient was in the
waiting room they could basically have their blood pressure, pulse, temperature taken, by
themselves while they sit there and fill out a form and have that electronically done, and a
nurse did not have to do it when they came in, it would save an incredible amount of money."
Hospital XYZ COO
Additionally, a general word of caution was given such that research efforts remained
non-biased to ED needs.
"[avoid] the prejudice of how everybody thinks the ER should take care ofpatients. So as you
interview nurses and the staff there, all they are going to say is how they can make their little
world better. That defeats our purpose."
Hospital XYZ COO
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7.3 Emergency Department Analysis
The data collection and analysis of the ED took place over several months and entailed
three main phases. The first phase was mainly concerned with building an initial
understanding of operations through a three hour walkthrough and as many as ten ED
onsite visits on different days of the week and at different hours of the day, which were
ultimately translated into a Value Stream Map (VSM). The second phase consisted of
eight individual interviews with different clinical staff, four of which were with ED
physicians who allowed for audio recording. The third phase consisted of a quantitative
analysis of patient data extracted from the ED's electronic medical record (EMR), as well
as other IT systems, and during which the results of the previous two phases were
leveraged and cross referenced. What follows is a description of each phase along with
their respective key findings.
7.3.1 1st ED Phase: Walkthroughs, observations, and VSM
Visits to the ED took place at different times of day, week, and months, so as to provide
for a more representative picture of underlying operations. Two things were immediately
apparent in this longitudinal approach. Firstly, patient volume seemed to vary with the
time of day and day of the week. Secondly, both clinical (i.e. physicians and nurses) and
clerical staff (e.g. supply technicians) exhibited different demeanor at different data
sampling periods. On the day of our first visit to the ED, we met with an ED Charge
Nurses2 in the hospital's main lobby and she walked us through a series of winding
hallways, and two elevator shafts, until we finally made our way to the ED. Upon
arriving in the ED, patient overcrowding was evident in a waiting area filled with patients
as well as in the number of patients overflowing into hallways on stretches (i.e. if all ED
beds are occupied, then patients need to be placed on stretches in the hallway, thus
indicating that overcrowding was taking place; additionally, the ED waiting area was also
full).
82 Charge Nurses are more senior nurses who have the responsibility of overseeing patient flow for a
specific service unit (e.g. emergency department). An ED Charge Nurse has the oversight of bed and staff
availability in the ED and also helps coordinate the flow of patients that need to be admitted to the hospital.
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Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3 provide for a simplified VSM of the ED. The initial intent was
not to derive a very detailed process map with rigorous cycle times but rather to identify
the key processes, information systems, shared resources, and points of interaction in
terms of inflow and outflow to and from the ED. The following is a description of these
key elements:
Patient Arrival Modes: A patient may arrive to the ED via three different ways. He or
she may be a walk-in which means that they arrived using their own means of
transportation, potentially coming from home, or their primary care physician's office, or
an onsite clinic. Alternatively they may arrive in an ambulance either for having been
involved in an accident where someone dialed 911, or as a direct transfer from another
hospital's ED. Finally a patient may also be transferred from a hospital's non-ED service
which would entail being transferred to the homologous service at Hospital XYZ (e.g. an
intensive care unit (ICU) patient from an external hospital is transferred to Hospital
XYZ's ICU, but uses the ED as a point-of-entry).
Walk-in Patient Acuity Level: Upon arrival walk-in patients are immediately visually
assessed by a nurse to determine if they are a level I acuity severity. The acuity severity
scale ranges from 1 to 5. A level 1 patient is the most severe and consists of a trauma
patient who needs immediate attention so as to preserve life and avoid loss of any
potentially endangered limb, and is thus immediately placed in an ED bed located in a
room or on a stretcher in a hallway. Levels 4 and 5 are considered minor injury patients,
whereas levels 2 and 3 although in a more serious condition, are nonetheless in a stable
enough condition and also remain in the ED waiting area while waiting to check-in83 .
83 For a sample listing of patient chief complaints associated to each acuity level please refer to Appendix
IV(i)
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Patient Note (3) 10 Patient direct
Amrves as Transfer from to floor
Note: (1) if bed not available, creative process comes into play whereby a bed is found for the patent (i.e. hallway, other)
Note (2): Check-in initiated over the phone and completed once patient arrives.
Note (3): Some hospitals have an agreement with Hospital XYZ where patients just roll through the ED
Figure 7-2: Hospital XYZ ED Value Stream Map (1 of 2)
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Figure 7-3: Hospital XYZ ED Value Stream Map (2 of 2)
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ED Hours of Operation: The ED is operational 24 hours a day however the number of
available staffed beds varies depending on the time of day. From 10am to 10pm there are
a total of 22 staffed beds, where 18 of them are considered "Main ED" and the remaining
four are considered "Minor ED" 4 . From 10pm to 10am the "Minor ED" is closed thus
the ED bed availability is reduced to 18 beds. The concept behind the "Minor ED" is to
allow for patients who have minor injuries (e.g. acuity levels 4 and 5) to be seen faster
and in a room where there is less capital investment (e.g. equipment, raw material, etc)
and less labor (i.e. nurse to patient ratios are lower in the "Minor ED" than in the "Main
ED"). Additionally, by increasing the throughput of minor injuries the availability of the
waiting area is increased.
Patient Check-In: An ED nurse, together with two ED clerks, operates the patient
check-in terminals where important patient information is captured. The patient is asked
for the reason prompting their visit (i.e. "Chief Complaint") as well as their name and
date of birth. This information is inserted into the ED's specific system called "T-
System", which is proprietary software that only runs in the ED and is mostly isolated
from other software applications that exist in the hospital. Finally, the check-in process is
also an opportunity to assess whether or not the patient's health has deteriorated into a
level 1, and if so the check-in nurse would proceed with finding them an available bed or
stretcher. Additionally, the check-in process consists of a quick way of collecting the
minimum amount of information necessary to insert the patient into the system and allow
for subsequent processes to begin.
Patient Triage: Triage takes place in a designated room and is conducted by a nurse
practitioner (NP)85. When available the NP nurse checks the T-System patient log to see
who is the next patient awaiting to be called, and she also determines what their Chief
Complaint is. Next she calls them from the waiting room, measures their vital signs, takes
a brief medical history, lists known allergies and medicine, asks screening questions for
domestic violence, assigns them their acuity level, and inserts their acuity level into the
84 Also known as "Fast Track" in the healthcare literature.
85 Nurse Practitioners have additional training which allows them to operate different equipment and/or
patient orders (e.g. drugs, blood tests, x-rays, etc).
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T-System. Once again, if the patient acuity level is 1, the patient is ideally immediately
placed in an ED bed or on a stretcher, otherwise he or she returns to the waiting are.
Finally, the triage nurse begins the patient's paper medical chart where most of the
information that was captured while triaging the patient is inserted. The paper medical
chart will then be used in concluding the patient check-in process as well as over the
course of the patient's visit to Hospital XYZ. Additionally the nurse will write patient
orders (on paper) which will then be used in the "Conduct Patient Tests" subsequent
process.
Patient Check-In Completion: Having gone through triage, and waited in the ED
waiting area, the patient is then called by the ED check-in staff to complete their
registration. The ED clerk confirms the patient's name and date of birth, and then collects
their address, contact information, social security number, insurance information, and
next of kin information. The information collected is immediately inserted into the T-
System and added to the MediTech Order Stack for later processing. The MediTech is a
software platform used throughout Hospital XYZ and its main purpose is to allow for
charge capture that is later translated into specific billing codes associated with each
insurance claim. Furthermore, it captures both patient and treatment information required
by law. Notably the T-System and MediTech software aren't integrated and require
duplicate human data insertion effort which may or not occur in simultaneous fashion,
and thus the existence of a "MediTech Order Stack". Once the registration process is
complete the patient returns to the ED waiting area.
Conduct Patient Tests: Having completed the check-in registration process, and waited
in the ED waiting area, the patient is then called by a registered nurse (RN) to conduct
tests in a designated room as per any patient orders that were written during triage. ED
onsite tests may include blood drawing for subsequent analysis in Hospital XYZ's
laboratory, or a first Elektrokardiogramm (EKG). If an x-ray (i.e. imaging) is required
then either a nurse or an ED technician accompanies the patient to radiology and once the
patient is ready they return to collect them and place them back in the ED waiting area.
Notably the laboratory and radiology are shared hospital resources which service the ED,
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the operating rooms (ORs), the inpatient units (i.e. inpatient bed areas), and clinics
(primary and specialist). All service requests issued by the ED are assigned a stat order
status which means that they have highest priority and need to be taken care of first. The
interaction between the ED and the laboratory and radiology is made possible via two
different systems:
e First, ED staff place laboratory orders in an old separate system which is
cumbersome to operate. For instance, if a patient requires more than one blood
test (which is often the case) the nurse needs to login, insert order, print order, and
logout from the ordering system as many times as laboratory tests are necessary
for each individual patient. The laboratory order printout is then placed in a
plastic carrier together with the patient specimen (e.g. blood vial, tissue sample,
etc) and sent over to the laboratory via a pneumatic tube. Once the laboratory test
is done and inserted into the laboratory's own system, the test result is inserted
automatically into the T-System and a visual signal is placed next to the specific
patient thus allowing for the ED nurse to know that the laboratory result is ready.
* Second, ED staff writes radiology orders in paper format and these orders are
carried by whoever is accompanying the patient to radiology and then
subsequently given to either an imaging clerk or an available technician operating
the imaging equipment. Once the radiology image is done it is automatically
inserted into radiology's own system, and a visual signal is also automatically
placed next to the patient name in the T-System. Once an ED nurse notices that
imaging results are ready for a given patient, either the nurse or an ED technician
proceeds to collect the patient from radiology and place them in the ED waiting
area once again. The imaging results themselves can be retrieved in a separate
system accessible in the ED by using the specific patient record number (i.e. one
cannot simply click on the T-System and automatically open the imaging results).
Patient Left-Without-Being-Seen or Against Medical Advice: In the course of waiting
for an ED bed and hence waiting to be seen by an ED physician, the patient may decide
to leave at any of the waiting times between core processes. The likelihood of patients
leaving increases as they find themselves waiting for longer periods of time (i.e. after
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going through triage, completing registration, and procuring tests). The immediate
implication of a patient leaving without being seen is that the ED is then responsible to
contact them or their next of kin should any impending test results turn out to require
urgent action.
Patient Placed in ED bed: In reality this process should read "Patient Placed in ED bed
or hallway stretcher" as a result of the patient overcrowding in the ED. As previously
noted, a patient will have been placed as soon as possible on an ED bed or stretcher if he
or she was assessed as a level 1 acuity patient. Otherwise, patients are only placed in an
ED bed/stretcher once they have undergone preliminary tests ordered during triage. The
ED Charge Nurse has the responsibility of identifying a bed that has become available
and has already been cleaned so that it may be assigned to a patient waiting in the ED.
Notably the T-System has the capability of indicating whether an ED bed is available or
not but the Charge Nurse prefers to keep visual tracking of bed availability since bed
availability is dependant on it being clean, and such is in turn dependant on house
keeping signaling that a bed has indeed been clean, which apparently doesn't always
happen. However, it was equally true that upon different visits it occurred that patients
were waiting in the ED waiting area and a clean bed was available and signaled as such
in the T-System but the Charge Nurse wasn't aware of this as she was busy managing
communications with inpatient units.
Patient Assessment and Treatment: Once placed in an ED bed the patient is seen by an
available ED physician who proceeds to examine them. In the case of level 1 acuity
patients, teams of physicians and nurses focus on stabilizing the patient and on avoiding
the loss of limb while treating visible injuries. The remaining patients undergo an
examination which may vary considerably depending on what their chief complaint was.
The physician may assess a specific region of the body (e.g. a knee injured in a fall) or
conduct a complete head to toe examination to determine a non-visible source of
discomfort, and this variation entails a different amount of time to examine the patient
and to subsequently treat them. At the end of the assessment the physician may
immediately administer a treatment and diagnose the patient in a healthy enough
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condition to be discharged and sent home or to a different type of healthcare provider (e.g.
hospice, rehabilitation center, etc). Alternatively, the physician may decide to keep the
patient in the ED under observation (i.e. the physicians describe it as "kick the tires" like
one would do to a car in an auto-shop) so that the additional time allows for the treatment
to take effect or for additional symptoms to reveal themselves in order to further treat the
patient. Finally, the physician may make the decision that the patient needs to be admitted
to the hospital to a given medical or surgical specialty in order to have sufficient and
adequate care before being leaving the hospital. If a patient is kept in observation, upon
reexamination by the physician, he or she may once again be discharged, or remain in
observation, or trigger an admit process. All the while patient assessment and designated
treatments are being recorded on the patient's medical chart. Notably, nurses have the
responsibility of inserting into the T-System the exact time when an ED physician begins
his or her assessment.
Patient Discharge (going home or to another provider): A patient discharge may be as
simple as the patient getting ready (e.g. putting clothes on) or it may involve a nurse case
manager coordinating care with external healthcare providers so that the patient may
pursue further treatment. Delays are introduced into the discharge process when the
patient doesn't have a means of transportation to leave the ED (e.g. the patient is unable
to operate a vehicle and their family isn't readily available to pick them up) and thus
unnecessarily continues to occupy an ED bed8 6 . A different delay may be introduced in
trying to locate an available external provider or in completing a hand-off process with
the available external provider. In an extreme case patients who are healthy to be
discharge may be admitted to general internal medicine as inpatients or otherwise remain
overnight in the ED (most likely on a stretcher in a hallway). Finally, there may be
situations where the patients themselves refuse to leave the ED even though they have
been considered healthy enough to do so. Such patients are labeled as "Tourists" by the
nursing staff.
86 Hospital XYZ is legally responsible for the patient until they physically leave the ED, and since they
don't have an observation unit (i.e. stable discharged patients are supervised by a minimum amount of
staff) the patients need to remain occupying an ED bed.
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Initiate Patient Admissions Process and Transfer: Once an ED physician makes the
decision that a patient needs to be admitted to a given inpatient specialty, a series of sub-
processes are triggered before a patient finally occupies his or her designated inpatient
bed. These sub-processes involve communication between the ED, the requested medical
or surgical specialty, the inpatient service units, and the hospital bed admission board.
These stakeholders typically exchange information over a separate "Pre Admit Bed
Tracking System", together with phone communication, beeper notifications, face-to-face
reporting, and eventually the patient's medical chart. However as evident in the series of
interviews and observations conducted, different physicians and nurses follow different
practices whilst executing the admissions process.
For the sake of readability what follows is a simplified version of the admissions process
which varies significantly whether the patient is being admitted to general internal
medicine (GIM) versus any other medical or surgical specialty:
GIM admission: If the ED physician wishes to admit a patient to GIM he himself
may write the necessary patient orders in order to move the patient from the ED to
the designated inpatient service unit whenever a bed becomes available and an
internal medicine medical resident and/or attending is available to receive the
patient handoff. Additionally the ED physician may request that the ED Charge
Nurse immediately start securing a bed in GIM by contacting the hospital bed
admission board. The admissions board is responsible for managing bed
admissions throughout the whole hospital, and it does so by coordinating with
each inpatient service unit and the ED using MediTech (i.e. inpatient system),
beepers, and phone communication. Also concurrently, as soon as the ED
physician writes the patient orders, an internal medicine resident may go to the
ED to check the patient and receive handoff. Once the internal medicine resident
receives the handoff what follows is a verbal report over the phone between the
ED nurse who oversaw the patient's care and the inpatient nurse who will be
caring for that same patient. Finally, an ED technician or ED nurse moves the
patient from the ED to a GIM bed, and upon departure from the ED, the ED
clerical staff is notified and inserts that information into the T-System.
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e Other type of admission: If the ED physician wishes to admit a patient to
another specialty (e.g. cardiology) then he or she must first seek approval from
that specialty's medical resident, fellow, and/or attending, and these in turn
ultimately write the patient orders in order to move the patient to the designated
inpatient service unit. Additionally, the decision to admit may be delayed as the
inpatient specialty physician may request further tests to be performed, and/or
further treatments be administered to further stabilize the patient, or ultimately
exercise his or her "right of first refusal"8 7. Theoretically, the ED is only allowed
to contact the hospital bed admission board once the designated specialty accepts
the admission. As before, the admissions board is responsible for managing bed
admissions throughout the whole hospital, and it does so by coordinating with
each inpatient service unit and the ED using MediTech (i.e. inpatient system),
beepers, and phone communication. The remaining sub-processes are also the
same as before (i.e. verbal nurse report, moving the patient88, signaling patient ED
discharge in T-System).
In both admission types, the ED physician is legally responsible for what happens to the
patient until a patient handoff occurs (i.e. inpatient physician signs the patient orders).
Similarly in both cases upon exiting the ED a T-System paper printout is made and
placed on the patient's medical chart given that the T-System isn't integrated with the
inpatient EMR (i.e. MediTech). Furthermore, each of the sub-processes described above
may introduce significant delays into the admissions process as physicians may or not be
immediately available to discuss a patient on the phone, or visit the patient in the ED, as
is the case with nurses being available to give verbal report or to move the patient from
the ED to the inpatient service unit. Finally, it is important to make a distinction between
a patient being assigned a bed versus the patient being placed on a bed. Specifically, a
patient may have been deemed admissible to a given inpatient service but because of the
87 Some specialties have what is called "the right of first refusal", which essentially means that they may
disagree with the ED's admission request and tell them to admit the patient elsewhere.
88 Some specialties may require both a technician and a nurse in order to move a patient should he or she
deteriorate in transit and require immediate assistance (e.g. chest compressions).
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above mentioned delays or simply a lack of inpatient beds, he or she will remain in the
ED as an admitted patient (i.e. also known as patient boarding).
7.3.2 2 nd ED Phase: Interviews
The second phase of ED data collection and analysis consisted of eight individual
interviews with different clinical staff, four of which were with ED physicians who
allowed for audio recording 9. Interviewees were selected randomly from each clinical
staff pool (i.e. attending physicians, medical residents, and nurses) and the interviews
themselves took place in the ED so as to be as convenient as possible for the interviewees
to respond to an emergent patient situation. The interview process was informed both by
the 1s' ED Phase described in the previous section, as well as by MIT's emerging
Nighitingale-Rhodes Enterprise Architecture Framework (NREAF) described in Chapter
390. As such preliminary interview questions were asked pertaining to each of the
NREAF views (i.e. External/Policy; Strategy; Process; Organization; Knowledge;
Information; Service/Product) while leveraging specific observations from the 1s' ED
Phase and allowing for each interviewee to provide depth in those NREAF views which
91he or she found most relevant
Figure 7-4 is an overview of our characterization of Hospital XYZ's ED sub-architecture
which emerged from the data analysis presented in the next subsections. This
characterization concerns both local enterprise architecture characteristics (i.e. pertaining
specifically to the ED) as well as enterprise level (i.e. pertaining to Hospital XYZ as a
whole), and reflects our enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture (i.e.
89 The procedural steps underlying the qualitative data collection and analysis that follows are described in
greater detail in Chapter 5.
90 See section 3.4.3.
91 The interviewees themselves were unaware of the NREAF while responding to questions, but subsequent
analysis adopted each of the EAF views in interpreting phenomena of interest. Notably the coding of
phenomena of interest as presented here already reflects the final coding resulting from the series of coding
iterations within and across each case embedded unit (i.e. ED, Clinical Support Services, Administrative
Support Services, Senior Leadership, and Inpatient Service Units), as well as with Chapter 8's Hospital
ABC in-depth case study. Please refer to section 7.7.2 for our resulting enriched version of the NREAF. We
recommend the reader to acquaint himself or herself with section 7.7.2 to better grasp the analysis and
findings pertaining to each embedded unit.
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leverages the enriched NREA framework discussed at the end of this Chapter 792). The
circle placement of the EA Views is meant to illustrate that they are interconnected.9 3
Extended enterprise
management constraints
Compromised flow stability Variable interaction performance(i.e. patient boarding) with inpatient service units
Poor information flow
transparency and timeliness Compromised patient/physician
experience (e.g. acuity level 3, LVVBS)
Tension in delivering community care, e ED built as an afterthought
clinical excellence, and teaching due to MA state pressure
Limited ED investment Statg Nearby hospitals closed
New ORs built for critical services growth but
their patients first come through the ED Emergency Limited organizational
Poor data quality Deatetlearning capability
Prevalence of characterization Limited access to stored
paper based information
systems
Fragmented inpatient/outpatient Overwhelmed
IT systems require air traffic boundary spanners
controller nurse
Negative local process Prevalence of
optimization behavior undesirable Corporate culture
processes focused on
Limited process "us vs. procedures
measurement capability them"
culture
Effective but narrow
process improvement
Figure 7-4: Hospital XYZ Emergency Department sub-architecture characterization
7.3.2.1 ED External/Policy View
"Policy/External: The external regulatory, political and societal environments in which
the enterprise operates" (Nightingale 2009)
The beginnings of Hospital XYZ were described as a multispecialty physician group
practice which used to operate in the center of a major city and decided to build its own
hospital rather than continue to refer patients to nearby hospitals. The decision to locate
the hospital 30 miles from the city center was deemed a brilliant one as it greatly
improved access and allowed them to provide a teaching and specialty care service in a
community where there were only cottage hospitals (i.e. small community hospitals). As
part of the negotiation with the surrounding community Hospital XYZ had to change its
92 See section 7.7.2.
9 The placement of the EA Views in a circle isn't intended to illustrate how they interconnect. Moreover,
the EA Views don't simply connect in a sequential manner with the adjacent EA Views in the circle. In
section 7.3.3.2 we describe dominant EA View interactions that emerged from the data, and demonstrate
the non-sequential nature of said interactions.
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original construction plans and include an ED, which was considered as an after thought
decision that ultimately hindered patient flow.
"the layout of this building is not efficient. This tells you how much of an afterthought the ED
was for Hospital XYZ. It was demanded by the town of [omitted] that [Hospital XYZ] have an
ED otherwise they would not permit the building to occur. So the ED was not part of the
original design"
Hospital XYZ ED Charge Nurse
More recently the large city hospitals began expanding their geographic reach and as a
result Hospital XYZ is said to feel additional pressure to continue to grow at the same
rate as before. Additionally, Hospital XYZ's own expansion plans in terms of its critical
services offering were said to specifically follow those for which external stakeholders
were willing to pay more and not necessarily those which the hospital itself needed more
in order to provide better care.
"A couple ofyears ago when they were building out the critical care services, more operating
rooms, more cat labs, when they were spending very large sums of money on services that
were clearly seen as generating income, the buzzword was 'financial credential". That ifyou
were going to look at departments that had needs, the needs that you were going to address
with investment, were the needs that were going to return the largest financial return on the
investment, because hospitals operate in a very narrow margin. So there was a compelling
need to spend limited resources in afinancial effectiveness way where you could guarantee
the maximum return on your investment. Unfortunately what would qualified as need was
more what was seen producing revenue, than what was seen as producing perhaps more
effective care, or better care."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 4
An additional factor considered of importance in describing the ED context was that of
the evolution of medicine itself and the aging of the population which ultimately impact
the provision of care. Whereas 20 years ago one would have to admit a patient to the
hospital for a three or four day stay just to get the diagnosis and treatment done, today
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drugs are available that allow for physicians to have a significant effect in a short amount
of time. Conversely, another effect of drugs is that they have changed the definition of
urgent care, where the previous 20 to 30 minute response window has been enlarged to as
much as two to three hours. Additionally, over time nurses have been better able to
support physicians by collecting patient information (i.e. chief complaint, vital signs,
current medications, and past medical history) even before the physician has seen the
patient. Such support helps considerably as the ED is considered a fast paced
environment which generally follows a problem focused approach. However as the care
delivery capability increased so have the expectations of individual patients.
but the more we can do, the more we are expected to do!"
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 3
Finally, several references were made concerning the regulatory requirements of a
physician's (i.e. attending) responsibility towards a patient and how it in turn may affect
patient flow. If an inpatient specialty resident and/or physician aren't available to write
orders for a patient who is in a stable condition, and even if an inpatient bed has been
assigned to that patient, then the patient must remain in the ED until someone is available
to receive the patient handoff and thus ensure the continuity of care.
"If a resident screws up, their attending is ultimately responsible because you didn't
adequately supervise the resident when he was treating patients."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 2
"A resident is always an agent of the attending. A resident is a licensed physician and they
exercise various degrees of independence and autonomy. I am legally responsible for what
the residents are writing and ultimately for that patient."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 1
7.3.2.2 ED Strategy View
"Strategic goals, vision and direction of the enterprise including the business model;
enterprise metrics and objectives " (Nightingale 2009)
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The definition of strategic goals, vision, and direction of the enterprise traditionally lie
with senior leadership in organizations, and indeed these were included also to that effect
in subsequent sections of Hospital XYZ's in-depth case. However, the ED's
interpretation and receptivity of Hospital XYZ's overarching strategy emerged as
relevant phenomena in describing organizational behavior, as evidenced in the following
analysis.
"Our obligation [in the ED] is to identify high risk illnesses and diseases. To do it in a timely
fashion and to institute life and limb saving and preserving. Emergency departments become
much more than that. It should say emergency care, it should say convenience care, and
primary care.
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 2
As noted in the previous section, ED physicians generally felt that senior leadership at
Hospital XYZ was tailoring its strategy to the most revenue generating services as
determined by what external stakeholders were willing to pay. As such, ED physicians
fundamentally disagreed with Hospital XYZ's strategy which they felt neglected the
ED's operation and consequently the hospital's responsibility towards the surrounding
community.
To begin with, the ED physicians noted that senior leadership narrowly focused on
expanding specific service lines (e.g. surgical care services, cardiothoracic services,
cardiovascular center, etc) and in doing so invested in additional operating rooms but
didn't take into consideration the impact that such a growth strategy would have on the
ED. Moreover, the ED experienced a significant increase in patients requiring emergency
care pertaining to the newly expanded service lines (e.g. heart attack) which necessarily
implied dedicating limited resources towards them and keeping less acute patients
waiting for attention for several hours (e.g. acuity level 3 patients).
Furthermore, several of the ED physicians alluded to a corporate culture that focused on
surgical procedures and minimized or even ignored the contribution that the ED had
towards sustaining overall operations. Not only that, senior leadership broadcasted its
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successes in the expanded service lines, which only reinforced the neglect felt by the ED.
However the implications of the procedure oriented corporate culture weren't only felt at
the strategy and investment planning levels, but also at a more fundamental operational
level in that surgical specialties were said to more often than not exercise their "right of
first refusal" and in doing so tell the ED to admit to GIM instead.
"Most hospitals see their emergency department as their interface with the community. That
has been absent here. We have essentially operated the same physical plant for the last two
decades, just minor revisions and minor expansions. There has not been an emphasis [on]
emergency care that is community friendly. You might ask why? The answer is cultural more
than anything else. It is financial. It is not seen that investing in the emergency department
generates more money
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 4
"Usually the specialty services have a default position of "admit to medicine" and exercise
their right offirst refusal."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 2
"Medicine is the default service. If nobody else wants the patient they go to medicine. A
specialty service can say "I don't want that patient on my service, admit them to general
medicine". Medicine takes the multiple hits and has the big load."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician I
"One of the things you need to understand is the corporate culture and that in great part
drives behaviors, and in great part affects how people perform. I don't think it will take you
too many visits here with stretches stacked up in the hallways and patients waiting for six
hours to be seen, to know that this a modelflaw. The hospital has created a tremendous need
for this critical care by extending all its critical care services, surgical services,
cardiothoracic services, becoming a cardio vascular center, we do interventional angioplasty,
we're a stroke service, we're a trauma service, and all these bring critical care patients, and
they all come through the emergency department. And that this emergency department has
not been redesigned for 15 or 20 years."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 1
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"From the perspective of the emergency department when we were looking at where the
money was going... knowing that there is a tremendous need in this department for expansion
and improvement of operating systems... that money was not being spent here... the
administration actually came to us trumpeting the successes of the expansion of the other
services, and had little appreciationfor the impact that that had on this department... that by
increasing all these critical care draws, all of which still needed to go through the emergency
department, not to address the rate limiting factor, to operate with complete disregard for the
rate limiting factor, it seemed at best misguided and was ludicrous."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 4
"They have gone out and they have marketed all their special services. Ifyou are having a
heart attack this is where you want to come, we are in the top 100 cardiovascular centers of
excellence in the country, so when you have your heart attack this is where you want to come.
If you are clutching your chest at home saying "I am having chest pain ", and the medics did
your cardiogram, and you had changes on your cardiogram that showed you had an acute
heart attack, your passage from door to angioplasty is measured, and it is measured by a
national standard, and that standard has become more rigorous, and there has been great
attention and effort paid tofacilitating the passage of those patients from the point of entry to
the point of the delivery of care. Same is true for stroke. Same is truefor other critical care
patients, sepsis for instance... but that uses a finite resource. If a patient comes through with
his MI, patients who are here with their shortness of breath, their pneumonias, their
abdominal pain, don't get seen! This is the narrowest point in the delivery of services in the
hospital system."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 1
7.3.2.3 ED Service View
"Services(s) delivered and or supplied by the enterprise, including in support of
products. " (Nightingale 2009)
The ED's inflow and outflow interactions are part of the overall service architecture of
Hospital XYZ, as are the ED's own internal processes. Events that take place either
upstream or downstream may have significant implications in the service architecture
overall. Some of these implications have already been noted in previous sections and are
summarized below:
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e Delay in discharging patients due to unavailable follow-on care providers
* Delay in discharging patients due to family members not being available to
retrieve patients
e Narrow strategy focused on increasing ORs for high revenue generating
specialties neglected the adverse impact and hence the necessary investment in
the ED
e Focus on patients requiring urgent inpatient specialty care adversely impacting the
care of more routine services required by the surrounding community.
In addition to enabling the procedure focused strategy of Hospital XYZ, the ED was also
said to be used inadequately by both clinics and inpatient services which took advantage
of its ability to process and attain test results faster.
"So when you are out here dealing with emergency patients, you are dealing with patients
that are overflowing from other services from the hospitalfor a variety of reasons"
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 2
For instance, rather than having the patient sent from the clinic to a series of ancillary
service visits, the clinic specialist would have the patient sent to the ED in order to have
all tests processed in a centralized and expedited manner. Technically, such a patient
could be administered such tests in a non-urgent care environment. Similarly, a patient
requiring admission from a specialist clinic is sent to the ED rather than being processed
as a direct admit to an inpatient service unit, because the ED theoretically does so more
efficiently. Another example is in the case of patients admitted through the ED who
remain longer in the ED in order to attain test results required by an inpatient specialty
admitting physician, who would otherwise have to oversee the test administration (e.g.
blood draw; tissue collection; accompanying the patient to radiology) and subject
him/herself to a non-stat test processing (i.e. urgent care tests are given precedence over
less urgent tests).
"... there has been the assumption that the emergency department will operate without initial
investment. There is the assumption that the emergency department will operate efficiently,
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that we can get evaluations done faster than in an inpatient service and certainly than on an
outpatient basis, so that it is convenient and expedious for the patient to use the emergency
department. But there has also been an assumption that you can expand the demand and that
demand will be incrementally met by the department. That it has the capacity to respond to
all demand. And that is unrealistic."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 4
"We also have patients that we admit where the decision to admit has been made in the office.
If I am an internist and see a patient that has chest pain discomfort and I know that patient
needs to be admitted, typically that patient gets sent to the emergency department to stage his
admission because we do it efficiently. But that patient legitimately could be sent to the floor
directly [from the office]. That is a cultural issue"
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 2
The compounding effect of these cultural issues together with the procedure focused
strategy has been an ED struggling to sustain patient throughput in a manner that is
equitable and caters to both the specialized care and primary emergency care needs of the
surrounding community. Already one could begin to appreciate that the ED's
overcrowding wasn't the sole responsibility of those working in the ED but rather a
combination of factors from the EA Views analyzed thus far (i.e. External/Policy,
Strategy, and Strategy). However, it wouldn't be accurate to say that the ED has been
completely neglected as there have indeed been efforts to improve the system. The
problem is that the improvement initiatives themselves have been equally narrow and
only focused inside the ED whilst adopting quick fixes rather than fundamentally
redesigning the service architecture within and beyond the ED.
"There have been efforts to improve the system but the impact has been very limited within
the hospital at large. The issue of admission, of getting orders written, has been addressed
repeatedly for many years, and there have been changes that have occurred, increased
number of teams, attending moonlighters, is it currently adequate? No! Patients wait in the
hallways because there are no beds for them to be on. It is a small department. It gets smaller
if beds are occupied. If you are obligated to maintain a certain flow, even of non critical
patients, ifyou want to target a certain flow rate, and I have now narrowed the diameter of
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the tube but can't increase the velocity, what happens? You have a dam effect. The holdovers
effectively reduce the size of this department, and we can have at times upwards of 15 holds
in the emergency department and we have 17 beds. So what you have are multiple patients in
the hallway."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 1
"The questions that you are asking are issues that many of us have dealt with over and over
and over again for many years. I have personally been on three process redesign committees
in the last 12 years, and the process has not been redesigned."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 4
Interestingly although some ED physicians recognized the importance of considering
other entities and their respective impact in ED operations (i.e. thinking beyond the
boundary of the ED), their proposed solution would be to either increase the size of the
ED or the size of the inpatient service units. The intermediate solution of improving flow
by other means wasn't a consideration thus existing overcrowding issues were mainly
associated to capacity issues.
"Personally I just think that we could manage this department really well if we could get the
admitted patients out. [...]Either the hospital gets bigger or we get bigger or I don't see us
being able to handle the volume that is going to get even worse down the road."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 3
Yet another example of an absent understanding of the service architecture became
evident in the ED physician's description of how inpatient specialties were scheduled and
how that in turn affected the ED flow. To begin with considerable variability was
described in terms of the admission processes and available resources of each inpatient
specialty. Depending on the time of day there is a different number of staff available and
indeed their configuration also varies (e.g. clinical staff team composition). For instance,
some specialties have an unwritten policy of not accepting ED patients during the first
two hours of a shift changeover. Other services may also have an unwritten policy of
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capping the number of admissions they receive during a given shift regardless of
inpatient bed availability.
"you may have one admitting team, you may have two admitting teams, you may have an
admitting resident, you may have an admitting night attending, it varies tremendously
throughout the day when we look at the medical services which is where we admit the
majority of the patients to the hospital. You may also have the situation where there may be 4,
or 5, or 6, or 8 patients awaiting admission to a medical service which means that the
medical service needs to see them in some capacity to write their admissions order"
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 1
"Usually around 7.30am they start answering their pages. But if the hospitalist [..] has
several patients from the previous evening that he has to see. You know if I say that this
patient is ready to be admitted, and the attending is still getting to the hospital and still has to
see his existing patients on the floor, then my patient can be left sitting and waiting for 3
hour! And during the day the admitting team may have capped... they have taken all the
admissions that they were going to take on their service for that day, so they may cap in the
afternoon at 3 o'clock, and yet the next team might not be coming in until 6 o'clock, so they
will take the name of the patient but when the six o'clock team or teams come in, there may be
8 patients who are waiting to be seen, and you may have not been able to get any orders
written in the afternoon."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 1
The end result is that care delivered in the ED is subpar to that which ED physicians
would like. Sick patients find themselves waiting for an ED bed and if admitted they also
have to wait for an inpatient bed. In turn ED physicians feel pressed to process the patient
volume and are unable to build a connection with the patient beyond focusing on that
which is absolutely necessary to prevent loss of life and limb.
"We are trying to deal with volume. I would like to spend 5 minutes interviewing the patient
to get to know them personally, but we don't have the time to do that in the emergency
department."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 3
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Granted the nature of emergency care is such that physicians need to respond quickly,
and it may well be that trauma patients may even be unconscious and incapable of
building any connection with clinical staff. However, the vast majority of patients isn't
trauma patients (i.e. level 1 acuity) and could potentially benefit from an improved
interpersonal connection. Avedis Donabedian, who has been referred to as one of the
founders of the modem science of health care quality measurement (Romano and Mutter
2004), supported the view that technical care alone is insufficient in measuring the
quality of care, and that the outcome of care indeed depends on the management of the
interpersonal relationship between the patient and care givers:
"It is a vitally important element. Through the interpersonal exchange, the patient
communicates information necessary for arriving at a diagnosis, as well as preferences
necessary for selecting the most appropriate methods of care. Through this exchange, the
physician provides information about the nature of the illness and its management and
motivates the patient to active collaboration in care. Clearly, the interpersonal process is the
vehicle by which technical care is implemented and on which its success depends. Therefore,
the management of the interpersonal process is to a large degree tailored to the achievement
ofsuccess in technical care "(Donabedian 1988)
Notably there were inpatient specialties that deserved the caveat distinction by ED nurses
and physicians alike in that they were quick to respond to the ED requests and thus
helped improve flow (i.e. neurosurgery service and orthopedics service). However, at a
higher level, the general perception of the ED clinical staff was that senior leadership
didn't acknowledge the contribution that the ED had for the whole of Hospital XYZ,
which was consistently evident in an absent understanding of the meaning and
importance of the EA Service View.
"The administration doesn't credit the added value service that the emergency department
allows for it to do the operations, you get to do the catherization, you get to do the
angioplasty, you get to have the stroke patient."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 4
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7.3.2.4 ED Process View
"Core leadership, lifecycle and enabling processes by which the enterprise creates value for
its stakeholders. " (Nightingale 2009)
In analyzing the ED from the previous three EA views of External/Policy, Strategy, and
Service we have already identified key factors that have had a direct implication to the
underlying Process View, as will be the case with the remaining EA views yet to be
analyzed in subsequent sections. Some of the implications noted in previous sections are
summarized below:
e Standards are absent on when patients should receive care in an ED environment.
For instance, clinics optimize their own throughput by sending their patients to
the ED instead of admitting them directly to the inpatient floors. Similarly,
inpatient specialties request additional tests before admitting patients as the ED
will process them in a more expedite fashion.
* Standards are absent on how and when patients are admitted to the different
inpatient specialties. For instance, different specialties have different teams that
vary in size and composition depending on the time of day which affects their
own ability to care for their inpatients and ultimately impacts their admissions
capability. Similarly, different specialties institute unwritten policies as to how
many ED patients they will admit in a single shift irrespective of inpatient bed
availability.
" All inpatient specialties other than GIM have the right offirst refusal which
enables them to reject an ED patient admission. Some specialties have the default
position of consistently exercising this right and instructing the ED to admit to
GIM instead.
* Process improvement initiatives have narrowly focused within the ED and have
yet to redesign processes across the value stream (i.e. beyond the ED) as
evidenced by the continued number of patients waiting in the hallways because
enough beds aren't available for them. Improvement efforts were described as
having had a very limited effect within the hospital at large.
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Having analyzed the detailed descriptions from both nurses and physicians as to how they
care for a patient in the ED and have him or her admitted as an inpatient, allowed us to
further appreciate the considerable complexity inherent in their processes. Notably
several of the process insights were already incorporated into the previously presented
VSM. However, there are some process nuances which deserve further refinement in our
analysis. To begin with different patients may require different patient orders (e.g. blood
tests, imaging, drugs, etc) and present variable response times to the same treatment. As
such, an ED physician assessment may focus on a specific body region (e.g. knee or an
ankle) or require a more thorough examination from head to toe. Treating and diagnosing
are two activities that go hand-in-hand in an emergency medicine context as the ED
physician tries to quickly isolate a problem by studying a patient's response to a
particular drug and/or has to allow for additional observation time (i.e. kick the tires) in
order for additional symptoms to present themselves.
"In emergency medicine you are often treating with diagnosing. So even at the patient
bedside we may be giving them medication depending on how sick they are, and then
reassessing based on the reaction to those interventions. Then there is usually a lag time
anywhere from half an hour to three hours depending on what tests I have ordered, if I have
ordered blood tests I should have those results within half an hour and that will be fine, if I
need a CA T scan [the] patient will have to drink for an hour, get their CA T scan, so it can
take up to another hour to get their results, and then I need to do my own review and
potentially confirm my thoughts with the radiologists. So the lag times can very a lot."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 3
"I knew that the patient needed to be admitted when I left the examination room, but I don't
have a diagnosis yet, so I don't know where she needs to be admitted to."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 2
Another factor concerning complexity introduced by specific patient characteristics is
that of patient gender which amid an overcrowded ED that relies on stretches places
additional challenges for physicians to care for those patients. Succinctly, a male patient
Page 290 of 759
offers greater flexibility as to what can be examined in the middle of a hallway as
opposed to a female patient.
"So what you have are multiple patients in the hallway, you are seeing patients in the
hallway, since you are a man I can do a chest and abdominal examination in the hallway, but
ifyou were a woman I couldn't do that examination in the hallway."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 1
Furthermore, additional complexity is introduced in the process when we consider that
Hospital XYZ is an academic medical center where as many as 30% of its physicians are
interns and residents enrolled in a given specialty training. Surgical services in particular
were said to be considerably more hierarchical because of ensuring quality of care while
training new physicians. However, the undesirable effect of training is that it
considerably hinders the flow of the ED. The following is a particularly rich description
that illustrates how an ED patient that requires admission can remain as many as eight
hours in the ED going through the admissions process of two different specialties:
"The medical service behaves differently than the surgical services. Surgical services have
what I refer to as the right offirst refusal, and they evaluate patients in a somewhat different
process. Surgical services are much more hierarchical. For instance, I have a patient now
that has a small bowl obstruction and I know this lady needs to be admitted. I have seen the
patient, I have seen the x-ray, I knew the patient needed to be admitted half an hour ago when
I looked at the films. I called up to thejunior surgical resident, and he is probably not at this
time going to be terribly busy because he hasn't been given too many other admissions, but he
may be off at the operating room, or he may be taking care of his inpatient services, but the
junior resident will come and see my patient and do an assessment. The junior resident will
then acquire or wait until he has data that he thinks is adequate so that he can present to the
senior resident. The senior resident will then see the patient. The senior resident will then
decide whether or not they need to contact a fellow who is a post residency graduate in a
specialty service. The fellow may then come and see the patient. And then after the fellow has
seen the patient they may decide whether the patient needs to go to the operating room, needs
to be admitted to the surgical service, or whether they don't want to admit that patient but yet
acknowledge a need for admission, at which point they may say: "we don't think this patient
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needs to be admitted to the colorectal service, admit them to medicine". So after 4
evaluations, emergency attending, junior resident, senior resident, fellow, discussion with the
attending, the decision to be made is that the patient is not going to their service. Each time,
each physician is obligated to give an assessment because he intellectually, academically,
and professionally is responsible for the decision that he is trying to make. Now the surgical
services work that way because it is good for their training in a way, but it is not good in
terms of managing flow in the emergency department. I knew that this patient needed to be
admitted an hour ago, and it may be an additional 3 hours until this patient to be seen by the
necessary people to have them admitted to the surgical service, and it is quite possible that
after they have seen this patient, they will decide that because she has an ovarian cancer and
had chemotherapy and has multiple lesions that they don't admit the patient. Then you'll have
to go to the medical service, who will call the medical resident who will then put the patient
in their list of things to do. And you can do an 8 hour evaluation before you can get an owner
that will admit the patient."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 1
The admitting process and individual discretion exercised by different ED physicians is
such that they described different processes in admitting their patients to either medicine
or surgical inpatient services. All physicians were consistent in their description of
admitting to general internal medicine in that they don't require an internal medicine
resident's pre-approval of admission in order to request an inpatient bed. However, some
physicians maintained this policy even when requesting admission to a surgical specialty,
whereas other physicians refrained from doing so as they knew that the specialty could
exercise their right offirst refusal.
"IfI want to admit to a surgical service I cannot immediately get the bed because I know that
they have a right of refusal. So I can't [immediately] start the bed process with the surgical
services.
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 1
"You can often make the decision of admitting a patient without any data. At that point you
notify the charge nurse who is either in touch with the bed board that works during the day,
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or the nursing supervisor during the evening, to get a bed assignment. We try to get a bed
assignment even before we have an inpatient physician to write the admission order."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 2
One of the cumulative effects of different stakeholders pursuing their non-standardized
localized process optimizations (e.g. admitting physicians holding patients longer in the
ED to attain quicker test results; clinics sending patients to the ED rather than admitting
them directly to the inpatient service units; ED physicians requesting beds without
inpatient attending approval) is that patients don't flow seamlessly and require constant
intervention from the ED Charge Nurse to find ways to accommodate admitted patients
inside the ED and have them eventually transferred to an inpatient service unit.
"My role is similar to the air traffic control at an airport where I try to bring in the patients,
make sure that we have a bed ready and that the required services are available to serve the
patient, and to do this while everything is moving and changing."
Hospital XYZ ED Charge Nurse
Finally, given the cumulative assertions that Hospital XYZ's senior leadership didn't
recognize the ED's contribution, and although the ED wasn't responsible for process
measurement activities, specific questions were asked as to what types of performance
data they had access to. In general clinical staff was consistent in terms of their
descriptions and use of quality metrics (e.g. patient falls, mortality, hospital readmissions,
etc) as well as their assessment of operations as being poor given the continued visual
evidence of patient overcrowding and difficult interactions with frustrated patients and
family members. Notably, whereas detailed reports were referenced in terms of quality
metrics, the same practice wasn't followed in terms of operational metrics (i.e. they
simply relied on visual inspection of throughput). When asked about financial metrics the
nurses and medical residents didn't express an interest or indeed knowledge of such
metrics. Conversely, ED physicians were keen to see financial metrics pertaining to the
ED and the inpatient services they referred to, but they said that they had been
continuously denied access to such information.
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We have asked for the financial data [on each of the services] and we have not had access to
it. This gets into a discussion of institutional behavior rather than pragmatics of a scientific
project. We got ourselves into a war because of what we chose to see and what we chose not
to see. And this administration has chosen not to see a need in the emergency department.
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 4
7.3.2.5 ED Organization View
"The organizational structure of the enterprise as well as relationships, culture, behaviors
and boundaries between individuals, teams and organizations." (Nightingale 2009)
As before, the analysis of the previous four EA views of External/Policy, Strategy,
Service, and Process have allows us to identify key factors that also have a direct
implication to the underlying Organization View. Some of the implications noted in
previous sections are summarized below:
* ED tension towards hospital administrators: on various occasions observations
were made regarding the dominant corporate culture of Hospital XYZ which
wasn't necessarily aligned with the underlying culture of the ED. Examples
included specific language used such as ED physicians being at war with hospital
administrators and feeling underappreciated in terms of the ED's contribution to
the remainder of Hospital XYZ. Specifically, from the ED's perspective the
surgical procedure focused strategy sought by hospital administrators and
welcomed by certain inpatient specialties prevents the ED from delivering on its
mission of providing emergency and primary care services to the surrounding
community.
e ED variable behavior towards inpatient specialties: clinical ED staff behavior
towards inpatient specialties exhibited sharp distinctions depending on the
inpatient specialty under consideration. Notably the neurosurgery and orthopedics
services were said to be better to work with and they responded to ED requests in
an adequate timeline and helped ED flow. Conversely other services such as
cardiology were described in a much dimmer light considering their practice of
consistently exercising their right offirst refusal. Finally the GIM service was
described sympathetically as overburdened as well and performing as best as
possible given the circumstances.
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" ED behavior towards outpatient clinic services: ED physicians noted that the
outpatient clinics had the practice of sending them patients which could have been
admitted directly to the inpatient floors but they elected to send them to the ED
instead so as to not have to manage the admissions process themselves.
" Variable clinical hierarchies: certain inpatient specialties require additional
hierarchical levels presumably to oversee the training of medical interns, residents
and fellows. Other specialties such as GIM allow for medical residents to admit
patients without intervention of senior residents or any higher ranked physicians.
The analysis of organizational culture and organizational origins are fundamental aspects
in understanding enterprise behavior. Earlier in this chapter 94 we described Hospital
XYZ's history and its institutional character as portrayed by senior leadership:
"Our character is specialized care and not to be a community hospital [..] the hospital is an
extension of the group practice, as opposed to all the other places where the hospital existed
and individual physician practices developed to support the hospital."
Hospital XYZ COO
Upon revisiting this particular description one is reminded of how the origins of Hospital
XYZ, namely it being a physician led multispecialty group practice which built its own
hospital, drove and still drives the previously described procedure focused strategy whilst
minimizing its role as a community care provider.
"Our obligation is to identify high risk illnesses and diseases. To do it in a timely fashion and
to institute life and limb saving and preserving. Emergency departments become much more
than that. It should say emergency care, it should say convenience care, and primary care."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 2
Clearly from the onset there is a cultural disconnect between the missions of senior
leadership at Hospital XYZ and that of ED clinical staff who see themselves as the
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94 Please refer to section 7.1.
primary link with the surrounding community. Such a disconnect helps explain the
negative views consistently expressed by the various ED physicians when describing and
evaluating Hospital XYZ's strategy. The ED physicians emphasized that senior
leadership specifically invested in high revenue generating services and neglected to
invest in the ED in order to at least cope with the associated increased demand of trauma
services related to those high revenue generating services.
"One of the things you need to understand is the corporate culture and that in great part
drives behaviors, and in great part affects how people perform. I don't think it will take
you too many visits here with stretches stacked up in the hallways and patients waiting
for six hours to be seen, to know that this a model flaw. The hospital has created a
tremendous need for this critical care by extending all its critical care services, surgical
services, cardiothoracic services, becoming a cardio vascular center, we do
interventional angioplasty, we're a stroke service, we're a trauma service, and all these
bring critical care patients, and they all come through the emergency department. And
that this emergency department has not been redesigned for 15 or 20 years."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 1
"From the perspective of the emergency department when we were looking at where the
money was going... knowing that there is a tremendous need in this department for
expansion and improvement of operating systems... that money was not being spent here...
the administration actually came to us trumpeting the successes of the expansion of the
other services, and had little appreciation for the impact that that had on this
department... that by increasing all these critical care draws, all of which still needed to
go through the emergency department, not to address the rate limiting factor, to operate
with complete disregard for the rate limiting factor, it seemed at best misguided and was
ludicrous."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 4
Previously we described how technical care and the management of the interpersonal
relationship between the patient and care givers are both important elements in assessing
the quality of care. However, several ED clinical staff members alluded to their inability
to engage patients from a blank slate to begin with and that in some cases patients were
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even hostile towards them. Thus not only physicians were unable to engage with patients
for prolonged periods of time due to patient overcrowding (i.e. they had pressure to see
several patients), but the short time spent with patients was in itself of poor quality given
that patients were upset. Nurses in particular expressed frustration as they felt powerless
in the presence of external factors (i.e. admitted patients remaining in the ED) and spoke
of a role disconnect in that they didn't feel satisfied in caring for less urgent patients (e.g.
I didn't train for this!)
"Ifyou spend enough time here you will get a sense that there is a very high level of
frustration, and I think that extends through the staff and certainly involves the patients, in
front of the patients. Most people don't like waiting 5 hours to be seen, especially if they have
a real problem, and that creates a certain hostility as the initial introduction to your
relationship. One of my initial challenges when I greet a patient is to align myself with you,
and not apologize for it is not my delay, in other words I say "I'm sorry, this is unfortunate, I
see this as a problem as well, but now that I am here, what can I help you with? ". We have to
work together in a patient-physician relationship. You start that relationship with that level of
frustration and sometimes hostility. And unfortunately the nurses deal with that all along.
While you are waiting for 6 hours you are not seeing me, you are seeing the nurses, and you
are saying to them "why am I not being seen? why am I waiting for my x-ray? why am I
waiting for my labs? why hasn't the doctor seen me? why is that patient being seen before
me? six people have come after me and have already been seen, why is that? why aren't you
telling me what is going on?". And even if the nurses speaks with them and explains all the
delays, it still is not enough because we are a demand society. Ifyou walk into MacDonald's
and you wait longer than 3 minutes to get served that has been an unsuccessful visit, and that
mentality extends to most service industry."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 4
Finally, an additional organizational element consistently reflected across interviews was
that of physician incentives and how these affected behaviors towards supporting (or not)
patient flow. Interestingly, senior leadership9 5 had also referred earlier to Hospital XYZ's
incentive structure and suggested that the ED has a shift mentality which prevents it from
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increasing patient throughput with the same level of ED resources. Notably, our analysis
has already highlighted how ED physicians perceived senior leadership incentives in
particular (i.e. focus strategy on higher revenue generating services). However, further
observations were made by ED physicians regarding the incentives of other care
providers placed upstream and downstream from the ED. In essence, the existing salary
structure at Hospital XYZ was thought to contribute to a loss of potential throughput
given that physicians lacked the incentive of caring for additional patients and in some
cases went as far as capping admissions even though inpatient beds were available.
"It is convenience care for you the patient and for the physician in the clinic flocated at
Hospital XYZ outpatient services] because a lot of what we see, we see because either the
attendings at the clinic don't want to add patients onto their day, they don't have any
financial incentive to do so"
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 2
"Hospital XYZ is unique because it is a multi specialty group practice with salaried
physicians. Here you know that ifsomeone is getting an operation is because they need it...
not because you need to pay your mortgage. People saw patients here who didn't have
insurance because there was no reason not to see patients who didn't have insurance. [...]
Conversely our salaried staff don't have an incentive to take care of more patients."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 4
"And during the day the admitting team may have capped... they have taken all the
admissions that they were going to take on their service for that day, so they may cap in the
afternoon at 3 o'clock, and yet the next team might not be coming in until 6 o'clock, so they
will take the name of the patient but when the six o'clock team or teams come in, there may be
8 patients who are waiting to be seen, and you may have not been able to get any orders
written in the afternoon."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 1
"This is a diagnosis driven department. A diagnosis establishes ownership and responsibility.
In the clinic ownership does confer to financial benefit, which is different from the real world
of medicine, ifyou are a surgeon in the real world of medicine and I say "I would like you to
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see this patient because they have abdominal pain and I think this patient needs to be
admitted". It is probable that even ifyou are not going to operate on that patient, and they
have abdominal pain, you will put them on your service, and why? Because you can bill for
that admission, if they need an operation you can billfor that operation, and ifyou piss me
off I won't call you again because there are other surgeons available to accommodate my
patients. Here everyone is salaried so an additional admission to your service... the best
admission is an admission to someone else's service because they do the work and then you
do the surgery.
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 3
"That is your livelihood, that is what paysfor your kids college education, that is what puts
the gold caps on your Lexus."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 1
7.3.2.6 ED Knowledge View
"The implicit and tacit knowledge, capabilities, and intellectual property resident in the
enterprise. " (Nightingale 2009)
An immediate insight from analyzing the ED interviews from a Knowledge View is that
it is useful to not only consider implicit and tacit knowledge (i.e. as originally described
in the NREAF), but also explicit and codifiable knowledge, as well as the underlying
requirements for knowledge transfer. Furthermore, it was useful to distinguish the types
of knowledge in terms of information pertaining to the practice of medicine (e.g.
administer a beta blocker drug within 15 minutes of a patient arriving with chest pain)
and the management of an enterprise (e.g. contact hospital admissions bed board only
after attaining approval from the attending of the desired inpatient specialty). With these
clarifications in mind, some of the implications noted in previous sections are
summarized below:
* External entities define evidence-based-medicine guidelines which are adopted by
Hospital XYZ as these are part of the clinical metrics that the ED is monitored on.
* Unlike nurses and medical residents, ED physicians expressed an interest in
seeing financial metrics pertaining to the ED and inpatient services they referred
Page 299 of 759
to, but they said that they had been continuously denied access to such
information.
e The hierarchy for each specialty's medical residency program is established to
provide an adequate learning experience whilst ensuring safe and high quality
care for patients. However, some specialties were singled out for having a greater
adverse impact on the ED's patient flow, notably cardiology.
e The continuum of care during a patient's visit to Hospital XYZ is a legal
requirement which implies different clinical staff exchanging information about
the patient as well as medical responsibility for that patient. The exchange may
take place within a single service unit (e.g. a shift change within the ED) or across
service units (e.g. an ED patient being admitted to an inpatient specialty).
e Upon first evaluating a patient an ED physician may already know that he or she
needs to be admitted. However, at times insufficient information is available and
it may be necessary to keep the patient under observation in order for other
symptoms to present themselves and/or for treatments to take effect before
determining which inpatient specialty to admit the patient to.
" Several information transfer mediums are in place to help transfer both implicit
and explicit knowledge
The admissions process of ED patients to inpatient specialties is one which is highly
dependant on the tacit knowledge of the ED Charge Nurse. By definition Charge Nurses
have a considerable amount of experience typically acquired while working in several
different service units within the same hospital, thereby giving them tacit knowledge of
organizational processes, supporting systems, and underlying culture. Furthermore, the
ED Charge Nurse has to maintain real time information of bed availability both in the ED
and at the different inpatient specialties. Inside the ED, although the EMR (i.e. T-System)
allowed for visual management of bed availability, the Charge Nurse confided that she
didn't trust the information and preferred to refresh her flow information through visual
tracking instead. When probed further the Charge Nurse revealed that the two main issues
giving rise to her distrust were the reliability of house keeping signaling that a bed had
already been clean and the timeliness of an ED discharge notification. An additionally
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important observation was that the Charge Nurse said she worked extensively beyond the
four walls of the ED while troubleshooting and/or facilitating the admissions process at
specific inpatient units of interest. Notably, she would benefit from acquiring real time
information from each of the inpatient units she visited, but she would also jeopardize her
ability to keep visual tracking of the ED patient beds.
Finally, an important aspect of practicing medicine in general is that there is always the
possibility that an ED patient may present symptoms which are unknown to physicians
thereby triggering inpatient specialty consults as a means of further refining a given
diagnostic evaluation.
"There are always sometimes that no matter how long you have been in this [practicing
medicine] you are always seeing something new, so sure, there are times that I am
confused."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 3
"You can consult with a service to try to admit the patient to that service. You can consult for
additional information that will help you and your diagnostic evaluation. Or you can consult
for an initial assessment with planned follow up. Most of the time you consult with a service
because you expect the patient to be admitted to that service."
Hospital XYZ ED Physician 2
7.3.2.7 ED Information View
"Information needs of the enterprise, including flows of information as well as the systems
and technologies needed to ensure information availability." (Nightingale 2009)
An extensive amount of data concerning the ED Information View was collected and
analyzed during the 1" ED Phase96 and an immediate insight was to clarify that
information systems may take forms beyond technology. Information flows aren't
necessarily only facilitated through computer systems but also via paper systems and
other means of communication (e.g. face-to-face meetings, telephone conversations,
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96 Please refer to section 7.3. 1.
email, medical charts, etc). Upon inspecting the VSM description provided previously
one can appreciate the extensive variety of systems in place which are used to support
different key processes within and beyond the ED. An overview of these includes:
e Existence of fragmented EMRs where the ED has its own system (i.e. T-System)
and the inpatient service units have their own system (i.e. MediTech) and neither
system is integrated with one another. System integration is facilitated via paper
printout from T-System whenever a patient is admitted to an inpatient service.
" Patient admissions require additional system called "Pre Admit Bed Tracking
System" whereby ED Charge Nurse can keep track of her bed requests in
inpatient service units. Additionally, the hospital bed admissions board may
communicate with the ED via telephone and/or beeper.
" Patient medical chart is in paper format and is updated by multiple clinical staff
e Patient orders written at triage are in paper format
* ED clerical staff insert data into the T-System and also the MediTech system (for
billing purposes) but not necessarily one immediately after the other (i.e. time lag)
e ED inserts lab test requests (e.g. blood, tissue, etc) in a cumbersome to operate old
system, and receives test results directly in T-System. Notably, lab test requests
are also printed in paper format and sent together with patient specimen in a
plastic carrier to the laboratory via a pneumatic tube.
* ED writes radiology orders on paper and receives test results signal directly in T-
System which requires subsequent retrieval of images in a separate system
Furthermore, some of the implications noted in previous sections of 2 nd ED Phase are
summarized below:
" The patient medical chart is a legal document in paper format which is updated
continuously by various clinical staff located in the different service units that a
given patient goes through.
* ED physicians appreciate the evolution in nursing staff ability in providing them
ahead of time with an overview of patient information (e.g. chief complaint,
allergies, etc) in paper format.
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0 The ED Charge Nurse doesn't trust the accuracy of the T-System information
concerning ED bed availability and relies on visual inspection instead.
7.3.3 3 rd ED Phase: Archival record analysis
In the introduction of this chapter we noted that over time a trust based relationship was
developed with senior leadership at Hospital XYZ which among other things allowed us
to access additional data to further inform our research. Data access was released in
incremental steps as senior leadership required debriefing of analysis results in both
document and presentation format. This procedure proved useful on several counts. First,
by sharing our findings with senior leadership we were able to test their validity firsthand
and address any concerns that surfaced. Second, the exploratory in-depth case research
method warranted an incremental approach as phenomena of interest emerged and our
underlying understanding of enterprise architecture matured along with our knowledge of
Hospital XYZ's operation and potential data sources. Third, as we neared theoretical
saturation and continuously sought validation from senior leadership, we were finally
granted access to very sensitive financial data pertaining to each patient visit.
In terms of archival record access (i.e. electronic data records) three main gatekeeper
events took place. The first system to be analyzed was the ED's EMR (i.e. T-System).
The second system to be analyzed was the "Pre Admit Bed Tracking System" in
conjunction with the ED's EMR. The third and final dataset analyzed was equally
sourced from the ED as well as the inpatient EMR and included financial data pertaining
to each patient visit. What follows is a description of each of these gatekeeper events
including how the data was acquired, subsequently analyzed, our findings, and reactions
by senior leadership9 7. Such detailed descriptions are useful as they provide further
insight into Hospital XYZ's EA Views.
97 Care was taken to conduct interviews with Hospital XYZ's senior leadership before they saw any
findings stemming from quantitative data analysis so as to minimize the potential of inducing bias in their
answers. However, for the sake of readability, the outcome of archival record analysis are presented now
and all at once.
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7.3.3.1 ED EMR Analysis
Addressing Hospital XYZ's inability to analyze its own data: Access to the ED's
EMR (i.e. T-System) wasn't so much of a problem in terms of data clearance but rather in
terms of system data extraction. The T-System is a proprietary software which includes
default scripts that allow users to run preset analysis reports (e.g. total number of patients
seen in the ED in a given time period; average and total length of stay of patients in the
ED). As of 2007 the T-System didn't offer the capability to run custom analysis reports
and indeed charged an extra fee if Hospital XYZ desired that service. As such, the
decision was made to leverage existing resources and extract data from the ED EMR for
subsequent external analysis. The T-Systern's inbuilt data extraction options also proved
restrictive as they only allowed for the generation of Adobe Portable Document Format
(PDF) files or Microsoft Excel files formatted in such a way that prevented external
analysis. Fortunately, the T-System's own internal database was XML enabled which
following a series of data tool manipulations was extracted into a convenient external file.
The take away of this data extraction overview is that Hospital XYZ, and indeed any
hospital running the T-System under the same configuration, was essentially incapable of
conducting data analysis beyond the inbuilt basic reports unless it paid a considerable
amount to the software vendor or had the unlikely database technical expertise in-house
to do so.
Assessing the extent of ED overcrowding: The first step in our ED quantitative analysis
was to assess to what extent ED overcrowding was indeed taking place. Figure 7-5
displays the ED patient arrival rate by hour of day and acuity in a given month 8.
98 The data in the following figures, and indeed in the remainder of this subsection, describe the ED activity
during the 14 month of onsite visits made to Hospital XYZ. The sampling of the particular month was
determined by it being the only month available in the "Pre Admit Bed Tracking System" (please refer to
section 7.3.3.2). Said month had a total of 2970 patient visits, which represents an average of 99 patients a
day, and is consistent with the total annual ED volume of 36,000 patients. Detailed information on each of
the patients was analyzed for that given month. Data analysis on each of the preceding eight months
yielded similar outcomes and were validated by senior leadership as well as ED clinical staff. Furthermore,
the number of inpatients discharged from the hospital, and who were originally admitted through the ED, is
within the range for all months in 2006 (i.e. ED represents on average 44.58% of all inpatient discharges in
2006, where the MIN was 42.95% and MAX was 46.37%. The analyzed month was 43.72%).
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Patient Arrivals by Hour of Day and Acuity
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Figure 7-5: 1 ED Patient Arrivals by Hour of Day and Acuity (1 month's data)
Notably only 5 acuity levels exist (i.e. 1- most severe; 5- less severe) but in 5.1% of the
patient records failed to register the patient acuity and were thus counted as "Acuity 0"99.
The figure includes all ED patients for that given month, meaning that both non-admitted
patients (e.g. discharged home or to another medical facility) and admitted patients (e.g.
transferred to Hospital XYZ inpatient service unit). On average each day for every hour
from 8am to 9pm there are 100 or more patients arriving to the ED, and the arrival rate
drops consistently in the remaining hours of the day. The bulk of ED patients consists of
acuity level 3 patients (40.3%), followed by acuity level 2 patients (26.1%), acuity level 4
patients (21.9%), acuity level 1 patients (3.9%), and finally acuity level 5 patients (2.7%).
As many as 75% of acuity levels 4 and 5 patients arrive between l0am and 10pm which
99 The attribution of "Acuity 0" did not express any tendency correlated to the patient's urgency of care as
evident in the following sample of chief complaints: trauma fall (normally level 1); attempted suicide
(normally level 2);flu like symptoms (normally level 3);finger tip laceration (normally level 4); recheck
suture removal (normally level 5)
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consists of the hours of operation for the "Minor ED" 00 (i.e. four ED rooms are labeled
as minor).
Figure 7-6 displays the ED patient discharge rate by hour of day and acuity in the same
month as before01 .
ED Patient Discharges by Hour of Day and Acuity
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Figure 7-6: ED Patient Discharges by Hour of Day and Acuity (1 month's data)
Once again both non-admitted and admitted patients are displayed. On average each day
for every hour from 11am to 2am there are 100 or more patients departing from the ED,
and the departure rate drops gradually during the night and early morning. As many as
77.6% of acuity levels 4 and 5 patients are discharged between 10am and 10pm (i.e.
"Minor ED" in operation).
100 The concept behind the "Minor ED" is to allow for patients who have minor injuries (e.g. acuity levels 4
and 5) to be seen faster and in a room where there is less capital investment (e.g. equipment, raw material,
etc) and less labor (i.e. nurse to patient ratios are lower in the "Minor ED" than in the "Main ED").
Additionally, by increasing the throughput of minor injuries the availability of the waiting area is increased.
101 Given that data pertains to the same month the previously quoted statistics remain the same (i.e. total
number of patients by acuity level)
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Figure 7-7 displays the total number of patients in the ED by hour of day. The analysis
takes into account the rate of arrival and departure and calculates the remaining patients
still left in the ED at any given hour of the day. The figure also demonstrates how the ED
is continuously overcrowded from 9am to l am (i.e. 22 beds available from 1Oam to 10pm,
and then the minor injury ED beds close, thus only 18 beds are available in the remaining
time) and is consistent with the evidence collected through interviews and observation
during the 1" and 2nd Phases of ED data collection and analysis. Interestingly 93.9% of
the patient records lacking an acuity level (i.e. Acuity 0) arrived in the ED when it was
overcrowded which may be representative of how data entry deteriorates when the ED is
overcrowded.
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Figure 7-7: Total Number of Patients in ED by Hour of Day
Measuring ED value stream throughput: The 1Vt and 2nd phases of ED data collection
and analysis were consistent in that ED overcrowding was occurring and that admitted
patients were spending a considerable amount of time in the ED (i.e. patient boarding10 2)
The total time spent in the ED (i.e. length-of-stay or LOS1 03) is an important metric
because longer LOS "may compromise quality of care and contribute to delays in the
102 Specifically, a patient may have been deemed admissible to a given inpatient service but will remain in
the ED as an admitted patient.
103 ED LOS represents the time elapsed from the patient check-in until the time the patient is discharged
from the ED (i.e. patient physically leaves the ED whether he or she is admitted to the hospital or was
treated as an outpatient).
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emergency evaluation of other patients." (Herring, Wilper et al. 2009). Specifically, a
longer ED LOS has been found to contribute to increased LOS for the hospital as a whole,
to a greater number of patient complications (i.e. morbidity), and an increased mortality
rate amongst critically ill patients (Cowan and Trzeciak 2005; Chalfin, Trzeciak et al.
2007). A recent study by Press Ganey Associates, a healthcare quality improvement
company, determined that the average ED LOS in the US was 4h00 (PressGaney
2010)104.
With the benefit of ED archival records we proceeded with the analysis of Hospital XYZ
ED's overall value stream 05 throughput and subsequently decomposed it for each patient
type specifically (i.e. non-admitted and admitted)(Figure 7-8, Figure 7-9, and Figure
7-10).
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Figure 7-8: ED Value Stream Overall Throughput (non-admitted and admitted patients)
104 The same study mentioned that the LOS varied considerably by US State, which is consistent with our
previous observations on the limitations of comparing hospitals (please refer to Chapter 5). Additionally,
having contacted a Press Ganey Associates representative they further clarified that the data is based on
patient satisfaction surveys and does not include patient boarding time. Despite these limitations the
organization is considered a reputable and primary benchmark service provider in the US.
105 Please refer to Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3 for the ED's Value Stream Map. Times denote elapsed time,
for instance "Check-in to Triage" denotes the time between the patient checking-in with the ED clerk and
beginning the triage process with the Nurse Practitioner. "MD" represents ED Physician. "Flag" means that
an ED Physician has completed the patient diagnostic and ED treatment, and has made a disposition (e.g.
discharge patient home; initiate admitting process to an inpatient specialty; etc)
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Figure 7-9: ED Value Stream Throughput for Non-Admitted Patients
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Figure 7-10: ED Value Stream Throughput for Admitted Patients
When comparing each of the ED's value stream throughputs the following observations
can be made:
* On average an ED patient spends 5h00 inside the ED. However, whereas non-
admitted patients spend on average 4h09 inside the ED, the admitted patients
spend close to twice that amount, namely 7h52. This is consistent with the ED
physicians' observations that the admitted patients were causing a significant
bottleneck to the ED flow.
* Non-admitted patients take longer to begin their triage process, to be assigned an
ED room, and finally to be seen by an ED nurse. However, their assessment,
treatment, and discharge are considerably swifter than those of admitted patients.
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* Admitted patients take longer to be seen by an MD once in the ED room, as well
as for the remaining ED key processes. The process "MD to Flag" takes
considerably longer but it makes sense given that admitted patients are generally
in a more severe medical condition and require a longer ED assessment and
treatment time (i.e. kick the tires). However, "Flag to Departure" clearly denotes
that admitted patients remain a considerable amount of time in the ED (i.e.
approximately 3h30) after an admission decision was made by the ED physician.
Measuring ED Throughput Specific To Each Patient Type: In the course of the 2nd
ED Phase of data collection and analysis, physicians observed that the ED was less able
to address the needs of the surrounding community given the high demand generated by
senior leadership for urgent inpatient specialty care. Figure 7-11 describes the average
ED LOS for both non-admitted and admitted patients while distinguishing their assigned
acuity level.
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Figure 7-11: Average ED LOS per Acuity and Patient Type'06
As before admitted patients spend inside the ED close to twice the amount of time non-
admitted patients. Patients of a lesser acuity, namely levels 4 and 5, spend considerable
less time inside the ED as compared to other patients and most likely due to the existence
106 The values at the top of each bar denote the absolute number of patients per acuity level and type.
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of the dedicated "Minor ED" beds (i.e. the bulk of acuity level 4 and 5 patients are inside
the ED while the "Minor ED" is open)1 07. The key take-away is that acuity level 3
patients that are admitted spend on average 8h40 inside the ED. Such is consistent with
the initially mentioned observation that urgent inpatient specialty care patients were
delaying the care of less urgent patients. Finally, one can note that the ED admissions rate
is 24%, meaning that from all patients visiting the ED, 24% of them are admitted as
inpatients.
Measuring ED Balking Rate (i.e. left without being seen): Whenever triaged patients
leave the ED without being seen by a physician they are assigned a discharge disposition
of "Left Without Being Seen" (LWBS). ED overcrowding is said to be a prime
contributor to the serious occurrence of patients LWBS (Rowe, Channan et al. 2006).
LWBS patients who might have initially had minor issues may delay their care and
consequently deteriorate in health unnecessarily (Derlet and Richards 2000). As such,
measuring LWBS is an important indicator of patient overcrowding as well as of quality
of care and ultimately performance (Akerke Baibergenova and Sharon 2006).
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Figure 7-12: ED Patients LWBS by Hour of Day and Acuity
107 Notably, the six admitted patients with acuity level 4 spent a considerable time in the ED (i.e. 7h25 on
average) but not only the sample denotes it is a rare event (i.e. 0.2%) but clinical staff also explained that a
patient might have significantly deteriorated while in the ED, or he or she was inappropriately triaged at
first, or it might have been a clerical data error.
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Figure 7-12 shows that the ED experienced a total of 5% of patients leaving without
being seen. In reference to Figure 7-7 one can see that the highest rate of LWBS took
place between 5pm and 6pm (i.e. total of 19 patients) which is precisely the same time
when the ED was experiencing the highest rate of overcrowding. In general the same
correlation can be observed at the remaining times of day. Previous studies concluded
that most of the LWBS patients had been triaged as lower acuity (i.e. levels 4 and
5)(Rowe, Channan et al. 2006). Hospital XYZ's ED however has the reverse patient
behavior in that only 15.9% of the patients LWBS are of lower acuity, and as much as
72.2% are of acuity level 3, and even more worrying is the 9.7% of acuity level 2 patients.
Validation of ED EMR Analysis with Hospital XYZ's Senior Leadership: Having
completed the ED EMR analysis our results were shared and validated with senior
leadership in both document and presentation format. Some of the key insights senior
leadership said they had gained from the analysis included:
e ED Value Stream Throughput Awareness: never before had leadership been able
to see quantitative data depicting the time spent in each of the key processes
inside the ED. They were surprised to see how little time was spent between
check-in and going through triage, which prompted them to cancel their localized
improvement plan of purchasing expensive self check-in kiosks for the ED.
* Length of Patient Boarding: senior leadership acknowledged it knew of the ED's
problem with patients boarding. However, they had yet to see actual numbers and
were surprised with the magnitude of the "Flag to Discharge" time for admitted
patients.
e Information Systems Limitations: senior leaders weren't aware of several of the
fields which were captured in the ED's EMR and valued the opportunity of
generating reports beyond the limited preset made available by their software
vendor. However, they also shared that they weren't quite aware of the full extent
of data insertion reliability issues.
* Rate of Patients Left Without Being Seen: leaders thought that their rate of
patients LWBS was at par with the national average (i.e. 2%). Their reaction upon
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learning otherwise was of disbelief and grave concern and especially so given the
number of more critical patients leaving.
The end result of this first gatekeeper event was that leadership validated, supported, and
granted further access to additional patient flow related information systems (i.e.
inpatient EMR and the "Pre Admit Bed Tracking System"). The intent was to analyze
more closely the patient flow between the ED and inpatient service units and try to
understand what was contributing to the "Flag to Discharge" time of admitted patients.
Additionally, walkthrough and interview access was also granted to study Clinical
Support Services and Administrative Support Services.
7.3.3.2 Extended Patient Flow Analysis (ED EMR + Bed tracking)
Addressing Hospital XYZ's inability to analyze its own data: Once again, as before,
there were difficulties in being able to extract the necessary patient data in order to
conduct an analysis of patient flow from the ED onto the different inpatient service units.
The "Pre Admit Bed Tracking System" was equally accessible in terms of generating an
export file in Microsoft Excel, but as a homegrown solution had two significant
limitations. Firstly all patient data was indexed by patient name and didn't have any
medical record numbers therefore requiring additional sensitive filtering and data
manipulation. Secondly only the previous month's worth of data was available (i.e. the
month analyzed in 7.3.3.1). Ad-hoc data integration exercises were conducted with the
ED Charge Nurse, several inpatient service unit Charge Nurses, the IT Director, and
Quality & Safety Engineers. Data schemas of each IT system were printed and covered a
15 feet table so as to visually track and determine what each data field could tell us about
the patient flow. Notably the IT Director and Engineers were as oblivious as we were in
terms of what the data schemas meant. As for the Charge Nurses they were able to relate
to their particular system's data schema but at times also revealed different mental
models as to what each data field meant. The take away of this data extraction overview
is that Hospital XYZ has multiple information systems both off-the-shelf (some of them
state-of-the-art) and homegrown which aren't integrated with one another and
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understandably aren't featured holistically in any of Hospital XYZ's existing
performance reports and indeed mental models.
Measuring ED and Inpatient Service Unit Interaction Throughput: Having measured
the magnitude of patient boarding in the ED, analysis proceeded towards measuring the
timeliness of the interaction between the ED and the various Inpatient Service Units. To
that effect we leveraged several fields in the different IT systems in order to track patient
flow as well as key processes (see Figure 7-13 for a simplified version).
T-Systern EMR
Pre Admit Bed
Tracking System
Flag time Discharge
Request-, Assign , Clean
Time Time Time
Bed
Assigned
Figure 7-13: Tracing Patient Flow in Fragmented IT Systems
The "Flag Time" to "Occupy Time" represents the time elapsed from an ED physician
making the decision to admit a patient to the time that patient occupies a bed in an
inpatient service unit. Thus it is a proxy for the timeliness of the interaction between the
ED and an inpatient specialty which ultimately allows for a patient to be admitted to their
service and consequently to an inpatient service unit.
Table 7-1: ED inpatient admission timeliness
Description Elapsed Time
Average 4h02
Standard deviation 2hl7
Maximum observation 12h43
Minimum observation 1h31
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Occupy
Time
Table 7-2: ED admission timeliness per inpatient service unit
Inpatient # of Bed type(s) Patient condition sample # admissions Elapsed
Service Unit beds from ED Time
2E 24 Surgical ICU / Medical ICU Major trauma; postoperative multisystem failure; 6 2h47
liver/kidney transplant
5C 16 ICU / Cardiac Care Unit Ventilator support and EKG monitoring; 11 2h28
intracranial monitoring; etc
5W 36 Telemetry only Coronary intervention; electrophysiological 94 4h30
procedures; arrhythmia; CHF; angina; MI
6C 36 General Medical / Surgical Liver transplant; hepatobiliary surgery 32 4h0 1
6E 24 Telemetry only Cardiothoracic surgery; vascular surgery 34 4h20
6S 18 Medical/Surgical/Telemetry Back pain; jaw pain; chest pressure 53 4h06
6W 27 Medical/Surgical/Telemetry Peritoneal dialysis; pulmonary 92 3h57
7C 38 Medical/Surgical Neurosurgery; orthopedics; trauma 50 3h31
7E 30 Medical/Surgical Renal and urological disorders; Kidney transplant 27 4h05
7S 18 Medical/Surgical/Telemetry Chest pain; pneumonia; fever 48 4h06
7W 35 Medical/Telemetry Hematology and medical oncology 56 3h54
Source: ED EMR and Pre Admit Bed Tracking System. 1 month data.
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As per Table 7-1, a patient admission takes on average more than 4h00. Upon breaking
down the admission time per each inpatient service unit, we found that different floors
interacted with the ED with significant timeliness difference (see Table 7-2). Hospital
XYZ has a total of 11 inpatient service units which are equipped with one or more types
of patient beds, and serviced by nurses with specific training to care for various patient
conditions. The patient bed types are typical of most hospitals but as Table 7-2 illustrates,
Hospital XYZ as multispecialty hospital caters for a broad spectrum of patient conditions,
from typical (e.g. fever, pneumonia, back pain) to highly specialized (e.g. liver transplant,
cardiothoracic surgery, coronary interventions, etc). Furthermore:
e Two inpatient service units measured the lowest timeliness of ED interaction at
approximately of 2h30. However, said units, namely 2E and 5C are high intensive
care units and seldom interact with the ED, as evidenced in our data sample.
e Two inpatient service units measured at opposite sides of the timeliness ED
interaction spectrum, namely 5W (worse unit) and 7C (best unit). Both units have
a comparable number of beds and registered a high frequency in our data sample,
but they are geared towards different patient populations. Said units cater to a
large portion of patients from the specific inpatient specialties mentioned by ED
physicians and nurses as being worse (i.e. cardiology) or better (i.e. neurosurgery
and orthopedics)to work with' 08.
Measuring ED bed request behavior: In section 7.3.2.4 we noted that different
physicians adopted different approaches in the bed admission process. A primary
distinction was that some ED physicians would first seek approval by an inpatient
specialty attending before requesting an inpatient bed for that service, whereas other
physicians admitted they didn't follow that standard, and indeed nurse interviews
confirmed that behavior. However, given the existence of archival records we could
measure this behavior and determine to what extent it was happening. To that effect a
good proxy was to identify whenever a "Request Time" happened before a "Flag Time",
which clearly denotes that a bed was requested ahead of time (i.e. the ED had yet to flag
108 Please refer in particular to sections 7.3.2.3, 7.3.2.5, 7.3.2.6.
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the patient, let alone get the inpatient specialty attending's input)' 09. We found that on
51% of patient admissions, beds are requested before patients being flagged and on
average this happens Ih33 ahead of time.
Uncovering clinical support staff opportunity: In examining the time between
"Occupy Time" and "Clean Time" we determined that on average 2h28 elapsed and that
50% of the beds cleaned remained unoccupied for at least 2h04." 0 That being the case,
considering that 687 patients were admitted from the ED during that month, when
extrapolating for a whole year, Hospital XYZ would have approximately 710 unoccupied
patient bed days, or 169 less patient admissions.
Validation of Extended Patient Flow Analysis with Hospital XYZ's Senior
Leadership: Having completed the Extended Patient Flow analysis our results were
shared and validated with senior leadership in both document and presentation format.
Senior leadership further refined its understanding of the level of Hospital XYZ's state-
of-the-art IT fragmentation and appreciated the value and ability of analyzing patient
flow beyond the ED. The end result of this second gatekeeper event was that leadership
validated, supported, and granted access to Inpatient Service Units of interest.
Furthermore, archival record access was given to the inpatient EMR (i.e. MediTech).
7.3.3.3 Inpatient EMR Analysis
State-of-the-art Inpatient EMR: Hospital XYZ's inpatient EMR (i.e. MediTech) is the
leading EMR software in the US and proved to be very accessible both in terms of
extracting the required data in both XML and Microsoft Excel format as well as in
enabling a longitudinal data set (i.e. one year's worth of data comprising 24,200 patient
discharges). The dataset includes several fields which allow for further insight into
109 Notably, this analysis also needs to take into account the data insertion reliability issues previously
mentioned (i.e. although "Request Time" is always accurate the "Flag Time" may not necessarily reflect
when the patient was indeed flagged in the ED given that the nurse may be busy with something else until
she actually inserts it into the T-System).
"0 Less than 1% of beds had a "Clean Time" to "Occupy Time" of 0, which meant that such beds were
already clean before being requested, and therefore housekeeping didn't introduce any delay into the
patient flow.
Page 317 of 759
Hospital XYZ operations as well as inpatient related revenue sources. Specifically, for
each inpatient discharge it describes the admission source (i.e. where the patient
originally came from), the inpatient service unit (i.e. where the patient was cared for), the
inpatient specialty (i.e. who was ultimately responsible for the patient), the length of stay
(i.e. how long the patient stayed in the hospital), the patient's insurance carrier, and
billing related information.
Assessing the contribution of each of Hospital XYZ's Admission Sources: Admission
sources for hospitals are essentially from three categories, namely the ED (which
includes hospital transfers), the clinics (which schedule elective cases for patients as
opposed to emergency cases), and internal hospital consults (which represent patient
transfers between inpatient service units). Figure 7-14 describes the contribution of each
of Hospital XYZ's admission sources in terms of total patient referrals, total length of
stay, and total revenue charge capture from medically related inpatient services.
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Figure 7-14: Hospital XYZ Contribution by Admission Source (*)'"
To begin with we determined that the ED has a sizeable contribution to Hospital XYZ as
compared to other admissions sources (i.e. referrals from clinics and internal hospital
consults between services). Succinctly, the ED's admitted patients represent 45.85% of
Hospital XYZ's total length-of-stay, stemming from a referral volume of 44.70% of
" For a detailed description on how each admission's source revenue contribution was estimated from
using Medicare Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) baseline payments, please refer to Appendix IV(ii)
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Hospital XYZ's total referrals, which ultimately contribute to 35.12% of the revenue
charge capture from Hospital XYZ's medically related inpatient services.' 12
Assessing the contribution of each Inpatient Service Unit: Next we inspected the
contribution of each of Hospital XYZ's inpatient service units described previously in
Table 7-2.
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As per Figure 7-15, the inpatient service units 5W and 7C see the greatest number of
patients, generate the most revenue charge capture, and are amongst the highest
contributors to the total LOS of Hospital XYZ. Specifically, 5W contributes with 16.7%
of total patients, 11.11% of total LOS, and 16.7% of total revenue charge capture from
Hospital XYZ's medically related inpatient services. Meanwhile 7C contributes with
14.1% of total patients, 13.2% of total LOS, and 14.8% of total revenue charge capture.
112 Data access was only provided to the principal diagnostic, primary procedural codes, and equivalent
DRGs which are established by Medicare. Notably, given the inherently lower payments pertaining to
Medicare in some markets, hospitals have been known to cost shift, meaning that they charge higher prices
to private insurers in order to compensate. Furthermore, hospitals differ in their ability to negotiate more
favorable contracts with insurance carriers. Therefore, the use of DRGs as a proxy is not necessarily
representative of the full potential revenue generated by Hospital XYZ's medically related inpatient
services. Specifically, the DRG proxy applied to the 24,200 inpatient discharges of a single year, generated
a revenue of $244,371,405, when Hospital XYZ's public annual report stated close to $700,000,000 for the
same period.
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Assessing ED's contribution to each Inpatient Service Unit: A useful construct is that
of analyzing the contribution of each inpatient service unit whilst considering the ED as
the source of admission. For instance, "considering the total patient population of
inpatient service unit 5W, how many of them were originated from an ED admission?"
Similarly, as before, the same analysis is done in terms of the total length of stay and the
revenue charge capture, but this time it is in relation to each unit's own totals (as opposed
to the whole hospital).
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Figure 7-16: ED's Contribution to Inpatient Service Units
Figure 7-16 is further evidence that the ED has a sizeable contribution to Hospital XYZ
as compared to other admissions sources. For instance, the ED generates at least 25% of
all the patient referrals and subsequent LOS for every inpatient service unit, and in some
cases as much as 70% of an inpatient service unit's referrals (i.e. 6S and 6W). Similar
observations can be made in terms of the total revenue charge capture.
Furthermore, referring back to the highlighted 5W and 7C, we also note that the ED's
contribution is similar for each one of them. Specifically, 5W receives from the ED
39.9% of its total patients, which represent 48.7% of its total LOS, and contribute with
29.1% of its total revenue charge capture. Similarly, 7C receives from the ED 31.7% of
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its total patients, which represent 40.4% of its total LOS, and contribute with 25.9% of its
total revenue charge capture.
Assessing ED's contribution to each Inpatient Specialty : Having assessed the ED's
contribution to Hospital XYZ as a whole and to each inpatient service unit specifically,
the final step was to analyze the ED's contribution to each Inpatient Specialty, since, as
noted before in Table 7-2, one or more specialties may be centralized at a given location.
Table 7-3 describes each of the 30 inpatient specialties at Hospital XYZ and assesses the
contribution of each inpatient specialty in relation to the hospital overall, in terms of total
patient volume, LOS, and revenue charge capture. Furthermore it does a similar analysis
in terms of the ED's contribution to each specialty.
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Table 7-3: Assessing inpatient specialty contribution
In relation to Hospital XYZ overall In relation to Inpatient Specialty
% %ED
contribution % % contribution % ED %ED
Inpatient patient contribution contribution patient contribution contribution
# Specialty Description volume LOS revenue volume LOS revenue
1 H GIMC General Internal Medicine 26.27% 24.62% 16.74% 86.57% 84.18% 84.07%
2 HCARD Cardiology 13.65% 9.32% 17.36% 10.87% 17.15% 12.05%
3 HUROL Urology 7.53% 6.67% 6.50% 14.03% 13.23% 10.60%
4 H GENS General Surgery 6.80% 6.26% 6.23% 50.92% 61.31% 55.07%
5 HORTH Orthopedics 6.45% 6.00% 7.23% 17.31% 20.63% 15.18%
6 HNESG Neuro Surgery 5.91% 4.43% 7.08% 8.39% 20.02% 11.66%
7 H COLS Colorectal Surgery 4.27% 5.88% 4.84% 32.19% 26.16% 22.96%
8 HGYNC Gynecology 3.80% 2.89% 2.73% 6.47% 5.64% 4.74%
9 HNEUR Neurology 3.72% 3.39% 2.61% 70.45% 66.10% 67.23%
10 HPULM Pulmonology 3.52% 6.97% 5.39% 66.50% 64.44% 63.93%
11 H HEPA Hepatology 2.81% 4.48% 4.71% 11.83% 6.90% 5.19%
12 HCOMM Multiple System Failure 2.73% 2.63% 1.90% 84.97% 83.51% 81.39%
13 HTHOS Thoracic Surgery 2.59% 4.69% 7.20% 11.83% 16.09% 13.43%
14 HGAST Gastroenterology 2.29% 2.37% 1.64% 60.08% 51.65% 57.37%
15 HVASS Vascular Surgery 1.98% 2.83% 2.55% 14.60% 20.28% 15.51%
16 HOTOL Otolyngarology 1.25% 1.03% 1.43% 10.69% 8.30% 7.55%
17 H HEMA Hematology 0.94% 1.69% 1.07% 38.53% 29.62% 28.90%
18 HONCO Oncology 0.92% 1.43% 0.84% 50.23% 50.99% 50.75%
19 HPLAS Plastic Surgery 0.59% 0.35% 0.27% 14.71% 10.29% 16.25%
20 H VASM Vascular Medicine 0.59% 0.58% 0.63% 54.41% 52.26% 51.57%
21 H GERI Geriatrics 0.40% 0.37% 0.28% 80.43% 79.62% 74.50%
22 HNEPH Nephrology 0.40% 0.33% 0.27% 32.61% 27.02% 33.50%
23 H ENDO Endocrinology 0.25% 0.19% 0.12% 46.55% 63.83% 46.76%
24 H INFD Infectious Diseases 0.15% 0.23% 0.09% 51.43% 42.15% 47.19%
25 H RHEU Rheumatology 0.12% 0.30% 0.22% 81.48% 82.03% 79.45%
26 H IRAD Interventional Neuroradiology 0.03% 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
27 HOPTH Ophthalmology 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 50.00% 57.14% 82.64%
28 H TRAU Trauma 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
29 H MISC Miscellaneous 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
30 H PAIN Pain 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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Table 7-3 tells us that Hospital XYZ draws from six inpatient specialties over 60% of its
patient volume, LOS, and revenue charge capture from medically related inpatient
services. By inspection, the four inpatient specialties that deserved specific mentioning
by ED's clinical staff' 1 3 are featured in these top six inpatient specialties. Recapping on
our previous findings, neurosurgery and orthopedics services were said to be better to
work with and they responded to ED requests in an adequate timeline and helped ED
flow. Conversely other services such as cardiology were described in a much dimmer
light considering their practice of consistently exercising their right offirst refusal.
Finally the GIM service was described sympathetically as overburdened as well and
performing as best as possible given the circumstances.
Furthermore, these findings are also relevant in the context of our extended patient flow
analysis 1 4 where we found that inpatient service unit 5W and 7C were at opposite sides
of the spectrum in terms of their timeliness in interaction with the ED. Recapping, 5W is
mostly associated with the cardiology inpatient service, whereas 7C is mostly associated
with neurosurgery and orthopedics'" 5
7.3.3.4 Summary ofArchival Record Analysis
The 3 rd phase of ED data collection and analysis pertained to archival records from
Hospital XYZ's IT systems and were attained in incremental steps following validation
with senior leadership. A total of three systems were analyzed in isolation and on
aggregate. These were the ED's EMR, the "Pre Admit Bed Tracking System", and the
inpatient EMR. Our analysis allowed us to validate several findings from the previous
phases. Additionally, new insights were gleaned from the validation exercise with senior
113 Please refer to section 7.3.2.5
114 Please refer to section 7.3.3.2
115 The analysis of the inpatient EMR also allowed further confirmation of the existence of an inpatient
specialty centrality assigned to specific inpatient service units. Cardiology centralizes its services in 5W,
whereas neurosurgery and orthopedics centralize their services in 7C. Additionally, one can confirm that
general internal medicine cares for the largest number of patients in Hospital XYZ, that these are
distributed across the inpatient service units, and represent the largest portion of 6S. For detailed data from
this additional analysis please refer to Appendix IV(iii)
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leadership, as well as when considering on aggregate all phases of ED data collection and
analysis.
Analysis summary using NREAF views: Our key findings are summarized below while
using the NREAF views:
EA Information View
a Fragmented IT systems: data from the 1s and 2nd ED phases were confirmed with
regards to the fragmentation of IT systems. Senior leadership, and indeed several
3rd party entities, considered the underlying medical record system as one of
Hospital XYZ's strategic assets. However, said system proved to be comprised of
several systems, proprietary and homegrown, which weren't integrated.
e Data capture reliability: data capture in the ED had several readily identifiable
issues (e.g. a patient being flagged after its departure time) and in some cases
these were correlated to the time when the ED was most overcrowded.
EA Organization View
* Organizational climate divide: when presented with data which indicated that the
ED's problems also lied beyond its walls, which was contrarily to what was
initially described by senior leadership's problem statement, they neither were
surprised nor did they object to our observations of varying performance with
different inpatient service units. Conceivably one could say, once again, that it
was due to the absent end-to-end measurement attributed to the fragmented IT
systems. However, a data point from the 2nd Phase (i.e. corporate culture was
suggested by ED physicians as an issue) warranted further exploration.
e Local optimization behavior: data from the 2 nd Phase was confirmed in terms of
ED physicians requesting inpatient beds ahead of time (i.e. ED patients had yet to
be flagged) and effectively attempting to locally optimize the system.
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EA Process View
e Inability of end-to-end patient flow measurement: the existence of fragmented IT
systems prevented senior leadership from having end-to-end patient flow
measurement. A key finding was that of there being a considerable difference in
the timeliness of the interaction between the ED and different inpatient service
units.
" Absent performance measurement: the existence of fragmented IT systems
prevented performance measurement practices at an end-to-end level. However,
leveraging the ED's EMR system alone allowed us to identify phenomena of
interest which senior leadership wasn't aware of (e.g. number of patients leaving
without being seen; considerable ED LOS difference from non-admitted patients
versus admitted patients; time spent in each ED key process; etc). Similarly, data
from the "Pre Admit Bed Tracking System" alone, allowed us to measure the
waste of an inpatient bed being unoccupied (i.e. bed clean to bed occupy time).
Finally, data from the inpatient EMR allowed us to measure the considerable
contribution from the ED to Hospital XYZ (see Strategy View below). Clearly,
the narrowness in performance measurement practices weren't only an effect of
the fragmented information structure. The ED EMR was undoubtedly
constraining in terms of the ability to readily perform analysis on the data.
However, the other two systems allowed for Microsoft Excel extracts which are
within the realm of Hospital XYZ analysis capabilities.
* Narrow ED process improvement initiatives: senior leadership was thinking of
implementing expensive self-service check-ins in the ED which at a minimum
would have had little effect on throughput and could introduce other problems as
well.
EA Service View
* Hindered ED patient experience: data from the 2nd ED phase was confirmed with
regards to patients suffering from more routine and non-urgent illnesses (i.e.
acuity level 3) were spending a considerably larger amount of time in the ED.
Furthermore, the rate of patients left without being seen was correlated with when
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the ED was most overcrowded. One could argue that ED physicians were correct
in saying that Hospital XYZ wasn't addressing the needs of its surrounding
community to the best of its ability.
" Compromised ED patient flow: data from the 1st and 2 "d ED phases were
confirmed in terms of the existence of patient overcrowding in the ED and patient
boarding in particular (i.e. inability to transfer patients to an inpatient service unit).
e Variable timeliness interaction between ED and inpatient specialties: data from
the 2nd Phase was confirmed in terms of the existence of variable performance in
the timeliness of the interaction between the ED and impatient service units,
which were strongly associated with specific inpatient specialties. Succinctly, 5W
was measured as the worse inpatient service unit interacting with the ED, and the
vast majority of its patients are from cardiology. In turn, 7C was measured as the
best inpatient service unit interacting with the ED, and the greater majority of its
patients are from neurosurgery and orthopedics. We also confirmed that general
internal medicine is the inpatient specialty which receives the most of the ED's
patients, and that these in turn are distributed across all but one of the inpatient
service units.
EA Strategy View
e Considerable contribution from ED to Hospital XYZ: data from the 2 "d Phase was
confirmed in terms of the ED's contribution to Hospital XYZ at several levels (i.e.
number of referred patients; total LOS from its referred patients; total revenue
charge capture from medically related inpatient services).
Analysis insights guiding further exploration of Hospital XYZ: As noted previously,
our findings from archival record analysis were presented all at once in this section for
the sake of readability. However, archival record analysis was done concurrently or
indeed sequentially with data collection efforts and analysis done elsewhere in Hospital
XYZ. For instance, senior leadership was interviewed before any results from archival
records analysis were shared with them. Similarly, the extended patient flow analysis
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from the ED to the inpatient service units, allowed us to identify and get access to
inpatient service units of interest before the inpatient EMR analysis took place. These
research flow clarifications are important so as to adequately explain how research
progressed from the emerging phenomena of interest, and gradually and iteratively
allowed for validation and theory building. Thus considering the key insights from the
first two archival record gateways with senior leadership, two emergent phenomena of
interest began to crystallize.
Firstly, we began understanding Hospital XYZ's organizational climate and how it was
embedded differently in different levels of the organization. Organizational climate is "a
summary perception, or global impression, of how an organization deals with its
members and environments" (Ostroff and Schmitt 1993) whereby a positive internal
environment, which is receptive of participation and inducing of mutual trust, is thought
to result in workers producing more and ultimately increasing organizational
effectiveness (Likert 1967). The ED's lst and 2 "d phase of data collection and analysis,
together with the results of the ED's EMR analysis allowed us to determine that the ED's
problems also lied beyond its walls, which was contrary to what was initially described in
senior leadership's problem statement. However, upon being briefed of our findings,
senior leadership were neither surprised nor did they object and did in fact acknowledge
that they knew of a problem existing with patient boarding due to an underlying difficulty
in admitting patients. As such, we had further evidence of a cultural disconnect between
the missions of senior leadership at Hospital XYZ and that of ED clinical staff"6 and
sought to explore this phenomena in subsequent data collection.
Secondly, the confirmation of a variable timeliness in the interaction between the ED and
inpatient specialties prompted further data collection to specifically look at the best and
worse performing inpatient service units (i.e. 5W and 7C). Additionally, two other
inpatient service units were included, for being the fastest (i.e. 5C was fastest, although it
had low volume) and one of the largest recipients of GIM (i.e. 6S). Ultimately, our intent
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116 Please refer to section 7.3.2.5.
was to understand why variable performance was taking place in the interaction between
the ED and these four inpatient service units.
The remainder of this chapter will explore these two emergent phenomena of interest by
continuing to describe Hospital XYZ's enterprise architecture in other functional areas of
the organization (see Figure 7-17). First we examine the Clinical and Administrative
Support Services, followed by Senior Leadership, and finally other segments of Hospital
XYZ's patient flow. Finally, in the last section we summarize our findings.
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Figure 7-17: Hospital XYZ Organizational
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7.4 Clinical and Administrative Support Services Analysis
Having completed the analysis of the ED's EMR, and together with our findings from
creating the ED's VSM and interviewing its clinical staff, our research began analyzing
the ED's key interfaces with other stakeholders within Hospital XYZ. These can be
broadly categorized as Clinical Support Services and Administrative Support Services.
What follows is a description of the findings gleaned from each of the two categories
while using the NREAF views already enriched with the emerged constructs from our ED
analysis.
7.4.1 Clinical Support Services
Clinical Support Services include Hospital XYZ stakeholders that support the ED in
providing indirect care for patients (e.g. pharmacy manages drugs that are administered to
patients but they don't directly interact with the patient; bed board admissions assign
beds for patients; etc). A total of four interviews were conducted (i.e. pharmacy,
laboratory, housekeeping, hospital bed board) where two of them allowed for audio
recording (i.e. pharmacy and laboratory).17
7.4.1.1 Clinical Support Services External /Policy View
The Pharmacy Director offered that one of the reasons that the ED was experiencing
overcrowding was that surrounding hospitals had closed doors and their respective
patient traffic was reverted to Hospital XYZ. However, even though Hospital XYZ might
have considered going on diversion (i.e. signaling to emergency transport services that
the ED was full) it wouldn't given the existence of regulatory oversight tracking the
number of patients seen in the ED, and that in general the community negatively
perceives such diversions.
Further evidence of regulatory oversight surfaced as the Pharmacy Director explained
that the ED wasn't allowed to use its normal drug supply procedures when caring for
admitted patients that were being held in the ED. In an urgent care scenario patients are
administered drugs without need of determining whether or not a patient is allergic to a
117 For a sample of interview excerpts and focused coding please refer to Appendix IV(iv.a)
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particular drug. Conversely, in a non-urgent care environment, prescribed drugs have to
be cleared by a pharmacist who checks the patient medical record for potential allergies
or potential conflicts with other existing medication, and then decides whether or not to
clear a patient for a particular drug ordered by a physician. As such, once a patient is
admitted and remains in the ED, regulations require that the non-urgent drug prescribing
process be followed. Ultimately, the industry's evolution in Hospital XYZ's geographic
area had been such that both the ED and the pharmacy were struggling to cope with
regulatory requirements for treating patients being boarded in the ED.
Finally, it was said that the way Hospital XYZ was paid for its outpatient and inpatient
services directly influenced underlying care processes. Essentially in an outpatient setting
Hospital XYZ doesn't have an incentive to reduce drug costs, as it is able to bill payers at
cost with a small margin. In an inpatient setting, the diagnostic related group (DRG) from
Medicare and other payers adopting similar payment models, influences the pharmacy to
find alternative drugs that help reduce costs whilst not jeopardizing patient care.
"The idea there is that you are going to use the least work you can consistent with getting
the person out of the hospital with a certain level of care. But you don 't want to have an
expensive drug used when a cheaper drug would suffice. That is basically the rules."
Hospital XYZ Pharmacy Director
7.4.1.2 Clinical Support Services Strategy View
The Pharmacy Director supported the ED's clinical staff view that there had been an
increase in patient demand as a direct result from Hospital XYZ's growth strategy in
highly specialized procedures (e.g. liver transplant).
7.4.1.3 Clinical Support Services Service View
The Pharmacy Director noted that patient overcrowding was having several negative
effects on patient experience as well as generating a considerable amount of waste for the
hospital. To begin with ED nurses are highly trained and expensive not only due to their
training but also because of their salary structure, and yet they are being used to take care
of stable patients boarding in the ED (i.e. admitted patients that remain in the ED while
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waiting for an inpatient bed). Secondly, the quality of the patient experience is
diminished as the patient has to remain in the ED and in a stable condition is better able
to sense the nature of emergency care around him. Furthermore, he supported our
analysis that patients of a less acuity needing to be admitted were spending a larger
amount of time in the ED waiting for an inpatient bed, thus further negatively impacting
their patient experience.
Ultimately, Hospital XYZ's service architecture was described as disjointed as a direct
result of the way it had been growing, and as a result, communication across the
enterprise was gradually becoming a bigger issue, whether it be for normal operational
day-to-day matters, or more fundamental system changes.
"I would say there is generally a disjointed view of this organization. It is so big that the
left hand does not know what the right hand is doing. Communication is becoming a
bigger issue than what I am used to. It isn't always an issue but... It is hard to get
anything out to everybody. It is hard for everybody to understand where we are going
with this or that."
Hospital XYZ Pharmacy Director
Another contributing factor to an inefficient value delivery of the service architecture,
was that of local process optimization behaviors taking place without regard for upstream
and/or downstream implications. One example was that of physicians submitting a patient
specimen to the laboratory (e.g. blood vial, flesh tissue, etc) with no order printout from
the archaic system, and used a hand-written note instead "please call Dr. ABC". In
essence, physicians were avoiding having to use or manage nurses using the cumbersome
archaic ordering system. However, they were adversely affecting the lab technicians as
these would have to place additional calls and track them down in order to ask them
which tests they wanted done.
7.4.1.4 Clinical Support Services Process View
Hospital XYZ Clinical Support Services exhibited several different ways to perform the
same tasks (i.e. lack of standardization) depending on the particular service unit, which
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added to the process management overhead. For instance, in terms of laboratory results,
every service within the hospital would have to use the archaic IT ordering system and
subsequently the pneumatic tube system to send-off a patient sample for analysis.
However, whereas the ED would receive direct notification in its EMR system that a lab
result was ready and that they could easily access it, other services would have to check
result availability in the archaic system. The laboratory was concerned that it wasn't able
to check whether or not isolated services (i.e. those whose system wasn't integrated to the
lab system) had already checked the status of their results. Therefore it was not only an
issue of lack of process standardization but also of process transparency.
At times the existence of different ways of doing things was not necessarily due to an
absent standard but rather because individual stakeholders were locally optimizing their
processes to improve their productivity. For instance, the previously mentioned lab
ordering technique used by some physicians was said to be a clear choice by the
physician as he or she could have used the archaic ordering system and follow standard
procedure instead. Another example are ED nurses who steal meds from drug dispensing
machines in order to build their own stock of medication and use them at their
convenience. Such behavior has several negative implications. First, medications are
being administered to admitted boarding patients in a non-controlled manner in the ED,
which is against regulations. Second, medications are being administered but no billing
information is being captured and thus Hospital XYZ isn't paid for administering that
drug or providing that service. Thirdly, when medications are stolen from a drug
dispensing machine, the machine doesn't "know" that it has less units than it should, thus
the pharmacy might think that enough drugs are available, when in fact there aren't, and
this might cause an unforeseen supply disruption (i.e. stock-out). Finally, the patient's
health might be at risk because of a drug not being available, or because of an incorrect
drug being administered (i.e. what regulation was trying to avoid in the first place).
In other cases an inefficient process doesn't necessarily result from an individual's
isolated behavior but rather from an enterprise process improvement initiative. As
previously noted, the occurrence of ED patient boarding required that a non-urgent
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prescribing process be implemented in the ED. Hospital XYZ's process improvement
director responded with the installation of expensive drug dispensing machines in the ED
that allow for pharmacy to control remotely whether a drug can be administered to a
patient or not. However, if the ED's interfacing with inpatient specialties and service
units had been addressed and redesigned, such an expensive drug dispensing bolt-on
wouldn't have been necessary. Also, in addition to the capital equipment investment,
there was the additional cost of training the ED nurses on a new system, and requiring
them to operate two different drug dispensing processes (i.e. urgent and non-urgent care)
which increased the complexity of their work.
7.4.1.5 Clinical Support Services Organization View
Hospital XYZ's history was further referenced when the Director of Pharmacy mentioned
that the hospital was run by physicians who had started as a physician group practice and
later built a hospital for their purposes. Traditionally, he noted, the reverse happens in
that hospitals purchase or contract with group practices and not the other way around. In
essence, it meant that a different mindset was in place, one that favored procedure type
care, rather than primary care potentially requiring longer patient stays. To that effect, the
Pharmacy Director was of the same opinion of ED's clinical staff in that Hospital XYZ
wasn't delivering the necessary primary and urgent care services to the surrounding
community, and such was causing discomfort amongst clinical staff. However he also
conceded that the market environment was particularly fierce and that hospitals in general
operated in an environment of very low margins.
Although not mentioned directly, further evidence surfaced pertaining to ED nurses
caring for both patients needing urgent care, and those already in a stable condition and
awaiting an inpatient bed. Specifically, the implications of caring for such patients in the
ED not only contributed to ED nurses' previously mentioned role disconnect" 8 but also
potentially exacerbated their frustration in having to accommodate additionally complex
processes due to regulations and the implemented bolt-on.
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" Please refer to section 7.3.2.5
7.4.1.6 Clinical Support Services Information View
The Laboratory Director described that all services (e.g. ED, operating rooms, inpatient
service units) had to use a homegrown archaic system in order to order tests, print them
on paper, and then have them subsequently sent to the lab via a pneumatic tube.
Conversely, the lab itself had a state-of-the-art off-the-shelf user-friendly system that was
considerably more efficient to insert and retrieve information from. In terms of laboratory
results dissemination both the ED and operating rooms had the benefit of having results
directly sent to their respective EMRs. However, the remaining services would have to
rely on the same archaic system which didn't prompt them whenever a new result had
become available, and was considerably difficult to navigate. Such was further evidence
of the underlying IT fragmentation of Hospital XYZ's information architecture, in that in
some services two systems had to be used, whereas in others only one system was used,
and that a mix of homegrown and off-the-shelf software solutions prevailed. However, it
also demonstrates that the IT user friendliness can impact the timeliness of available
information. In other words, the archaic system, although archaic, did allow for test
results to be shared between the labs and the inpatient service units, but its difficult user
interface prevented users from knowing that new information was available.
An additional effect of the lack of user friendliness of the lab ordering system was that
physicians would elect to write orders by hand rather than insert them and print them off
the system. Thus, cumbersome technology can in itself be a reinforcing element of the
behavior it was originally aimed to replace (i.e. paper-based ordering). A related problem
is that the legibility of physician handwriting, which may lead to lab technician error and
waste (e.g. new patient samples need to be drawn and tested; patient diagnose delayed;
etc).
"It is an archaic lab system where it is more laborious to insert the order in the computer
than it is to write it by hand."
Hospital XYZ Laboratory Director
On a similar note, the Pharmacy Director explained that drug prescribing was still done
on paper and that Hospital XYZ had yet to transition to an electronic drug ordering
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system. One of the reasons offered was that physicians were reluctant and resistant to
changing their handwritten process. However, the pharmacist further observed that at
times physicians are unable to read each other's hand writing, and that some of the drugs
being administered could potentially kill a patient if done incorrectly.
"It was interesting because the other day there were 4 doctors trying to understand
another doctor's writing. [...] in our world one of these drugs could potentially kill you,
therefore we need to move away from the current world [towards more technology
solutions] but it is difficult to do that."
Hospital XYZ Pharmacy Director
Further evidence surfaced pertaining to the importance of having an information
architecture capable of supporting both patient clinical information, as well as workflow
information. Despite the inpatient EMR being a state-of-the-art software solution, it was
deficient in providing real time information as to where a particular admitted patient
might be. For instance, in the case of urgent tests where the lab cannot rely on physicians
and/or nurses checking results through the archaic system, the lab must call the physician
that requested the test. However, not only a shift change might have occurred and the
physician is unaware of the test having been requested, but the patient might have also
moved to a different inpatient service unit, thus requiring the lab to make several phone
calls to track down the patient. To further complicate matters, as time elapses a patient
condition might worsen given that the physician doesn't have the required test results that
might help diagnose and treat the patient.
"Sometimes it is hard to find where the patient is so that we can send the result to them.
Each floor will say "we sent him there" then you call here and they say 'we sent them
there
Hospital XYZ Laboratory Director
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7.4.2 Administrative Support Services
Administrative Support Services include stakeholders that either support Hospital XYZ
as a whole (e.g. process improvement engineers) or a set of inpatient services (e.g.
medical and surgical services). In both categories data collection consisted primarily of
interviews but also included internal documentation and observation. A total of six
interviews were conducted with Administrative Support Services and allowed for audio
recording.119
7.4.2.1 Administrative Support External/Policy View
External and policy related factors are evident throughout the analysis of the
Administrative Support stakeholders, who centered their focus on the direct and indirect
influence of regulatory requirements and healthcare payers, in shaping their day-to-day
activities and hence, the analysis of the remaining EA views.
The enterprise process improvement and planning scope begins first and foremost with
the requirements set forth both by regulatory authorities (e.g. Joint Commission) and
healthcare payers (e.g. Medicare and private insurance companies). Furthermore, the
influence of regulators was also noted amongst nursing staff in that they were aware of
national campaigns towards specific issues (e.g. eliminating patient falls; reducing
medical errors; etc). The influence of other organizations such as LeapFrog20 was also
recognized however the interviewees didn't give it priority over the requirements of
regulators and payers.
The importance of the surrounding community was further noted in terms of Hospital
XYZ's requirement towards it, namely having an ED in order to have been able to open
doors in the first place.
"you have to do what the Joint Commission tells you. The department ofpublic health
you have to do what they say. And CMS, government stuff you have to do what they say.
Hospital XYZ Process Improvement Project Manager
19 For a sample of interview excerpts and focused coding please refer to Appendix IV(iv.b)
10 "The Leapfrog Group is a voluntary program aimed at mobilizing employer purchasing power to alert
America's health industry that big leaps in health care safety, quality and customer value will be recognized
and rewarded." LeapfrogGroup. (2011). "About us." Retrieved January 22nd, 2011, from
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/aboutus.
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"what [Medicare payfor performance] does force is the organization [chuckle] to
declare what are we going to work on improving next year. It helps focus."
Hospital XYZ Quality and Safety Director
"The community would never accept having a tertiary medical center in this area without
an ED. They would feel that we weren't meeting the needs of the community."
Hospital XYZ Quality and Safety Director
"All the care that we are supposed to provide and we measure are defined in terms of the
core measures. Strict definitions, national definitions, about what you look for, what has
to be documented, and what you are supposed to do. Pneumonia needs antibiotics 4
hours, a heart attack needs an aspirin, etc."
Hospital XYZ Planning and Development Director
7.4.2.2 Administrative Support Services Strategy View
The reasoning behind what Administrative Support Services did on a day-to-day basis
was often tied to strategy, or lack of it, and in turn, the previously described influence of
external stakeholders. Furthermore, the underlying culture of Hospital XYZ was also
consistently referred to in explaining the strategic direction set by senior leadership.
The importance of surgical services over other services at Hospital XYZ was clearly
denoted by different stakeholders. The Chief of Perioperative Services essentially
described herself as "the revenue generator" of Hospital XYZ and said that neither the
CEO nor the COO would tell her to cancel elective cases in order to make room for the
ED. In turn, the Quality and Safety Director said that the ED "is not the engine" and that
senior leadership is reluctant to make investments there. Similarly the Planning and
Development Director said that by closing the operating rooms (i.e. surgical services) for
a day, she could prove that they are the most important asset for Hospital XYZ.
Hospital XYZ's cultural preference for surgical services was also evident in the scope set
by senior leadership for enterprise transformation, as investments were made in
additional operating rooms, but not on additional inpatient rooms or the ED. Granted, a
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narrow scope of strategic transformation could also speak to senior leaderships' lack of
awareness of its service architecture. For instance, the additional operating rooms were
completed long before any additional recovery rooms became available.
The end result of Hospital XYZ having both a preference for surgical services and having
to offer ED services to the surrounding community, is that daily operations consist of
continuous tension amongst services trying to get scarce shared resources, and attempting
to make their case in order to influence the bed allocation process. Nonetheless, by
default no inpatient bed would be awarded to an ED admitted patient if the ED hadn't
reached a sufficiently large state of overcrowding as measured by the Chair of the ED
becoming involved. Moreover, hospital operations are adversely impacted by the
strategic tension between surgical services and other services.
Finally, the pressure (or revenue generating opportunity) presented by different payers
(i.e. both public and private organizations) was such that Hospital XYZ was said to be
pursuing too many priorities at a single time, and that a clear strategic focus was absent.
So much so that the Quality and Safety Director welcomed pay-for-performance payment
models as these would at least narrow down the list of priorities. Moreover, strategic
priorities were perceived as a function of requirements set by external stakeholders,
which in turn compromised the ability to internally outline clear strategic initiatives.
"I am surgical services, the revenue generator for the hospital. I know you have read all
the literature where they say that the elective cases should be cancelled so that we can
keep the ER moving. That is not the vision. I really think that Dr. [CEO] or Dr. [COO]
would come up here saying for us not to cancel elective cases to keep the ER running. If
we cancel elective cases we've now lost revenue. So we have a conflict of interests."
Hospital XYZ Associate Chief Nurse Perioperative Services
"That is the part that you may be cautioned about... because I think that the ED in part
understands this... It is with some reluctance that there is investment made in that area,
because it is not the engine."
Hospital XYZ Quality and Safety Director
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"[The key] asset is the OR, and I can prove that by shutting it down for a day."
Hospital XYZ Planning and Development Director
"Right now [at Hospital XYZ] there is 100 of them! There is so much stuff going on! So I
knock on someone's door and I just have to knock louder, be pushy sometimes, and try to
get something up on his radar screen. I have asked [Chief of Strategy] many times to tell
us what the big seven are."
Hospital XYZ Process Improvement Project Manager
7.4.2.3 Administrative Support Services Service View
As previously noted, senior leaderships' narrow scope of strategic transformation could
also be a function of its lack of awareness for Hospital XYZ's service architecture.
Similarly, other stakeholders were also said to lack such an awareness or appreciation. To
begin with different services were said to work independently from one another and
lacked an appreciation for their impact upstream and/or downstream. Additionally,
improvement initiatives were described as centered within each one of the services, and
that end-to-end oversight committees had proven to be ineffective in the past. Moreover,
having an awareness and/or appreciation for the hospital's service architecture would be a
desirable characteristic, as would be the involvement of the right people in improvement
initiatives to enable change across the hospital enterprise. Ultimately, although at a
different level of analysis, these instances are similar evidence of the previously noted
narrow scope of strategic transformation exercised by Hospital XYZ's senior leadership.
Finally, we also gained a better understanding of the implications of cancelling elective
procedures. From a surgeon's perspective he or she is faced with the complex task of
rescheduling a case (i.e. finding another available time in the operating rooms amid
existing block scheduling practices). In turn patients will have made personal time
commitments as well as undergone psychological preparations to do an elective
procedure. Finally, Hospital XYZ itself wouldn't appreciate losing the operating room's
setup costs (i.e. each procedure is uniquely prepared for each case), and also potentially
lose the patient's payment who would elect to go elsewhere for his or her procedure.
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Ultimately, given existing operational constraints and enterprise values the cancelling of
procedures at Hospital XYZ is the absolute last resort to accommodate ED overcrowding.
7.4.2.4 Administrative Support Services Process View
In analyzing the Administrative Support Services stakeholders from an EA Process View,
further effects of EA View interactions became apparent, and once again these effects
reflected themselves at different levels of analysis. Furthermore, specific characteristics
pertaining to the EA Process View were identified as having an exacerbating and/or
mitigating effect towards each other, thus prompting us to add that layer of analysis.
To begin with, different nursing teams, whether they are staffed in the ED, or in different
medical or surgical inpatient floors, were said to adopt local standards which weren't
followed at other locations (e.g. the data and order of said data, captured by nurses when
keeping patient status for subsequent nursing handoff). The immediate adverse effect
quoted was the inability to transfer nurses with the same core level of training to other
service units which were struggling with higher patient demand at a given point in time.
However, lack of standardization was also said to take place within individual service
units themselves, as nurses adopted different ways of doing things (e.g. some ED nurses
immediately signaled flow status updates in the ED EMR, whereas others used a batch
approach and assigned the same time to several patients at once).
The existence of these localized standardization practices, or lack of them, was
contributing to the undermining of Hospital XYZ's enterprise process measurement
capability. One example was the prevalence of Microsoft Excel sheets used to track the
usage of different Operating Rooms (ORs). Firstly, different ORs used different versions
of Excel sheets. Secondly, different surgeons would allow or not access to said Excel
sheets.
A similar issue in data sharing occurred in that data was indeed available to non-
physician staff, however it wasn't being shared amongst non-physician staff. In other
words, content was available but it wasn't being analyzed holistically. At least three
different stakeholders, responsible for three different areas, were looking at their own
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data and wondering about each others' data. Additionally, the Quality and Safety Director
defined her role in the realm of clinical and operational performance, and said that she
didn't have access to financial aspects underlying her processes, and in fact had no idea
what was the financial contribution of the ED (or any other service). The Director's lack
of access to financial aspects might in principle be a way to keep her impartial to the
underlying effects of her enterprise process improvement and planning activities.
However, as noted in the EA Strategy View 21 , the Director's direction is first and
foremost set by external stakeholders, rather than a clear internal Hospital XYZ focused
strategic plan. Moreover, enterprise process improvement and planning scope follows
external prompting, with little or no connection to internal strategy and underlying
finances. Finally, and conversely, the Planning and Development Director concerned
herself with financial data extracted from the inpatient EMR (e.g. patient volumes,
procedure volumes, physician volumes, etc), and didn't see any data regarding operations.
Therefore, strategic planning was being based primarily financial data and excluding
other performance dimensions.
Finally, our analysis also uncovered undesirable standards in that thefirefighting of
operations had become the norm rather than the exception (e.g. figuring out when the ED
would be allowed inpatient beds as opposed to the ORs) and such was causing
considerable stress to different stakeholders on a daily basis.
"Each nursing area has its own process for different types of orders and that contributes
to a silo effect where a nurse only knows how to do things in a given area even when
those things are also done elsewhere"
Hospital XYZ Associate Chief Nurse Med/Surg
"Some health plans are beginning to include quality measures into the contracts. I don't
do contracts [chuckle] I just worry about performance, so I don't know how much is tied
to each measure."
Hospital XYZ Quality and Safety Director
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"Hour by hour we are saying who is going to get what. At that time an email usually goes
out saying to discharge all your patients and we just hope that we can keep the ED and
the OR going. The physicians aren't involved at all unless I get the impression that we
have to cancel a [elective] case."
Hospital XYZ Associate Chief Nurse Perioperative Services
7.4.2.5 Administrative Support Services Organization View
Previously we identified the importance of Hospital XYZ's enterprise history and how it
in turn had generated an organizational climate divide between ED clinicians, and indeed
those of other services, and senior leadership. The specific point of contention was
whether enough was being done in terms of the role of Hospital XYZ's emergency care
services towards the surrounding community, and whether or not a focus on elective
procedures was undermining that role. With the benefit of the ED analysis as well as the
Clinical Support Services, the analysis of the Administrative Support Services revealed
further insights into the elements comprising a hospital enterprise's EA Organization
View.
To begin with, organizational climate is a phenomenon that can be examined both at an
enterprise level as well as lower levels of analysis (e.g. service unit). At an enterprise
level one can assess the relative cultural harmony amongst the various stakeholders (e.g.
ED, inpatient service units, senior leadership, inpatient specialties) and whether tension
exists or not when considering effects beyond a single service unit (e.g. strategic plan to
solely invest in additional ORs while the ED wasn't the target of significant investment
since its inception). At a service unit level one can assess several factors. First, to what
extent the employees of a service unit are receptive towards enterprise leadership (i.e. do
they view them favorably). Second, to what extent leadership at the service unit level can
influence and ignore enterprise leadership. Third, what are the incentives in place at the
service unit level and do its employees generally feel motivated and supported in their
activities.
Some of the insights in the previous EA Views for this section can be further
contemplated from these refined constructs. The Chief of Perioperative Services
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considered her activity as the revenue generator for Hospital XYZ, and reported that
senior leadership wouldn't tell her to cancel an elective case. Subsequently, competition
for scarce resources was said to exist between the ED and the ORs, and each of them
would engage in self-optimization behavior. Another perspective was that different
leaders from inpatient specialties were less inclined to share their OR data, and all of
them kept it in their own local format (i.e. non-standard and inaccessible by other
services). Finally, both ED clinicians and the Chief of Perioperative Services noted that
nurses from each area were dissatisfied with their work and were even quitting their jobs.
In turn, physicians were said to prefer high-tech surgical procedures over other types of
care.
"Dr. [X ED Director] and Dr. [Y Surgery Director] report separately to the CEO. I don't
think that the CEO tells them where to go. [...] Dr. [X] of course would say "You know
just cancel those elective cases Debbie", and you know he would because his important
piece is the ED. Dr. [Y] on the other side is the Chief of Surgery is going to say "Debbie
we are not cancelling anything. You know what we can sit down and relook at all this but
it is a huge job to take a [scheduling] block based system and redo it all". So you have
competing high levels because they have vested interests in their own division."
Hospital XYZ Associate Chief Nurse Perioperative Services
"The philosophy at [Hospital XYZ] is that for each individual application we want to get
the best software and then afterwards we'll figure out how to tie it all together."
Hospital XYZ Process Improvement Project Manager
"Leadership support for data transparency is very variable across specialties.
Department like orthopedics, doctor [X] has been into data for a long time. I would say if
there is a grand daddy of data collection at [Hospital XYZ] it is probably doctor [X]. In
an access database. It is "their" access database, because that is the right adjective, and
published papers with that data. They look at what we are trying to do skeptically."
Hospital XYZ Planning and Development Director
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"Physicians are here to do the high tech really cutting edge stuff And surgeries are
really what generates revenue here and that is kind of the sexy work to do. [...] even
among the specialties my opinion is that the surgeon in terms of stature is higher than the
other medical specialty. The CEO is a surgeon, the prior CEO is a surgeon, ... [..]
generally the operative services generate more revenue than the medical services."
Hospital XYZ Quality and Safety Director
Finally, we elaborated further on modes of coordination so that these highlight not only
the importance of boundary spanners (i.e. organizational elements that work across two
or more service units) but also of cross departmental management boards. The latter was
also captured in the data. However, the lack of senior leadership involvement in such
management boards was associated with their poor results and later disbandment.
7.4.2.6 Administrative Support Services Knowledge View
As with the case of the ED Knowledge View analysism we found that Administrative
Support Services stakeholders heavily relied on their tacit knowledge in order to mutually
adjust whilst managing their competition for scarce resources. Once again, information
wasn't codified in any readily available format (e.g. internal policy document) and relied
on the Chief Nurses and Charge Nurses of each respective service in order to facilitate
patient flow at Hospital XYZ.
Also, whereas before ED physicians had noted that their access to financial data had been
denied, several of the Administrative Support Services were also operating with restricted
access to information.
Ultimately, when considering the insights from the previous EA Views for this section
one can begin to argue that Hospital XYZ has a diminished ability to practice continuous
organizational learning. For instance, even in the case of existing data that could inform
lean enterprise thinking (i.e. organizational learning principle), such data isn't readily
available across different services, and indeed some of them are very territorial about
Page 344 of 759
m2 Please refer to section 7.3.2.6
their data. Another example is the persistence of standards at local service unit level
which hinder the aggregation of data and subsequent analysis.
7.4.2.7 Administrative Support Services Information View
The previously identified dysfunctionalities concerning the EA Information View were
once again evident. However, we also identified that such dysfunctionalities aren't
necessarily readily solvable even if an IT solution already exists.
To begin with we noted the prevailing use of fragmented information systems where each
service unit would host its own software (i.e. homegrown and/or off-the-shelf) and elect
whether or not to share its data with other stakeholders. Additionally, we further noted
that strategic decisions support data was primarily sourced from the administrative data
captured by the inpatient EMR. The immediate implication was the non-inclusion of the
ED specific data to inform strategic decision analysis. Another implication is that, in
terms of Hospital XYZ's own data, the underlying strategic thinking is informed by
archival records only pertaining to data required by external stakeholders (i.e.
administrative data for regulatory and payer entities). As such, it was further evident that
a hospital's information architecture ought to be able to support both patient clinical
information (also used for billing), as well as workflow information.
Finally, we also gained a better understanding of the considerable overhead involved for
Hospital XYZ to extract information from paper-based medical records, and then insert it
into the inpatient EMR for subsequent internal use, and also to submit said data for
regulatory agencies, or to file insurance claims.
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7.5 Senior Leadership Analysis
Interviews with senior leadership took place at different points during the in-depth
analysis of Hospital XYZ, and included the Chief Operating Officer (COO), the Chief of
Strategy, and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Both the CFO and CSTG were non-
clinicians, while the COO was a practicing clinician. A total of eight interviews were
done and allowed for recording (i.e. three with the COO, another three with the CSTG,
and two with the CFO). The findings presented in this section stem from interviews that
took place before senior leadership had access to our ED archival record analysis, so as to
minimize the potential for biasing their data. However, the findings themselves already
reflect several iterations of analysis both within this section and across sections (e.g.
Clinical and Administrative Support Services). As such, what follows is a description of
the findings gleaned while using the NREAF views that have been continuously refined
with emerged constructs from said sections. 23
7.5.1 Senior Leadership External / Policy View
The US healthcare system was described as fragmented mainly in terms of providers and
payers. The former was often referenced as the cottage industry as healthcare providers
are mostly practicing in small groups independently of each other and require patients to
go through an extended period of time to seek their care from start to finish (e.g. primary
care, specialty care, ancillary tests, etc). The latter described the existence of dozens of
insurance companies whereby each had a separate contract with Hospital XYZ and paid a
different negotiated price for the same services rendered. Notably, the government was
singled out for its prospective payment system (i.e. Diagnostic Related Groups used by
Medicare) which are based on national averages and don't allow for negotiation. As a
result Medicare payments were said to be insufficient and Hospital XYZ had to resort to
the known technique of cost shifting, whereby private payers indirectly subsidize
Medicare through their larger payments.
13 For additional interview excerpts and focused coding please refer to Appendix IV(iv.c)
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When describing Hospital XYZ's external environment at large, senior leadership
referred to several stakeholders, including regulatory, payers (both public and private),
providers (both competitors and cooperators), patients (both patients and families), the
surrounding community, and vendors. A reoccurring theme concerned the influence and
pressure of each of these stakeholders, and how some of them in particular shaped the
strategy and other architectural elements of Hospital XYZ.
From senior leadership's perspective, healthcare was different from automotive
manufacturing in that a patient was part of the product or service being provided. As such,
Hospital XYZ didn't have full control over its processes and had to accommodate the
effects induced by patient behavior. Some of the effects mentioned were patients showing
up at the ED without any sign of needing urgent care. Additionally, discharge processes
were slow mostly because patients didn't have family members available to pick them up.
Also, patients were said to be disconnected from the financial impact they had on the
healthcare system in general, given that they only paid for a fraction of their care, and the
bulk was paid by their healthcare insurance company. On a related observation, patients
were considered comparable in terms of their behavior in healthcare versus other
industries, in that they followed the strength of brand name and had little understanding
of the quality of care being provided to them and what it cost.
The pressure and influence of healthcare payers was evident in several different ways. In
general, insurance companies were described as preferring care targeted at the preventive
side of medicine (e.g. screening tests; immunization; etc), so that patients remain out of
the high-cost hospital care environment. Leadership agreed that such an approach makes
sense but not in the context of existing contractual arrangements:
"Makes great sense from an overallfinancial perspective and from a population health
perspective. I don't dispute for a second that the best things that we could do are to keep
healthy people healthy, keeping them from getting sick, keep sick people from getting any
sicker, manage the chronic diseases, those are the two best things that you can do.
However when we have these contractual arrangements with insurance companies [..] it
is very difficult to make money within health patient primary care practice. That is not
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how we at [Hospital XYZ] make money. We don't make money from our patient primary
care. We have a lot of outpatient primary care, but we don't make money from it. We
would make more money from specialty care. We make our money from procedures,
surgeries, from admissions to the hospital, so exactly the things that the health plans
would like to prevent that is what we make our money from."
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
Notably Hospital XYZ's ED is regarded as an outpatient care delivery service, and as
such it is also included in senior leadership's notion of services that don't make money.
Ultimately, the value proposition of healthcare payers and Hospital XYZ weren't aligned
with one another. However, there was one time where the value proposition seemed
aligned, and that was in the context of capitation, where Hospital XYZ was paid a flat fee
per patient per month, regardless of any costs incurred while caring for the patients. As
such, the hospital had the underlying incentive of keeping patients out of the hospital and
in as healthy state as possible and to care for them otherwise, rather than have them go to
another provider, as Hospital XYZ would be ultimately responsible for those costs also.
Similarly, Hospital XYZ had a program in place to closely manage the care offrequent
flyers (i.e. 1% to 5% of patients that consumed 20% to 30% of resources) and curb their
behavior. As a result, Hospital XYZ was able to care for patients at a reduced cost and
profit from the capitation model. In the end, the capitation model was not sustained at
large in Hospital XYZ's State, and Hospital XYZ went back to being paid on a fee-for-
service model (i.e. a contractually agreed price for each procedure with each payer). As a
result, Hospital XYZ ceased to offer services focused on preventive care and reoriented
its services to a volume based model.
"we would call [the patients] up and work with them to see if we could meet their needs
inside [Hospital XYZ] and keep them there. We got rid of those positions now because we
don't need them. Capitation has gone away so we no longer have the incentive to keep
them here for everything."
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
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Several issues are introduced in the context of the fee-for-service model. To begin with,
the way insurance companies pay Hospital XYZ (or any other hospital for that matter)
has no relationship with the underlying costs of delivering the contractually agreed
services. The patient revenue captured is primarily a function of Hospital XYZ's
negotiating ability, and different insurance companies value different services differently,
therefore making it very difficult to understand which services perform better than others.
"One of the things that I seem to struggle with all the time I speak with health plans and
they don't get there is the fact that how they pay us holds no relationship to what it costs
us to deliver.[..] let us take a look at our department and see who the winners and losers
are... it is afunction of where insurance companies are putting their money, it is not a
function of how well the physicians are performing, or how productive they are, or how
efficient they are"
Hospital XYZ CFO
In the end, Hospital XYZ tries to offer the services that the insurance companies are
willing to pay most for. Similarly, Hospital XYZ plans its process improvement
initiatives on the areas where each insurance company is focusing its own attention on.
Moreover, senior leadership felt that the US healthcare system lacked a sense of
centralized direction, and Hospital XYZ responded as best it could to maximize the
fragmented opportunities.
"at the end of the day we end up having to take wherever the money will come from, and
I am certainly not going to say that we don't want all this money to go into inpatient
because we are making a profit there and you are not willing to give it to our group
practice therefore we willforego it, so at the end of the day we take whatever way we will
get it"
Hospital XYZ CFO
"On the cost side, both the employers and the insurers... there is no system of care. As I
say, what we have now are random acts of clinical improvement where people decide this
year we are going to work on this, this year we are going to work on that, ... there is no
systematic approach to healthcare in the United States, either by the government or by
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the healthcare industry, and that is a real problem[..] We arejust shooting like a shot
gun all over the place and there isn't any systematic rationale."
Hospital XYZ COO
"We have many different goals which has partly confused the improvement effort because
the improvement effort can be the same, I can want to improve congested of heart failure
in my hospital A, and someone can want to improve congested heart failure at hospital B,
but the customer they are doing it for can be completely different. In some cases they
don't even know who the customer is, they are just doing it because CMS is not going to
pay you unless you get better"
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
"what is happening now is that we have 15 different things that everybody is asking us to
do, and they are not all the same, and they are all trying to tie a reward to them in pay
for performance.[..] the government is doing it the slightly in the opposite way which
says, ifyou don't report this we are going to pay you a little less"
Hospital XYZ COO
An additional key issue regarding the fee-for-service model, is the level of secrecy
surrounding the contractually agreed price for each procedure done by Hospital XYZ.
Such secrecy is a defensive mechanism instituted by Hospital XYZ so that insurance
companies don't try to pressure them into lowering their price further. In essence,
insurance companies have an acceptable operating margin in mind for Hospital XYZ,
and if they find out that care is being delivered more efficiently, they try to reduce their
payments in the next contract renewal negotiations.
"what the government and the insurers want to do is if they pay us [Hospital XYZ] 15K,
in order to survive, we figure out how to do it for 10K, once they figure out we know how
to do it for ten they lower the reimbursement from 15K to 10K and say that we [Hospital
XYZ] are making too much."
Hospital XYZ COO
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Finally, leadership discussed the existence of a significant amount of regulatory oversight
but that some of it was useful, such as patient privacy laws (i.e. Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act) and public reporting of clinical measures.
Furthermore, Medicare was praised for being the only payer that made explicit
contractual arrangements to compensate Hospital XYZ for its teaching mission. Finally,
further mentioning was made to the the state's planning commission approving the
hospital's construction only on the condition that primary and emergency care
components be added to its services.
7.5.2 Senior Leadership Strategy View
At the beginning of this chapter we described Hospital XYZ's history and how senior
leadership stated the problem surrounding its ED. Both sections124 were useful in
allowing for an initial understanding about Hospital XYZ's strategy. Furthermore, the
immediately preceding section also refined our understanding about the external
environment drivers influencing senior leadership's strategic decision making. What
follows is a focused description of Hospital XYZ's strategy in terms of key strategic
goals, the vision, but also the existence of internal drivers shaping those strategic
elements.
The key elements of Hospital XYZ's strategy were said to be built on the following:
* Integrated multispecialty care delivery: all of Hospital XYZ's physicians are
salaried and therefore committed to Hospital XYZ rather than a series of different
stakeholders as it normally happens even in the largest of hospitals. Additionally,
Hospital XYZ is committed to team based care, bringing together multiple
physicians from multiple specialties in order to take care of a single patient with
multiple illnesses. Furthermore, all the care required by a patient can be delivered
at Hospital XYZ thus eliminating the waste of patient movement, scheduling
delay, information handoffs, accumulated price markups, etc. Finally, Hospital
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124 Please refer to sections 7.1 and 7.2
XYZ uses a single patient medical record where all relevant patient information is
captured.
e Highly sophisticated care: evidence based medicine guidelines were said to be
designed for specific diseases rather than people. People have multiple illnesses
and thus require customized care, often involving expert knowledge and highly
sophisticated treatments from multiple disciplines. Hospital XYZ is a regional
leader on several medical specialties and in same cases at US national level also.
" Teaching: Hospital XYZ has teaching programs in all of its specialties. These are
still relatively new when compared to those of other institutions that have existed
for over a century at least. However, teaching is a fundamental mechanism to
build a specialty referral network, as newly trained clinicians who venture into
other organizations will refer their toughest cases to their mentors at Hospital
XYZ.
e Community hospital alliances: Hospital XYZ has selectively opened its
technology to surrounding community hospitals, so as to attract physicians to
bring their patients to Hospital XYZ. Conversely, Hospital XYZ also selectively
staffs surgeons in surrounding community hospitals in order to teach them how to
do the simpler cases, and have them refer the more complex cases to Hospital
XYZ. As previously noted, Hospital XYZ's current core strategy isn't centered on
primary care services, and thus seeks to complement surrounding community
hospitals, rather than compete on their lower margin services.
The core expectation of senior leadership as set by Hospital XYZ's Board of Directors is
to continue to grow its operating margin and volume, so that it may be able to continue to
invest in the most sophisticated medical technologies, distinguish itself as a provider of
excellence in as many subspecialties as possible, and grow its physician group practice in
the process. With this in mind it is useful to refer once again to one of the COO's initial
observations about Hospital XYZ:
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"Our character is specialized care and not to be a community hospital [..] the hospital is an
extension of the group practice, as opposed to all the other places where the hospital existed
and individual physician practices developed to support the hospital."
Hospital XYZ COO
When the capitation payment model was in place, it prompted Hospital XYZ to acquire
existing physician practices in the region and in doing so increase its geographic spread
and number of covered lives. The ultimate goal however was to feed the hospital's
tertiary care services in order to sustain the number of specialists that were needed to
continue to meet their growth aspirations. In the end the model failed for them for three
main reasons. Firstly, although care givers were said to be oblivious of a particular
patient's health plan, the organization described itself in a schizophrenic state as senior
leadership was well aware that it got paid less money the more resources that were spent
taking care of capitated patients. Secondly, the organization felt that the health plans
meddled too much in their affairs and demanded extensive utilization reviews which
often resulted in unpaid insurance claims. Thirdly, although the health plan said the
organization was responsible for managing the capitated patients, it allowed patients to
seek care elsewhere and Hospital XYZ was ultimately responsible for any costs incurred
by them at any other facility.
The alternative to capitation was to continue to grow in a fee-for-service model whereby
any procedure is reimbursed at a previously negotiated price, and in the process avoid the
perverse incentives of cutting patient care costs. In doing so the value of the primary care
network was to strictly feed the hospital's tertiary care services and ancillary services
such as radiology, laboratory, and so forth. Realizing that patients were only willing to
drive 10 to 20 miles to their point of care, leadership decided not to renew their contracts
with any community care practices beyond that range from their hospital. Furthermore,
the current COO devised a growth strategy centered around key specialties or service
lines which were epidemiologically aligned with the needs of the surrounding patient
population, and where Hospital XYZ could build a strong reputation of excellence.
However, the Chief of Strategy also noted that the surrounding patient population was
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insufficient to provide the necessary number of cases for certain procedures (e.g. liver
transplants), thus growing a strong reputation of excellence was essential to enlarge the
market geographically. Finally, the Chief of Strategy also added that the objective is not
only to attract patients to services where Hospital XYZ excels on, but also where they
make the most margin from (as noted in the preceding section by all senior leadership).
"[Hospital XYZ] is known as a diagnostic center where if no one can figure out what is
wrong with you, you should come to the [Hospital XYZ]. And also for tertiary and quaternary
care at a very high level surgical as well as medically the excellence of very complicated
difficult cases."
Hospital XYZ COO
"We have a lot of outpatient primary care, but we don't make money from it. We would make
more money from specialty care. We make our money from procedures, surgeries. [..] So we
get paid based on encounters, visits, surgeries, admissions, procedures, colonoscopies,
angioplasties, we get paid based on volume utilization and so that is what we count, it is what
drives our revenue. [...] our growth priorities are really in those areas of sub specialty
expertise where we are and want to remain and grow even stronger as a center of excellence.
So we are focused on cardiovascular services, we are focused on neurosciences. [Ultimately]
our incentive is to work to attract patients to the services that we excel in and that we make a
better margin from and that are really core to our mission"
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
7.5.3 Senior Leadership Service View
Our analysis far has already made several specific inferences on Hospital XYZ's senior
leadership awareness and appreciation of the underlying service architecture. In particular,
when analyzing the Administrative Support Services 25 we gathered that the enterprise
transformation strategic scope had narrowly focused in building additional operating
rooms, but not additional recovery rooms, inpatient rooms, or upgrading the ED. What
follows is a specific analysis of Hospital XYZ's senior leadership data with regards to the
service architecture EA View.
125 Please refer to sections 7.4.2.2 and 7.4.2.3
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Several aspects emerged consistently once again, and these were service architecture
management, extended enterprise management, service sustainability (from a patient and
clinician experience perspective), service continuity (from a patient care perspective), and
ultimately, service architecture awareness and appreciation.
In terms of service architecture management the COO made a useful distinction between
two models of servicing a patient in Hospital XYZ. On one hand, there is the notion of
single build model where a patient codes (i.e. patient is in a bed and suddenly goes
unconscious) and all the necessary resources (e.g. clinicians from throughout the hospital,
equipment, drugs, etc) come to the patient's bedside to deal with the specific code. On the
other hand, there is the notion of a sequence model where the patient moves physically
along different key processes, as he or she is being administered the necessary treatments
(e.g. blood tests, radiology, operating room, etc) rather than have all the resources come
to the patient. With regards to the single build model, senior leadership were consistent in
saying that everything stops in order to take care of a coding patient, because otherwise
he or she may deteriorate considerably (and in the process cost additional resources to
treat), or even expire (i.e. loss of life). However, with regards to the sequence model they
noted that the operating rooms (ORs) were "feeling the pain" as they were unable to
discharge patients at times to the recovery room, who in turn was waiting for inpatient
beds. One of the solutions supported by senior leadership was to hold patients longer in
the ED in order to allow for extra inpatient beds for the ORs, and also to order additional
tests as these are done faster in the ED and would ultimately reduce the patient's LOS as
an inpatient. Interestingly, said solution specifically confirms the evidence collected from
the ED and the Clinical and Administrative Support Services.
"Average length of stay is 4.6 days, including solid organ transplantation, [...] One of the
things that we have found is that there is a body of consultation and testing that is part of the
ED workup before the patient gets to the floor, and what we have found is that if the patient
needs a CAT scan while they are in the ED, through a care process map, orjust being in the
ED, getting that test done is basically the single build mode. We have great concern that if
the goal is to get them on the floor quickly and then order those tests, that then they become
in the large queue for the whole hospital with all the other patients that needs whatever and
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in the end the length of stay for that patient in the hospital is smaller. Having the patient
doing those tests in the ED really saves us time on the LOS."
Hospital XYZ COO
"The other place that is feeling the pain is the OR. Upstairs is full and the OR backs up. The
last thing a surgeon needs to hear is that you cannot do your next case, because we cant get
this patient out of the OR, because the PACU is full because no one can be sent upstairs."
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
In terms of extended enterprise management senior leadership explained the previously
described strategic alliances with surrounding community hospitals where select
technology is made available, as well as Hospital XYZ surgeons who make time to
practice in community hospitals. Additionally, Hospital XYZ continues to invest in its
teaching program with hopes to build its specialty referral network over time.
In terms of service sustainability, the experience of two separate stakeholders was
identified as particularly important, namely the patient and the physicians/surgeons.
Clinical staff were said to want Hospital XYZ to support them adequately and in a timely
manner in terms of their tools, operating suites, technical personnel, ancillary service
support, etc. In terms of the patient, the COO mentioned how their expectations are
variable and how they have implemented different services to accommodate them. In the
ED there is a Minor ED that caters to less acute patients in a timely manner. As for
patients seeking specialized care (e.g. heart attack, stroke, etc) they arrive at the ED and
are quickly processed and sent to the designated inpatient specialty. Interestingly, all of
the patient examples used referred to the need (and hence, contribution) of ED services.
"IfI want a stent I might pass through the emergency room and go right up to a cardiac cath
lab, I have all kinds of issues about informed consent, about my loved ones knowing what I
am doing and where I am going, all this is part of our customer service piece for the patient."
Hospital XYZ COO
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In terms of service continuity senior leadership had noted that one of its core strategic
capabilities was it being an integrated multispecialty provider. A key element mentioned
was the use of a single electronic medical record which adequately captured all the
necessary information pertaining to a patient, thereby supporting service continuity.
Interestingly, the Chief of Strategy said that they didn't measure patients, and instead
measured encounters, meaning that they were unable to identify the number of times each
patient had visited Hospital XYZ (and for that matter, which services it had used). Thus,
despite having a single electronic medical record, senior leadership didn't leverage it in
terms of assessing service continuity. Notably, senior leaders had already mentioned that
they were paid on a volume basis (i.e. fee for service) and not a patient member basis (i.e.
capitation), and most likely the payment model was affecting the way they leveraged
their information system, and ultimately how they assesses their service architecture.
"We don't measure patients. We measure encounters. We measure visits to the outpatient
clinics by department. We measure visits to the emergency room. We have 36,000 visits to the
emergency room per year. I can't tell you that it is 38,000 people, if it is 10,000 people, or if
it is 5,000 people. I am certain that we have some frequent flyers who over the course of the
year are here 10 times and we have other people who are here once or maybe once every
three years, but the point is that we don't measure people. We measure use of our system."
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
7.5.4 Senior Leadership Process View
In terms of process enterprise measurement capability we previously mentioned how the
organization was unable (or perhaps uninterested) to measure patients, and instead it
measured its system use. Furthermore, the Chief of Strategy noted that he was unable to
measure accurately the financial contribution of those patients living within a 20 mile
radius from Hospital XYZ, and those patients willing to travel farther distances to seek
subspecialty services at Hospital XYZ.
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Meanwhile, the CFO bluntly considered clinical leadership (i.e. CEO and COO)
unsuccessful in adequately managing and changing Hospital XYZ's behaviors.
Specifically, he felt that clinical leadership was missing the opportunity of further
improving Hospital XYZ, and instead opted to side with the physicians.
"Leadership has to decide what it wants to do, to help communicate that to the staff
physicians, and I don't think they are there. I don't think they are there. I still think the
physician leadership still sides with the staffphysicians. The administrators may want to
provide more transparency, provide more information, try to get these guys to understand
what their contribution is or isn't, and that there is opportunity to improve, but we don't have
a physician leadership thinking that way. So there isn't a meeting of the minds between the
two groups
Hospital XYZ CFO
In terms of ED specific performance measurement practices we were reminded that the
Chief of Strategy narrowly measured the ED's physician productivity in terms of the
number of patient encounters per full-time-equivalent (FTE), and thus felt that the ED
could solve its problems by having its existing staff work harder. However, the CFO
exhibited similar narrow measurement although from a different perspective. When
describing a potential investment to build a new ED, he considered it nonviable as the
new ED would be unable to pay for itself, thus clearly disregarding the ED's contribution
to inpatient services.
"I wonder if there is enough new activity in the new ED to pay for a $25Mproject. This is a
heavy weighted project... I still can't get over the $25M.. I have seen the presentation 2 or 3
times and it is not the presentation wasn't good, but when they go away, my mind still says to
myself "that is an awful lot amount of money for this amount of space ".
Hospital XYZ CFO
In terms of broader performance measurement practices the COO noted three different
content areas, namely evidence-based-medicine, operations process analysis, and
operations financial analysis. In doing so he mentioned that three different people had
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been assigned to one content area (notably, two of them were the Quality and Safety
Director, and the Planning and Development Director, both interviewed as
Administrative Support Services). However, although three key content performance
areas (or dimensions) were being analyzed, their champions weren't cross-referencing
their data or analysis (as confirmed in our interview analysis with them). Furthermore,
each champion was report to a different senior leader (i.e. the Planning and Development
Director reported to the CFO; the Quality and Safety Director reported to the Chief of
Strategy; and the evidenced-based-medicine champion reported to the COO). Ultimately,
although multidimensional performance data was being captured, the processes by which
they were being analyzed and validated weren't holistic, and thus didn't fully leverage
the data's potential.
7.5.5 Senior Leadership Organization View
The analysis of senior leadership from an EA Organization view generated further insight
into behavior previously described while identifying further interactions across EA Views.
Additionally, several aspects emerged consistently once again, and these were enterprise
history and culture, incentives (both individual and hospital), local organizational climate
and subculture, and finally, enterprise organizational climate.
In terms of Hospital XYZ's history and culture we have noted how senior leadership
considers specialized care as its defining characteristic and thus one of the reasons behind
the strategic focus in growing specific subspecialties. However, there are other
characteristics also worth highlighting. To begin with, the founder and every subsequent
CEO at Hospital XYZ has always been a surgeon, and it is said to remain that way for the
future as well. Furthermore, Hospital XYZ defines itself as a physician-led multispecialty
group practice, meaning that several of its physicians sit on the Board of Directors which
oversees the work of the senior leadership team. All in all, the hospital structure is
considered an extension of the physician group practice, as opposed to the more common
model where hospitals acquire or contract with individual physician practices.
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"the chair is a CEO, and chair will always be a physician. [..] it really is a physician led
group practice, and the group practice decides what it needs to take care of the patients that
it wants to take care of and the hospital is an extension of the group practice, as opposed to
all the other places in [city centre] where the hospital existed and individual physician
practices developed to support the hospital"
Hospital XYZ COO
"Our doctors here are involved in deciding what the strategic priorities of the organization
are going to be. In the community hospitals the CEO often times is the business person, and
the doctors in the community who have used that workshop are constituencies that they need
to keep happy but it is not the doctor's workshop."
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
More broadly, the physician was described as the most important stakeholder in making
decisions at Hospital XYZ.
"In healthcare we say that this [his pen] is the most powerful technology in the world
because the only person that can get anything done on a patient is a physician, a legal person
who can write orders and change things. [..] the physician is directing the care or he is
directing someone else to direct the care, whether it is in the hospital in terms of orders,
whether it is working up a set of symptoms on a problem you have, or whatever you have"
Hospital XYZ COO
Nonetheless, it is worth recapping that Hospital XYZ was only granted construction
approval from the State, with the addition of primary and emergency care services, and
thus why the ED was added to the initial floor plans. Furthermore, one can infer from our
analysis this far that the ED isn't directly associated with Hospital XYZ's grassroots
culture, but rather as a necessary requirement for the hospital to come to exist. Moreover,
by definition the emergency department is associated with providing primary and
emergency care to the surrounding community. Ultimately, senior leadership's disregard
for the ED's contribution to its core strategy can also be associated with Hospital XYZ's
history and culture.
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Another key aspect related to Hospital XYZ's history and culture, is that of the hospital's
incentives as a whole. Senior leadership described that it was constantly under pressure to
produce financial results and that traditionally leadership changes occurred whenever said
results dwindled. As before, one can infer that Hospital XYZ's culture is associated with
previously observed phenomena, namely that the core strategy is to continuously grow
specialty services that return a higher financial margin.
"[Hospital XYZ] hired a new CEO in 1999 as a result of the old one leaving, and he was here
for about 6 months, and all of the sudden [Hospital XYZ] started losing money, and so then I
became the COO in December of 1999"
Hospital XYZ COO
"there is an internal motivation that we need to get the constant financial pressure, so that
we need to do this in order to be able to create a margin and to be able to take care of more
and more patients, do it efficiently, do it in a high quality way."
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
In terms of individual incentives, all clinical staff working at Hospital XYZ is salaried,
and thus said to work for the same goal of making Hospital XYZ successful financially,
so that they can reinvest capital in new technology and additional space. It was noted
however, that being salaried doesn't mean that everyone, and more precisely amongst
subspecialties, earns the same salary. Finally, the downside of the salary model was said
to be that employees work by the hour and don't have the incentive to be more productive.
Also, as the hospital has continued to grow, so have the difficulties of keeping a collegial
work environment where everyone knows each other and considers any patient as a
"Hospital XYZ patient" rather than a "Dr. X patient".
Instead, subspecialties have begun developing their own organizational climate and
subculture where senior leadership realize that they can't solely rely on a service unit's
commitment to a project, as the Chair of said unit will only be able to affect what is
within his or her own boundary of control.
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"The problem is that [Chair of ED], and others, only control what is inside their environment,
so he can make that commitment and implement what he can in his environment, but the
things that he doesn't control which are probably equally as many things as he does control,
he may not be able to implement, if we don't influence it early."
Hospital XYZ CFO
At an enterprise level, and perhaps related to the physician led culture, a related
phenomenon is observable in that clinical senior leadership is said to side with physicians
and avoid guiding them through necessary changes towards opportunities. In some cases,
physicians aren't very receptive of senior leaders and outright ignore their requests.
"The thing that always worries me, from having been here for so long, is that it is so hard to
get the commitment of the medical providers to change, that if we get too far down the path,
even though we have the simulated models and the concepts designed, and agreement, the
rubber hits the road in implementation, and we oftenfind that we can't get there. Part of that
is that we are not a top down organization. With 500 physicians it is a consensus building
organization. So the CEO might say you know, in the planning process, "absolutely, we are
going to do this, and we will make everybody do it, and what a great idea", and what it comes
to the end, when the medical staff go "oh we don't really want to do that", the CEO goes
"ohhh... okay" [CFO bursts out laughing] and then we have to live with it."
Hospital XYZ CFO
7.5.6 Senior Leadership Knowledge View
Succinct information was shared in terms of evidenced-based-medicine practices and
how one physician is responsible for championing their implementation by influencing
each specialty. Also, as previously mentioned, Hospital XYZ's expertise in multiple
specialties was considered a strategic asset in that evidenced-based-medicine targeted
individual diseases, as opposed to people, who have multiple diseases and thus require
customizable and specific treatment plans. Similarly, teaching programs were also
described in the context of Hospital XYZ's strategic assets, but senior leadership didn't
describe them at length. However, a key insight was shared by the Chief of Strategy who
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considered that healthcare delivery was so complex that not even his Administrative
Support Services had the necessary knowledge about how Hospital XYZ delivered care.
"Our finance people, our IT people, our supply chain people, they don't really understand
how the delivery system works, and they work at [Hospital XYZ]."
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
7.5.7 Senior Leadership Information View
Succinct information was shared in terms of the single electronic medical record that
Hospital XYZ uses and senior leadership considers part of one of its strategic pillars.
Notably, as with previous sections, senior leadership weren't probed directly with regards
to each EA View, but the resulting interview data was indeed analyzed through each EA
View. As such, in the case of the Information View there weren't many specific insights.
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7.6 Inpatient Service Unit Analysis
The quantitative and qualitative analysis of the ED 126 determined that a variable
timeliness existed in the interaction between the ED and different inpatient specialties. A
total of four inpatient service units were selected to explore this phenomenon in detail.
The sampling criteria included the best and worse inpatient service units (i.e. 7C and 5W)
with the largest patient volume, and the remaining inpatient service units consisted of the
largest recipient of General Internal Medicine patients (i.e. 6S) and the fastest unit
interacting with the ED (i.e. 5C)(see Table 7-4). More broadly, said units centralized the
largest number of patients for four of the top six inpatient specialties, as measured by
their financial contribution to Hospital XYZ (see Table 7-5).
Table 7-4: Summary of ED admission timeliness per inpatient service unit
Bed type(s) Patient condition sample
5C 16 ICU / Cardiac Care Ventilator support and EKG monitoring; 11 2h28
Unit intracranial monitoring;
5W 36 Telemetry only Coronary intervention; electrophysiological 94 4h30
procedures; arrhythmia; CHF; angina; MI
6S 18 Medical/Surgical/Tel Back pain; jaw pain; chest pressure 53 4h06
emetry
7C 38 Medical/Surgical Neurosurgery; orthopedics; trauma 50 3h31
Table 7-5: Summary of inpatient specialty contribution assessment
In relation to Hospital XYZ
overall
In relation to Inpatient
Specialty
% %ED
contrib. % % contrib. % ED %ED
patient contrib. contrib. patient contrib. contrib.
# Description volume LOS revenue volume LOS revenue
1 GIM 26.27% 24.62% 16.74% 86.57% 84.18% 84.07%
2 Cardiology 13.65% 9.32% 17.36% 10.87% 17.15% 12.05%
5 Orthopedics 6.45% 6.00% 7.23% 17.31% 20.63% 15.18%
6 Neurosurgery 5.91% 4.43% 7.08% 8.39% 20.02% 11.66%
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126 Please refer to section 7.3
Ultimately, our intent was to understand why variable performance was taking place in
the interaction between the ED and these four inpatient service units. As before our
analysis adopted multiple levels of analysis in that we examine each inpatient service unit
individually, in relation to the ED, and also in relation to the Hospital XYZ enterprise as
a whole. A total of six interviews were conducted and allowed for recording. These
included the Charge Nurses for 5C, 5W, and 7C, as well as one physician from 5W and
127
another from 6S, and finally one additional senior nurse from 5W
Figure 7-18 is an overview of our characterization of Hospital XYZ's highest and lowest
performing inpatient service units, 7C and 5W respectively, which emerged from the data
analysis presented in the next subsections. These characterizations concern both local
enterprise architecture characteristics (i.e. pertaining specifically to 7C and 5W
respectively) as well as enterprise level (i.e. pertaining to Hospital XYZ as a whole), and
reflects our enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture (i.e. leverages the
enriched NREAF discussed at the end of this Chapter 7128). The circle placement of the
EA Views is meant to illustrate that they are interconnected.12 9
127 For a sample of interview excerpts and focused coding please refer to Appendix IV(iv.d)
128 See section 7.7.2.
129 The placement of the EA Views in a circle isn't intended to illustrate how they interconnect. Moreover,
the EA Views don't simply connect in a sequential manner with the adjacent EA Views in the circle. In
section 7.3.3.2 we describe dominant EA View interactions that emerged from the data, and demonstrate
the non-sequential nature of said interactions. Furthermore, the colorings of the circles provide a visual
indication as to which sub-architecture performed lowest (i.e. red circle) or highest (i.e. green circle).
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Figure 7-18: Hospital XYZ highest and lowest performing Inpatient Service Units sub-architectures
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7.6.1 Inpatient Service Unit External / Policy View
When describing Hospital XYZ's external environment and how it affected the inpatient
service units, the interviewees focused their attention on the regulatory requirements and
oversight, and in some cases on the interaction with external providers or family
members that are responsible for follow-on patient care.
Regulatory requirements had specific implications in terms of the inpatient service units'
processes and staffing. For instance, units with more severe patients were required to
have a lower ratio of patients per nurse, so that each nurse could dedicate more time to
each respective patient. Additionally, nurses mentioned that discharged patients needed to
remain in their rooms while waiting for their transportation out of Hospital XYZ., as
legally Hospital XYZ is responsible for them until they leave the hospital premises, and
thus they are unable to simply vacate the room and place them in a waiting area.
Furthermore, several process requirements were consistently mentioned in terms of
patient privacy regulation (i.e. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) and
patient handoffs within and beyond Hospital XYZ.
Finally, external providers were said to slow down operations in that they might not be
open over weekends, or they might take a considerable amount of time to respond to
Hospital XYZ nurse inquiries, and all the while patients remain occupying patient beds in
Hospital XYZ. Worth noting, is that inpatient service unit 5C has no interaction with
external providers as it is an intensive care unit which either services other inpatient
service units, or seldom receives external patients arriving through the ED.
Ultimately, the studied inpatient service units were similar in their observations about the
EA External and Policy View.
7.6.2 Inpatient Service Unit Strategy View
Interviewees were consistent in describing their contribution to Hospital XYZ's mission
in terms of delivering the highest quality of care in the subspecialties that characterize the
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enterprise as a leader in the marketplace. However, both 6S and 7C went further and also
described their role in supporting the surrounding community.
Several of the observations made by interviewees from 5W reflected the execution of
Hospital's XYZ core strategy of growing key subspecialties, and cardiology being one of
them. Specifically, nurses shared that they experienced as much as 50% patient turnover
every day. Additionally, the cardiology fellow noted that the majority of patients are
direct admissions from the clinics, which was in line with Hospital XYZ's business
model of establishing a strong referral base for its cardiology services.
The cardiology fellow made several additional observations as to how the enterprise
transformations had only focused on building operating rooms (ORs), and ultimately
constrained cardiology's ability to function appropriately. To begin with he noted that the
number of ORs had been increased but that the number of clinical staff doing admissions
and caring for patients had remained the same. In fact, he suggested that increasing the
size of 5W wouldn't solve the problem, as it would increase the number of patients that
needed to be cared for, and in turn would further jeopardize patient flow. More
importantly, he mentioned that there weren't enough recovery beds (i.e. Post-Anesthesia
Care Unit) to handle the volume of procedures being done in the Cath-lab.
"Increasing capacity up here [in terms of available beds] also increases the work that
prevents us from getting down there [to the ED] in a timely manner too."
Hospital XYZ Cardiology Fellow (5W and Cathlab)
"Another bottleneck is our holding area which wasn't designed with enough beds for the
number of procedures that we are doing [in the ORs]"
Hospital XYZ Cardiology Fellow (5W and Cathlab)
A related observation was made by the physician in 6S where he characterized Hospital
XYZ's strategy as ineffective as it merely increased the number of beds in 6S and it
neither invested in the ED nor did it change the ED's processes.
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"Another bottleneck in the ER... we spent a zillion dollars [in building 6S]... the idea was to
improve the ER flow but I think it is a silly idea. So what they have done is that they have now
increased the volume inside the hospital but you still have a very limited access point, it is a
small hole that people still have to squeeze through to get in.
Hospital XYZ Hospitalist Physician (6S)
From the clinical staff in 5W it was clear that a high volume of cardiology patients
existed, and that those undergoing elective procedures were competing for beds with
patients waiting in the ED. When asked specifically as to who gets the priority in terms of
a 5W bed, the cardiology fellow replied:
"The holding area because they are not technically in the hospital. That patient being in the
holding area is creating an inabilityfor those 5 cath labs to function, so you have got to get
that patient out."
Hospital XYZ Cardiology Fellow (5W and Cathlab)
"This is a very aggressive service line. Which is probably the premiere role modelfor the
institution in terms of efficiency, volume, outcomes, length of stay, you name it... this is a 36
bed unit that on an average day turns over probably 40% to 50% of the patients on any given
day. So 56 patients on a given day could come through this unit in terms of workload of the
physicians."
Hospital XYZ Charge Nurse (5W)
Finally, reference was made to Hospital XYZ being a teaching institution and that it was
an important mission, however it also slowed down ED admissions and other care
processes in general.
Ultimately, the studied inpatient service units were similar in their observations about
their contribution to Hospital XYZ's mission, although 6S and 7C included both the
surrounding community and those patients specifically requiring subspecialty care.
Additionally, 5W and 6S described how senior leadership had embarked upon narrow
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enterprise strategic transformations, and these had constrained patient flow and care
delivery in general.
7.6.3 Inpatient Service Unit Service View
When describing how their inpatient service unit interacted with other stakeholders
within and beyond Hospital XYZ, interviewees were consistent on some topics, and
exhibited very different approaches on others.
Similarities across inpatient service units: In terms of similarities, all inpatient service
units confirmed the rationale of admitting specific patient populations to specific units, as
it increases the skill level of the nursing staff and increases efficiency for physicians to
round on patients and communicate with nursing staff. All nursing staff complained
about housekeeping not cleaning their beds soon enough and therefore either adversely
impacting their patient flow or prompting them to clean the beds themselves. Specifically,
5W, 5C, and 7C, described different occasions where they were holding up the PACU
because of an unclean bed.
Nursing staff were also consistent in describing service continuity issues in the matter of
patients suffering from multiple illnesses and who visited the hospital on multiple
different occasions. Hospital XYZ has a single medical record that is updated
electronically at the end of each patient visit. However, if a patient has multiple illnesses
which require multiple separate visits (i.e. scheduled and/or emergent), Hospital XYZ
relies on the patient's primary care physician to keep track of all the visits. As such,
physicians from different specialties caring for the same patient, who might have visited
the hospital on separate occasions, are unaware of potentially critical health updates that
might have taken place since they last saw the patient themselves. An anecdotal episode
was shared by one of the nurses whose father is a Hospital XYZ patient:
"Every time the patient comes back he starts from the beginning all over again. My father
now has 4 doctors. He has leukemia so he has an oncologist. He is a diabetic so he has an
endocrinologist. He has a heart condition so he has a cardiologist. And he has severe
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arthritis so he has rheumatoid arthritis doctor. So when something happens with one of the
specialties of his healthcare he would like to have all his doctors know about it, so that when
he comes back he says "oh you didn't know I had a heart attack 3 months ago and was in the
hospital?!!!" [...]I emailed the PCP cardiologist because I know him because I work here,
and I also notified the rheumatologist because there were issues with the meds that he was
taking that they felt was causing his problem, I just emailed them myself We called a family
meeting... I orchestrated it, the system didn't orchestrate it. I had all 4 physicians sit at the
same table and no information had to be repeated andjoint decisions could be made."
Hospital XYZ Senior Nurse (5W)
Finally, as noted previously, units 5W and 6S made specific observations as to how
senior leadership lacked an appreciation for the service architecture as evidenced by the
scope of their enterprise transformation.
"Ifyou can get the power guy, [COO], to actually see really how the whole system is
functioning. Give these guys a real big picture overview which I don't think they have."
Hospital XYZ Hospitalist Physician (6S)
Key differences between 5W and 7C: The analysis of inpatient service units from an
EA Service View revealed key differences as to how inpatient specialties worked with
their inpatient service units as well as with other services. 5W and 7C were found to be
similar on several characteristics (e.g. patient severity; number of beds; interaction with
ORs/PACU; clinic admissions), and being at opposite sides of the timeliness performance
metric, warranted a comparative analysis'3 0 . Table 7-6 below summarizes the key EA
Service View differences between 5W and 7C.
130 Analysis determined that 5C is a service unit geared towards a significantly more acute patient
population in need of ventilators and often times experiencing multiple system failure, therefore requiring
stat (i.e. priority) patient transfers from other units which would explain its better timeliness in interacting
with the ED. Similarly, 6S wasn't included in comparative analysis as it mostly cares for GIM patients (i.e.
not associated with Hospital XYZ's core strategy), has little interaction with ORs, and has half the size of
5W and 7C.
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Table 7-6: Key Service Architecture differences between 5W and 7C
Characteristic 5W 7C
Physician - nurse Nurses are told last minute patients Nurses told ahead of time when
communication can be discharged patients can be discharged
Physician - patient Patients are told last minute when Patients know ahead of time when
communication they are being discharged they should expect to be discharged
Nurse - bed board Initiated by bed board via phone Physically visit bed board twice a
communication day to discuss flow
Nurse - ED Reactive (initiated by ED) Proactive (check on ED ahead of
communication time)
Patient admission policy First cath lab patients, then clinics, Ongoing negotiation with no preset
(executed by bed board) finally ED policy
Medical residents Afternoon 24 hours
supporting admissions
7C
Orthopedics and neurosurgery physicians (i.e. mostly servicing 7C patients) let their
patients know ahead of time when they should expect to go home, depending on the type
of surgery being done, so that they can make the necessary arrangements to leave the
hospital by 10 am on the designated morning. Every morning when physicians round
their patients they inform the nurses as to whether a patient has changed status, and can
expect to be discharged earlier or later than expected.
Therefore, communication between physicians, nurses, and patients in 7C is such that
patients are able to plan ahead (e.g. avoid spending unnecessary time in the hospital; help
family relatives plan accordingly; have enhanced patient experience), and nurses are able
to manage flow more effectively and maximize utilization (e.g. initiate ahead of time
admissions process with ED; initiate discharge documentation ahead of time; manage
rehab discharge handoff ahead of time).
Furthermore, communication beyond 7C is facilitated by a proactive approach by 7C
nurses. Throughout the day, these engage with the ED over the phone and in person, to
get an idea as to what the ED volume looks like and guesstimate how many 7C beds will
be needed. Similarly, they visit twice a day the patient bed board which tells them how
busy the hospital as a whole looks like, including planned admissions originating from
the specialist clinics. In both instances, this proactive approach improves 7C's
understanding of what is happening elsewhere in the pipeline and allows them to prepare
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accordingly. Finally, attending physicians had the support of medical residents (i.e. house
staff) throughout the day, which allowed for ED patients to be admitted at any time of the
day.
5W
Unlike 7C, the cardiology physicians servicing 5W patients don't communicate discharge
information ahead of time neither with patients nor with nurses. As a result, as many as
30% of patients are said to be unnecessarily occupying beds whilst awaiting for a family
relative to pick them up. Similarly, nurses admit that they are unaware of planned
discharges and are thus unable to better manage the flow not only with the ED, but also
with the cardiac care unit (i.e. 5C) and the PACU. Additionally, the patient daily turnover
(i.e. 50%) is busy to the extent that nurses feel unable to communicate beyond 5W unless
responding to requests initiated by external stakeholders. Finally, physician cardiology
fellows don't have the support of medical residents in the morning, and find themselves
spread thin running consult services and admissions on their own.
"We are at 98% capacity [in cardiology] that even ifsomeone wrote orders downstairs [in
the ED] they would still be there for 6 hours until someone up here gets to go home. So that
kind of makes other things mute."
Hospital XYZ Cardiology Fellow (5W and Cathlab)
7.6.4 Inpatient Service Unit Process View
In our ED analysism we noted how most inpatient specialties had the right offirst refusal
where they can disagree with the ED's patient diagnosis and advise them to admit the
patient to general internal medicine (GIM). The one inpatient specialty that doesn't have
such a right is GIM. Most likely for this reason, the hospitalist physician in 6S
complained that the ED's evaluations were superficial and often required additional tests.
However, the physician also conceded that it was physician dependant, in that some ED
physicians consistently called for the hospitalist too soon, whereas others did a more
thorough workup to begin with. In essence, no standard process was in place as to what
Page 373 of 759
131 Please refer to section 7.3.2
should feature in a GIM patient admission from the ED, and hence, there wasn't a preset
information requirement as to when one could call for admission. Ultimately, one could
argue that the ED felt pressured to reduce its overcrowding, and given that GIM couldn't
refuse its patients, ED physicians would call upon them ahead of time. Moreover, the ED
was also exhibiting localized process optimization behavior.
"The ER people who feel that it is essentially their job to decide admit or discharge and then
pass it on to us, feel that that accelerates the movement of someone on the floor because they
called us sooner, so that we can get their sooner, so that we can get them out of the ER
sooner. But it is just the converse because we go down there and we find that treatments that
need to be done now haven't started yet, you need more acute evaluation, etc. It actually
slows everything down contrary to what their belief is"
Hospital XYZ Hospitalist Physician (6S)
Key differences between 5W and 7C: As before, we specifically compared inpatient
service units 5W and 7C and once again found that they had key differences that further
refine our understanding as to why they have opposite timeliness performance whilst
interacting with the ED. Table 7-7 below summarizes the key EA Process View
differences between 5W and 7C.
Table 7-7: Key Process Architecture differences between 5W and 7C
Characteristic 5W 7C
Discharge performance Not available In operation for a year
tracking
ED admissions Not available Variable
performance tracking
Physician rounding Not available Every morning
debriefing for nurses
Discharge times Throughout the day (no preset Policy to discharge all patients by
policy) 10am
Admissions capping Variable Only if beds not available
Nurse behavior Nurses hold-beds to avoid new Bed holding closely supervised and
admissions contained. Also, nurses cover for
each other to take verbal report from
other units.
Bed board behavior Patients assigned unclean beds Patients assigned clean beds
(against policy)
Admission and discharge Not available In operation for several years
leveling
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7C
Orthopedics and neurosurgery physicians instituted a series of policies to improve their
local performance. First, they have nurses fill out a survey sheet for every patient, where
discharge information is captured in terms of the discharge day, discharge time, and if
their discharge was late. If the discharge was late they need to indicate why (e.g. delayed
family relative; unavailable rehab facility; etc). Second, they engaged the ED to conduct
a joint survey assessing their performance admission in terms of the type of patient (e.g.
orthopedics or neurosurgery), the time the first ED call for admission was made, the time
when an ED nurse gave her report, and finally the time the patient arrived. Third, every
morning when physicians finish their patient rounds, they engage the nurses and let them
know each patient's status in terms of likely discharge date. Fourth, discharges are
planned to take place every morning by lOam, so as to allow for new patients to be
admitted still in the morning, both from the ED and the clinics. Fifth, attending
physicians rely on nurses to let them know whether or not medical residents are capping
admissions (regardless of patient source) when beds are still available. Sixth and seventh
also concern curbing staff behaviors to ensure patient flow. Sixth, the Charge Nurse
keeps a close eye on nurses who might be holding on to a bed, which essentially means
that a nurse doesn't register a patient discharge immediately, so as to avoid getting sent
another patient right away. Another nurse behavior is that 7C nurses have a policy of
covering for each other when needed in order to take report from nurses from other
service units, and thus avoid holding up a patient admission simply because the originally
intended nurse wasn't available. Finally, physicians have in operation for several years a
conscious leveling of the number of clinic admissions and expected discharges, so that
these don't differ considerably on any given day.
Ultimately, it is important to note that localized process optimization behaviors such as
the ones described in 7C, aren't necessarily non-desirable. The referenced policies follow
best practices and either solely impact 7C or involve external stakeholders to attain
alignment.
5W
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Unlike 7C, the cardiology physicians haven't instituted policies towards tracking
performance (e.g. discharge or admission) or towards sharing information with nurses at
specific times (i.e. end of patient rounds). Similarly, patient discharges can happen at any
time of day, and so can medical residents capping admissions (i.e. no longer accepting
patient admissions even though beds are available' 32 ). Furthermore, as a result of 5W
nurses holding on to beds, the hospital bed board would assign them patients even when
their beds weren't yet clean. Earlier interviews with the bed board revealed that this was
indeed the case, and that they did so as they didn't feel that 5W was as responsive as it
should be. Finally, there wasn't a conscious effort towards leveling patient clinic
133admissions with the number of expected discharges
7.6.5 Inpatient Service Unit Organization View
The analysis of inpatient service units from an EA Organization view generated further
insight into behavior previously described while identifying further interactions across
EA Views. Additionally, several aspects emerged consistently once again, and these were
local organizational climate and subculture, modes of coordination, and finally, enterprise
organizational climate.
In terms of local organizational climate each of the inpatient service units were consistent
with regards to their occupancy levels and associated workload. They were similarly
consistent in their evaluation of senior leadership's enterprise transformation plans, and
in particular their poor assessment of its service architecture awareness (i.e. series of
investments targeted at narrow segments such as only building additional ORs). Finally,
as noted previously, nursing staff complained about housekeeping adversely affecting
operations and not understanding the seriousness of their actions.
132 Another reason for admissions capping is if an inpatient service unit is understaffed in terms of nursing.
Thus, beds might be available, but not enough nurses are on a shift to cover for the state regulated patient to
nurse ratios. However, no such ratios are set by regulatory authorities for patient to physician ratios. Such
ratios may be applied at the discretion of the hospital provider who sets an enterprise wide policy or allows
for each medical specialty to set its own policy. Evidently, cardiology had a capping policy in place
whereas orthopedics and neurosurgery didn't.
133 Notably, cardiology has a considerable number of elective procedures which could warrant leveling, and
should there indeed be an emergency case, it can always be referred through the ED (as is currently the
case).
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"I don't know that house keeping have a grasp as to what implication they have... I still can't
get over it... it is just mind blowing."
Hospital XYZ Charge Nurse (7C)
In terms of modes of coordination all inpatient service units were consistent in baseline
admissions coordination mechanisms. For instance, any inpatient specialty physician
responsible for admissions would visit the ED in order to check on a patient and
determine whether or not to admit them to their service. Similarly, each inpatient
specialty rounded on its patients in the early morning and exchanged patient information
between physician shifts. However, we have also highlighted specific differences
pertaining to each inpatient specialty and inpatient service units. Succinctly:
* The majority of 6S patients is GIM, and hence only requires a medical resident to
process ED admissions, without any involvement of a senior resident, or a fellow,
or an attending physician.
" Cardiology adopts the most layered hierarchy as part of its medical training
requirements, whereby every ED admission involves at least three physicians (i.e.
resident, senior resident, fellow) if not four (i.e. the additional attending
physician).
* Orthopedics and neurosurgery adopt a medium layered hierarchy as part of its
medical training requirements, whereby ED admissions can be processed by two
physicians (e.g. resident and senior resident), with follow-on co-sign by an
attending physician within 24 hours of admission (i.e. patient can be admitted to
7C pending attending's signature).
Further analysis revealed that modes of coordination are also influenced by the local
organizational subculture, and these were distinctively different in 5W and 7C in
particular. For instance, 7C nursing staff spoke very positively of their relationship with
all levels of orthopedics and neurosurgery physicians, as evidenced by their daily
debriefing policy after morning patient rounds. Conversely, 5W nurses complained that
physicians weren't interested in holding joint debriefings. Furthermore, orthopedics and
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neurosurgery physician leadership was particularly proactive and took it upon them to
improve their processes and service architecture (see Table 7-6 and Table 7-7). Similarly,
7C's Charge Nurses took it upon themselves to visit the ED and the hospital's patient bed
board in order to have a better sense of patient flow requirements. Moreover, 7C's
subculture was geared towards continuously improving patient flow within and across its
boundaries.
Finally, the inpatient service units were consistent in their appreciation of the ED's
difficulties with overcrowding, although their underlying position towards the ED varied
and denoted a heterogeneous organizational climate at an enterprise level. Specifically:
e 6S was visibly the most critical of the ED and felt that they were limited in their
understanding of the patient flow, and in terms of their impact on inpatient
operations.
e 5W acknowledged its adverse impact on the ED but had a clear policy towards
first accommodating elective cases.
* 7C was sensitive towards the ED and made visible efforts towards improving and
sustaining their interaction with the ED.
e Finally, 5C was mostly empathetic towards the ED being fully stretched and
doing its best to accommodate patient volume.
"The ER issue just frustrates the hell out of me! Their view [ER] is a limited. We work both in
the ER because we are going down there picking up the patients that are in the ER, dealing
with the evaluation issue and then bringing them up here. Whereas their view they don't see
what happens up here. They really don't. They are very isolated as to what they see. They see
first contact and that is it."
Hospital XYZ Hospitalist Physician (6S)
"at least in the emergency room they are on a stretcher and they can keep them there if they
need to, but if they are in the cath lab and they are done, they need to come to a bed."
Hospital XYZ Charge Nurse (5W)
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"Orthopedics and neurosurgery just got to the point that 'you know what, we have got to do
something because we want our patients to get on their floor".
Hospital XYZ Charge Nurse (7C)
"[ED] staff is stretched taking care of other things, and they have to wait for a window when
they can free themselves up to be actually able to bring the patient up."
Hospital XYZ Charge Nurse (5C)
7.6.6 Inpatient Service Unit Knowledge View
Interviewees were consistent in describing their use of care pathways which follow
evidenced based medicine and consist of standardized care practices that are considered
to be the most adequate for a given type of treatment.
"Pathways are a good idea. We have a lot ofpathways here. You have different people
rotating through on the inpatient service, people who don't always do it all the time, and
when you don't do something all the time you are not necessarily as good as it. You don't
remember what you should be doing. So I think that clinical pathways lead to better quality of
care
Hospital XYZ Hospitalist Physician (6S)
Previously, we noted that Hospital XYZ's senior leadership was concerned with only
being able to rely on what subspecialties could control within the boundaries of their
individual departments' 34 . However, as per orthopedics and neurosurgery's example, an
organizational learning capability was being developed within and beyond inpatient
service unit 7C. Evidently, a service unit's organizational learning capability is not only
related to senior leadership's influence and support, but also, and perhaps more
importantly, local physician leadership.
Finally, we had already discussed the knowledge transfer requirements of each
subspecialty's medical residency programs, and how these affected patient flow.
However, we also uncovered the training requirements of nursing staff, and some of the
implications of nursing staff's experience and vocation. Succinctly, training new nurses
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was said to impact team work (i.e. less experienced staff are focused in getting their
things done, and less available or knowledgeable to help others), impact relations with
physicians (e.g. inexperienced nurses aren't as efficient in gathering the necessary
information for physicians, and they are less likely to ask questions, or even disagree with
a physician).
7.6.7 Inpatient Service Unit Information View
The analysis of inpatient service units from an EA Information view further validated the
constructs previously defined in the analysis of the ED, and Clinical and Administrative
Support Services. Additionally, the analysis further refined our understanding of how
other EA Views are influenced and in turn may influence the EA Information View.
In terms of information systems integration the inpatient service units described a high
degree of fragmentation for which there were several contributing factors, and in turn
considerably affected other EA Views.
To begin with, an individual inpatient service unit is able to share information with other
inpatient service units via the enterprise EMR (i.e. MediTech). However, said system
isn't integrated with the ED's EMR (i.e. T-System). Integration between the two systems
is enabled by paper printouts and verbal communication. Specifically, when a patient is
transferred from the ED to the designated inpatient service unit, its bed carries with the
patient's paper medical chart together with a printout from the T-System. Additionally, as
required by law, a verbal nurse report is done between an ED nurse and an inpatient
service unit nurse. However, both the paper and verbal report mechanisms are non-ideal
integration enablers as they are error prone, require additional human intervention, and
may potentially delay patient care. Inpatient nurses were reportedly unable most times to
ask additional questions of ED nurses, as these were too busy and used available time to
simply repeat the information that already existed in the T-System.
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"Half the time it is so busy down there [in the ED] that the nurse giving report doesn't even
give you time to ask questions. If we had the tsystem information prior to the nurse giving
report it would make the handoff a lot more efficient."
Hospital XYZ Charge Nurse (7C)
The fragmented EMRs have an immediate adverse effect on a patient's experience, as he
or she is required to repeat all the information that was already given in the ED. Notably,
having patients repeat information is in some cases useful towards ensuring their safety
(e.g. asking date of birth and patient name before administering a drug). However, for the
purpose of an ED transfer handoff, patients at times become frustrated with nursing staff
and refuse to cooperate in their care.
"down in the ED that patient has been asked by the initial assessment doctor, the nurse that
received him, any consult physician that comes in to the room. They can be asked 2, 3, 4
times the same story, then guess what, they come up here and I am going to start again
[chuckle], the admission doctor up here is going to start again [more chuckle].[... patients
say] 'vou know what, I am not going to answer you any more. I have already given you this
information. It is somewhere in this hospital. I am done repeating it. Please leave me alone".
Patients are tired."
Hospital XYZ Senior Nurse (5W)
Another effect from the fragmented EMRs was the creation of paper-based surveys which
were local to each inpatient service unit (i.e. non-standard) and used to construct an initial
patient assessment. Essentially, each inpatient service unit had its own version of what
information was regarded important from the ED's nurse verbal report, as well as from
interviewing the patient, and in what sequence, format, etc, it should be codified. Notably,
some service units also used said paper surveys for inpatient transfers (e.g. between cath-
lab and 5W). Finally, upon discharging patients, said paper surveys were trown away, as
nurses didn't have time to record them in the patient's paper medical chart. By time
nurses meant translating the information into a format that was understandable and
appropriate for subsequent readership by other medical providers or legal authority (i.e.
fear of potential malpractice suits stemming from nurse paper survey).
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"A lot of these papers that you write that transfer from unit to unit is not something that you
are going to save, it gets lost, it is not part of the permanent record."
Hospital XYZ Senior Nurse (5W)
Information systems fragmentation was further persistent within the inpatient service
units, as evidenced by the nurses having to operate multiple software applications at once
and on separate machines in order to request and access information (e.g. labs, imaging,
etc). We should add that the software programs although fragmented were almost in their
entirety state-of-the-art off-the-shelf solutions (with the exception of the lab archaic
homegrown ordering system). Ultimately, ongoing information systems transformation
efforts were themselves regarded as narrow and further reinforcing the existing systems
fragmentation.
"I have been sitting on this EMR committee for a while, and giving advice on how to do
things, and somehow it came out that there is no big picture plan, they eventually are going
to put together 5 or 6 separate systems and try and knock them together somehow. Everybody
has this little microscopic little view of things and they are not seeing the big picture. They
are totally missing it."
Hospital XYZ Hospitalist Physician (6S)
Finally, as with Clinical and Administrative Support Services135 we noted that inpatient
service units found their electronic information systems insufficient in terms of the
underlying workflow information conveyed. Inpatient nurses expressed an interest in
being able to know what is coming without having to phone anyone or rely on someone
either phoning or paging them. In the case of inpatient service unit 7C the absence of a
workflow capability was even more apparent. To begin with, the Charge Nurse would,
twice a day, physically visit both the hospital patient bed board and the ED to get a sense
of what the patient volume looked like, as she was unable to access either of their
systems. Additionally, orthopedics and neurosurgery physician leadership instituted a
paper-based survey in order to track 7C's discharge performance, as well as its
interaction with the ED. Physicians had engaged with Hospital XYZ's IT staff and
135 Please refer to sections 7.4.1.6 and 7.4.2.7
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learned that their required workflow information was neither captured nor could it be
easily implemented into existing systems (i.e. and thus the paper survey). Similarly, the
same physicians, or rather, the Chair of Orthopedics, created a homegrown Microsoft
Access database to keep track of OR start times, turnaround times, stop times, reasons for
delays, etc. Moreover, as previously noted, the orthopedics and neurosurgery physician
leadership had a predisposition towards continuously improving patient flow, and in the
absence of a capable Hospital XYZ information architecture, they would implement their
own information systems (paper and electronic) to that effect.
7.6.8 Multiple Internal Architectural Configurations and Hospital
Enterprise Performance
Hospital XYZ's inpatient service units had different levels of performance in their
interaction with the ED. Two of these inpatient service units were at opposite sides of the
performance spectrum, as measured by the timeliness in transferring patients from the ED
to each respective unit. Furthermore, ED clinical staff subjectively assessed said inpatient
service units as such, namely 5W as the worse performer, and 7C as the highest
performer. Notably, as previously mentioned, we verified their subjective assessment by
not only triangulating their responses, but also through comparison with our quantitative
analysis of electronic information systems 36 . At an enterprise level both inpatient units
services centralized inpatient specialties (i.e. cardiology at 5W, and neurosurgery and
orthopedics at 7C) which were high revenue generating flagships for Hospital XYZ.
Additionally, the ED's contribution to both service units, as measured by % of total
hospital inpatient revenue and % of total-length-of-stay, was comparable. Finally, both
inpatient service units had the greatest number of beds in Hospital XYZ and were
comparable (i.e. 36 and 38). Moreover, the different ED performance interaction for these
two comparable inpatient service units, beckoned explanation for said phenomena, and
prompted further exploration. A close examination of the qualitative and quantitative data
on these two inpatient service units in particular, uncovered both similar and different
architectural characteristics.
136 Please refer to sections 7.3.3.2. and 7.6. for an overview of our quantitative results.
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Figure 7-19: Hospital XYZ highest and lowest performing Inpatient Service Units sub-architectures
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Figure 7-19 is the overview of Hospital XYZ's sub-architecture characterizations for
inpatient service units 5W and 7C, which were presented earlier 37, and pertain to the
analysis of the previous subsections. These characterizations concern both local
enterprise architecture characteristics (i.e. pertaining specifically to 7C and 5W
respectively) as well as enterprise level (i.e. pertaining to Hospital XYZ as a whole), and
reflects our enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture (i.e. leverages the
enriched NREAF discussed at the end of this Chapter 7138). The circle placement of the
EA Views is meant to illustrate that they are interconnected.139 The coloring of the
elements in the figure is a visualization technique to readily compare the sub-
architectures to one another. Specifically, black denotes no change between sub-
architectures; from the Main ORs sub-architecture; red denotes new elements in sub-
architecture 7C, which weren't present in 5W; orange denotes elements which are of a
similar type but with different properties.
Similar external characteristics included the oversight of regulatory authorities as well as
the impact of other external stakeholders. Additionally, the information architecture was
similar in terms of its underlying fragmentation, which required the manipulation of
multiple software applications, and more fundamentally, prevented the direct
communication with the ED's EMR. Finally, both service units shared their assessment
of Hospital XYZ's strategy in that it had followed a narrow enterprise transformation
scope, and its teaching mission was important but had the adverse effect of slowing down
operations.
Conversely, the two inpatient service units had considerable differences in terms of their
service architecture, processes, organization, and knowledge. On one hand, cardiology
being the highest revenue generator for Hospital XYZ, enabled its local leadership to
focus on elective cases, and to regard the ED as their buffer, or as a means to support
137 See section 7.6
138 See section 7.7.2.
139 The placement of the EA Views in a circle isn't intended to illustrate how they interconnect. Moreover,
the EA Views don't simply connect in a sequential manner with the adjacent EA Views in the circle. In
section 7.3.3.2 we describe dominant EA View interactions that emerged from the data, and demonstrate
the non-sequential nature of said interactions. Furthermore, the colorings of the circles provide a visual
indication as to which sub-architecture performed lowest (i.e. red circle) or highest (i.e. green circle).
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their operations (e.g. order additional tests; delay admitting patients; etc). In fact, there
was evidence that Hospital XYZ's senior leadership was aware, and also supported these
policies. The communication amongst senior physicians and nurses in 5W was poor, and
nurses had not only been denied regular debriefings with physicians, but were also very
careful, or even fearful, in their interactions with physicians. All in all, 5W concentrating
the majority of cardiology patients, was a reflection of cardiology's predisposition
towards clinics, and the cathlab, while remaining at an arm's length from other service
units, and the ED in particular.
On the other hand, neurosurgery and orthopedics were equally high revenue generating
flagships for Hospital XYZ but had decided to institute policies that were different than
those of cardiology when managing elective and emergency cases. 7C provided for a safe
environment where clinical staff of all levels felt that they could engage with others to
ask for help or even to question decisions. Moreover, nurses and physicians worked very
closely together and valued each other's contribution to the delivery of care. Clinical staff
was better able to manage patient expectations and behaviors (e.g. positive patient
interactions; planning discharge pick up; etc) which in turn improved operations and the
quality of care. Furthermore, local physician leadership was proactive towards
streamlining processes with the ED. Notably, clinical staff in 7C was also proactive
towards continuous improvement, and regularly sought process improvements in their
operations, while being mindful of other services in Hospital XYZ.
A notable insight from this comparative summary is that 7C follows practices that
observe lean enterprise principles, whereas 5W is focused on a narrow approach that
tends to generate suboptimization and compromises Hospital XYZ as a whole. It can,
therefore, be concluded that multiple internal architectural configurations may exist
within a single hospital enterprise, and that these in turn generate different levels of
hospital enterprise performance, where performance is measured as a multidimensional
construct, both in terms of dimensions and stakeholders. Specifically, a specialty and/or
hospital generating high revenue by focusing on elective cases, while pressuring or
indeed neglecting emergency patients, and in doing so affecting stakeholders within and
Page 386 of 759
across the hospital enterprise, isn't in line with the practices of a lean enterprise. However,
the reverse behavior whereby the needs of elective and emergency patients, as well as
those specialties servicing them, are addressed in a transparent and balanced manner, are
in line with the practices of a lean enterprise, and more capable of delivering higher
hospital enterprise performance.
All in all, we established that unlike Hospital XYZ's inpatient service unit 5W (i.e. worse
performer), the inpatient service unit 7C had gradually developed an enriched
understanding of hospital enterprise architecture, and had made decisions which
improved not only their local performance but also enhanced its interactions with
other service units upstream and downstream.
7.7 Enterprise Architecture Discussion
Senior leadership's initial problem statement attributed the ED's problem of
overcrowding to there being fewer ED's available in the area, and to Hospital XYZ's
salaried model which induced a shift mentality amongst clinical staff. Senior leadership
clearly explained that Hospital XYZ's strategy was to grow but that it had no interest in
doing so in its ED. As such, senior leadership's desired goal was to be able to do more
with the existing resources in the ED (i.e. "how to speed flow in the ED?"). What began
as an exploratory research of the ED, gradually progressed to other parts of Hospital
XYZ, as we realized that the issues of overcrowding had contributing factors beyond the
ED's functional boundary.
In this section we aggregate our findings presented previously for the different embedded
units of analysis, namely the ED, the Clinical and Administrative Support Services, the
Senior Leadership, and the Inpatient Service Units. In doing so we conducted within and
cross case analysis of each of these embedded units, and empirically and theoretically
enriched MIT'S NREAF, followed by descriptions of dominant EA View interactions
which emerged from the data, as well as revisit our finding that hospitals may be
comprised of multiple internal architectural configurations which embed different levels
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of understanding of the hospital's overall enterprise architecture, and ultimately make
decisions that have different levels of impact on hospital performance.
This section is divided in three subsections. First, we summarize our findings pertaining
to the ED, which leverage both the qualitative and quantitative data collected from
various parts of Hospital XYZ. Second, we then describe our enriched version of the
NREAF, now comprised of 24 main categories and 53 subcategories that emerged from
the analysis, and characterize in detail each EA View (i.e. External/Policy; Strategy;
Process; Organization; Knowledge; Information; Service). Third, we describe Hospital
XYZ's overall EA while leveraging our enriched version of the NREAF and explicitly
identifying the key EA View interactions which help explain the enterprise's
performance and lean enterprise principles in place. As part of our EA View interactions
analysis, we also present our multiple internal architectural configuration construct while
describing the two polar inpatient service units (i.e. 5W and 7C) with regards to their
interaction with the ED.
7.7.1 ED Main Findings Summary
Quantitative and qualitative analysis determined that senior leadership's initial problem
statement was largely inaccurate in that the means to solve the ED's overcrowding didn't
lie only within the ED, and that the ED was in fact contributing to Hospital XYZ's core
growth strategy. The following is a summary of the main findings directly pertaining to
the ED:
e The ED was struggling with patient overcrowding largely because of patient
boarding. Non-admitted patients required on average 4h09 to be discharged from
the ED, whereas admitted patients required 7h52. Specifically, admitted patients
spent almost 3h30 waiting to be discharged from the ED after being flagged for
admission by an ED physician.
140 The nature of the service industry, and that of hospital care in particular, whereby patients are an integral
part of the process of care (i.e. don't consume a hospital product per se), rendered that MIT'S NREAF
original version of "Products/Services" be referred to only as "Service".
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* Emergency care for the surrounding community was being compromised. The ED
was taking a considerably long time to care for acuity level 3 patients (i.e. 5h00
for non-admitted, and 8h30 for admitted). As many as 5% of the ED's patients are
leaving without being seen by an ED physician. 72.2% of those patients are acuity
level 3.
* The ED was contributing to Hospital XYZ's strong financial performance. 24% of
the ED's patients were admitted to the hospital and contributed to over 50% of
Hospital XYZ's total length of stay. Additionally, patients admitted from the ED
went on to contribute 35.1% of Hospital XYZ's total revenue charge capture from
medically related inpatient services.
* The ED's clinical staff felt neglected by senior leadership and by specific
inpatient specialties as well (i.e. cardiology). Conversely, two inpatient specialties
were praised for their behavior and interaction towards the ED (i.e. neurosurgery
and orthopedics). Quantitative data analysis confirmed that this was indeed the
case, as measured by the timeliness of their interaction and admission of ED
patients. Furthermore, our interviewees and observation of each respective
inpatient service unit, further verified the ED's clinical staff assessment of
inpatient specialty behaviors towards the ED.
7.7.2 Empirically and theoretically enriched NREAF
A close examination of the 34 interview transcripts presented in the previous sections,
together with the archival record analysis of Hospital XYZ's fragmented information
systems, and the literature review of chapters 2 and 3, gave rise to a total of 24 main
categories and 53 subcategories which enriched the characterization of MIT'S NREAF.
Notably, several other constructs for each of the EA Views emerged from the data. However,
these were either aggregated into the finalized list of constructs or removed entirely if they
weren't sufficiently illustrated in the evidence. Moreover, the derivation of the main and
141 Please refer to Chapter 5 for a detailed description on how the main and subcategories for each EA View
emerged from qualitative and quantitative evidence in the course of exploratory case research. Furthermore,
please note that our enriched version of the NREAF also reflects the learning from the in-depth case study
done on Hospital ABC presented in Chapter 8.
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sub categories (see Figure 7-20 and Figure 7-2 1) followed the literature's
recommendation of keeping frameworks simple enough to support effective decision
making (Porter 1996; Rhodes and Nightingale 2008).
As noted in Chapter 3142 this research adopted an enterprise diagnostic mindset and held
no pre-conceived notion of organizational element interactions including strength and
direction. Such an approach reflects the described nascent phase of EA theoretical
development and allowed for the iterative improvement of our understanding and
characterization of each of the EA views both individually and holistically while
comparing and contrasting empirical results within and across cases. As such, Figure
7-20 and Figure 7-21 have the EA Views ordered alphabetically. However, subsequent
analysis of Hospital XYZ's overall EA and in particular the interactions across its EA
Views, culminates in the description of dominant interactions which help explain the
enterprise's performance and whether lean enterprise principles were being followed.
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142 Please refer to section 3.5.
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Figure 7-20: Main Categories of Enriched NREAF
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Figure 7-21: Subcategories of Enriched NREAF
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- Holistic performance process
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- Referral network management
- Patient and family management
* Supplier management
- Modes of clinical coordination (single build/ sequential/
network)
" Service sustainability (patient and employee experience)
- Stability and leveling of flow
- Flow information transparency and timeliness
The following are brief descriptions of each of the 24 main categories identified:
External / Policy EA View: Industry history and context provide background
information as to the industry as a whole progressed in its multiple dimensions (e.g.
payment models, regulatory reform, medicine evolution, etc), as well as in the
enterprise's particular context (e.g. regulatory requirements have evolved differently in
different US states). External stakeholder value requirements, reflects the stakeholders
that were most prevalent in our study of seven hospitals in Massachusetts, as well as with
various stakeholders within Hospital XYZ and Hospital ABC.
Information EA View: First and foremost the categories reflect information held in
information systems in general, as opposed to only technologically enabled solutions. As
such, it recognizes that hospital enterprise information systems consist of electronic
medical records, as well as a considerable quantity of paper-based records. Notably, a
distinction is made between clinical and workflow information systems, as several state-
of-the-art electronic medical records, including that of Hospital XYZ, were found to be
geared only towards captured patient related information, and not support workflow
analysis and management. Information systems sustainability, concerns the effort
required from the end-users manipulating such systems, as well as the cost in maintaining
and upgrading them. Finally, information systems integration reflects the degree of
integration of the underlying IT architecture, as well as with the paper-based information
systems, which ultimately impact the information systems organization and integration,
as well as the timeliness of information availability, and the data reliability.
Knowledge EA View: Both implicit and explicit sources of knowledge are addressed in
the identified categories, and in particular in Knowledge codifiability and transferability,
as different types of knowledge require different mediums of transfer. Information
retrieval and access reflects the ease of retrieving information that has been codified into
knowledge, and whether or not such information is accessible to everyone within the
enterprise. Finally, learning organization capability specifically captures the 7th lean
enterprise principle and embodies it in terms of existing enterprise mechanisms that
nurture employees who are knowledgeable at an enterprise level (i.e. as opposed to a
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limited functional level), as well as ongoing improvement efforts that cross individual
service unit boundaries.
Organization EA View: Enterprise history and culture provides specific background
enterprise information that helps understand contemporary enterprise behaviors (e.g.
enterprise origin; key historic events; performance trends; etc). Organizational climate is
analyzed both at an enterprise level and a service unit level. At an enterprise level, the
relationships between service units are considered, as well as how they perceive and
accept senior leadership. At a service unit level, a series of dominant interrelated
subcategories are identified. For instance, a troubled service unit (i.e. poor local
organizational climate) may be struggling with absenteeism or employees quitting their
job (i.e. poor work stability), if their underlying incentives aren't being met (e.g. caring
for critical patients as opposed to stable patients). However, divisional incentives are
equally important to consider, as these also help explain a service unit's internal behavior,
as well as its relationship with other service units and/or divisions. Furthermore, a service
unit's leader may hold considerable importance in the enterprise (e.g. key revenue
generating subspecialty) which allows him or her to shape a subculture which may or
may not be aligned with that of the enterprise as a whole. A key construct to that effect is
that ofpsychological safety (Edmondson 1999)which describes to what extent different
stakeholders feel safe in interacting with others, and in particular, with those who are
hierarchically superior (e.g. physicians and nurses). Finally, modes ofservice unit
coordination reflect mechanisms in place (e.g. boundary spanners, committees, teams,
role definitions) to help facilitate the interaction amongst service units. Specifically:
* Boundary spanner is a construct described in the literature (Leifer and Huber
1977), and characterizes those individuals who facilitate key information beyond
the boundary of their particular service unit. However, in a hospital context the
term needs further refinement. Specifically, hospital operations rely on care givers
to share information via their information systems, in person, or through some
other means, whenever they execute a patient handoff or carry out a patient
consult. However, boundary spanners are individuals who systematically and
proactively engage with other service units in order to support information and
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patient flow across the service architecture (i.e. not just because it is the end of a
shift or because they need to transfer a patient).
* Cross departmental and service unit management boards are mechanisms that
facilitate communication across service units, enable transparency, encourage
accountability, share lessons learnt, and devise solutions that consider the service
architecture as a whole, rather than only a segment of it. The management board
should encourage the sharing of lessons learnt and assess whether or not these
make sense to replicate, and in what order, across the hospital service architecture.
* Service unit boundary of control and influence evaluates what is within or beyond
an individual service unit's capability to change.
" Team familiarity is a construct described in the literature (Huckman and Pisano
2006; Huckman, Staats et al. 2009) and which emerged consistently from both in-
depth hospital case studies. Essentially it evaluates the level of familiarity
amongst team members, and it establishes a correlation with performance (i.e.
surgical teams that are stable, get to know each other better, and tend to perform
better than teams that aren't as stable).
Process EA View: Process standardization and transparency considers the baseline
complexity and flexibility of existing processes (e.g. admitting a patient; ordering a lab
test; rescheduling an elective case; etc), as well as the existence of undesirable processes
which have become standard over time (i.e.firefighting standard broken processes). The
existence of local process optimization behavior (e.g. ordering beds too soon; discharging
patients at a regular time; etc) isn't necessarily an undesirable practice, and is a
particularly key construct when analyzing EA View interactions. Similarly, enterprise
process improvement and planning, reflects enterprise level initiatives (as opposed to
local optimization efforts) which are also key when analyzing EA View interactions. The
two remaining constructs are related to the initial two. Performance measurement
capability speaks to an enterprise's baseline ability to measure its performance both
within and across service units. In turn, holistic performance measurement considers the
content and process of performance measurement practices. Such distinction is key in
determining whether or not hospital enterprise performance is being measured.
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Service EA View: Two constructs address the inflow and outflow of patients specifically,
and the 4 th lean enterprise principle in particular (i.e. internal and external enterprise
interdependencies). These are extended enterprise management and service architecture
management. The former one addresses stakeholders that have a direct impact on the
patient flow, both in terms of receiving and discharging patients. The latter includes
subcategories that reflect the 5th (i.e. stability and flow), and 4th (i.e. effectiveness before
efficiency) lean enterprise principles. Service continuity (patient lifecycle care) embodies
the 1st lean enterprise principle (i.e. holistic approach) where patient experience and
quality of care are assessed throughout the patient's lifecycle, as opposed to individual
visits to a particular provider (i.e. predominant model today). Other implications are
related to this last subcategory and will become more apparent when discussing EA View
interactions. Similarly, service architecture awareness/appreciation first emerged from
answering this thesis' first two research questions, and embodies several lean enterprise
principles and offers a means of further understanding EA View interactions. In effect, a
hospital's service architecture is comprised of several service units (e.g. emergency
department, operating rooms, laboratories, etc) which function with varying levels of
interdependence amongst them. Such interdependence may imply sharing scarce
resources and/or producing services to support another service unit. However, a
hospital's service architecture shouldn't end with a consideration for its internal service
units and should also include its interactions with external stakeholders. Ultimately, in the
presence of an adequate service architecture awareness/appreciation, an enterprise, a
division, or indeed an individual, make decisions that reflect not only local context but
also that of others upstream and downstream in a given service architecture.
Strategy EA View: Enterprise strategy elements describe the core of the hospital
enterprise's strategy (i.e. strategic goals, vision, enterprise metrics, and business model).
The remaining three constructs are specific assessments of the enterprise strategy(ies) in
place, as per lean enterprise principles. To begin with, determine whether or not the
portfolio of strategies in place are in alignment, or if conflict exists among them.
Enterprise awareness and appreciation ascertains whether or not the contribution of each
service unit, as well as their joint contribution and capability, are adequately accounted
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for by senior leadership and reflected in the enterprise strategy(ies). Similarly, enterprise
transformation scope emphasizes the importance of evaluating enterprise strategy(ies) in
terms of the projects and planned investments, and how these address the EA Views of
Information, Organization, and Service.
7.7.3 Hospital XYZ Enterprise Architecture
Having described the empirically and theoretically enriched MIT's NREAF, what follows
is a description of Hospital XYZ's overall EA, as well as the dominant EA View
interactions which help describe the enterprise's performance and extent of lean
enterprise principles in place.
Figure 7-22: Hospital XYZ Enterprise Architecture
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Figure 7-22 was derived in the context of our exploratory research which included
multiple stakeholders, within and across multiple enterprise levels, and studied multiple
dimensions of performance 43 . What follows is a two-part analysis of Hospital XYZ's EA.
The first characterizes each EA View separately, whereas the second explores in greater
detail the dominant interactions amongst EA Views specifically.
7.3.3.1 Hospital XYZ EA View Analysis
Hospital XYZ External / Policy EA View
From a Policy/External EA View it is clear that Hospital XYZ is strongly influenced by
its external stakeholder value requirements, and those of regulatory and payer entities in
particular. There is no doubt that the state's requirement that Hospital XYZ offer primary
and emergency care services, as part of its building rights approval, was a key event of
external policy intervention, and one which had rippling effects on the enterprise (as will
be explained in EA View interactions).
On a more operational daily basis, the key regulatory entities consistently mentioned
were the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) and
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The former is responsible for the
accreditation of healthcare organizations in the US, and commonly conducts surprise
inspections to Hospital XYZ, and hospital in general, in order to determine whether or
not they are up to standards. JCAHO's accreditation allows for Hospital XYZ to service
the needs of CMS which represents the US government as a payer of healthcare. Other
types of external policy stakeholders were consistently mentioned (i.e. Leapfrog) but
these weren't associated with significant pressure as they didn't have regulatory authority
and only mildly influenced behavior with their performance prizes on specific clinical
metrics.
In terms of payer entities (i.e. insurance companies) Hospital XYZ serviced as many as
82 different payers in 2006, and the most dominant ones (including CMS) visibly
pressured and influenced Hospital XYZ in a variety of ways. To begin with, different
143 Please refer to chapter 2 section 2.3 for a detailed description on each of these elements.
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payers required that different metrics (i.e. clinical process metrics) be tracked and
reported on, if Hospital XYZ wanted to be eligible for insurance claims reimbursement.
Additionally, different payers paid different prices for different services offered by
Hospital XYZ, and indeed exercised different levels of bargaining power, whereby no
direct relationship existed between what Hospital XYZ got paid, and what it cost to
provide a given service.
Worth noting is Hospital XYZ relationship to a nearby reputable medical school, as part
of its teaching hospital mission, and which earns Hospital XYZ additional revenue from
CMS (i.e. the hospital's indirect medical education factor is 6.7%, which means that each
DRG payment is added that % from baseline value1 4 4).
Finally, surrounding hospitals had closed their doors in the recent past, and thus less ED
beds were available in general in the region. However, the large city center hospitals were
beginning to more aggressively expand their geographic reach, and in doing so were
increasing their competitive pressure on Hospital XYZ. Such pressure was not only direct
in terms of attracting patients themselves, but also indirect in terms of the bargaining
power they exercised over Hospital XYZ provider referrals (i.e. surrounding community
hospitals).
Hospital XYZ Information EA View
Hospital XYZ's senior leadership considers its single patient medical record as one of the
core capabilities underlying its strategy of delivering integrated multispecialty care.
Hospital XYZ does indeed have state-of-the-art software systems in various parts of the
organization. However, the key problem is that these software systems aren't integrated
with one another, and most notably, the ED's system doesn't communicate directly with
the inpatient electronic medical record. Valuable information exists in the fragmented IT
architecture, and was indeed leveraged in this research, however, ready access to such
information isn't available, and would either require prohibitively expensive in-house
144 For a detailed explanation on Hospital XYZ's DRG payments please refer to Appendix IV(ii)
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software programming capability, or paying equally expensive software vendors to
upgrade their default built-in reports and forms.
Furthermore, although state-of-the-art electronic medical records were in place, albeit
fragmented, neither of them readily captured and/or enabled visualization of workflow
related data. In essence, said systems are offered as the industry standard and reflect a
focus on patient related data, and capturing charges for subsequent billing of Hospital
XYZ's services rendered to each particular patient. As a result, the prevalence of paper-
based information systems (e.g. surveys, performance sheets, etc) is further reinforced,
and in turn, further exacerbates the information systems' fragmentation. Additionally, in
the absence of real time workflow information, employees had to compensate by seeking
alternative ways of attaining the same information.
Finally, some of the electronic systems in place were indeed integrated and supported
effectively different service units. However, integration alone proved to be insufficient,
as the existence of arcane cumbersome systems induced users to once again seek
alternative ways of attaining the same information.
Hospital XYZ Knowledge EA View
One of Hospital XYZ's core capabilities is the provision of team based care stemming
from its multiple medical and surgical specialties, which allow it to provide high quality
care to patients suffering from multiple illnesses. To that effect, evidenced-based-
medicine practices are beginning to be pursued on a service unit individual basis.
However, different service units developed different mental models as to how to run their
individual operations, therefore, knowledge became highly embedded and specific to
each service unit.
Additionally, the previously mentioned electronic medical record would supposedly
provide a single point of information to assist in the delivery of care. However, clinical
staff members found it difficult to retrieve real time previously captured patient related
data, and resorted instead to redundantly asking for said information once again.
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Similarly, in some cases valuable information existed within Hospital XYZ, and was
known by a particular stakeholder to be the case. However, said stakeholder would
consistently be denied access to the information (e.g. ED physicians enquiring about their
financial contribution; clinical and administrative support staff wanting access to OR
databases; etc). Notably, the lack of access wasn't a function of the information systems
fragmentation, but rather a distinctive access privilege decision made by the owner(s) of
the desired information.
Finally, Hospital XYZ exhibited an organizational learning capability at different levels
of its staff. To begin with, nursing staff would rotate through various service units within
Hospital XYZ, and not only acquire additional clinical skills, but also familiarize
themselves with the different systems (e.g. electronic, paper-based, processes, people,
etc) and become enterprise knowledgeable employees. Such employees are critical for the
functioning of Hospital XYZ, as they facilitate the flow of patients and information, and
even more so, in the absence of clear standards and fragmented information systems.
Furthermore, different service units exhibited an innate predisposition towards
continuously improving their internal processes (e.g. track patient discharges and reasons
for delays) as well as those interacting with other service units (i.e. admitting ED patients
to an inpatient service unit).
Hospital XYZ Organization EA View
Hospital XYZ's origin and early beginnings was previously described in section 7.1.
Essentially, Hospital XYZ is a non-profit physician led medical center and teaching
hospital with a longstanding culture of specialized teams. The hospital began as a for-
profit physician group practice led by its founding surgeon which rapidly increased the
size of the practice as he offered more specialized care. Since its inception, the CEO of
Hospital XYZ has always been a surgeon. As part of its growth plans, the group practice
decided to build its own hospital in the late 1970s in order to have more control over
patients and over the financial flow. The group practice was allowed to build its hospital
in its current location and to change its status to non-profit, provided that it added
primary and emergency care services to its service offering. Both the state and the
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surrounding community made that an ultimatum requirement for Hospital XYZ to build
its hospital. Senior leadership complied but still today defines its character as specialized
care primarily engaged in tertiary diagnostics, rather than being a community hospital. In
essence, unlike other hospitals which acquired or contracted physician group practices,
Hospital XYZ began as a group practice and built its own hospital. Nonetheless, when the
capitation payment model was in vogue, Hospital XYZ did increase its primary care
physician practices throughout the region, and geared operations towards covering a
greater number of patients, whilst managing their care and keeping them healthy. Over
time, capitation fell out of favor with the public, and Hospital XYZ didn't appreciate
insurance company arrangements either, and thus returned to a fee-for-service model.
Notably, despite the significant differences in the payment models, Hospital XYZ's
baseline objective and indeed culture, were the same, namely to continue to grow
financially and its reputation of excellence of providing high-tech multispecialty care.
Hospital XYZ has clearly been successful in achieving these goals as evidenced in its
strong financial numbers and the multiple awards given by third party organizations.
Hospital XYZ's enterprise organizational climate is strongly aligned amongst clinical
staff across various functional areas and at multiple levels of authority. It isn't uncommon
to find clinical staff that has been with the organization for at least 15 years, and each and
every one of them resonates with the mission of delivering the highest level of care in any
patient encounter. However, a close examination of the interview data depicts strong
differences of opinion, as to how Hospital XYZ is delivering on its overall mission. There
are essentially three groups within the organization. On one side of the spectrum there are
those who are close to Hospital XYZ's culture of providing high-tech procedures, and are
thus receptive and aligned with senior leadership. It is clear that they realize that the ED
is struggling with overcrowding but their priority is towards elective cases, and resources
are geared towards accommodating the specialist clinics. On the other side of the
spectrum there are those who feel that Hospital XYZ is failing to deliver the adequate
level of care to the surrounding community, which requires not only high-tech procedures,
but also primary and emergency care services, as per Hospital XYZ's initial mandate, or
that which is expected of any hospital. Furthermore, physician leadership in the ED felt
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that it had been neglected not only in terms of investment but also with regards to the
ED's contribution to sustaining Hospital XYZ's procedure oriented growth strategy. In
the middle of the spectrum were those who didn't particularly side with senior leadership,
or the physician leadership of a particular service, and were sensitive to both elective and
emergency patients. Finally, within senior leadership itself, the non-clinical leaders (i.e.
CFO and Chief of Strategy) felt that other leaders (i.e. CEO and COO) sided with
physicians in the organization, and didn't push through with previously agreed measures
that would change and improve the system.
At a service unit level, organizational climates were consistent insofar that patient
throughput was high and clinical staff felt stretched to accommodate patient demand.
Furthermore, Hospital XYZ's staff was employed under a salaried model. Notably, not
everyone received the same salary and there was some indication that higher revenue
generating subspecialties were rewarded accordingly with higher salaries. Finally,
inpatient service units were also consistent in describing their general frustration towards
housekeeping and the inherent process complexity entailed by the fragmented
information systems.
When considering the various service units there were distinctive differences
characterizing their subculture and organizational climate. On one end of the spectrum,
there was the ED. As noted, the ED physician leadership felt neglected by senior
leadership, which contributed to frustration and was evidence of their low importance in
the enterprise power environment. Such frustration was also evident among other clinical
workers, who were quitting their job at Hospital XYZ, as they didn't feel they were
providing the specialized care they were trained for, and also felt frustrated with the
complexity of the underlying system (e.g. IT systems, processes, etc). Interestingly, the
ED provided for a safe environment where clinical staff of all levels felt that they could
engage with others to ask for help or even to question decisions. Moreover, nurses and
physicians worked very closely and valued each other's contribution to the delivery of
care.
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On the other side of the spectrum was cardiology and the way it operated the inpatient
service unit 5W. Being the highest revenue generator for Hospital XYZ enabled
cardiology's leadership to focus on elective cases, and to regard the ED as their buffer, or
a means to support their operations (e.g. order additional tests; delay admitting patients;
etc). Notably, the communication amongst senior physicians and nurses in 5W was poor,
and nurses had not only been denied regular debriefings with physicians, but were also
very careful in their interactions with physicians. All in all, 5W concentrating the
majority of cardiology patients, was a reflection of cardiology's predisposition towards
clinics, and the cathlab, while remaining at an arm's length from other service units, and
the ED in particular.
In the middle of the spectrum, in terms of clinical specialties, were neurosurgery and
orthopedics, which were also reputation flagships for Hospital XYZ and generated a
combined 14.31% of total patient revenues. As with the ED, nurses and physicians
worked closely together and valued each other's contribution to the delivery of care.
Senior physician leadership was protective of its resources (i.e. OR orthopedics database
inaccessible to outsiders) but very open to streamlining processes with the ED, despite it
only representing similar patient volume as the ED supplied cardiology with. Notably,
clinical staff in inpatient service unit 7C was proactive towards continuous improvement,
and regularly sought process improvements in their operations, while being mindful to
other services in Hospital XYZ. However, such proactive posture also reflected a
frustration towards the underlying support that clinical and administrative support staff
was able to provide.
Interestingly, both clinical and administrative support staff expressed frustrations of their
own towards Hospital XYZ's senior leadership, as well as the medical and surgical
specialties and inpatient service units. In terms of clinical support services, these
primarily experienced frustration towards the localized optimization behaviors that were
common practice and were adversely affecting their own operations (e.g. a lab specimen
without any orders; drugs being stolen from other drug dispensing units; etc). However,
they were also sensitive to the issues that were driving such behaviors (e.g. fragmented
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and arcane information systems). Some of the clinical support staff also sided with the
ED in their appreciation that Hospital XYZ wasn't meeting the expectations of the
surrounding community in terms of primary and emergency care, but they also conceded
that healthcare is in general a fierce market environment, and thus senior leadership's
focus on high revenue generating procedures.
In terms of administrative support services, these were consistently struggling with the
localized optimization behaviors that were common practice and adversely affected their
ability to maximize Hospital XYZ's throughput (e.g. nurses from different service units
couldn't cover for each other because they had different standards for the same type of
processes). Similarly, they were frustrated in their inability to access existing information
held by specific ORs. Different stakeholders felt differently empowered and supported by
Hospital XYZ's senior leadership. Notably, the Quality and Safety department expressed
a concern towards senior leadership's lack of prioritization, and 90% of process
improvement initiatives following external requirements without any clear direct
relationship to a core internal strategy. Conversely, administrative support for inpatient
services (e.g. perioperative services), were aligned with senior leadership, as they were
responsible for managing medical and surgical procedure related operations.
Finally, with regards to the modes of service unit coordination, these followed closely the
characterization of the service unit's organizational climate and subculture. In general,
flagship specialties had higher importance in the enterprise's power environment, and
exercised a greater degree of control over their service unit, as well as influence beyond
the boundary of their service unit. Furthermore, the use of Charge Nurses responsible for
facilitating flow within and across designated inpatient service units, was common
practice across Hospital XYZ (i.e. boundary spanners). However, different service units
adopted more sophisticated practices in terms of their boundary spanning activities (e.g.
proactively visiting another inpatient service unit, or the ED, or the hospital patient bed
board). Similarly, adhoc cross departmental and service unit management boards were
invariably implemented and sustained.
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Hospital XYZ Process EA View
The delivery of specialized care often entails a series of complex processes which ideally
follow pre-established evidenced-based-practices so as to deliver the highest quality of
care. However, determining what constitutes evidenced-based-medicine and assessing
whether or not these are being followed, more often than not requires both clinical
training and expert knowledge in a given subspecialty, which were beyond the skill set of
our research team and would have represented a much too granular lens in the context of
this enterprise level research. Instead, our analysis from a Process EA View primarily
concerned enterprise level processes, and from that lens also included evidenced-based-
medicine practices as appropriate (e.g. patient handoff between service units).
In general we found that various service units had adopted their own standardized
practices and workarounds, as a result of their local optimization behavior. At times, said
behavior resulted in visible improvements (e.g. patient flow) within and across service
units. However, it was also often the case where said behavior hindered other service
units upstream and downstream. Examples included patient beds being requested ahead
of time, or definite ED admissions being delayed purposefully to get additional tests, etc.
As a result, undesirablefirefighting had become common practice in order to streamline
a series of broken processes, and resolve issues arising from scarce resources being
requested by competing specialties.
A direct result of these practices is a diminished ability for the enterprise to measure its
performance. The absence of stable and standard processes compromised enterprise
process improvement and planning initiatives. Notably, the previously examined
fragmented information systems, also negatively contributed to a lesser performance
measurement capability. However, there were other issues compromising Hospital
XYZ's Process EA View. Specifically, administrative support services consistently
focused their attention in redesigning processes within each service unit, in an attempt to
maximize local efficiency, and did so at the potential expense of adjacent service units in
the value stream. In essence, Hospital XYZ was following the industry standard of lean
implementations, which seldom considered improvement beyond the boundary of a
Page 406 of 759
single service unit, and never specifically considered the enterprise as a whole (i.e.
beyond the process architecture). One notable example was the contracting of lean
experts to increase the throughput between the ED and radiology for those patients
requiring contrast imaging, following a new performance incentive established by
Medicare for that process. The improvement initiative not only cost a significant amount
of resources (i.e. consultants and organizational labor) but also failed to consider that less
than 3% of the ED's patients required that particular process. Evidently, at least in this
instance, improvement efforts involved two service units, but the same improvement
resources could have been better applied elsewhere, and would have attained a higher rate
of organizational acceptance (i.e. generally those involved in improvement efforts felt
that their cost didn't translate into worthwhile benefits).
Finally, Hospital XYZ could partially be considered to be measuring hospital enterprise
performance insofar as it captures the multiple performance dimensions identified in
Chapter 2. However, although the performance content is holistic, processing of said
content and subsequent decision making, is very fragmented. For example, one
department concerns itself with operational metrics, while another department focuses on
financial metrics, and yet another one on clinical metrics, and none of them cross-
reference their data in order to holistically examine enterprise performance. Similarly,
different service units had access to different performance dimensions concerning their
individual operations, and were even denied access to additional existing information.
Finally, it is important to note that a more thorough examination of EA View interactions
will further explain why these practices were taking place. Ultimately, we determined
that holistic content was available, but it was being processed in a fragmented way, and
ultimately preventing hospital enterprise performance measurement.
Hospital XYZ Service EA View
Hospital XYZ has several mechanisms in place to help manage its extended enterprise,
although these are adopted at different levels of the organization. At an enterprise level,
Hospital XYZ is building a specialized referral network through its medical training
programs, and its close partnerships with surrounding community hospitals which refer
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them the most complex cases. Similarly, Hospital XYZ has centralized procurement of its
supplies (e.g. drugs, surgical kits, etc) through one of the largest healthcare distributors in
the US. However, at a service unit level there are different practices in place with regards
to the management of the extended enterprise. As previously noted, some service units
are proactive in their continuous improvement and to that effect have implemented
processes that help manage the relationship with patients and their respective families, as
well as with other providers for follow-on care (e.g. rehab facilities). Similarly, said
service units adopt demand leveling practices which manage the elective case flow from
clinics, with regards to the expected discharge flow within the hospital. Conversely, other
service units don't apply any of these practices while attempting to accommodate as
much elective volume as possible.
In terms of service architecture management, once again Hospital XYZ exhibits variable
behavior amongst different service units. Partly it is a refection of the just mentioned
leveling flow practices in place. Similarly, the quality of the relationship amongst clinical
staff, impacts the information availability and timeliness, which are essential to manage
patient flow. Some inpatient service units are better able to discharge their patients and
manage their interactions with the ED, as a direct result of their nurse-physician
communication practices (i.e. 7C). The variability amongst service units necessarily
impacts the service sustainability, both in terms of the quality of the patient's experience
and that of the clinical staff caring for them. For instance, patients who find themselves in
a stable condition waiting for a considerable amount of time in the ED, become
aggravated and even hostile towards the clinical staff. Similarly, clinical staff find
themselves stretched, and in some cases wondering whether they will be able to resolve
patient flow issues, while in others finding themselves dissatisfied with caring for
patients that require a different type of skill. Additionally, and most evident amongst ED
physicians, clinical staff may feel unable to adequately care for their patients, and have
considerable animosity towards others within Hospital XYZ. In essence, different patient
populations were having a better experience, as were the clinical staff caring for them.
Beyond clinical staff, a divide seems to exist between clinical and administrative support
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services with the various service units, as these at times don't share vital information that
could help in the management of the service architecture.
All in all, the prevailing practices in terms of the management of the extended enterprise
and the hospital's service architecture reflect a mostly fragmented service architecture
awareness/appreciation. Specifically, a service unit which solely concerns itself with its
own operations (as evidenced by local optimization behaviors, or policies focused only
on elective patients), demonstrates a lack of appreciation for the underlying service
architecture. Conversely, a service unit which is sensitive to the potential repercussions
from changing its local processes, and engages with other service units to work towards
streamlining flow, is evidently aware and appreciative of the underlying service
architecture. Notably, at times the adverse impacts of service unit behaviors are unknown
to those sustaining said behaviors, and thus demonstrate more of a lack of awareness,
rather than appreciation. However, in the case of Hospital XYZ's senior leadership in
particular, there is both a lack of awareness and appreciation, which together further
hinder the service architecture. One example was senior leadership's surprise upon
realizing that its proposed self check-in kiosks envisioned for the ED, would have
minimal effect on the overall patient flow, as compared to the time spent in other key
processes. Ultimately, both a lack of awareness and appreciation were evident in the
scope of enterprise transformation plans (e.g. strategic planning document had no
mentioning of the ED, and was primarily focused on building new ORs, without adding
additional bed capacity).
Finally, despite the architectural dysfunctionalities highlighted this far, Hospital XYZ
was undoubtedly successful on its integrated multispecialty care delivery strategy, as
compared to the traditional fragmented provider cottage industry where patients have to
travel and wait a significant time between appointments with different physicians and
collecting different ancillary tests. As previously noted, one of Hospital XYZ's core
capabilities is the provision of team based care stemming from its multiple medical and
surgical specialties, which allow it to provide high quality care to patients suffering from
multiple illnesses. However, our analysis uncovered the importance of also evaluating
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said integrated practices in terms of the service continuity, namely the care provided
within and across patient visits, and not only during a single visit. Such a construct is key
in ultimately assessing whether or not a hospital enterprise is adopting lean enterprise
principles. In the case of Hospital XYZ, two particular phenomena are evidence that
mindful management towards service continuity was absent. First, senior leadership
measured its service architecture in terms of system use (i.e. patient encounters) rather
than patient centered care, as evidenced by its performance measurement reports (i.e.
volume based), and its underlying information systems (i.e. indexed by patient encounter
number). Second, and more concerning, important information pertaining to multiple
patient visits could potentially go unnoticed to the multiple physicians caring for a
particular patient suffering from multiple illnesses. In essence, potentially adverse effects
from a patient's system failure weren't being communicated with those responsible for
his or her other internal systems. Finally, it is important to note that a more thorough
examination of EA View interactions will further explain why these practices were taking
place.
Hospital XYZ Strategy EA View
Hospital XYZ's strategic goals, vision, and business model have been previously
described in sections 7.1 and 7.5. Essentially, the key elements of Hospital XYZ's
strategy were said to be the integrated multispecialty care delivery, the provision of
highly sophisticated care, medical teaching (i.e. medical students, residents, and fellows),
and finally, its community hospital alliances. All four strategic elements are meant to
support the overall goal of continuously growing financially strong, so as to also
continuously increase Hospital XYZ's reputation of excellence in providing high-tech
multispecialty care. Hospital XYZ has clearly been successful in achieving these goals as
evidenced in its strong financial numbers and the multiple awards given by third party
organizations. However, an assessment based on lean enterprise principles, whilst
leveraging our privileged access to the organization, reveals significant room for
improvement in terms of Hospital XYZ's Strategy EA View.
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To begin with, it is clear from both the quantitative archival analysis and qualitative data
analysis that the ED is contributing towards Hospital XYZ's core growth strategy both
financially and in supporting inpatient operations. However, in several of our initial
interactions with senior leadership, their assessment was quite the opposite. Moreover,
senior leadership (and admittedly some inpatient specialties) didn't readily recognize the
ED's contribution, and had no intention in significantly investing in their capabilities.
In terms of enterprise strategy alignment it was evident that a key conflict existed
between a growth strategy centered on high revenue generating subspecialties, and a state
and community mandate to provide primary and emergency care. Close examination of
the Strategic and Operational Plans shared by Hospital XYZ's senior leadership, show no
less than 16 strategic objectives (i.e. advance evidenced based medicine; care process
management redesign; functional unit strategic growth planning; philanthropy; electronic
medical record development; medical education strategy; medical research strategy;
customer relationship management; physician recruitment; nurse recruitment; operations
improvement; people strategies; primary care re-engineering; retail and cash services;
supply chain management; and safety). By inspection, the ED is neither included in any
of these 16 strategic objectives, nor in any part of the strategic documents. Furthermore,
the extensive list of objectives is additional evidence of the lack of prioritization
mentioned by the Quality and Safety department. It can, therefore, be concluded that
Hospital XYZ's strategic portfolio exhibited both conflicting strategies as well as a
diluted attention span.
Finally, when considering the enterprise transformation projects underway, and as
previously mentioned, it was clear that senior leadership was favoring investing in
specific segments of its service architecture (i.e. ORs) whilst neglecting other upstream
and downstream service units. The criterion for said investments was determined on an
independent functional unit basis and in terms of the revenue generating potential.
Clearly, this approach didn't follow several of the lean enterprise principles outlined in
Chapter 2. For instance, only investing in the ORs failed to consider the
interdependencies with other service units (i.e. 4 th principle), and electing to only focus
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on higher revenue generating services (i.e. non-holistic as per 1" principle), alienated
several stakeholders within Hospital XYZ and also hindered its relationship with the
surrounding community (i.e. 2nd principle).
Ultimately, it is important to note that Hospital XYZ's behaviors examined from a
Strategy EA View, strongly reflect the effect of EA View interactions. In its simplest
form, senior leaders are in themselves part of the Organization EA View, and upon
executing their leadership processes (Process EA View), they define and refine the
Strategy EA View. Several of these interactions, as well as others, will now be described
in detail in the next section.
7.3.3.2 Hospital XYZ EA View Interaction Analysis
In Chapter 3 we clarified that the meaning of holistic pertains not only to an enlarged
number of views used a framework but also to an "understanding of the interactions of
the views [which] becomes of increased importance" (Rhodes and Nightingale 2008). As
noted before, this research adopted an enterprise diagnostic mindset and held no pre-
conceived notion of organizational element interactions including strength and direction.
Such an approach reflects the described nascent phase of EA theoretical development and
allowed for the iterative improvement of our understanding and characterization of each
of the EA views both individually and holistically while comparing and contrasting
empirical results within and across cases.
Notably, hundreds of EA View interaction instances were documented over the course of
our analysis, as evident in the detailed descriptions for each of Hospital XYZ's
stakeholder groups. What follows is a description of the dominant EA View interactions
that emerged from the exploratory case of Hospital XYZ, which further explain the
enterprise's performance and the extent of lean enterprise principles being adopted.
A series of regulatory requirements on multiple EA Views
Etternal Infornation Knowledge Organizatlon Process Service
The influence of external stakeholder value requirements and those of regulatory
agencies in particular, directly affects multiple EA Views. The following are the most
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prominent for a hospital enterprise. Hospital enterprise information systems need to be in
place in order to capture patient treatment information, which is later used for billing
purposes, and while ensuring patient privacy (i.e. HIPAA14 5 ). Expert panels determine
evidenced-based-medicine practices embodied in codified clinical pathways which should
be followed by hospital providers, and in several cases require public reporting if the
hospital is to receive payment for services rendered. Modes ofservice unit coordination
need to oversee the continuity of patient care when transferring a patient between service
units. Set patient-to-nurse ratio standards need to be adhered to and these vary in terms of
patient severity. Service continuity needs to be assured whenever pertinent information
regarding a patient becomes known to a provider who should then act appropriately and
contact the patient if need be (e.g. ED tracking down patients who left-without-being-
seen by a physician and whose test results signaled a complication requiring immediate
attention).
Strategy enacting upon both the payment model and the enterprise's core culture
External Organizatien Service Strategy
The definition of Hospital XYZ's enterprise strategy elements reflects the influence of its
enterprise history and culture as well as that of external stakeholder value requirements.
Hospital XYZ's decision to grow high revenue generating service lines, followed the
enterprise's procedure oriented culture, and responded to the incentives posed by the fee-
for-service payment model. Notably, when the payment model was geared towards
capitation, Hospital XYZ changed its service architecture by increasing the number of
primary care provider locations, and implementing processes to manage patient care and
keep them healthy. Upon reversing back to the fee-for-service model, Hospital XYZ
began dismantling its primary care network, and started building its reputation around the
higher revenue generating services.
145 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
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A non-appreciated ED
External Orgawiratien Strategr
The ED was contributing financially to Hospital XYZ's core growth strategy as well as
supporting its operations. However, senior leadership as well as some inpatient
specialties weren't aware or appreciate the ED's contribution. A series of internal and
external factors may be contributing to this phenomenon. First, since its inception,
Hospital XYZ had to provide primary and emergency care services as mandated by
external stakeholders (i.e. the state, following pressure from the surrounding community).
The provision of emergency care was seen as a necessary nuisance towards reaching the
desired goal (i.e. building Hospital XYZ). In essence, emergency care wasn't considered
part of Hospital XYZ's core culture. Second, it is common practice for hospitals not to be
reimbursed for services rendered in the ED on patients that were later admitted. All of the
patient's stay is normally only billable as a single code meant to represent all of the
services rendered throughout the patient's stay. As a result, the ED's financial
contribution is further removed from senior leadership's analysis.
A narrow enterprise transformation scope compromising service sustainability and
organizational climate
External Organization Service Strategy
Investment decisions were based on each service unit's 'financial credential', or more
simply, its expected return-on-investment as determined by the services which payers
were willing to pay higher prices. Since its inception the ED only underwent minor
localized improvements and wasn't targeted with significant capital investment.
Conversely, a series of ORs were newly built in order to accommodate the increased
volume of elective cases stemming from a growing specialist referral network, and
extensive marketing campaigns. Notably, the enterprise transformation scope was
narrow as it focused on building ORs, but didn't add capability in terms of inpatient beds,
recovery room beds, ED beds, or additional labor at any of these service units. A series of
internal issues resulted from this. First, it worsened the organizational climate at both an
enterprise level and service unit level, as the ED felt neglected and competing for scarce
resources with inpatient specialties. Second, it compromised service sustainability both in
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terms of patient experience and that of enterprise employees. Patients found themselves
waiting for a considerable amount of time in the ED, and in particular those of acuity
level 3, normally associated with traditional emergency care needs of a hospital's
surrounding community. Employees were stretched thin trying to accommodate increased
patient volume with the same amount of resources, while at the same time feeling a
deterioration of their interaction with no longer cooperative patients, and ultimately,
feeling a disconnect with their role as they were treating patients that required different
care skills. Moreover, the compromised service sustainability further exacerbated a
deteriorated organizational climate.
A diluted and narrow enterprise process improvement and planning scope
Extenal Organization Process sevice Strategr
Enterprise process improvement and planning lacks prioritization from senior leadership
who requires Quality and Safety to implement and improve several processes demanded
by different external stakeholders. A series of internal issues resulted from this. First,
Quality and Safety, as well as process improvement engineers, were critical of senior
leadership's approach, and although they didn't do so in an outwardly fashion, it
deteriorated the enterprise organizational climate. Second, Quality and Safety employees
felt stretched in pursuing multiple disparate initiatives which were narrowly focused on
specific processes that mostly resided within a single service unit. Ultimately,
improvements neglected service architecture awareness and merely followed what was
required by regulatory and large payer stakeholders, rather than an enterprise strategy.
Fragmented and costly state-of-the-art information systems compromise process
measurement capability and service architecture management
Infornalon OrgWizatin Process Service
Hospital XYZ lacked overall information systems integration which was the result of
several factors and in turn generated multiple enterprise behaviors. To begin with each
service unit exercised its influence to acquire state-of-the-art software without an initial
reference to the overarching IT architecture, which invariably compromised the degree of
information systems integration. In turn, vendors of existing software solutions in place
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demanded expensive fees in order to build additional information systems capability. As
such, this further reinforced localprocess optimization behavior whereby different
service units would continue to buy isolated software solutions, or would build their own
homegrown solutions, which were equally disconnected from the overall IT architecture.
Five related issues arose from said system fragmentation. First, there was a reduced
process measurement capability as data couldn't be easily aggregated across the different
systems, and some service units refused to share their homegrown data. Secondly, service
architecture awareness was compromised as there wasn't a means of conducting end-to-
end quantitative workflow analysis (e.g. determining how much time is spent in each of
the ED's key processes, as well as in transferring patients to different inpatient service
units). Third, this represented a missed opportunity to support enterprise process
improvement andplanning beyond the traditionally narrow lean implementations. Fourth,
fragmented systems require additional human intervention, and hence add to the process
complexity carried out by clinical staff members (e.g. lab technicians need to track down
patients by calling multiple inpatient service units; nurses need to insert redundant
information into multiple systems; etc). Finally, service architecture management as a
whole may be compromised as information isn't available in as timely fashion as possible,
and patients are consistently required to provide information which they have given
before, thereby adversely impacting their patient experience.
External factors may induce service unit behaviors which lack a service architecture
appreciation
Extemal Orgaization Process SOOvice
Hospital XYZ's external context and stakeholder value requirements induce different
behaviors on different service units which ultimately trigger other effects across the
enterprise. For instance, the ED faced with increased patient demand and struggling with
service sustainability as evidenced in its overcrowding with patient's boarding in the ED,
resorts to localprocess optimization behavior by attempting to secure inpatient beds
ahead of time, or transferring patients to GIM before conducting baseline tests. Such
practices have the potential of compromising service architecture management elsewhere
in the enterprise, as beds are potentially being held unnecessarily, and clinical staff are
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having to oversee patients who aren't yet in a stable enough condition. Similarly, the
focus of some inpatient specialties on elective cases, prevents the ED from admitting its
patients, and hence exacerbates the ED's optimization behavior and adversely affects its
organizational climate. Several other related examples emerged in analyzing Hospital
XYZ (e.g. ordering lab tests with blank orders to prompt a lab technician call back;
nurses holding on to beds and delaying be availability in the system to avoid receiving
another patient; admitted patients held in the ED to conduct tests which could be done as
inpatients; drugs being stolen from drug dispensing machines to ease a nurse's own care
process; inpatient specialties capping their admissions even though inpatient beds and
staff are available, etc). Ultimately, whenever a service unit carries out local optimization
behaviors without concern for the potential impact upstream and downstream to other
service units, it is effectively lacking (or potentially ignoring) a service architecture
awareness.
Local optimization behaviors may compromise organizational learning capability and
reinforce enterprise fragmentation
Knowledge Organization Process Service
As noted, different service units exhibited different localprocess optimization behaviors.
Said behaviors at times resulted in local standards which reducedflexibility and increased
complexity as it prevented nurses from being readily shared amongst inpatient service
units, and also increased the process variability amongst interacting units (e.g. there were
unnecessarily multiple ways of servicing different units for the same simple task).
Additionally, local standards weren't codified into protocols or training manuals and thus
resided as tacit knowledge and required human resources to enable their transfer to other
employees. In turn, this further reduced flexibility as service units became dependant on
specific "go to" employees (e.g. ED bed "air traffic controller"). Ultimately, the existence
of localized undocumented process optimization behaviors, hindered Hospital XYZ's
organizational learning capability, and reinforced its fragmentation.
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Different internal architectural configurations exhibit different levels of service
architecture awareness and make decisions that enable different levels of hospital
performance
Infetlaon Knowlede OrganIzanon Process Service
Hospital XYZ had multiple internal architectural configurations embodied in its service
units, and which generated different levels of hospital enterprise performance.
Neurosurgery and orthopedics (centralized in inpatient service unit 7C) questioned
Hospital XYZ's information systems sustainability, and initially struggled with
maintaining service sustainability (i.e. unsatisfied patients). However, their local
physician leadership held sufficient service unit enterprise importance and were able to
institute local process optimization behaviors targeted at both 7C and the ED. Examples
include the creation of paper-based surveys to track 7C's discharge performance as well
as its ED admissions performance. Furthermore, physician leadership fostered a safe
environment for both junior medical staff and nurses, thereby enhancing their service unit
organizational climate as well as improving communication about patient treatment and
patient flow. Similarly, charge nurses were critical boundary spanners as they proactively
engaged with both the ED and hospital's patient bed board to discuss patient flow.
Notably, such initiatives allowed 7C to improve its service architecture management (e.g.
level elective cases with expected discharge; discharge patients every morning by 10am).
Ultimately, clinical staff in 7C had an organizational learning capability which allowed
them to compensate for compromised hospital information systems, and successfully
address service sustainability. All in all, we established that unlike Hospital XYZ's
inpatient service unit 5W (i.e. worse performer), the inpatient service unit 7C had
gradually developed an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture,
and had made decisions which improved not only their local performance but also
enhanced its interactions with other service units upstream and downstream.
7.8 Chapter 7 Summary
In this chapter we presented the first of our two in-depth exploratory studies of leading
multispecialty hospitals, as we empirically and theoretically enriched MIT's Nightingale-
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Rhodes Enterprise Architecture Framework (NREAF), and explored whether an enriched
understanding of hospital enterprise architecture can improve hospital performance
We followed our hybrid research design which consisted of qualitative and quantitative
data collected from multiple levels of the organization, and assessed multiple dimensions
of performance, using both subjective and objective data. A total of 34 interviews were
conducted, of which 29 were recorded, transcribed, and subsequently coded. Several
walkthroughs, hosted by various clinical staff members, were made throughout different
areas of Hospital XYZ, as well as a series of non-participatory observations made at
different days of the week and at different times of day. Finally, archival record analysis
examined two separate data samples. The first one consisted of a month's worth of data
with approximately 3000 patients, of which approximately 700 were admitted as
inpatients to Hospital XYZ, and for all of which detailed patient throughput was analyzed.
The second sample consisted of a year's worth of data with approximately 24000
inpatient discharges, which allowed assessing the contribution of each service unit, and
their respective patient source, to Hospital XYZ's performance.
We determined that Hospital XYZ's ED was indeed overcrowding but largely because of
its interaction with inpatient specialties and their respective inpatient service units, rather
than it being a matter of simply increasing productivity in the ED, as initially proposed by
senior leadership. Furthermore, when measuring Hospital XYZ end-to-end we
determined that its ED was contributing directly to the core growth strategy of high
revenue generating procedures, as well as supporting hospital operations in general.
However, the ED was struggling to care for acuity level 3 patients, who were consistent
with the primary and emergency care needs of the surrounding community.
A close examination of the coded qualitative evidence, together with the quantitative
archival record analysis, and the insights generated from chapters 2 and 3, gave rise to a
total of 24 main categories and 53 subcategories in the enrichment of MIT'S NREAF.
Leveraging our enriched version of the NREAF, the data was reanalyzed, comparing and
contrasting findings within and across cases, and ultimately identifying dominant EA
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View interactions, which further characterized Hospital XYZ's EA in relation to its
performance, and the extent to which lean enterprise principles were being adopted.
We identified that a hospital enterprise may consist of multiple internal architectural
configurations, and that these in turn generate different levels of hospital enterprise
performance, where performance is measured as a multidimensional construct, both in
terms of dimensions and stakeholders. Specifically, a specialty and/or hospital generating
high revenue by focusing on elective cases, while pressuring or indeed neglecting
emergency cases, and in doing so affecting stakeholders within and across the hospital
enterprise, isn't in line with the practices of a lean enterprise. However, the reverse
behavior whereby the needs of elective and emergency cases, as well as those of the
specialties servicing them, are addressed in a transparent and balanced manner, are in line
with the practices of a lean enterprise, and more capable of delivering higher hospital
enterprise performance. Specifically, we established that unlike Hospital XYZ's inpatient
service unit 5W (i.e. worse performer), the inpatient service unit 7C had gradually
developed an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture, and had
made decisions which improved not only their local performance but also enhanced
its interactions with other service units upstream and downstream. Finally, it seems
that an architectural deficiency in one or more EA Views, may be compensated by the
particular configuration of the remaining EA Views.
We clarified that hospital enterprise performance measurement should not only be
assessed in terms of its content adhering to lean enterprise principles, but also whether
the process analyzing said content also follows lean enterprise principles. Specifically,
Hospital XYZ could partially be considered to be measuring hospital enterprise
performance insofar as it captures the multiple performance dimensions identified in
Chapter 2. However, although the performance content is holistic, processing of said
content and subsequent decision making, is very fragmented. For example, one
department concerns itself with operational metrics, while another department focuses on
financial metrics, and yet another one on clinical metrics, and none of them cross-
reference their data in order to holistically examine enterprise performance. Similarly,
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different service units had access to different performance dimensions concerning their
individual operations, and were even denied access to additional existing information.
Ultimately we argued that a lean enterprise hospital would measure its performance in the
context of all of its patient population, including elective and emergency cases, and all of
its service units.
Finally, the healthcare literature regards integrated multispecialty providers as being
better able to offer efficient higher quality care, as compared to what is traditionally
described as the US's provider cottage industry. Hospital XYZ has clearly been
successful as evidenced by its strong financial numbers and the multiple awards given by
third party organizations. However, our privileged access to the organization, revealed
fragmentation at several levels, and significant room for improvement.
In the next chapter we present the second of our two in-depth exploratory studies of
leading multispecialty hospitals, as we continued to empirically and theoretically enrich
MIT'S NREAF, and sought to test whether replication occurred with regards to our
Hospital XYZ case findings described above.
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8. UK Hospital In-Depth Study
What follows is the second of the two in-depth exploratory studies of leading multi-
specialty hospitals. Hospital ABC' 4 6 is located in the UK, and as with the previous
chapter's in-depth case, it is ranked at the top 1% acute hospital in its country, and also
grappling with a nationwide problem in 2008. Specifically, the NHS was beginning to
apply financial pressure for hospitals to shorten elective surgery operating waiting lists.
However, the intent of this chapter is not to compare Hospital ABC to Hospital XYZ but
rather to continue to explore and further our understanding of the inherent complexity of
high performing hospitals, to demonstrate the benefits of a systems thinking research
approach, and determine to what extent literal replication14 7 across both cases is
established.
This chapter starts out by introducing Hospital ABC and presenting its history followed
by a description of senior leadership's initial problem statement, and our necessary
research design refinements. The subsequent three subsections describe in detail different
areas of the hospital both individually and in relation to each other, namely the Main
Operating Rooms, Administrative Support Services (e.g. process improvement engineers,
performance and planning managers), and Specific Operating Rooms (i.e. Cardiac and
Neurosurgery). Each subsection analyzes qualitative and/or quantitative evidence as these
became available from building a trust based relationship with the organization and
identifying additional data sources. In essence, inquiry was informed and reflected both
lean enterprise principles and our enriched version of the NREAF presented in the
previous chapter. The latter part of this chapter provides an overview analysis of Hospital
ABC's enterprise architecture, while discussing whether an enriched understanding of
hospital enterprise architecture can improve hospital performance.
146 Hospital ABC is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the enterprise in the case study. Much of
the analysis in the in-depth case is sensitive, so measures were taken to protect ABC's identify and disguise
any identifying data.
147 As noted in section 5.4.2. 1, literal replication occurs when the phenomena of interest is found under
similar conditions across cases (Yin 1994).
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8.1 Hospital ABC Enterprise and its History
Hospital ABC is a multispecialty acute care and teaching hospital in the United Kingdom
(UK), not only serving an inner city population of over 700,000 people but also as a
tertiary referral center to millions of people in the UK. Moreover, the hospital provides
comprehensive local services to an economically challenged and ethnically diverse
population, whilst at the same time builds clinical excellence in a portfolio of specialist
services (e.g. liver transplants, neurosurgery, etc).
Hospital ABC began in the first half of the 1800s and early on pioneered several types of
surgery, which earned it a reputation of being one of the most advanced surgical hospitals
in Europe. The hospital's infrastructure itself was considered to be state-of-the-art at the
time, with the implementation of adequate ventilation systems (e.g. reduce hospital
infections), the ability to generate its own power, and notably one of the first internal
phone systems in the UK. The hospital is incorporated into a one of the UK's best ranked
universities and provides the setting for advanced medical training of students who have
completed their pre-clinical training at the associated university. Hospital ABC's
teaching status was only formally established with the creation of the National Health
Service (NHS) in 1948.
The NHS148 is the UK's publically funded health care system which provides free health
care for all British citizens or legal residents (including foreign nationals). In the event of
emergencies, care is provided for free regardless of citizenship or residence. Essentially,
no percentage of the population is uninsured and no one has to co-pay for their primary
care visits. With an annual budget of over £100 billion, the NHS caters to a population of
51 million people and employs more than 1.3 million people, totaling approximately 1
million full time equivalents, of which 100 thousand are doctors and 300 thousand are
148 There are four NHS systems in the UK, and each of which is managed under a separate government (i.e.
Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and England). However, the English NHS is the only one officially
referred to as the National Health Service.
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nurses (NationalHealthService 2011). On average, qualified nurses earn an annual
salary of £33,300 and consultants14 9 earn E121,700 (NationalHealthService 2010).
Broadly speaking, the NHS is divided into two sections: primary care and secondary care.
Primary care comprises the General Practitioner (GP)15 0 as well as dentists, pharmacists,
and optometrists, whereas secondary care concerns acute care facilities that provide
elective and emergency care. Specifically, elective care means planned specialist medical
care or surgery, usually following referral from a primary or community health
professional such as a general practitioner. Each of the two sections is subdivided into
trusts (e.g. Acute trust, Ambulance trust, Foundation trust, Primary Care trust, etc). An
Acute Trust oversees one or more hospitals. Additionally, trusts may be further
characterized as Foundation Trusts, which grants the institution a greater amount of
operational and financial freedom than those that are merely classified as a Trust (e.g.
managers have the flexibility to reinvest any surplus according to their internal plans, as
opposed to having to return said surplus to the NHS). In total there are 167 Acute NHS
Trusts (129 of which are Foundation Trusts) that oversee a total of 1,600 hospitals and
specialist care centers in the UK.
Hospital ABC is a leading hospital in the NHS and the only hospital part of its
Foundation Trust. In 2006 the hospital derived close to $750 million in operating
revenues which translated into an operating income of $20 million, and at a time when
most hospitals in the region were struggling to break even. With over 5500 staff and close
to 900 patient beds, they have national and international recognition in particular for
hosting the largest transplantation program in Europe for a particular surgical specialty,
as well for their clinical excellence in cardiac, neurosciences, liver, etc. Furthermore,
Hospital ABC also plays a significant role in clinical trials and both practices and
contributes to research whilst adopting a multidisciplinary team model.
149 Consultant is the highest rank for a physician or surgeon in the NHS system regardless of sub specialty.
Its equivalent in the US health care system would be "Attending Physician". For the remainder of this
document we shall refer to them as physicians or surgeons as appropriate.
150 The US equivalent is the Primary Care Physician (PCP).
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8.2 Senior Leadership Initial Problem Statement
In 2008, the shortening of elective wait lists was still an increasing national imperative in
the UK. Specifically, the NHS had instituted a policy entitled 18 Weeks which increased
demands upon hospital operations, as it represented the maximum wait time from a
patient referral to initiating treatment, and in the event of it not being met, the hospital
wouldn't be paid for treating that patient, and would have to face an audit and additional
potential penalties.
Hospital ABC, although a leading hospital in the NHS, and like the remainder of the
country, found itself unable to meet the designated target (i.e. lengthy hospital waiting
lists had always been the norm in the NHS system). As such, when senior leadership was
approached in the context of this research they specifically requested that analysis focus
inside their Main Theaters' 5 1 , and proposed the initial exploratory question of "How to
increase productivity in the Operating Rooms?". Furthermore, they disclosed the
hospital's performance scorecard which indicated that the ORs were only being used on
average at 75%, and the inpatient unit bed utilization was also only 85%. Specifically,
senior leadership thought that the ORs weren't being as productive as they could since, in
their view, they weren't being held back by the inpatient service units (i.e. the bed
utilization was "only" 85%). Hence senior leaders emphasized that the Main ORs were at
fault. Finally, leadership also mentioned its plans to dismantle a prevailing individualistic
culture amongst surgeons, which was contributing to system inefficiencies and were also
an opportunity to improve patient outcomes.
"how we get individuals to work better together with the intent of improving patient
outcomes. Health services use the word team quite a lot but doctors are very individualist
in their orientation and culture. So we have a lot to do to produce genuine teams. [...]So
we are currently dismantling our current individual approach."
Hospital ABC CEO
151 Main Theaters are the equivalent of Main Operating Rooms in the US. The "Main" designation
traditionally means that several surgical specialties share a given set of operating rooms (ORs). However, it
is also common for multispecialty hospitals to have reserved ORs for specific specialties, as was the case
with Hospital ABC's cardiac, neurosurgery, and liver specialties. For the remainder of the document
Theaters will be referred to as Operating Rooms.
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8.3 Research Design Refinements
Three research design refinements took place when studying Hospital ABC. Two of them
were originally planned, whereas the other one emerged as a necessity having studied
Hospital ABC's information technology architecture capability and determining that it
was significantly inferior to that of Hospital XYZ.
While studying Hospital XYZ, data was collected over a series of onsite visits over an
extended period of time. Conversely, at Hospital ABC data was collected over a one
month period but benefited from the author being continuously onsite and integrated into
the in-house lean department. Said department was a permanent structure that reported
directly to the Director of Strategy and was created by the CEO to conduct lean
transformation projects throughout the hospital. The author wore a badge with the
designation of "Change Leader", had his own desk and telephone at the hospital, and was
always introduced as a PhD student working on an independent research project.
Additionally, data collection at Hospital ABC also benefited from the research
participation of a Harvard Medical School (HMS) student doing a surgery rotation at
Hospital ABC during the same period. By design, only the CEO of Hospital ABC was
aware that the author and the medical student were collaborating on the same research
project, and hence additional valuable insights were obtained from Hospital ABC's
physicians. Specifically, the HMS student collected observational and internal document
data pertaining to her interactions with different surgeons while assisting them on
different patient procedures performed in different ORs. Furthermore, the HMS student
logged her data daily (i.e. within 24 hours from phenomena occurring) so as to preserve
its contents and readily share them with the author, who then added it to his overall data
collection and analysis.
Finally, in the previous chapter, a key insight while studying Hospital XYZ was the
importance of having electronic systems in place that assist in the analysis of workflow
across the hospital enterprise. Hence, electronic medical records are a necessary but
insufficient capability, as these only concern clinical data to assist care practitioners, and
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capture billing charges of any treatments rendered. Nonetheless, disparate information
systems at Hospital XYZ were integrated in the context of this research, and also allowed
for additional financial and workflow analysis. Notably, at Hospital ABC the underlying
information technology infrastructure was limited and consequently constrained our
ability to collect data and conduct quantitative data analysis. Specifically, all patient
medical records were in paper format and all workflow heavily relied on paper and excel
sheets residing in various departments. Pertinently, health care scholars have noted that
"the cost of collecting data depends on each hospital's information capabilities, which
vary among hospitals and over time at any given institution" (Mehrotra, Lee et al. 2003).
However, the determining factor to seek an alternative data collection method was also
the poor accuracy of the recorded data. For instance, the excel sheets mentioned, used
different terminology and relied on the accuracy of whoever inserted and updated the
data. Furthermore, an analysis of a random set of OR operating listsis2 yielded
considerable inconsistencies in the data and made any retrospective data aggregation
efforts meaningless. As a result, theoretical sampling at Hospital ABC took place on the
basis of perceptual data (e.g. which ORs seem to be more efficient?) as well as pre-
existing internal documents describing OR performance.
8.4 Main Operating Rooms Analysis
The data collection and analysis of the Main ORs took place over a one month onsite
assignment and entailed two main phases. The first phase was mainly concerned with
building an initial understanding of operations through a three hour walkthrough and as
many as ten onsite visits on different days of the week and at different hours of the day,
which were ultimately translated into a Value Stream Map (VSM). The second phase
consisted observations and five individual interviews with different clinical staff, three of
which were with physicians (i.e. two surgeons and one anesthesiologist), and two were
with nurses managers (i.e. for the whole of Main ORs, and the recovery room
specifically). All five interviewees allowed for audio recording. What follows is a
description of each phase along with their respective key findings.
152 An operating list is made available daily and comprises a varying number of surgical cases to be
conducted by different surgeons, at different ORs, on different patients, and using different teams.
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8.4.1 1 t Main ORs Phase: Walkthroughs, observations, and VSM
Visits to the Main OR took place at different times of day and every week, so as to
provide for a more representative picture of underlying operations. In following this
approach it was immediately apparent that resource utilization varied with the time of day.
Mornings were particularly hectic, in getting patients from the wards'5 3 to their respective
OR, as were late afternoons when decisions were made on whether or not to cancel
patient procedures. On the day of the first visit to the Main ORs the author was
introduced to the Main OR Coordinator who then proceeded to give an overview of
operations and the overall patient flow in the Main OR.
There are a total of 17 ORs at Hospital ABC: ten are located in the Main ORs, two are
dedicated to Cardiac, three are dedicated to Neuro, one is for Liver, and one is for
Obstetrics. The Main ORs cater to a predefined set of surgical specialties (e.g.
orthopedics, urology, general surgery, etc) but may also accommodate other specialties
that need the extra OR time (e.g. although neuro has its own ORs it also routinely uses
space in the Main ORs). It is important to note that different ORs are accountable to, and
managed by, different divisions within Hospital ABC.
Organizationally, Hospital ABC is divided in a series of divisions called "Care Groups".
Each division houses one or more types of specialties, has its own division director, a
clinical director, and a head of nursing. Additionally, each division has its own
management structure with regards to procurement, recruitment, scheduling, coordination,
and other functions. The Main ORs are part of the Surgery and Critical Care (SCC)
division, and are shared by several surgical specialties. Notably, specific surgical
specialties (i.e. cardiac, neuro, and liver) are part of their own divisions (e.g. Cardiac and
Neuro; Liver and Renal; etc) and have dedicated ORs, which may or not be managed by
their division directly. For instance, whereas the Liver and Renal division have their own
OR and manage it independently, the Cardiac and Neuro division also have dedicated
ORs, but these are managed by the Main OR Coordinator, who ultimately is accountable
113 Wards are the UK equivalent of inpatient service units. For the remainder of this chapter wards will be
referred to as inpatient service units.
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to the division director of the SCC division. Furthermore, as previously noted, some
specialties with dedicated ORs may share OR space provided by the Main ORs. These
organizational distinctions are important in describing the overall context of the Main
ORs, and will be elaborated in further detail in subsequent sections.
Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2 provide for a simplified VSM of the Main OR. The initial
intent was not to derive a very detailed process map with rigorous cycle times but rather
to identify the key processes, information systems, shared resources, and points of
interaction in terms of inflow and outflow to and from the Main OR. The following is a
description of these key elements:
Patient Arrival Modes: Patients undergoing surgical procedures are either seeking
elective care (i.e. scheduled ahead of time) or emergency care (i.e. emergency department
(ED) trauma patient). Emergency patients are only moved from the emergency
department once they have been stabilized, and are thus first transferred to an inpatient
service unit before being brought to the Main OR for additional surgery. Only in very
rare occasions are patients transferred directly from the ED to the Main OR. The bulk of
patients are elective cases and there is a dedicated OR to cater for emergency patients;
hence their flow isn't considered disruptive by the Main OR operations. Both elective and
emergency patients are transferred using two different methods. In some cases the
patients are accompanied by an inpatient service unit nurse who walks them to the Main
OR area, while in others they require a Main OR porter to transport them in their bed.
Porters are managed by the Main OR Coordinator and concern themselves with
transferring patient beds between different service units (e.g. inpatient service unit to
Main OR; recovery room to inpatient service unit; etc).
Main OR Hours of Operation: The Main OR is operational from 8 am to 5 pm, and on
average each OR is meant to carry out three surgical procedures per day. However it is
often the case that operations lists overrun and staff continue to work beyond 5 pm.
Notably, a decision is made on a case-by-case basis as to whether to overrun the hours of
operation or to cancel a case and reschedule it for a different day.
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Figure 8-1: Hospital ABC Main ORs Value Stream Map (1 of 2)
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Figure 8-2: Hospital ABC Main ORs Value Stream Map (2 of 2)
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Fetch 1 't patients: At the beginning of each day the Holding Bay nurse checks the
operating list prepared in the previous day, and triggers the transfer of the first patients
from the inpatient service units to the Main ORs (and other OR specialties). The Holding
Bay is an area meant to function as a buffer between inpatient service units and the ORs,
so that the ORs may call for the patient and have him swiftly available for the designated
surgical procedure. The patient may be transferred to the Holding Bay either using a
porter or walking on his own whilst accompanied by an inpatient service unit nurse. The
transfer mode is specified in the operating list. If a porter is needed, at 7.30 am the
Holding Bay nurse hands a piece of paper to different porters who then proceed to pick
up patients from various inpatient service units, who are meant to undergo a surgical
procedure at 8 am (i.e. the first patients of the day). Theoretically, the porters will arrive
at the designated inpatient service unit and the right patient will be ready for pick up, and
is immediately transferred to the Holding Bay in the Main ORs. Similarly, theoretically
patients capable of walking will be adequately and timely accompanied by their inpatient
service unit nurses to the Holding Bay. The target is to move patients to the Holding Bay
at least ten minutes before their procedure start time.
Check in patient: When the patient arrives at the Holding Bay the Holding Bay nurse
checks-in the patient. Checking-in the patient implies specifying the patient's temporary
location within the Holding Bay, signaling in the Main OR computer system that the
patient has arrived, and phoning the anesthesiologist who will be responsible for inducing
the patient before, during, and after the procedure.
Anesthesiologist verifies patient: The anesthesiologist designated to the patient's case
comes to the Holding Bay and proceeds with the verification of the patient. Is it the right
patient? Has the patient signed his or her consent to undergo the procedure? Are the
required tests complete (e.g. blood work, imaging, etc)? Has the patient fasted? Is the
patient cold and cough free? If any of these questions has an unfavorable answer then the
procedure has to be delayed and the Main OR Coordinator needs to become involved. A
decision is made as to whether to keep the patient in the Holding Bay while making last
minute arrangements (e.g. signing consent form), or to cancel the patient's procedure,
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move him back to the inpatient service unit, and bring the next patient on the operating
list.
Holding Bay triggers patient fetch: A patient's procedure may have been cancelled or
is in the process of finishing, hence the Holding Bay nurse phones the inpatient service
unit where the next patient is located and warns them that a pick up is about to take place.
Ideally the inpatient service unit already has the next patient ready, and if so the Holding
Bay nurse hands a piece of paper to a porter who then proceeds to pick up the patient
from the designated location, and brings he or she to the Holding Bay. If however the
inpatient service unit says that the next patient isn't ready, the Main OR Coordinator
needs to become involved and make the decision as to whether to wait for the patient, or
to proceed with the next case on the list. Please note that the reshuffling of operating lists
involves a considerable amount of additional processes which will be described in further
detail in subsequent sections.
Move and prep patient to OR: Having been verified as fit to undergo the procedure, the
patient is moved to the OR by a porter or the anesthesiologist himself. Ideally the surgeon
or a member of his team greets the patient and acclimatizes him or her for the surgery
(e.g. help them with their anxiety). The patient is put to sleep and is positioned for the
surgery according to the preferences of the designated surgeon. A timeout occurs before
the surgeon cuts the skin, whereby everybody in the team must agree that the correct
patient is on the OR table and that they know the procedure about to take place. Timeouts
are a cornerstone of surgical safety and should occur every single time according to the
evidence based medicine guidelines set by the NHS.
Perform procedure: The surgeon together with the anesthesiologist and the surgical
team perform the procedure on the patient. An OR nurse registers the case start time on
the Main OR computer system. Nearing the end of the procedure an OR nurse recognizes
that the procedure is about to finish and she calls the inpatient service unit where the next
patient to undergo a procedure is located, and warn them that they are finishing up the
current patient. Ideally, inpatient service units are warned 30 minutes before the Holding
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Bay sends a porter to fetch the next patient. Once the procedure ends the time is inserted
into the Main OR computer system, and the patient is woken up while still in the OR. At
the same time, an OR nurse should phone the Recovery Area and warn them that they are
about to receive a patient from the OR. If a staffed recovery bed is available then the
patient is moved by an OR nurse and the anesthesiologist to the Recovery Area.
Otherwise the patient either remains in the OR, or is indeed moved to the Recovery Area
but the anesthesiologist has to stay with him (i.e. a bed is available but a recovery nurse
isn't, hence the anesthesiologist stays and can't begin prepping the next OR case).
Patient assessment: A Main OR physician checks on the patient in the Recovery Area
and determines if further tests are needed in order to adequately assess the patient or if
the patient needs more time to stabilize in any case. If the patient is considered stable, the
recovery nurse triggers the process to return the patient to the designated inpatient service
unit.
Initiate return to inpatient service unit: Once a decision is made to return the patient to
the designated inpatient service unit, a recovery nurse must locate the surgeon's post
operative notes (i.e. specification of drugs administered, whether solids can be ingested,
etc), and then phone the inpatient service unit and inquire about their bed and nurse
availability (i.e. to pick up the patient). If the inpatient service unit isn't available, then
the patient must continue to wait in the Recovery Area.
Check patient: The inpatient service unit nurse arrives and checks the patient and the
surgical post operative notes. If the nurse is satisfied with the patient's stability, and a
porter is available to move the patient, the nurse signs the patient handoff and the patient
is moved to the inpatient service unit. Otherwise the patient must continue to wait in the
Recovery Area.
8.4.2 2"d Main ORs Phase: Interviews and Observation
The second phase of the Main ORs data collection and analysis consisted of five
individual interviews with different clinical staff, three of which were with physicians (i.e.
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two surgeons and one anesthesiologist), and two were with nurses managers (i.e. for the
whole of Main ORs, and the recovery room specifically). All five interviewees allowed
for audio recording. The physician interviewees were selected randomly within each
category (i.e. surgeon or anesthesiologist), whereas the nurse interviewees were first
theoretically sampled (i.e. had to be at managerial level for their respective function) and
then randomly selected (i.e. each function had two or more possible nurse managers). The
interviews took place in different settings. The nurse interviews took place inside their
Main OR office. The anesthesiologist interview took place in the Main OR Coordinator
office, as anesthesiologists don't have an office in the Main OR. Finally, the surgeon
interviews took place in their own offices which were located in different buildings than
that of the Main ORs.
The interview process was informed both by the 1 st Main ORs phase described in the
previous section, as well as by the emerging Nightingale-Rhodes Enterprise Architecture
Framework (NREAF) described in Chapter 3, and already refined in Chapter 8 (i.e.
resulting from the analysis of Hospital XYZ's in-depth case study) 54 . As such
preliminary interview questions were asked pertaining to each of the EAF views (i.e.
External/Policy; Strategy; Process; Organization; Knowledge; Information;
Service/Product) while leveraging specific observations from the 1st Main ORs Phase
and allowing for each interviewee to provide depth in those EAF views which he or she
found most relevant . Additionally, interviewees were implicitly and explicitly probed on
specific insights generated in the previous chapters (e.g. assessing the interaction of their
service unit with other service units; evaluating the existence of multiple internal
architectural configurations; etc).
Figure 8-3 is an overview of our characterization of Hospital ABC's Main ORs sub-
architecture which emerged from the data analysis presented in the next subsections. This
characterization concerns both local enterprise architecture characteristics (i.e. pertaining
specifically to the Main ORs) as well as enterprise level (i.e. pertaining to Hospital ABC
154 The Chapter's main text will include key interview excerpts to support the findings from the analysis.
For additional excerpts please refer to Appendix V(i.a).
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as a whole), and reflects our enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture
(i.e. leverages our enriched version of the NREAF discussed at the end of Chapter 7l55).
The circle placement of the EA Views is meant to illustrate that they are
interconnected.156
Compromised flow stability Poor service architecture
awareness/appreciation
Poor information flow
transparency and timeliness Compromised patie nt/physician
experienceCommunity care, clinical
excellence, and teaching European Work Directive
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Figure 8-3: Hospital ABC Main ORs sub-architecture characterization
8.4.2.1 Main ORs External/ Policy View
In describing Hospital ABC's external environment all interviewees were consistent in
referring to the pressure of meeting the 18 Weeks target set by the NHS and how it in
turn was placing the Main ORs under close scrutiny by senior management. Essentially
they felt that they were having to increase throughput with only the incentive of being
able to maintain Hospital ABC's reputation and referral base'57 .
155 See section 7.7.2.
156 The placement of the EA Views in a circle isn't intended to illustrate how they interconnect. Moreover,
the EA Views don't simply connect in a sequential manner with the adjacent EA Views in the circle. In
section 8.4.3 we describe dominant EA View interactions that emerged from the data, and demonstrate the
non-sequential nature of said interactions.
157 The NHS publically published compliance data on how well each individual hospital was meeting the 18
Weeks target. Such data, being publically available, was meant to be reviewed by patients with their
primary care physicians, who would then potentially elect to seek treatment at hospitals who were
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However there were other influential external factors which lied beyond the NHS.
Specifically, a recent European Work Directive dictated that junior doctors could only
work a maximum of 48 hours per week, rather than the previous non-limited labor
arrangements that allowed for as many as 100 hours. The implications of such a severe
reduction were significant in that junior doctors are responsible for a considerable amount
of processes that help provide care to patients within and beyond the OR. Moreover,
clinicians felt that on one hand 18 Weeks was asking them to do more with their existing
plant, while on the other, they had even less resources associated with the plant. As such,
the surgeons expected that Hospital ABC's senior management exercised its Foundation
Trust status and implemented internal solutions that would allow then to adequately
respond to the external pressures.
In describing their regulatory environment at a clinical level several pertinent
observations were made. To begin with, it was clear that both surgeons and
anesthesiologist described themselves as autonomous agents, whereby they didn't
necessarily have to follow evidenced based medicine guidelines set by external entities 58.
Indeed they acknowledged their existence but they opted to follow their own individual
or group practices. For instance, the guidelines recommend that surgeons perform what is
called a timeout before the start of a procedure, whereby he or she reviews what is meant
to happen and seeks everyone's acknowledgment and approval (e.g. make sure that the
correct side of the body is being operated on). However, one particular surgeon simply
refused to be present to do a timeout.159 In their own defense, the surgeons argued that the
guidelines were too high-level and couldn't apply to their particular subspecialty.
Conversely, nurses described in detail several of their processes which had to abide by
the NICE guidelines, and in doing so, they demonstrated a predisposition to follow them
judiciously (e.g. patient handoff information requirements).
compliant (i.e. triggering a referral), as opposed to those who weren't. Hence, the referral implications of
18 Weeks were clearly understood not only by senior leadership, but also by clinical staff.
158 In the UK these are known as the NICE Guidelines, namely the National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence (www.nicc orguk).
159 This information was also confirmed by the HMS student who was doing her surgical rotation at
Hospital ABC. None of the surgeons she trained with at Hospital ABC did timeouts.
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8.4.2.2 Main ORs Strategy View
The definition of strategic goals, vision, and direction of the enterprise traditionally lie
with senior leadership in organizations, and indeed these were included also to that effect
in the analysis of Hospital ABC's in-depth case. However, the Main OR's interpretation
and receptivity of Hospital ABC's overarching strategy emerged as relevant phenomena
in describing organizational behavior, as evidenced in the following analysis.
"For a surgeon theatres are extremely important. Main theatres have a wide range of sub
specialties and you have a wide range of individuals that each of which have their own
niches in developing tertiary practices. You'll see surgeons that are doing some new hip
replacement, or some new something else... so everybody is developing a tertiary center
as well as serving the local community. And that is difficult for theatres!"
Hospital ABC Main ORs Surgeon 1
The location of Hospital ABC is such that its surrounding local community is mostly
comprised of minorities who tend to be resource deprived and are generally associated
with higher indices of violence. Hence, a key component of Hospital ABC's strategy is to
provide high quality care in as safe a manner as possible to its surrounding community.
However, over the years, Hospital ABC has also strived to build a national and
international reputation as a tertiary center, having already established a strong presence
in various subspecialties. The patient population for each strategy (i.e. community vs.
tertiary) is inherently different and has different requirements of the hospital's delivery
platform. Moreover, Hospital ABC experiences tension in its enterprise strategy
alignment, as it positions itself to care for the local community, and at the same time
strives to remain at the clinical excellence forefront of various subspecialties.
The third and final key element of Hospital ABC's strategy is the training of medical
students, subspecialty physicians, and nurses. Hospital ABC is associated with a leading
university, and wants to remain the preferred place for training. Hence, the hospital
wishes to be the first choice for both patients and trainees.
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8.4.2.3 Main ORs Service View
The Main ORs' inflow and outflow interactions are part of the overall service
architecture of Hospital ABC, as are the Main ORs' own internal processes. Events that
take place either upstream or downstream may have significant implications in the
service architecture overall.
The Main ORs staff shared a concern towards patient experience but their different
perspectives of how to deliver it, compromised the service architecture' 60
All interviewees consistently demonstrated a concern towards the patient experience at
Hospital ABC. Both surgeons and nurses were sensitive to the implications of having to
cancel a patient's surgery. A patient will have made time from work in order to undergo
and recover from surgery. The anxiety level will be high and patients will have had to be
fasted and undergone a series of tests, which are only relevant if the surgery does indeed
take place. However, the concern for the patient in turn created tension between nurses
and surgeons when interpreting various processes of their service architecture. For
instance, the Holding Bay is by definition an area in the Main ORs meant to hold patients,
such that when the ORs are ready, they can be swiftly moved to the ORs. The surgeons
and anesthesiologists were unanimous in their assessment that the Holding Bay is a good
thing to have. Conversely, the nurses argued that patients are very uncomfortable once
there because they aren't allowed to use the toilet, to watch TV, or to be with their
families. Moreover, nurses suggested that surgeons abuse the holding concept, whereas
surgeons complained that nurses refused to hold patients. Ultimately, in both scenarios,
stakeholder behaviors were adversely impacting patient experience (e.g. slowing down
operations and potentially contributing to the cancelling of surgeries; holding patients
unnecessarily for too long). From a service architecture standpoint, the ideal would be to
have the patient arrive at the holding bay in a timely manner, and in a reasonable
timeframe be transferred to the designated OR.
160 The coding of both qualitative and quantitative data allowed for the categorization and sorting of
emergent phenomena of interest, while analyzing the data informed by the lean enterprise principles. The
results of said analysis are several key findings, which we highlight by underlining, and pertain to the text
immediately following each finding. Notably, some key findings were derived from larger sets of data,
which generated sub-findings that we highlighted in bold, and together support the key finding underlined.
Moreover, neither underlined nor bold segments are meant to be recommendations, but rather, reflect our
findings from analyzing the collected data.
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"Due to [the] holding bay the sending issue is no problem for us... so we can send for a
little bit earlier than when we usually need the patient actually. This is a very helpful
device"
Hospital ABC Main ORs Anesthesiologist
"The idea of a holding bay is that they hold a patient until surgery. In terms ofpatient
comfort and dieting it pays not to leave them down here for a long time. They want to go
to the toilet and we don't have a patient toilet [down here]. We don't have facilities for
them to watch TV"
Hospital ABC Main ORs Matron
Misaligned processes and poor information visibility beyond the Main ORs compromised
both patient care and patient flow
Further insight was derived when considering Hospital ABC's service architecture, and in
particular the alignment of processes and information visibility across different service
units. These affected both the inflow and outflow of patients to and from the Main ORs.
With regards to inflow, by definition, elective care implies a joint patient and surgeon
decision to perform some kind of procedure on a given date. Also, depending on the type
of procedure, a surgeon will know whether or not the patient will need a high dependency
unit (HDU) bed after undergoing the procedure. However, knowing the schedule and
associated resource requirements ahead of time is insufficient to ensure a timely start of
the OR operations. One of the surgeons referred to the issue of bed availability possibly
changing during the night (e.g. an emergency patient visited the emergency department
and was admitted to the hospital), and not being able to readily know the next morning
whether or not that is the case. Two key factors were contributing to this situation. First,
while some surgeons begin their day at 7 am with the intent of starting the OR at 8 am,
HDU nurses only begin their shift at 8 am or later, hence their schedules aren't aligned
with OR start times. Similarly, physicians don't have a standard time to visit the HDU
area to evaluate patients, thus stable patients may remain longer than necessary in the
HDU. Second, the underlying information technology architecture doesn't support
workflow, so much so that bed availability is done on the basis of a visual count.
Page 440 of 759
With regards to outflow, the Recovery Area nurse elaborated as to how difficult it can be
to track down inpatient service unit nurses to collect patients that have been deemed
stable enough for discharge from the Main ORs. Once again the issue of misaligned
schedules is mentioned (e.g. patient rounding; nurse lunch breaks; etc), although capacity
constraints may also be contributing to the poor service unit interaction.
"You know it would be lovely ifyou sat in recovery and see what we have to go through.
Of course they know [that we have a patient ready for pick up], but for some reason they
are either [administering] drugs, or they have gone on their lunch, or it is just one
qualified nurse on the ward... they can't come. [...]We give them 20 minutes notice. And
after 20 minutes we ring them again. We can wait up to 2 hours sometimes"
Hospital ABC Main ORs Recovery Area Nurse
Ultimately, misaligned schedules and fragmented information systems generate poor
information visibility which complicates the management and effective utilization of the
overall service architecture.
Misaligned processes and poor information visibility within the Main ORs compromised
both patient care and patient flow
Theoretically the first Main OR cases are scheduled for 8 am each morning. However, all
junior physicians (i.e. still in training) who manage a considerable amount of flow
processes, only start their shift at 7.45 am. Hence, staff scheduling within the Main ORs
themselves is also compromising patient flow. However, it is important to note that
Hospital ABC is also struggling with complying with the reduced work hours imposed by
external policies (i.e. the European Work Directive). Nonetheless, the fact still remains
that the schedules are misaligned even within the Main ORs.
A similar problem exists with the coordination of nursing schedules within the Main ORs.
Specifically, nurses are allowed to go on break in between procedures, and the same
nurses are the only resource available to clean and ready the OR for the next procedure.
Surgeons repeatedly said that they would prefer to have one less nurse during the
procedure itself, rather than have them go on break in between cases, and in doing so,
slow down overall patient flow.
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Further issues exist within the Main ORs with regards to poor information visibility. For
instance, surgeons complained that their Main OR Coordinator is unable to detect when
an OR has had its procedure cancelled and is being unused. The surgeons offered that the
coordinator is too busy doing paper work or that she was only aware of her immediate
surroundings (i.e. she only sees ORs nearest to her office). However, it also speaks to the
poor information architecture infrastructure in place. Furthermore, when probed
specifically as to whether the surgeons warned the coordinator that an OR was about to
go unused, they confided that it was solely dependant on clinical staff being proactive
and unfortunately didn't happen across the board.
Still within the Main ORs, a different kind of issue arises in the communication between
the ORs and the Recovery Area, in that the former is meant to warn the latter when a
patient is about to be woken up and moved to the Recovery Area. According to the
recovery nurses, and both the anesthesiologist and the Harvard Medical Student, they
aren't warned at least 25% of the time and they find themselves scrambling to find a
solution. Alternatively, given the lack of communication, the recovery area assigns a bed
to another patient that has since finished his or her procedure, therefore disrupting the
flow of the originally intended OR. It is important to keep in mind that several surgical
specialties are indeed housed within the Main ORs, but they are assigned specific ORs
and are staffed with specific people. Hence, a surgical team that has just finished a patient
who is now taking up space in the OR whilst awaiting space in the recovery area, cannot
simply call for the next patient to be operated in a different OR.
Another bottleneck in Main OR patient flow occurs due to surgeons not providing post
operative notes and leaving the premises. Said notes are a requirement to fulfill the
patient handoff between the Recovery Area and an inpatient service unit nurse collecting
the patient. However, as much as 50% of the time recovery area nurses have to track
down the paper post operative notes. All in all, the lack of communication between Main
OR units (i.e. OR and Recovery Area) leads to suboptimal decisions that may
compromise the service architecture as a whole.
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"Half the time we have to go looking for them or we then find that the surgeon is gone
and nothing has been written, and that is a big headache. And sometimes we get a ward
nurse to get the patient and she will not take the patient without the notes, which we can
understand. So the patient then ends up in recovery far longer than is necessary really."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Recovery Area Nurse
Inadequate inpatient service unit processes were contributing to the Main ORs
cancellation rate
Main ORs interviewees consistently said that the inpatient service units significantly
contributed to the Main ORs existing 9% on-the-day cancellation rate. The key reasons
quoted for the cancellations were that patients weren't pre-assessed properly, that they
weren't consented, or that they weren't worked up properly. Both the author and the
HMS student had the opportunity of frequently observing and verifying this phenomenon
taking place. All of the abovementioned tasks are meant to be done before the patient is
transferred to the Holding Bay in the Main ORs. For instance, a patient who has a cold, or
who has not fasted, cannot undergo surgery. Similarly, no procedure can begin without a
signed formal consent from the patient, stating that he or she understands the risks
involved, and that a physician has explained these carefully. Finally, test results may take
up to 4 hours in processing time, hence if they weren't requested in the previous day,
there is no way that said patient can undergo surgery at the beginning of the day.
Interdependent service units demonstrated poor service architecture awareness in day-to-
day operations
In Chapter 6 we introduced the concept of service architecture awareness and argued that
it should be embedded at all levels of the hospital enterprise and inform the planning and
execution of improvement initiatives, transformation plans, organizational learning, and
performance measurement in general. In analyzing the Main ORs at Hospital ABC it
became apparent that developing service architecture awareness is equally important at
the individual level in day-to-day operations. The following are two of the key examples
described in this section with regards to a generalized lack of service architecture
awareness at the individual level:
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e Interdependent service units establish their schedules independently, which leads
to poor information visibility and availability, and ultimately compromises patient
flow.
e Interdependent service units neglect to update adjacent units in their flow and
provoke last minute troubleshooting and further delays
8.4.2.4 Main ORs Process View
Service architecture dysfunctionalities generated localized process optimization
behaviors
Earlier we mentioned a service architecture dysfunctionality stemming from misaligned
schedules and poor information system capability (see section 8.4.2.3). However, other
types of service architecture dysfunctionalities were identified and found to generate
localized process optimization behaviors. Essentially, a stakeholder optimizes his or her
local processes without regard to the potential implications upstream or downstream. The
following are examples of such behaviors:
OR calling for patients too early: Surgeons and anesthesiologists generally preferred to
call patients earlier than needed in order to make sure that the inpatient service units
made them available on time, hence hopefully lessening the potential for delays (i.e. the
more warning we give them, the more time they have to make sure that the patient is here
when we need him). However, this not only conflicts with the nurses understanding of
what is reasonable in terms of patient experience (i.e. the Holding Bay isn't
recommended for patients to remain extended periods of time), but also pressured
inpatient service units in a potentially untimely fashion (e.g. they could send the patient
to the Main ORs without fully working them up or getting their surgery consent).
Poaching of surgical kits: The advantage of elective cases, and in particular those that
are standardized and have been done a considerable number of times, is that surgical kits
can be prepared ahead of time for a particular surgeon. However, a prevailing practice
was that nurses were poaching surgical kits from other ORs in order to be able to find
specific instruments required for their own OR.
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Surgeons generating overly ambitious lists: Establishing an operating list schedule
necessarily depends on how long each surgeon thinks his procedures will take. What
happens is that some surgeons will be over-optimistic (i.e. schedule too many procedures)
so as to trigger the necessary processes to get patients ready (i.e. order tests the night
before), etc, and by design plan to overrun into another surgeon's OR slot, or require staff
to remain longer at the end of the day. Moreover, their localized optimization behavior is
adversely affecting overall patient flow as well as placing additional pressure on OR staff.
Recovering Area calling inpatient service units too early: In the case of non-major
procedures (i.e. those that require ICU beds) surgeons feel comfortable with initiating a
procedure even without a Recovery Area bed being available. As procedures near the end
and the Recovery Area nurses find themselves without a bed and/or staff for them, they
feel pressured into calling inpatient service units too early, so as to make sure that they
are readily available to pick up one of their current patients. However, this may lead to
further delays because nurses might be called and the handoff documentation isn't ready
yet (e.g. post operative notes not available), and in some extreme cases patients have yet
to be considered stable enough to be transferred (e.g. recovery area nurses hope that
inpatient service unit nurses accept an unstable patient).
Service architecture dysfunctionalities caused last minute suboptimal decisions
In some cases, rather than generating systematic localized process optimization behaviors,
service architecture dysfunctionalities call for last minute decisions, which may
ultimately also have suboptimal results.
Reshuffling an OR operating list pressures other service units: Amid a last minute
cancellation, surgeons have to change the order of their operating list. This means that a
patient that was only meant to be called from the inpatient service unit later in the day, all
of the sudden has to be made ready as soon as possible. Understandably, such a decision
impacts the operations of several other service units (e.g. patient may still be undergoing
tests; the patient might have not yet arrived; the patient might have not yet been rounded
on by the clinical staff; etc) and has the potential of further slowing the ORs workflow.
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Reshuffling an OR operating list pressures the surgeon: Surgeons traditionally
schedule their hardest cases first, as they feel that they are better able to perform, and are
more likely to have a positive outcome. By switching around patients in the operating list,
the surgeon more often than not, finds himself starting the day operating on a less
complicated patient, which isn't ideal.
"What we now end up doing is that we put a small case first. But ifyou ask me when do I
operate best it is first thing in the morning. Iget more done efficiently in that time than I
do later in the day. There is no doubt about that in my mind."
Hospital ABC OR Surgeon 1
Misaligned service unit schedules constraint resources: Previously (see section
8.4.2.3) we mentioned how interdependent service units had misaligned schedules which
were affecting OR start times. In some cases, surgeons took it upon themselves to
physically visit the high dependency service unit and check the bed availability. In other
cases, if an HDU bed isn't readily available, some surgeons were reported to have already
gambled the start of their OR with a major procedure, based on their unofficial
assessment of those patients currently in the HDU, and awaiting to be seen by the HDU
team later in the morning. Besides potentially running into an HDU shortage when a
major case is finished, surgeons were stepping on other service unit turfs which
ultimately didn't contribute to amicable cross unit relationships.
Non-dedicated inpatient service units: Often times, patients are discharged from the
Main ORs Recovery Area to a different inpatient service unit than the one they originally
came from. Inpatient service units are unable to centralize patients of a particular type,
hence they have to accommodate a great mix of specialties. There are several advantages
in doing the opposite, including the ability to appropriately staff nurses (i.e. the skill set
required of surgical nurses is quite different from medicine nurses), and maximizing
physician rounding (e.g. physicians are of a specific specialty which have specific
patients, and if these are centrally located, physicians can more readily round on them).
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Recovery Area staffing: Recent improvements to the Main ORs included increasing the
number of beds available in the Recovery Area. However, more often than not, the
bottleneck caused by the Recovery Area isn't because of a lack of beds, but rather a lack
of nurses to staff the beds. As a result, patients may be transferred from an OR to the
Recovery Area because there is physical space, but the anesthesiologist has to remain in
the Recovery Area given that a nurse isn't available. This is understandable in that both
surgeon and anesthesiologist want to clear the OR and allow it to be cleaned and readied
for the next procedure. However, three issues can be observed with this approach (and
which signal the practice of costly last minute decisions). First, there is an
anesthesiologist shortage at Hospital ABC, which implies that the anesthesiologist that
stays in the Recovery Area is unable to prepare the next patient, hence the procedure is
delayed.16' Second, the salary structure in the UK is such that nurses earn considerably
less than anesthesiologists and surgeons, therefore it would make more sense to hire more
nurses, and adequately staff the Recovery Area. Third, a non-operational OR not only
implies the potential of cutting short its operating list, but also implies that all its staff
(e.g. nurses, surgeon, junior doctors) are idle.
OR turnaround: the same nurse team that assisted in an OR procedure is meant to help
setup the next procedure, as well as clean the OR, therefore contributing to a longer
turnaround time. At first such might not be detected as a problem since the patient flow is
already sufficiently disrupted when considering the interaction with inpatient service
units. However, should said interactions indeed flow adequately, the OR turnaround time
would prove to be unnecessarily long.
OR scheduling complexity required considerable effort to make adjustments
When scheduling a procedure many factors have to align themselves perfectly across
multiple service units and organizational structures. Some of these include: an OR being
available; the surgeon agreeing to perform the surgery; the patient being available,
properly assessed, consented, and worked up; nursing staff being allocated to the OR;
161 Note that prepping a patient with anesthesia may take anywhere between 8 to 90 minutes depending on
the complexity of the procedure.
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recovery beds being available; etc. Understandably, accommodating last minute
scheduling adjustments (e.g. cancelling one procedure and calling for a different patient)
requires a considerable amount of time and effort. In some cases it may take as long as 90
minutes to make the readjustment, requiring the involvement of surgeons, coordinators,
anesthesiologists, etc, and all the while, it may prove to be too late in the day to actually
go ahead with the new procedure (i.e. it would imply an unreasonably overrunning list).
"It takes 90 minutes fighting to get people to move from one theater to another... Which
usually at 3 o'clock you don't even need tofight for 90 minutes, because 90 minutes later
you can't start the case anymore."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Anesthesiologist
"there is a bit of micro managing because we don't want to lose 1.5 hours and [instead]
get another patient in that slot."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Matron
Non-standardized and unclear processes compromised patient flow
When taken to an extreme, local process optimization behaviors reside at an individual
level and essentially prevent the use of standard processes and require even more
resources unnecessarily. Examples include:
Non-standard requirements: Different anesthesiologists although covering the Main
ORs for the same subspecialties, have different requirements of the nursing staff. For
instance, while some anesthesiologists want to be called immediately as a patient arrives
at the Holding Bay, others first want to check their equipment and then see the patient. As
such nurses have to keep track of all the individual preferences and make sure that they
abide by them. Similarly, anesthesiologists complained that not only different surgeons
have different requirements for exactly the same procedure, but also are inconsistent at an
individual level. In other words, surgeons may change their mind last minute as to how
they want a patient positioned, thus forcing anesthesiologists to start all over again.
Notably, the HMS student verified thorough observation that this was indeed happening.
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Non-standard process definitions: Interestingly, when comparing the process
descriptions from nurses and surgeons as to how the next patient being operated on is
called for from the OR, these were different. Whereas the surgeon sees himself
responsible for triggering the process, the nurse said that nurses were responsible for
detecting when the case was about to finish, and then trigger the process themselves.
Moreover, it is unclear who is meant to do what in terms of assuring that the next patient
is called for, which consequently may adversely impact patient flow.
Similarly, the Recovery Area nurse said that at least 25% of the time the ORs don't warn
her staff that they are going to bring them a patient. Indeed the anesthesiologist
recognized that this was the case and that human error was at play. However, it could also
well be that once again each OR team does it differently, and different people have
different interpretations as to who is responsible to make the phone call, and in what time
frame it should be made.
Finally, another example pertains to the post operative surgical notes. Some surgeons
elect to fill them out by hand (which may be at times difficult to decipher), while others
use their own word processing software (which may delay their availability at times).
Furthermore, different surgeons have different standards as to what they write on their
notes, and according to the Recovery Area and inpatient service unit nurses, it isn't
uncommon for them not to signal whether or not patients can eat or drink in a given
timeframe (i.e. a basic requirement for a successful patient handoff). Ultimately, nurses
find themselves having to track down surgeons in order to get the information that they
need and adequately finalize a patient handoff.
"A lot of the times we have to go chasing for the notes. The surgeon forgets to write the
notes. We then have to ring. You have to go to the switchboard to find where they are.
That can take a big chunk of time tofind where they are.
Hospital ABC Main ORs Recovery Area Nurse
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The Main ORs experienced tension between enabling team stability and maintaining
operational flexibility
When discussing process complexity, surgeons referred to two factors in particular,
namely the composition of their team and the nature of the procedure itself. There are
procedures that have become standardized to the point that surgeons know ahead of time
all of the materials that are required, and with the aid of a stable team they can operate
like a focused factory. However, if the team composition changes it necessarily has a
potential adverse effect on both standard and non-standard procedures, because the staff
will be less familiar with the needs of the particular surgeon.
Conversely, the anesthesiologist observed that stable teams may indeed help a surgeon
but they may also hinder operational flexibility. Currently Main ORs are staffed such that
the same pool of staff is assigned to the same set of ORs, and cannot be rotated as needed
to other ORs. Therefore, in the event that one OR finishes early (i.e. its staff become
available), and another OR of a different type is available (i.e. capable of accommodating
an additional patient undergoing a different procedure), the OR capacity will remain
unused. We offered that perhaps the staff was associated to specific ORs because of their
skill set, but both surgeons and nurses agreed that nursing staff could conceivably assist
at any of the ORs. Hence, it seemed that surgeon preferences over team stability were
taking hold over operational flexibility.
The Main ORs experienced performance measurement process and content issues
When probed in terms of performance measurement practices, surgeons consistently
referred to them as reactive, incomplete, and lagging. Reactive because only in the event
of an audit would they look closely into a particular metric whether it be quality or
operations related. Incomplete because surgeons expressed an interest in accessing
financial related data (e.g. how much income is the department generating for Hospital
ABC?) but were consistently denied access by senior management. Finally, lagging
because information isn't presented in real time (i.e. reinforces the reactive approach to
performance measurement). Ultimately, the underlying information system capability
may also undermine the ability to have ready access to robust performance related data.
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However, it is clear that the data indeed being tracked by senior management isn't being
shared across the enterprise.
External policies significantly constrained key Hospital ABC processes
Detailed process level explanations concerning patient flow allowed us to further
appreciate the complexity and some of the inherent resource constraints present in the
Main ORs. For instance, surgeons recognize that junior doctors are essential to manage
the communication with nursing staff, scheduling the OR, and managing ancillary tests.
However, once again surgeons made reference to the constraints imposed by the
European Work Directive and how they had to do more with less.
8.4.2.5 Main ORs Organization View
The Main ORs' local organizational climate was characterized as its staff being generally
frustrated and tired (i.e. worn out)
All interviewees, whether physicians or nurses, expressed frustration and tiredness in
coping with system dysfunctionalities within and beyond the Main ORs.
The OR matron (i.e. most senior nurse) alluded to the fact that operations relied on the
continued dedication of the nursing staff, and that these were beginning to feel burnt out
and leaving Hospital ABC. For instance, on top of the normal pressures of assisting
surgeons and patient flow, nurses would have to compensate for missing surgical kits and
sterilize them last minute, when supposedly these were meant to be provided by an
external service provider. Similarly, the Recovery Area nurse expressed her difficulty in
managing her unit's staff shortage, and also commented on how the inpatient service
units are stretched thin and less able to support patient flow.
As for physicians, both surgeons and anesthesiologist felt that they had to spend an
unreasonable amount of time troubleshooting system issues, when what they should
really be doing is operating and caring for patients. Examples included the difficulty in
getting patients to the Main ORs in a timely fashion, and being able to discharge them
from the inpatient service units so as to keep a stable flow. Additionally, surgeons took it
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upon themselves to check bed availability in other service units (i.e. compensate for the
poor information systems and the misaligned schedules across service units). Similarly,
surgeons wanted to institute practices where they didn't have to rely on the system (e.g.
process chain of nurses sharing information to trigger a patient transfer) and instead they
wanted to bypass the system and do it themselves. Ultimately, surgeons felt frustrated
with the inability to maximize Main ORs throughput as it compromised their desire of
building clinical excellence and serving the surrounding community. Said frustration
drove them to seek further control and if possible rely less on others for specific key
processes that impact patient flow.
"Igo to HDU to sort out the HDU beds. Isee who is wanting what beds. I don't have
time for this! I shouldn't need to worry about it... I shouldn't need to think have I got an
HDU bed. Ifyou were to ask me what do I do best? What I do best is to operate... my job
is not to work out and run around... Actually that is more stressful than is the operating."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Surgeon 1
"We rely on good will day after day... ifyou burn them out... they leave"
Hospital ABC Main ORs Matron
"The ward nurse arrives, the ward nurse is stressed and would like to get back to the
ward because they have got work to do, and sometimes because there isn't a porter they
leave."
Hospital ACB Main ORs Recovery Area Nurse
The Main ORs culture was supportive of Hospital ABC's strategic tension and mission
When describing Hospital ABC's strategy, the surgeons explicitly mentioned that a
tension exists between serving the surrounding community and striving for national and
international clinical excellence recognition. Further analysis didn't yield a preference for
one particular element of Hospital ABC's strategy. In other words, surgeons were openly
concerned and devoted to serving the surrounding community, but also were vested in
developing their clinical excellence niches. As for nurses, they didn't make a distinction
between patient populations and emphasized the importance of providing the best patient
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experience possible for any patient at Hospital ABC. Notably, one could argue that such
is in line with the nature of the nursing profession which is centered in caring for the
patient and assisting physicians and surgeons, who in turn are also contributing to
furthering the boundaries of clinical excellence.
"service delivery at the highest level of care and safety for the community... that is
clear... and especially in [in this area] where we have a strong diversity population
catchment. We have all levels of wealth... it is something absolutely special... we are
proud"
Hospital ABC Main ORs Surgeon 2
Hospital ABC had a fragmented divisional structure and experienced a considerable
organizational divide amongst senior leadership, management, and clinicians
The interviewees in this phase were all clinicians and from their perspective they
evaluated the relationship with the senior leadership and management structures. Unlike
academic medical centers in the US where clinicians commonly hold the most senior
level positions, at Hospital ABC, and indeed most hospitals in the UK, senior leadership
were non-clinicians' 62 . Similarly, Hospital ABC's division directors were non-clinicians,
and most people in coordination positions were also non-clinicians.
When referring to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) all interviewees spoke positively of
him and the surgeons in particular said that he had been instrumental at the beginning of
his tenure. However, over time, and with regards to leadership and management in
general, there was a visible separation between clinicians and them. Several factors were
said to contribute to this separation, starting with the geographic distance between offices
and the look and feel of the offices. Whereas senior leadership were housed in new
buildings with pretty corridors, the clinicians had their offices in run-down settings. Such
was verified by observation by the author. Furthermore, surgeons felt that they seldom
saw senior leaders and at best only had meetings with division directors and their
coordinators. Ultimately, clinicians spoke of a physical and cultural divide between
162 With the exception of the Medical Director, which is the US equivalent of Chief Medical Officer.
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themselves and both senior leadership and management.
"[the CEO]... he has really been a great, great support. [..] so even before signing my
contract he was surprisingly that interested. And after a couple months we are working,
had full support... it was amazing. He had an open mind. [..] Manager and surgeon, it is
like dogs and cats... they are not hating each other but they have big
misunderstandings... certainly [they are] not on the same boat... Even if the operation is
extremely good you can sometimes possibly feel, perceive that the feelings are, that, those
bloody surgeons think aboutjust the money and the managers are in the office and they
know nothing about patients."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Surgeon 2
Finally, as previously noted, Hospital ABC is comprised of eight divisions which may
have dedicated resources and/or shared resources. In describing the relationship across
division boundaries, both surgeons and anesthesiologist spoke of independent,
compartmentalized, and potentially redundant thinking. Interviewees suggested that each
division worked towards maximizing its own operations and didn't share experiences or
concerns with the remaining divisions.
"I know strictly care group or department are quite independent and everybody looks at
his own door and doesn't care really and nobody really cares to what happens to a
neighboring department. You can have exactly the same issue... but everybody works in
quite closed compartments and it can be in the same department, or in the care group, or
in the division, but it is really a water tight wall."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Surgeon 2
The Main ORs exercised limited control and influence beyond their service unit boundary
When probed specifically with regards to the misaligned schedules across service units
(see section 8.4.2.3) the surgeons spoke of their failed attempts to rectify the situation in
the past. Whereas in the context of their ORs they were supported by clinical staff to
work longer hours if need be, in the context of inpatient service units they had
unsuccessfully tried to have earlier nursing and medical rounds.
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Similarly, operating list scheduling adjustments were described as complex and human
resource intensive because of the number of organizational structures and the various
levels within them. The Main ORs Coordinator not only had to somehow seek approval
from the various structures (e.g. nursing manager, division director, anesthesiologist
manager, etc) but also had difficulty, as a non-clinician, requesting surgeons to abide by
the suggested list adjustments.
"There is no reason why they couldn't be done earlier. I think the nursing staff should
have a 7 o'clock round, and at 7.30 you do the medical round. BANG! That culture needs
to change. That would have a major impact."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Surgeon 1
"[There are] too many levels of responsibility. So there is not shortcut through the
system. [The Main ORs Coordinator] can't tell the consultant surgeon anything that he
won't do right now. It sometimes means that the surgeon has to wait for 10 minutes for
something, and he will go mad about that and he will insist "no this is my list... I want
this theater now ". At that stage, you need a person who is capable of saying to another
consultant "no, you are wrong, we need the theater now, and you get theater 5 in 10
minutes"."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Anesthesiologist
Boundary spanners between the Main ORs and inpatient service units were inadequate
Perhaps related to the limited control and influence beyond service unit boundaries, was
the assertion that the link between the Main ORs and inpatient service units was only as
strong as the checklist carried by the porters transferring patients across units. In other
words, the tie across service units was considered weak, and in the particular case of
porters, these were unable (or indeed unqualified) to prevent needless patient transfers
(e.g. sending a patient to the Holding Bay when the consent form hasn't been signed, or
when test results are still missing).
"overall there is a big mix ofpatients in the ward and no communication between the
wards or little communication with theatres. [...] in terms of no strong ward culture and
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no link between ward and theatre, then I say there is no link... the link is a porter with a
form with a ticking box on either side to make sure everything is safe... but it is not
strong."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Surgeon 2
Boundary spanners between Main ORs and ancillary services were adequate
Unlike the link between the Main ORs and inpatient service units, the link with ancillary
services works well. Junior doctors with varying levels of experience, and more or less
monitoring from senior doctors, are capable of adequately managing teams of ancillary
services. Similarly, nurses in Recovery Area feel that they have a good connection with
ancillary services.
"The juniors put the lists in, they talk to radiology and tell them that we need imaging...
This all depends on the middle grade who basically tell the housemen what to do and they
implement it.... They communicate with other teams. All this revolves around how good
your middle grade is Ifyour middle grade is very experienced then they do doctor level...
if they are not experienced then you need to take more control...."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Surgeon 1
"We have to communicate with radiologists because the xrays are performed in
recovery... we get along with them very well, never had a problem."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Recovery Nurse
Main ORs local organizational culture was inconsistent amongst different roles
We have already described the existing organizational divide between the Main ORs and
both senior leadership and management. An analysis within the Main ORs allowed to
determine different tendencies in the relationships amongst various stakeholder roles:
e Both physicians and nurses thought little of porters and their ability to contribute
to a stronger link between the Main ORs and inpatient service units. Interestingly,
porters aren't meant to make decisions as to whether they should transfer a patient
or not. They merely follow orders. However, clinical staff holds them accountable
for the unreliable actions of other clinical staff (e.g. transferring a patient who
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isn't ready).
* Surgeons described themselves as having big egos and were comfortable in seeing
themselves as such. They noted that at times there were differences in opinion
amongst them and that the Medical Director had to become involved. However,
there was a general sense that surgeons were respectful towards each other.
* Nursing staff was cohesive and respectful of each other, regardless of their
function within the Main ORs (i.e. Holding Bay, Recovery Area, ORs, Matron).
Similarly, both nurses and anesthesiologists stated that they shared a good work
relationship. The same was true between nurses and junior doctors who saw
themselves on the same team, and shared the objective of somehow enabling
patient flow and providing a good patient experience.
* Nurses felt that senior surgeons were both distant and in some cases dismissive
towards nurses. They shared that surgeons wouldn't communicate with them
directly even though they were in the same room with the patient. In analyzing
surgeon statements, although they understood that nurses were spread thin and
indeed felt that communication should improve, they also demonstrated a clear
animosity towards them (i.e. surgeons blaming and calling nurses stupid for slow
turnarounds).
0 Finally, whereas nurses felt that the Main ORs Coordinator was approachable and
they understood her charter, both surgeons and anesthesiologist felt quite the
opposite. Essentially, surgeons thought poorly of the Main ORs Coordinator and
openly stated that being a non-clinician she didn't have the required skill set and
credibility to manage their OR operations.
"I think it [is] probably a reflection of days gone by where "them and us" situation where
surgeons were probably placed on a pedestal and nurses knew their place. It is wearing down
a little but not a whole lot really"
Hospital ABC Main ORs Recovery Area Nurse
Team familiarity was said to help build culture and performance
Previously we described how there was tension between team stability and operational
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flexibility (see section 8.4.2.4). Nonetheless, both surgeons and anesthesiologist further
emphasized the importance of keeping their clinical teams as stable as possible, as this
contributes to building team familiarity and ultimately improves flow and outcomes.
Specifically, whether doing difficult or simple procedures, surgeons mentioned that their
clinical team was only as good as its weakest link, and that whenever a new person was
introduced, he or she would be the weakest link and compromise flow and potentially
also outcomes. Hence, the European Work Directive was once again mentioned as a
serious constraint, as it further limited their ability to build stability with junior doctors.
So much so that one of the surgeons hired a nurse in a private practice context and paid
out-of-pocket for her to assist him with NHS procedures at Hospital ABC.
Furthermore, with team familiarity being built over time, surgeons felt that they were
able to nurture a favorable culture amongst the clinical staff, including nurses and
anesthesiologists, which had everyone on the same page. For instance, while
unreasonable overrunning lists wouldn't take place, teams had a baseline willingness to
finish an operating list and avoid cancelling procedures. Notably, the Harvard Medical
Student was part of different teams in her surgical rotation at Hospital ABC and she
noted the strong influence that some surgeons in particular, had over their clinical teams.
The Main ORs staff had multiple individual incentives but generally considered them to
be insufficient
When describing what drove them to perform at Hospital ABC, all interviewees
consistently referred to the importance of providing the best care possible to patients.
Surgeons and anesthesiologist were also unanimous in referring to Hospital ABC's
clinical excellence and how they valued its brand. However, interviewees also spoke of
additional incentives (or lack of) which influenced their behavior at Hospital ABC.
In terms of financial incentives a key distinction existed in terms of the type of insurance
held by patients. Moreover, Trusts could offer their services to both private and public
insurance patients. The NHS dictated hours of operation that Hospital ABC ORs (or that
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of any other Trust in the UK) should be used exclusively for patients insured by the NHS
(i.e. public care). These were from 8am to 5pm during weekdays. Both Trusts and
surgeons were free to use the ORs after 5pm and the whole day on Saturday, to care for
private insurance patients. The ORs staff caring for patients was the same regardless of
the type of insurance. However, whereas the NHS paid a fixed salary to nurses and
surgeons regardless of patient volume, private insurance paid them a variable
reimbursement policy. Specifically, surgeons and the Trust would earn on patient volume
(i.e. the more cases they did, the more they would earn), while nurses would earn on an
hourly basis. In light of this, surgeons expressed an interest in the NHS providing a
volume based incentive for both surgeons and nurses, and suggested that such would
greatly improve patient throughput, as demonstrated in the operating hours paid by
private insurance.
Interestingly, surgeons also suggested that financial incentives need not be the only
incentive. For instance, they argued that nurses should be allowed to leave early when
they completed a baseline daily number of procedures. Instead, today nurses have to
remain at Hospital ABC regardless of how many procedures they supported. Hence, they
don't have an incentive to help throughput. Quite the opposite apparently, as surgeons
noted that nurses would at times purposefully delay processes in order to get some rest.
Similarly, surgeons suggested that if nurses are required to work overtime on NHS
patients, that they should be allowed to use that overtime as paid vacation at a time of
their choosing. Instead, management expects nursing staff to remain overtime caring for
NHS patients, so as to complete operating lists, and nurses understandably offer
resistance and are unhappy about the arrangement.
"There is no doubt ifyou say... this is our target, achieve 150 cases within the year, 3
cases a day, whatever, we'll make sure we give you a 10% raise in your pay pack. But the
other important thing is that once people get finished they can go home and don't have to
go into the other theater. That sort of change will drive efficiency through theatres."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Surgeon 1
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Other incentives took form in terms of staff awards, which in some cases also had
financial incentives associated to them. Surgeons could earn as much as an additional
20% of their NHS baseline salary depending supposedly on their clinical excellence
appraisal. In practice, clinical excellence was appraised as a measure of a surgeon's
commitment towards throughput, rather than supporting the strategic goal of national and
international recognition. Nurses also had an award in terms of their dedication, and it
was presented in a public forum amongst their peers. However, the financial amount of
the nurse awards was insignificant as compared to the surgeon awards.
8.4.2.6 Main ORs Knowledge View
In previous subsections we have noted phenomena pertaining to the Main ORs
Knowledge View. Specifically, the divisional structure at Hospital ABC is such that they
work independently from one another and don't share their learning, even though they
may be faced with the same issues. Additionally, surgeons emphasized how the European
Work Directive had limited their ability to build team stability with their junior doctors,
and adversely affected patient flow and potentially patient outcomes as well. Furthermore,
whereas nurses followed evidenced based medicine practices, both surgeons and
anesthesiologists admitted to follow more of an autonomous model whereby they didn't
necessarily adopt such practices. Finally, some stakeholders were regarded as inadequate
to fulfill their role requirements. For instance, the Main ORs Coordinator was regarded as
an ineffective manager as she didn't have the necessary clinical skills to interact
appropriately with surgeons, and was unable to make decisions that would enable OR
flexibility and increase throughput (e.g. match nurses according to procedure needs,
rather than only allocate them to specific ORs). Similarly, porters were considered an
ineffective resource which was barely able to enforce a checklist when transferring
patients between service units. The following are additional insights that emerged from
the Main ORs data pertaining to the Knowledge View.
The UK's medical training philosophy was an additional source of pressure for patient
waiting lists
With the benefit of the insights from the HMS student doing her surgery rotation at
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Hospital ABC, we detected significant differences in the medical training philosophy in
the UK as compared to the US. As before, our intent is not to compare directly the in-
depth case studies. However, the differences have visible implications in hospital
operations and potentially the quality of care. Generally speaking, US academic medical
centers require medical residents to have an active role during surgical procedures, as
opposed to merely observing and having a minor supportive role, as is the case in the UK.
One implication is that the medical and subspecialty training in the UK takes longer in
the UK and it isn't uncommon for doctors to only arrive at the attending level in their late
30's and early 40's. Conversely, in the US, it is normal for doctors to become attendings
in their early 30's163. Notably, different specialties require different years of training, but
such is the case in both countries. At Hospital ABC, training was a function of each
surgeon's algorithm (e.g. resident spends two years observing, and if and only if he can
do X well, I will have him start doing Y), as well as the size of their operating waiting
lists (i.e. training implies longer procedures, hence if the list is long there will be less
training). Conversely, in the US, there is a more structured and standardized approach,
where surgical residents have to log the number and type of procedures they do, in order
to become certified in their respective specialty in the US.
All in all, one could argue that the UK system is more demanding of its academic
surgeons, as these don't generally rely on residents to do the procedures. Similarly,
although highly involved in carrying information to enable patient flow processes,
residents have less autonomy to make decisions, and hence require attending doctors'
oversight even for the smallest decisions. Moreover, one could argue that an operational
level, Hospital ABC is more constrained than its academic medical center counterparts in
the US. However, one could also argue that Hospital ABC enables better quality of care,
as residents take longer to learn, and do so by observing extensively, rather than by trial
and error to begin with. It is important to note that our research instruments weren't
163 The HMS student who was part of this in-depth research will be completing her surgical residency in
Obstetrics and Gynecology by age 29. After that she may elect to pursue further training (i.e. fellowship) or
she could work at an academic medical center already as an attending (i.e. have responsibility for teaching
others and be accountable for her patients' experience and outcomes).
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designed to either compare the in-depth cases directly, or to evaluate whether different
training surgical practices generated different patient outcomes.164 However, it is safe to
argue that the different training philosophies do indeed impact directly resource
availability and patient flow.
"Essentially if I have a too big a list I don't train people... this is not the American model
where the junior does the operation... Most of my operations are done by me... very few
of them are done by the junior [..] The States are very different... basically the residents
do the operation, the chief resident and the surgeon stands next to them and they have to
go through this log work of training"
Hospital ABC Main ORs Surgeon 1
Hospital ABC, and the Main ORs in particular, had limited or non-existent formal
medical training opportunities
As noted above, our intent isn't to compare directly the in-depth case studies, but in this
section we find it pertinent to elaborate on key differences pertaining to their knowledge
practices which have significant and unquestionable implications in their overall
enterprise architecture.
Academic medical centers in the US have multiple formal training opportunities beyond
those inherent in caring directly for patients inside ORs, inpatient service units, or other
healthcare delivery settings. For instance, it is common practice for each subspecialty
department to have weekly grand rounds which are a topical lecture on cutting edge
evidenced based medicine. Such venues help train medical residents as well as refresh
senior physicians. Additionally, medical residents are commonly required to also meet on
164 A targeted literature review in this regard yielded sparse evidence in addressing the comparability of US
and UK medical training in terms of surgical outcomes, and is deemed interesting to pursue in another
context with adequate expertise and medical training (e.g. interpreting patient charts; observing and
understanding surgical procedures; etc). When considering the US alone, a recent article from the
American College of Surgeons studied the influence of resident involvement on surgical outcomes in
American hospitals. Their conclusion was that residents were associated with slightly higher morbidity
rates but slightly lower decreased mortality rates. Moreover, a patient was more likely to survive although
it may imply a longer patient stay at the hospital: Raval, M. V., X. Wang, et al. "The Influence of Resident
Involvement on Surgical Outcomes." Journal of the American College of Surgeons In Press, Corrected
Proof.
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a weekly basis amongst themselves and take turns in preparing a literature based
discussion on an advanced topic. Furthermore, departments use both M&M sessions (i.e.
procedures that somehow went wrong, hence the morbidity and mortality, and are
discussed openly to avoid making the same mistake in the future). Finally, hospitals are
required to have quality assurance practices which audit procedures both randomly and
selectively (e.g. procedure X is meant to take 2 hours but took 4 hours instead). All in all,
it is fair to argue that leading academic medical centers in the US have several formal
training opportunities that continuously enhance and sustain their medical knowledge.
Understandably, with the benefit of our Harvard Medical School colleague we were able
to determine that Hospital ABC has significantly different practices with regards to
knowledge sharing. So much so, that when Hospital ABC surgeons were probed
specifically on it, they agreed that these were limited or almost non-existent. Once again
they explained that the continuous external (and managerial) pressure to maximize OR
throughput, was essentially deterring them from standing down and investing in learning
opportunities. Additionally, surgeons also recognized that there isn't an incentive for
surgeons at large to support learning efforts, and even suggested that they should become
contractually mandatory.
"I think one of the key weaknesses of the british surgery is that we did have rounds a bit
like yours [in the US]. It is like a teaching hospital, but not everybody can... it is not
mandatory. [..] We do have teaching rounds on Fridays but what do we normally talk
about? Do we talk about unusual cases? Do we talk about evidence based practice? Not
really but that is an area where that should be discussed. [...]and you know things like
infection control policy, etc, and all these things that everybody forgets every six months,
we would really learn about it [..]I think it is a very good idea. It has to be mandatory."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Surgeon 1
The Main ORs exhibited limited organizational learning practices
Both surgeons and nurses exhibited a predisposition to engage in organizational learning
practices but their execution didn't lend itself to learning organization behavior.
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Surgeons spoke of their continuous pursuit of perfection but felt constrained in their
ability to do so beyond the procedures themselves. Moreover, fragmented divisional
structures and inadequate information systems prevented them from realizing the
improvements that they thought necessary. Additionally, information wasn't being shared
openly amongst senior leadership, management, and clinicians. Surgeons had not only
been denied access to financial related data, but they also desired real time data rather
than retrospective reports. Furthermore, whilst interviewing the lead surgeons of different
specialties it was apparent that they were particularly interested in improving their own
specialty, as well as their own flow, and didn't really mention the need for a consorted
effort or an enterprise level approach.
Conversely, nurses spoke enthusiastically of their nurse forum which brought together
nurse staff from the ORs as well as the inpatient service units. At this forum they would
review ongoing issues stemming from their interdependent activities, and would discuss
ways to resolve them. For instance, the shortage of porters slowed patient transfers across
service units, hence they were now discussing ways to have inpatient service unit nurses
accompany patients who were able to walk by themselves to the Main ORs. The nurse
forum descriptions sounded interesting and warranted further investigation. 165 At a local
level (i.e. within the Main ORs) nurses had practices akin to organization learning
behavior. For instance, nurses were required to circulate across the different Recovery
Areas (i.e. Main ORs, Cardiac, Neuro, and Liver) and other functions within the Main
ORs (i.e. Holding Bay). Although, such rotations were primarily meant to enhance nurse
training in different specialties, they also allowed them a glimpse as to how other service
units functioned. However, rotations would remain within the same type of service unit
and wouldn't cross over (e.g. an inpatient service unit nurse didn't rotate to a recovery
area, and vice versa).
8.4.2.7 Main ORs Information View
In previous subsections we have noted phenomena pertaining to the Main ORs
Information View. Similarly, the 1" Main ORs Phase identified several key information
165 The nurse forum in question is discussed in further detail in section 8.5
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systems as well as necessary information handoffs in the patient flow as represented in
the VSM. An overview of these previous insights includes:
" Hospital ABC relied on paper-based patient records which limited not only our
ability to conduct quantitative analysis, but also that of physicians to readily
access, search, and share patient data.
* The absence of electronic workflow information systems required the extensive
use of phone communication and visual confirmation within and beyond service
units. Several adverse impacts resulted from this. First, flow information was
delayed or neglected altogether, which contributed to anxiety and last minute
suboptimal solutions. Second, misaligned schedules prevented readily available
information (e.g. number of free ICU beds) which either delayed OR start times
or/and required surgeons to physically inspect another service unit and in some
cases gamble that a patient one be discharged in time for a new patient. Third,
junior doctors spent a considerable amount of time essentially pushing paper
between surgeons, inpatient service units, and Main ORs admin staff.
e The absence of electronic workflow information systems required the extensive
use of paper forms. Patient operating lists are shared in paper format between the
Main OR Coordinator, the Holding Bay, the Recovery Area, as well as the paper
slips carried by porters to collect patients from the inpatient service units.
Additionally, the majority of surgeons writes post operative notes by hand and
neglect to readily share the notes with Recovery Area nurses, therefore once again
causing delays in patient flow. The same is true of those surgeons who write their
notes using their own text editing software.
e The Main ORs information system was rendered useless due to extensive data
insertion quality issues.
* The positive exception in terms of electronic information systems was the
ordering system for ancillary services (e.g. imaging and labs) which allowed
physicians to access patient results from any terminal. The problem was that no
such terminals were available in the Main ORs, and the information had to be
printed out in the inpatient service units' printers. Therefore, test results weren't
always readily available when the patient was transferred to the Main ORs.
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All in all, Hospital ABC's electronic information systems capability was very limited and
required extensive use of alternative modes of information sharing that not only were
error prone and introduced system delays, but also required extensive human resource
dedication and ultimately demanded more of them both physically and mentally.
8.4.3 Main Operating Rooms analysis summary
In this section we presented our analysis of the Main ORs in two phases. The first phase
was mainly concerned with building an initial understanding of operations and was
translated into a VSM. The second phase consisted observation and of five individual
interviews with different clinical staff, three of which were with physicians (i.e. two
surgeons and one anesthesiologist), and two were with nurses managers (i.e. for the
whole of Main ORs, and the recovery room specifically). Figure 8-4 is the overview of
Hospital ABC's Main ORs sub-architecture characterization presented earlier' 6 .
Compromised flow stability Poor service architecture
awareness/appreciation
Poor information flow
transparency and timeliness Compromised patient/physician
experience
Community care, clinical
excellence, and teaching
Narrow Main ORs NHS 18 Weeks Target
transformation
Meet NHS 18 Weeks targets Main ORs Poor organizational learning and limited
Poor data quality saheu medical training opportunities
subarchitecture 7
Prevalence of characterization Limited access to stored
paper based information
systems
Inexistent electronic Inadequate
workflow information boundaryspanners
Negative local process
optimization behavior
Insufficient
individual
Prevalence of Fus s incentives
undesirable Fragmented them"\
uncesse Hospital ABC culture Stressed and
divisional tired Main
structure OR climate
Figure 8-4: Hospital ABC Main ORs sub-architecture characterization
The characterization of the Main ORs sub-architecture concerns both local enterprise
architecture characteristics (i.e. pertaining specifically to the Main ORs) as well as
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166 In section 8.4.2.
enterprise level (i.e. pertaining to Hospital ABC as a whole), and reflects our enriched
understanding of hospital enterprise architecture (i.e. leverages our enriched version of
the NREAF discussed at the end of Chapter 7167).
Hospital ABC's core strategy as a whole was to deliver care to its surrounding
community while at the same time striving for national and internal recognition for
clinical excellence, as well as medical training capability. The two dominant external and
policy pressures were the shortening of available work hours for junior doctors (i.e.
European Work Directive) and the previously mentioned NHS 18 Weeks target for
elective surgery. In light of these external pressures, senior leadership at Hospital ABC
had instituted as a key strategic objective, to meet the NHS 18 Weeks target across all of
its divisional structures and associated surgical specialties. To that effect, senior
leadership was placing considerable pressure on the Main ORs in order for them to
increase their productivity given the low rate of OR utilization (i.e 75%). Additionally,
very localized investments had been done in an attempt to improve the Main OR flow (i.e.
invested in additional beds for the Recovery Area). However, an enriched understanding
of the hospital's enterprise architecture allows us to begin realizing that the Main ORs
poor performance is neither only due to its internal functioning, nor solvable with narrow
capacity related investments.
From an Organization EA view the Main ORs clinical staff exhibited a stressful
environment as they were well aware of the NHS 18 Weeks pressure as well as senior
leadership holding them primarily responsible for the long waiting lists and for finding a
solution. In evaluating the organizational climate at both local and enterprise levels,
varying levels of fragmentation were evident. At an enterprise level clinicians described
senior leadership and management as separate entities that weren't aligned with clinicians.
Furthermore, the divisional structure (e.g. Surgery and Critical Care, Cardiac and
Neurosciences, etc) replicated several functions which more often than not worked in
isolation of each other. At a Main ORs level stakeholders from different groups (e.g.
nurses, anesthesiologists, and managers) generally worked well together, with the
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167 See section 7.7.2.
exception of surgeons and nurses who had an arms length relationship. In terms of the
link between the Main ORs and other patient care structures, these were characterized
only as strong as the unskilled porters who transported patients between service units,
hence the existence of inadequate boundary spanners. Finally, individuals felt that the
salaried model in place was inadequately aligned with the throughput requirements.
Specifically, clinicians felt that senior leadership expected them to consistently work
longer hours, and they would earn the same regardless of throughput. Indeed there were
other types of incentives in place (i.e. non-financial) but none of these were considered
sufficient to sustain the increasing throughput demands of individuals.
From a Process EA View two dominant characteristics emerged from the Main ORs data,
namely the prevalence of undesirable processes, the existence of negative local process
optimization behaviors, and narrow process improvement initiatives. These
characteristics had impacts both at a local and enterprise level:
e Undesirable processes are processes that may be either standard or non-standard,
but that ultimately have a negative impact either within or beyond the Main ORs.
Examples we discussed included the last minute reshuffling of operating lists,
which among other things contributed to the pressuring of inpatient service units
and ancillary services to expedite the readying of the next patient on the list.
Furthermore, we described how stakeholders within the Main ORs had
inconsistent process descriptions (i.e. who does what) and process requirements
(i.e. what is needed).
e Negative local process optimization behaviors reflected how stakeholders within
and beyond the Main ORs were making local decisions to improve their
individual function, but without regard for potential impacts upstream or
downstream. Examples we discussed included the Main ORs calling for patients
too early, the poaching of surgical kits, and surgeons creating overambitious
operating lists that were bound to overrun and compromise flow. Similarly,
inpatient service units at times transferred patients to the Main ORs even when
said patients weren't ready (e.g. patient not consented; exam results pending; etc).
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From an Information EA View three dominant characteristics emerged from the Main
ORs data, namely the prevalence of paper-based information systems, the nonexistent
electronic workflow information system, and poor data quality. Overall, Hospital ABC's
electronic information systems capability was very limited and required extensive use of
alternative modes of information sharing that not only were error prone and introduced
system delays, but also required extensive human resource dedication and ultimately
demanded more of them both physically and mentally.
From a Service EA View four dominant characteristics emerged from the Main ORs data,
namely poor information flow and timeliness, compromised flow stability, compromised
patient experience, and poor service architecture awareness/appreciation. These
characteristics are largely a reflection of those of other EA Views. For instance, the poor
service architecture awareness is similar to the construct we introduced in Chapter 6 (see
section 6.5.2) whereby stakeholders make decisions while only mindful of their local
context. Hence, a negative local process optimization behavior is a reflection of a
stakeholder's poor service architecture awareness, as (s)he is negatively and
independently impacting others upstream and/or downstream. However, other
stakeholders may knowingly do so as they are under pressure and attempt to find a quick
solution to their local problem, which in their mind is more important than those of others.
Specifically, not only the local problem might not necessarily be more important than the
problems that a quick solution introduces elsewhere in the service architecture, but also it
isn't the recommended approach as a better solution might be available when considering
two or more service units at the same time.
From a Knowledge EA View two dominant characteristics emerged from the Main ORs
data, namely the limited access to stored information, and the poor organizational
learning and limited medical training opportunities. These characteristics specifically
result from the interactions across EA Views and are discussed below.
In examining each of the above EA View descriptions it is apparent that several EA View
interactions are taking place. The following are some examples:
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e The NHS 18 Weeks pressure (i.e. External / Policy View) drove senior leadership
to set it as a core strategic objective (i.e. Strategy View), and given their poor
understanding of hospital enterprise architecture, their pressuring of the Main
ORs as the primary source of the problem reflected Hospital ABC's "us vs. them"
culture and further contributed to the Main ORs stressed climate (i.e.
Organization View).
e The preceding example reflected the ongoing pressures to increase throughput. In
turn these pressures lessened the opportunity for medical training and
organizational learning (i.e. Knowledge View) given that everyone was focused in
squeezing yet another patient through the Main ORs.
e The need to reshuffle an operating list at the last minute (i.e. Process View) adds
to the existing stressed Main ORs climate (i.e. Organization View) and ultimately
potentially contributes to both the compromised patient flow stability and patient
experience (i.e. Service View).
* The arms length relationship between clinicians and senior leadership (i.e.
Organization View) was said to contribute to the lack of clinician access to
financial related data (i.e. Knowledge View) which ultimately reflected a non-
holistic measurement of Main ORs performance (i.e. Process View). Notably, the
inherent limitations of Hospital ABC's information architecture capability, were
also related to the lack of information access and data tracking (i.e. Information
View).
e The predominant paper-based information systems across service units (i.e.
Information View) together with the prevalent misaligned schedules across
service units (i.e. Process View) not only contributed to the frustration and
additional stress in the Main ORs (i.e. Organization View) but also to the poor
information flow transparency (i.e. Service View) which ultimately further
reinforced local optimization behaviors (i.e. Process View) and potentially
compromised patient flow stability and patient experience (i.e. Service View).
All in all, our enriched understanding of Hospital ABC's enterprise architecture, and in
particular that of its Main OR's sub-architecture, led us to determine that the service
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unit's throughput issues neither resided only at a process level nor only within its
boundaries. As such, investments and/or improvement plans solely targeted at the Main
ORs would at best increase local efficiency and continue to deliver unsatisfactory results
overall.
Presumably, if one were to holistically address the issues raised in our detailed
characterization of each EA View, and doing so whilst supported by lean enterprise
principles, one would be able to make decisions that would improve hospital performance.
Next we continue to examine another embedded unit of analysis, namely the
Administrative Support Services, so as to build a more complete characterization of the
Main ORs and that of Hospital ABC as a whole.
8.5 Administrative Support Services
Administrative Support Services include stakeholders that either support Hospital ABC
as a whole (e.g. process improvement engineers) or a set of service units. In both
categories data collection consisted primarily of interviews but also included internal
documentation and observation. A total of five interviews were conducted with
Administrative Support Services and allowed for audio recording16 8 . All interviewees
were theoretically sampled 69 as per phenomena which emerged from the data while
analyzing Hospital ABC's service units. Specifically, the sample included the director of
the Surgery and Critical Care (SCC) division, the Main ORs Coordinator, the Anesthetic
Delivery Manager, the director of Hospital ABC's internal Lean Team, and finally a
maxillofacial surgeon responsible for Hospital ABC's OR interdepartmental management
board. Each of the interviews took place in the respective offices of each of the
interviewees. Additionally, observational data from non-participatory meetings was
included, namely the OR Management Board (ORMB) meeting, and the OR Inpatient
Service Unit Group (ORISG) meeting.
168 The Chapter's main text will include key interview excerpts to support the findings from the analysis.
For additional excerpts please refer to Appendix V(i.b)
169 Theoretical sampling is a technique used in strengthening in-depth case studies. Succinctly, theoretical
considerations guide decisions about sampling and variables to include in a study. For a more detailed
description please refer back to section 5.2.4.1
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Figure 8-5is an overview of our characterization of Hospital ABC's sub-architecture
beyond the Main ORs, as it emerged from the Administrative Support Services data
analysis which concerns not only the Main ORs, but also other OR groups, as well as
Hospital ABC in general (e.g. the internal Lean Team supported not only elective surgery
sites but also the emergency department, and the ancillary service, and the clinics). As
before, the characterization reflects our enriched understanding of hospital enterprise
architecture (i.e. leverages our enriched version of the NREAF discussed at the end of
Chapter 7170). Similarly, the circle placement of the EA Views is meant to illustrate that
they are interconnected but not necessarily how they are connected.171. The data analysis
pertaining to this sub-architecture is presented in the next subsections.
Extended enterprise
management constraints
y Variable service architecture
awareness/appreciation
dliness Compromised patient/physician
experience
European Work Directive
NHS 18 Weeks Target
Hospital ABC EA Variable organizational learning capability
Narrow enterprise s tR cli te
process improvement
Figure 8-5: Hospital ABC Enterprise Architecture characterization beyond its
rd service unit
Main ORs 72
10 See section 7.7.2.
171 The placement of the EA Views in a circle isn't intended to illustrate how they interconnect. Moreover,
the EA Views don't simply connect in a sequential manner with the adjacent EA Views in the circle. In
section 8.5.8 we describe dominant EA View interactions that emerged from the data, and demonstrate the
non-sequential nature of said interactions.
172 In section 8.5.8 we compare and contrast this section's sub-architecture characterization with the one
previously discussed in the context of the Main ORs. In our comparison we leverage the use of data
visualization techniques to help the reader readily identify key similarities and differences across the sub-
architectures.
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8.5.1 Administrative Support Services External / Policy View
The following summarizes the key aspects consistently referred by the interviewees
pertaining to their external and policy environment:
. The European Work Directive had drastically reduced the amount of hours that
junior doctors could work. This had an immediate impact on the quality of their
training, as well as their availability to support Hospital ABC's operations,
whether in inpatient service units, ORs, and elsewhere. Specifically, recently
appointed full consultants (i.e. physician attendings) were running into trouble
due to lack of experience (i.e. with fewer allowable work hours, junior doctors
didn't train as much as they used to), and were being suspended immediately after
completing training.
. The NHS' 18 Weeks target was placing significant pressure on Hospital ABC's
operations. At the same time, interviewees were concerned with patient
experience, which had become a buzzword in a recent NHS report' 3 .
"Under patient's choice ifyou are the only hospital that has missed 18 weeks, where do you
think referrals are going to go?"
Hospital ABC SCC Division Director
"18 weeks has been a big forcing feature... we are clearly understanding it in a way we
didn't before about thefact that we haven't got enough capacity to do the work that we have
got to do and therefore we have got to be more efficient in order to sustain our position... and
I think that is the big strategic change."
Hospital ABC Lean Team Director
8.5.2 Administrative Support Services Strategy View
Interviewees were consistent in describing Hospital ABC's triple mission as described
already for the Main ORs (see section 8.4.2.2). Succinctly, these were providing high
quality care to the surrounding community, pursuing clinical excellence with national and
13 The NHS report is commonly referred to as "The Darzi Report" which was led by a British Lord named
Darzi and where recommendations were made for the NHS to improve its quality of care Darzi (2008).
High quality care for all: NHS Next Stage Review final report. NHS. London, Crown of United Kingdom.
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international recognition, and sustaining its leading training programs. In general,
interviewees described the existence of strategic tension in terms of the requirements of
the different patient populations. On one hand, different specialties attract patients with
different complexity which in turn requires different amounts of resources to treat. On the
other hand, less acute patients will centralize in one set of specialties, whereas more acute
patients centralize on another. The following quote is illustrative of this concern:
"I think it is afantastic tertiary but local service focused hospital. It is really embedded
in our population. We lose that at our peril as we might seek other sort of reputation in
the national or international scene."
Hospital ABC SCC Division Director
The chairman of the ORMB criticized senior leadership's approach to enterprise
transformation, in that it was difficult to convince them to make investments at various
points of patient flow, rather than on the visible problem areas. As an example he
described the focus on the ORs, and how leadership was considering adding an additional
OR for Neurosciences, and yet, what was most urgently needed was additional resources
at the pre-assessment phase'74.
8.5.3 Administrative Support Services Service View
Interviewees were consistent in describing delays and cancellations taking place in the
Main ORs, and to that effect offered several reasons as to why they thought it was
happening. Notably, they also shared that part of the reason that they were now aware of
these issues, was because they had recently instituted the practice of cross service unit
174 The pre-assessment phase takes place before a patient is admitted to Hospital ABC to undergo a
scheduled procedure. A common problem that Neurosciences are struggling with, is that the waiting lists
are large, thus the time elapsed between pre-assessment and procedure is large and allows for symptom
changes (not to mention extended patient discomfort). The end result is that pre-assessments are no longer
valid at the time of the procedure, and patient procedures need to be cancelled and rescheduled. Additional
anesthesiologists to allow for a closer pre-assessment screening would help reduce procedure cancellations
at the last minute (i.e. prevent inducing additional variability and stress on the Neuro ORs). Moreover, the
ORMB chairman's inability to sway senior leadership's investment strategy is one example of their
inadequate enterprise transformation scope.
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management boards 175. For instance, the chairman of the ORMB noted that surgeons
needed to realize that what happens inside the OR is only a subset of the patient
experience, and that if Hospital ABC is to improve its performance, they must necessarily
acquire a sense beyond the OR (i.e. attain service architecture awareness):
"a lot of surgeons see it as 'end theatre... I am out of here'. [..] It would be rather fool
hardly to ignore all of the aspects that come to leading to a successful completion of
treatment, because me spending two hours with somebody in an operating theatre is only
a small aspect of the time that has gone in to getting that patient in and out of [the]
hospital appropriately"
Hospital ABC ORMB Chairman
The following are key themes that emerged as issues from the data'7 6:
* Poor coordination between the ORs and the inpatient service units. Patients
aren't being prepared in a timely manner and such delays the OR start times,
sometimes causing cancellations, and ultimately contributing to overrunning
operating lists. However, inpatient service unit nurses are starting their shift at the
same time, or close to, the OR start times, hence they are busy doing patient
handoffs and treating ill patients. Also, nursing staff in the inpatient service units
might not be available to accompany the patient during transfer between service
units. Additionally, it may be that porters aren't available to help push patient
beds between service units.
* Poor communication between surgeons and management. Surgeons fail to
update the centralized procedure schedule and hold on to their assigned OR slots
until it is too late to find another patient to take a cancelled slot. Moreover, the
Main ORs Coordinator isn't warned that a change has occurred in a surgeon's
schedule, hence the OR slot scheduling remains unchanged, and ultimately goes
175 Cross service unit management boards are discussed in detail in section 8.5.5
176 The analysis of multiple embedded units of analysis allowed for the strengthening of the validity of our
findings. For instance, several of the key themes highlighted here, as well as elsewhere in the remainder of
this section, were already discussed in the context of the Main ORs. As previously noted, in section 8.5.8
we specifically conduct a compare and contrast analysis between the Administrative Support Services and
the Main ORs. A similar comparative analysis is done with the remaining embedded units of analysis
included in this in-depth case study.
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unused. Alternatively, a surgeon may rearrange who is assigned to a given slot,
and also leaves to the last minute until the Main ORs Coordinator is warned,
therefore contributing to delays of last minute scrambling (e.g. preparing surgical
kit for a different procedure; gathering the equipment necessary for a different
procedure).
* Poor communication between clinical staff within the ORs. The OR staff fail
to call the Holding Bay for the next patient. The Holding Bay nurse fails to call
the inpatient service unit for the next patient. Etc.
* Patient pre-assessments misaligned with actual procedure date. The time
elapsed between patient pre-assessment and the day of the procedure is too long,
which may give rise to a patient's symptoms changing, which only becomes
known at the last minute, and thus may force a cancellation.
* Less common factors contributing to OR delays and cancellations. Surgeons
arriving late to the ORs and delaying the operating lists as a result. Equipment
shortage due to 3rd party sterilizer not making instruments available on time.
Unforeseen complications during a patient's procedure. However, these were
neither considered to happen often nor to contribute the most to the overrunning
operating lists.
The following quote particularly captures how the Main ORs feel pressured by
stakeholders beyond their service boundary and that there isn't a shared service
architecture awareness:
"We see ourselves as the piggy in the middle. The patients come from the wards to us, and
they go from us to the wards. Many of our issues result from the ward not preparing... [...]
The start of lists... if we start well it goes well... if not it is a snow ball effect that we always
have to play catch up [..]They [namely, senior leadership] see that theaters are the fault on
many occasions, but it is such a shame that they don't understand the big picture of it.."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Coordinator
Page 476 of 759
Furthermore, the intervention of multiple stakeholders across the service architecture is
such that information can be changed by different people. However, said information
isn't centralized or readily shared across the service architecture, therefore exacerbating
the above mentioned communication and coordination issues.
"Information should be made accessible easily for all the decision making stakeholders, and
whenever a change takes place, instead of the information going back to only one stakeholder,
it should be made available to all the stakeholders affected by that change. Ensuring that the
flow of the information and the information are there as a resource."
Hospital ABC Anesthetic Delivery Manager
All interviewees were consistent in identifying the Cardiac ORs as the highest performing
ORs in Hospital ABC. Conversely, the Neuro ORs were identified as the least performing.
Finally the Main ORs were considered to be at the middle of the performance spectrum
as compared to Cardiac and Neuro. Notably, the interviewee's perceptual assessment of
the various types of OR's not only was consistent amongst interviewees but also with the
performance scorecard shared by senior leadership1 77 . Table 8-1 has an overview of
Hospital ABC's OR performance for each of the respective service units. Each service
unit is assessed in terms of four performance dimensions and can score either positively
(+) or negatively (-). By inspection, the Cardiac ORs outperform all other service units in
all performance dimensions, whereas Neuro ORs is the reverse scenario (apart from staff
availability where the Main ORs score as poorly as the Neuro ORs). As for cancellation
rates, the Cardiac ORs have less than 2%, the Main ORs have 9%, and the Neuro ORs
have 18%178.
177 For an overview of Hospital ABC's Performance Scorecard please refer to Appendix V(ii).
178 Procedure cancellation rates were provided by the Surgery and Critical Care division director, and later
confirmed with stakeholders from each service units. The rate itself pertains to the NHS operating lists
which function from Monday to Friday. On Saturdays, Hospital ABC, as with any other NHS Trust, is
allowed to sell its OR space and staff to private insurance companies who arrange for NHS surgeons to
perform the procedures. Notably, the impact of Saturday operations is contained as private patients are
located in a completely separate private wing of Hospital ABC. As such, Hospital ABC doesn't track the
performance of these Saturday lists and doesn't consider them to be a core part of its operations.
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Table 8-1: Hospital ABC OR Performance Overview
Main ORs Neuro ORs Cardiac ORs
Performance Dimension + - + - + -
Quality of Care 1 4 0 5 4 1
Patient Experience 4 3 1 6 7 0
Finance and Operations 5 9 3 11 11 3
Staff Availability 0 1 0 1 1 0
Total 10 17 4 23 23 4
Furthermore, lead clinicians from the Cardiac ORs were considered to be more proactive
in terms of adopting a service architecture approach to improvement initiatives.
"Cardiac came out with the fact that this is how they wanted to run the surgery 'I want three
cases in the day'. Anesthesiologists say 'you can't do that'. Okay sit in a room and tell us
how you might do it and what are the resource implications for that together with your
business manager, and then came back to us and say 'actually we need an extra recovery
bed... we need the theater team to work over lunch time if we can actually start anesthetizing
the second cardiac case as the other one is still coming off the table"'
Hospital ABC ORMB Chairman
8.5.4 Administrative Support Services Process View
Interviewees discussed at length their enterprise process improvement and planning
practices. The following are key observations that emerged from the data:
e Lean improvements failed to stick because of local optimized behaviors.
While the internal lean team was involved and onsite they were able to change
some local processes. However, after the lean team had left, the care givers would
revert back to their original way of doing things. For instance, since some
operating rooms shared an induction room, it was recommended that a simple
case start before a hard case. Such would allow for the simpler induction to be
done faster, move the patient to the OR, and then bring in the other complex
patient. However, both surgeons and anesthesiologists returned to their old
practice of starting an induction depending on whoever got there first, as opposed
to what made sense.
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" Lean improvements solely targeted at process level. The SCC director felt that
both senior leadership and the internal lean team were mistaken in their approach
to improvement. Specifically, he didn't support their perspective that everything
could be improved provided that the right processes were in place. Instead, he
suggested that processes are simply a means to an end and that one should have
the flexibility to institute incentives to change behaviors.
* Lean improvement targeted at isolated service units. Several improvement
initiatives were described taking place at different service units. However, these
efforts further reinforced the existing organizational fragmentation in that they
optimized their existing structure, rather than consider a value stream
improvement across the different service units. The Lean Team director expressed
his frustration as to how simpler lean methods had proven successful (e.g. 5S and
visual management) while scheduling "never got off the ground".
* Lean improvements lacked strategic direction and failed to engage
stakeholders. The Lean Team director shared that earlier attempts at improving
the enterprise had failed mainly for a lack of communication and strategic
direction. The following quote captures his self-assessment:
"So basically what we did was that we crashed landed... with no prior warning... with no
engagement up front... with no strategic direction and just said that we have got to get in
there and start doing stuff.. and guess what... the management team didn't really buy
it... the general manager never really got it and didn't buy it, she was being done too."
Hospital ABC Lean Team Director
Interviewees also provided insight into their performance measurement capability,
emphasizing the limitations of their existing information systems, and how they had to
rely on guesstimates to inform their decision making, as well as assign a physical person
to keep track of procedure cancellation rates and reasons for their cancellation. For
instance, the information system installed in the Main ORs wasn't even able to indicate
the top ten procedures per surgeon, and much less how long those procedures had taken
on average.
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Interviewees elaborated on their difficulties in managing the care delivery platform due to
non-standardized processes and stakeholders exhibiting local process optimization
behaviors without informing or considering other stakeholders beyond or even within
their own service unit. The following are examples the interviewees provided in this
regard:
e Unclear role definitions. Both nursing and physician/surgeon staff were said to
be unclear at times as to who was responsible for a particular process. Moreover,
people might have even been aware that a process needed to happen but they
thought that it was someone else's responsibility to trigger and monitor it.
Similarly, there wasn't a clear role description in terms of who was meant to
educate others about processes in the Main ORs. Hence, there was a self-
perpetuating cycle of unclear role definitions.
* Each surgeon has his own list scheduling requirements. Each division has its
own admissions team in order to manage the initial scheduling of patient lists.
Additionally, each admission team has to keep track of the individual preferences
of each surgeon, and the efficiency of the scheduling depends on the quality of the
relationship between the surgeon and the admissions team.
* Surgeons elect to continue using paper-based operating lists. Although the
capability exists in the ORs information system for surgeons to schedule their
procedures, the majority of surgeons elects to continue to use a paper-based
system which is prone to generate miscommunication and inefficiency (e.g. junior
doctors going back and forth pushing paper; operating lists having inaccurate
data).
e Surgeons schedule overambitious lists. Some surgeons in the Main ORs
consistently schedule overambitious lists which invariably overrun and place a
strain on the overall patient flow. Interestingly, the Main ORs Coordinator shared
that there is indeed a senior surgeon that checks the operating lists every day, but
he fails to dissuade the offending overambitious colleagues.
e Junior doctors purposefully insert wrong information to secure an OR. When
a patient is added to the operating list as a last minute patient, junior doctors are
required to fill out a standard form where they indicate that they have ordered the
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necessary tests, that the patient is consented, etc, otherwise the junior doctor isn't
allowed to schedule the procedure. As a result junior doctors often insert wrong
information, and perhaps under the assumption that everything will be ready in
time for the procedure. However, their localized optimization contributes to
throughput issues later on when they realize that a procedure cannot start because
something is missing.
"They [junior docs] genuinely believe that they can get the tests in time for the blood
work, or imaging, etc but then someone else has let down the system and the things are
not ready as expected. There are so many variables and all of them are relying on
everyone playing the game."
Hospital ABC Main ORs Coordinator
Holding bay nurses insisting on using porters to transfer patients.
Management had set a policy that patients fit to walk from an inpatient service
unit should do so whilst accompanied by an inpatient nurse. Instead, the holding
bay nurses are said to insist on using porters to transfer patients, as they believe
that patients shouldn't be made to walk just before a procedure (and even though
said patients checked into Hospital ABC the day before and were perfectly
mobile).
* Surgeons failing to communicate changes that they made to their operating
lists. Main ORs staff find themselves preparing the wrong surgical kits because
they printed an operating list from the system, and it no longer is accurate because
a surgeon changed something on the list (e.g. decided to operate on another
patient when rounding on the inpatient service unit) and failed to update the
information on the system. Similarly, the admissions team will not know of the
change being made and may schedule a procedure on an OR slot that was thought
to be available, when in fact the surgeon already agreed with a patient to conduct
a procedure in that slot. Additionally, surgeons may fail to warn the Main ORs
Coordinator that they aren't planning to use one of their designated OR slots,
hence, more often than not contributing to unused OR capacity. Conversely, some
surgeons who were on leave of absence may decide to come to Hospital ABC
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without warning the Main ORs Coordinator and force a last minute scramble in
order to find capacity and ready the ORs for him.
"It all depends on the relationship between the surgeon and the admissions team are
having. And they all work differently. And you would hope there is always a very open
communication channel but you don't know where all the information is held"
Hospital ABC Anesthetic Delivery Manager
Finally, interviewees referred that scheduling in general was a complex task which
required considerable human intervention and was prone to inefficiency mainly because
of the fragmented division structure, the local optimization behaviors previously
mentioned, and the fragmented information systems supporting each stakeholder. For
instance, the Main ORs scheduling system is based on an excel sheet which used a
coloring system that needs to be updated manually by the Main ORs Coordinator, and
isn't integrated to any other system. Concurrently, the Anesthetic Delivery Manager has
her own set of systems (i.e. excel, paper, and proprietary software) in order to keep track
of annual leaves and general availability of anesthesiologists, so as to staff an OR
procedure. As a result, both the Main ORs Coordinator and the Anesthetic Delivery
Manager have to go back and forth bridging across their different systems, as well as
those of others (e.g. admissions), in order to arrive at a scheduling decision.
"Just the logistics ofproducing roster, ensuring they know where they are, managing
annual leave systems, managing sickness, supporting the clinical director in the
management of the consultants and the junior doctors, ensuring that the right people are
at the right place at the right time. It is like throwing a lot of balls up in the air and
making sure that they get into the right slots."
Hospital ABC Anesthetic Delivery Manager
8.5.5 Administrative Support Services Organization View
Hospital ABC had a fragmented divisional structure and experienced a considerable
organizational divide amongst senior leadership, management, and clinicians
Interviewees provided further evidence concerning Hospital ABC's stakeholder divide
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among senior leadership, management, and clinicians. The following are the key themes
that emerged from the data:
" Fragmented division structure. Management recognized that they struggled
with assets belonging to a particular division and staff members belonging to
another division. Specifically, the SCC managed the ORs and the
anesthesiologists that serviced all the other divisions (e.g. Cardiac and
Neurosciences, Liver, etc). However, the surgeons of each division were said to
have an allegiance to their respective division, which in turn hindered the value
alignment across divisions. For instance, SCC centrally managed
anesthesiologists in order to identify potential crossovers in staffing ORs.
However, each division was continuously trying to become ever more
independent and manage its own anesthesiologists for instance.
"Everybody works in silos... is that because you have direct relationship between the
surgeons and their admissions... they tend to stick very close to their offices... they don't
have to have a phone conversation with someone on the other end of the hospital. Those
silos foster the relationships between them."
Hospital ABC Anesthesiologist Delivery Manager
* Cooperation between middle management and junior clinicians. The middle
organizational layer at Hospital ABC was more often than not tasked with making
sure that information flowed and that the enterprise delivered its value proposition.
Recognizing inherent limitations in the hospital's enterprise architecture (e.g. lack
of an electronic medical record; fragmented divisional structures) both middle
manager and junior clinicians179 felt that they were working towards a common
goal and had mutual respect.
* Some cooperation between senior management and senior clinicians. The
SCC division director was proud of what he called "the embarrassment strategy"
where he would publically and promptly publish data concerning individual
179 It is important to note that a junior clinician at Hospital ABC, or in the NHS system in general, is any
physician who isn't yet an attending (i.e. a physician/surgeon consultant in the UK). However, the UK's
medical training is such that it generally implies that the junior physicians are in their late thirties when
they reach attending level (note: in the US it can be as early as their late twenties). Moreover, the
designation "junior clinician" doesn't necessarily convey the maturity that some of the physicians already
have.
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surgeons. He was particularly fond of the OR late starts metric, however such
metric doesn't explain why an OR was late (i.e. late starts were often related to
issues that lay beyond the Main ORs), and when used in this manner, it is
representative of the tension between the two groups. Additionally, the director
described that surgeons would delay their operating lists on purpose, so that
Hospital ABC was forced into paying them additionally to operate on Saturdays
and meet the NHS 18 Weeks target. However, it was also noted that different
surgeons appreciate different division director styles, and the individual style may
set a fundamentally different tone as to how the tension and cooperation takes
place between management and senior clinicians.
* Some cooperation among management and senior clinicians. The OR
Management Board (ORMB) was an interdepartmental board to bring together
senior clinicians from all divisions at Hospital ABC and openly discuss ongoing
issues (e.g. waiting lists; cancellations). The ORMB was presided over by a
surgeon well recognized amongst his peers, and who relied on empathy in order to
attain the buy-in of other surgeons to change their behaviors and processes.
Moreover, the ORMB relied on voluntary attendance and on the empathy of its
chairman in changing his peers. Additionally, the Main ORs Coordinator was also
present at the ORMB. However, her role was limited to observation and reading a
long list of metrics (e.g. cancellations; late starts). The coordinator later explained
that she didn't feel at ease to confront senior surgeons on the Main ORs issues
and that on her day-to-day business she felt powerless to force surgeons to finish
overrunning lists which were clearly a result of their own actions (e.g. late arrival;
overambitious list).
* Cooperation between middle management and nursing in general. Similar to
the ORMB, Hospital ABC had recently begun an interdepartmental board to bring
together the nursing staff from the ORs and inpatient service units. The board was
called OR Inpatient Service Unit Group (i.e. ORISG) and was presided over by a
middle manager. From observation, as well as interviews, it was visible that
nursing staff openly discussed their issues in their individual service units, and
tried to explain why their interaction with other service units wasn't as good as it
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could be. The nature of the solutions that were pursued tended to be narrow (e.g.
focused on improving one specific process rather than considering the service
units as a whole), however the ORISG was nonetheless evidence that a
communication platform was being developed amongst nursing staff and that they
were vested in improving their overall performance.
e Tension between management and senior leadership. Management
characterized senior leadership as being primarily interested in the "big
glamorous services" and in doing so forgot about the common local patient. As a
result, Hospital ABC's service architecture had difficulty in accommodating the
different types of patients (i.e. specialized care vs. regular care). Additionally,
management felt unsupported by senior leadership to execute necessary unpopular
initiatives in order to meet the NHS 18 Weeks target. Specifically, the SCC
director described senior leadership as theoretical in its discussions with clinicians,
and failed to emphasize the strategic importance of a particular change, and
harbor the support of everyone towards that change.
" Tension between senior leadership and clinicians. As previously noted, the
chairman of the ORMB was a surgeon leader. In characterizing senior
leadership's attitude towards meeting the NHS 18 Weeks target, he said that they
simply expected the existing delivery platform to work harder and refrained from
investing on additional staff or compensating them for the extra hours (i.e. "they
are doing it on the cheap at the moment").
"Sometimes what can happen at a place like [Hospital ABC] at the strategic level is that the
discussion is all about, you know, the big glamorous services, the ones that have a national
or international reputation, like liver, cardiac, neurosurgery, oncology. Forgetting the fact
that the experience of most local patients is far more likely to be in our chest clinic, or in
orthopedics, far more people locally experience those services."
Hospital ABC SCC Division Director
Hospital ABC had valuable cross service unit management boards but they lacked senior
leadership support
The issue of division compartmentalization was known to both management and
Page 485 of 759
clinicians. Learning from the practices of the Cardiac ORs'8 0 which were said to
contribute to its higher performance, two management boards (i.e. ORMB and ORISG)
had recently been instituted by the director of SCC. Essentially, the boards were meant to
provide a forum where clinicians and management, from different service units, could
openly discuss issues (e.g. late OR starts; number of OR cancellations; etc) and attempt to
arrive at solutions to address them. Additionally, they contributed towards transparency
and consequently a sense of accountability, as surgeons didn't appreciate having their
peers publically think poorly of their dedication and performance.
In doing so, the boards would avoid going back and forth between management structures
and hold independent discussions. Instead, issues would first be identified at the
management board level and subsequently assigned to a subset team who would include
all necessary stakeholders (e.g. anesthesiologist, surgeons, nurses, etc), derive a solution,
and propose it back to the management board. Furthermore, the boards would serve as a
mechanism to shape a culture towards improvement and accountability. As previously
noted, the issues pertained to the interaction between different service units. Theoretically,
the management boards made great sense and indeed replicated proven methods from the
Cardiac ORs. However, execution limitations were hindering their usefulness.
One of the groups (i.e. ORISG) was devised specifically for nursing staff from the
inpatient service units and ORs. The other group was devised for senior clinicians from
the ORs (i.e. ORMB). Whereas the ORISG was in the process of developing a cohesive
group with a shared mission to improve, the ORMB was struggling with engaging and
motivating all senior clinicians to change their behaviors and contribute with solutions.
Specifically, the chairman of the ORMB felt that the board needed the involvement of
senior leadership in order to establish its strategic imperative and get the required buy-in
from senior clinicians in general. Notably, the director of the SCC division had expressed
a similar sentiment about senior leadership not supporting his efforts in engaging senior
clinicians with necessary unpopular initiatives.
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10 Discussed in detail in section 8.6.1
"I think that the theatre management is coming... I can't go around and wag the finger at
somebody... This is all done by encouragement... by trying to understand people... and
empathy... and trying to get people to say "guys we need to do this better, and actually if
you play ball, maybe the management will look at these issues, they may well look at how
we can improve the moral in terms of incentives and reward etc ".[..] this is where the
Theatre Management Board lacks in my view a senior manager allocated to it. In other
words, [the CEO], or someone along those lines because she also needs to hear what are
the sticking points. At the moment I don't have a regular meeting with [the CEO] on the
back of this."
Hospital ABC ORMB Chairman
"I have had the director of operations and the chief executive come to me into the
surgical teams, where I was hoping, that in not a blunt way, but in a pretty reasonable
straightforward way they would make the strategic imperative and the consequences of
failure clear. Yeah?! They didn't! They had a nice theoretical conversation and left it
with me. Quite frankly I am pissed off about it. But it is just one of those things [where]
as a middle manager you are a bit flike] the meat in the sandwich."
Hospital ABC SCC Division Director
External pressure hindered service unit performance reviews
Performance reviews are currently in place at Hospital ABC on a monthly basis.
Management recognizes that these are insufficient in order to keep close monitoring of
operations and make necessary adjustments. However, they also cite that the pressure to
meet the NHS's 18 Weeks is such that they are unable to afford additional time to track
and review performance. Moreover, management and clinicians are kept working flat out
and aren't able to collect, review, and make decisions on data on a more regular basis.
External pressure increased tension between management and specific service units
Management recognized that the external pressure of the NHS' 18 Weeks target was
triggering issues and tension between the leadership of neurosurgery and the SCC
division, as they were struggling to keep up with the demand given their existing OR
throughput and availability.
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Administrative Support Services regarded NHS' salary structure and labor laws as
inadequate, and that these constrained its ability to adequately reward or punish clinicians
according to their effort
Management felt that Hospital ABC had to be able to provide clinicians with a good
environment to work in, so as to attract the best surgeons and further support the
hospital's mission. However, management also emphasized that they need to closely
monitor clinicians in order to ensure that they are managing their waitlists and not
incurring unnecessary additional costs for the hospital. Specifically, both surgeons and
nurses were said to delay their operating lists in order to force the use of Saturday lists
whereby Hospital ABC had to pay surgeons per procedure. Finally, management
observed that they didn't have the flexibility to financially reward staff on merit, hence
they were prone to induce the wrong behavior or reward people who didn't deserve it.
"In the public sector the whole issue of incentives is a massive issue. How do you design
something for the knaves that does not compromise the knights?[..] I think there is a lot
of stuff that goes on at the subconscious level like 'hang on a minute, lets not get this
patient quite as quick as we need, lets have a break' [..]At the moment we are relying on
a massive amount of discretionary effort which is not rewarded and therefore it is hugely
variable. People say what the hell do I get for being more productive? On the carrot side
Ifeel constrained. The way the system is setup is that you end up having to give the bonus
to everyone even if they haven't performed."
Hospital ABC SCC Division Director
"To incentivize some of these individuals you have to be very careful. They are easy to
string a list out, to take more time just to get the overtime at the end because you know
you are going to get it."
Hospital ABC ORMB Chairman
Constrained by NHS's salaried structure the SCC division director instituted the practice
where any savings that individual service units were able to derive from their annual
budget, would be theirs to invest in additional resources as they saw fit (e.g. equipment,
training, staff, etc). Although the redistribution of surplus was viewed as a positive thing
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by senior clinicians, the side effect was that it also reinforced the independent culture of
each service unit. Moreover, their incentive was to optimize internally and not necessarily
engage at their interfaces in order to derive greater improvements. Notably, some service
units had already been engaging their interfaces (i.e. Cardiac ORs); however they were
doing so out of their own initiative and not because of a strategic directive or a rewarding
system that encouraged that behavior.
Management also made reference to their inability to financially penalize surgeons for
their poor performance. Instead, any losses were sustained by each division's
management structure, and no direct link existed with the surgeons themselves. However,
surgeon interviewees also argued that they only had a salary structure, and were
interested in a procedure volume based incentive in order to drive throughput.
Finally, the chairman of the ORMB observed that changing the hospital culture was
going to take time and in some cases would require specific individuals to retire and then
bring in new appointments. However, he also observed that mechanisms need to be in
place in order to incentivize changing the status quo. For instance, if surgeons are
requested to work longer hours, they should be given some sort of compensation at least
in the form of additional equipment. Similarly, he argued that nursing staff should be
given the option to have more flexible work arrangements where they could elect to work
longer days and shorten their work week, or potentially take a longer holiday instead.
Finally, he argued that people shouldn't be rewarded on the number of years that they
have worked, but rather in their dedication to Hospital ABC and on their merit. Instead,
clinicians are said lower ranked clinicians are said to leave Hospital ABC because they
feel that they aren't appreciated and are blocked by more senior staff members.
"But it will happen... but [it] is a slow, slow, culture change... but the minute we can
break that with the next round of appointments, hopefully, then you will start to see a
seed change... and that is difficult"
Hospital ABC ORMB Chairman
"Pay them more. Give them an incentive. Say 'these are the cases, do you think honestly
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that we can get through 8 cases rather than 7 in this timeframe, if we pay you an
incentive?' This is a dirty phrase within the NHS, okay, they don't like this. But for
Christ sake this is what you do in any other aspects of business!"
Hospital ABC ORMB Chairman
Team familiarity was said to be conducive of higher OR performance
Anesthesiologists and surgeons are teamed together consistently and allocated to the
same ORs as managers find that this arrangement is conducive of higher OR performance.
Specifically, anesthesiologist and surgeon share an understanding of each others' regular
practices and are familiar with a particular type of patient and associated procedure.
Conversely, junior doctors have short rotations at the Main ORs and such is said to
contribute to a continuous reset of the learning curve in terms of the new junior doctors
and their relationships with management and the remaining staff.
The Main ORs Coordinator's skill set was considered inadequate by both interviewed
clinicians and managers, and such negatively impacted her ability to manage operations
Previously when analyzing the Main ORs surgeon and anesthesiologist views of the Main
ORs coordinator, we had already established that she was poorly characterized as a non-
clinician who didn't have the required skill set and credibility to manage their OR
operations. Similarly, within the management structure itself, there were negative views
of the Main ORs Coordinator. The Lean Team director qualified her as an impediment to
large scale lean improvements, whereas the ORMB chairman insisted that she was unable
to visualize theater capacity and to flexibly allocate clinicians across different ORs (i.e.
staff was assigned to a specific OR). However, the SCC division director also recognizes
that managing clinicians can be very difficult and that sometimes he has to intervene in
order to protect the Main ORs Coordinator.
"This might work for British Airways, this might work for Aerospace, and sure of course
it is about process, but the people who give the messages have to have an intrinsic
understanding and be recognized as being credible to those people they are giving the
message to. [...] You need somebody with an overview of what is going on."
Hospital ABC ORMB Chairman
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"I provide aerial cover for her. 'Right you get a load of grieffor this, if they cross a line
of where it is acceptable and where it is not acceptable then I will deal with it', and I
have had to have afew anesthesiologists interestingly up here and said 'that was
essentially bullying and don't do it again. You are not getting away with that even ifyou
got away with it in the past"'
Hospital ABC SCC Division Director
Clinician accountability was achieved through data transparency, but some mechanisms
were considered to be more adequate in changing clinician practices and behavior
The management layer at Hospital ABC proactively attempted to measure behaviors with
concrete measures. In particular the SCC division director believed that culture was a soft
term, that although important, was all too often "thrown about". For instance, managers
began tracking late starts of operating lists, and believed that the publishing of that
information had led surgeons to be more accountable. However, while interviewing
clinicians it was apparent that they weren't pleased with how the information was shared
at times, and hence it contributed to further entrenchment of the clinician vs. management
culture. It wasn't that the information content was being questioned, rather the process of
delivery was considered inadequate. Hence, the previously described and recently created
cross service unit management boards were regarded as a valuable mechanism to not only
address issues, but also do so in an appropriate manner.
8.5.6 Administrative Support Services Knowledge View
Whilst analyzing data collected from the Administrative Support Services, the following
key themes emerged with regards to their Knowledge View:
Hospital ABC was trying to build an organizational learning capability
As previously noted, the practices of the Cardiac ORs in terms of solving both its own
issues and attempting to improve their interactions with other service units, prompted
management to create cross service unit management boards which were in their infancy
at the time of data collection. However, the management of the boards was comprised of
both clinicians and non-clinicians, and their espoused values and ideas were aligned with
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those of an organizational learning organization. Specifically, they understood that
service units don't operate in a vacuum and that surgeons shouldn't only concern
themselves with what happens inside the OR, and instead should also concern themselves
with the inpatient service units, as well as the pre-assessment clinics. Moreover, their
observations and improvement plans were evidence of their service architecture
awareness. As such, their improvement approach was one built on engagement and
participatory decision making in the context of the management boards. The intent was to
bring transparency to issues, as well as make senior clinicians feel accountable, and
understand how their behaviors were affecting others downstream and upstream.
Furthermore, the ORMB in particular, adopted concepts similar to those of lean
enterprise thinking when they included multiple stakeholders from various groups, and
essentially put together cross disciplinary teams to address problems in an expedited and
consensus driven manner. However, both the SCC division director and the ORMB
chairman were aware that they were merely at the infancy of their cultural transformation,
and they were still trying to find ways to counter key obstacles to their efforts. To begin
with, the existing pressure to meet the NHS' 18 Weeks target prevented them from
holding more regular performance review meetings, let alone allocate resources to
support improvement initiatives.
"One of the issues is that we have sweated the asset far more... the soft time that we used
to have has evaporated because we are cracking through the work... the production line
has got to be like buzzing all day long, seven days a week, or five days a week or
whatever... so we have that challenge now as to how we release staff to do that sort of
stuff.."
Hospital ABC SCC Division Director
Then, there were clinicians who were comfortable with the status quo, didn't want to
change things, and if anything, wanted to further increase the fragmentation or at the very
least revert back to the old way of doing things. Additionally, they felt that they didn't
have the necessary reward mechanisms to motivate the right kinds of behaviors and to
nurture a culture of meritocracy, rather than the traditional NHS "cast system". Also, they
felt that senior leadership wasn't involved enough in their efforts, and that the boards
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weren't regarded as a strategic imperative by several clinicians, even though they were a
mechanism devised to replicate and magnify Cardiac ORs practices, and in doing so,
address the pressure of the NHS' 18 Weeks. Finally, the boards relied mostly on opinions
or lagging indicators such as the number of cancelled procedures, as the existing
information systems capability was unable to capture more detailed information
regarding patient flow. All in all, the Cardiac ORs had been repeatedly singled out as an
example to replicate, and attempts were being made to apply their learning at a wider
scale.
"I think it is good for [Hospital ABC]. By my very nature I like things when they work
well. I hate waste, but I also want to make sure that people are reimbursed and feel part
of something that they are adding to. It has got to be a team culture. It really has to be.
And unfortunately there are several teams that are working in theatres at the moment and
what you are looking for is something that is going to bring them all together.
[..] There is a perception that there are things that keep popping up that are common to
everyone. So that might mean that we need more recovery space across the board. It
might be about how the pre admissions setup is designated for all the critical care about
how they can get these patients into on day admissions. Reduce through anesthetic pre
assessments the number of on day cancellations. Speed things up with some generic
things that might need a bit of investment and actually someone with a bit of clout to say
"I can see how this is going to improve it""
Hospital ABC ORMB Chairman
The Main ORs (non-clinician) Coordinator was said to have an inadequate skill set, and
such negatively impacted her ability to manage operations and assist other managers
Several observations were made stating that the existing Main ORs Coordinator didn't
have the necessary skill set and credibility in order to influence the necessary behaviors
amongst clinicians, and also execute resources flexibly. Instead, resources were assigned
to specific ORs, and it was common for an OR to go unused because she wasn't able to
reassign staff, or to influence surgeons to take responsibility and finish a list that is
overrunning because of non-clinically related issues (e.g. overambitious list; surgeon
arrived late). Furthermore, the ORMB chairman felt that the Main ORs Coordinator
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didn't provide him with the necessary information as to what was really happening on the
ground.
8.5.7 Administrative Support Services Information View
The Administrative Support Services were in the process of deploying cross service unit
management boards which helped improve information flow. However, such was done in
ad-hoc manner and not on a day-to-day basis. As previously noted in the analysis of the
Main ORs (see section 8.4.2.7), information was shared predominantly in paper format
and physically (e.g. verbally over the phone or in the presence of another).
The scheduling of procedures was a complex process that required extensive human
intervention from different service units, which had their own information systems that
not only weren't integrated across service units, but also weren't integrated within each
service unit.
For instance, the Anesthetic Delivery Manager had to manage staffing with no less than
five separate systems. One was a paper-based ledger which kept staff holidays. Another
was an off-the-shelf software specifically designed "for the production and management
of anaesthetic department rotas". Another was the OR electronic information system,
however the manager didn't quite trust the system because she knew that more often than
not it was populated with outdated information. The fourth one was the daily email she
received from the Main ORs Coordinator with the finalized operating list that needed
staffing for the subsequent day. Finally, the fifth one was a weekly planning sheet of
paper she created every Monday morning after meeting with the Main ORs Coordinator.
The Main ORs Coordinator was faced with a similar situation and she used a series of
excel sheets with her own coloring system to attempt to keep track of OR scheduling. For
instance, all OR slots were pre-assigned to different surgeons, and she manually
conciliated information with the admissions system in order to determine whether or not
a surgeon had already booked a patient for his given slot. If she saw that a slot was yet to
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be booked she would physically chase the surgeon and ask him whether he intended to
release the slot, and if she could use it for another procedure. However, this system was
very error prone, as we previously observed that surgeons don't always inform
admissions or indeed update the Main ORs information system with their operating list
changes. Moreover, a slot might look empty but it isn't, hence the Main ORs Coordinator
never really knows whether there is an opportunity to squeeze in another procedure.
Also, the ORMB chairman expressed difficulty at times in determining whether or not a
colleague's list was overambitious as he wasn't aware of his colleague's historic
performance for a particular procedure. Hence, even when decisions were thought to be
overambitious, they were kept the same as there wasn't any readily available data to
refute whoever suggested the list in the first place. Similarly, the activity of the ORMB
could be better supported if information was available in terms of the patient throughput
throughout the value stream inside Hospital ABC. Instead, they had to rely on anecdotal
evidence set forth by different stakeholders belonging to different service units and hope
to reach some consensus. Admittedly, the previously noted status quo surgeons proved to
be more difficult to change, and it was thought that workflow information would be
essential to nudge them towards indeed changing their behavior.
"the problem here with the theatres debate in general is that people regard their opinions
as facts and we have to disabuse them where that is possible."
Hospital ABC Lean Team Director
Overall the Main ORs information system was considered unsuccessful at supporting the
administrative services for several reasons. To begin with the system was unable to
indicate what had been the top 10 procedures in a given time period, given that people
inserted information in free-text boxes which were prone to generate different labels that
prevented the aggregation of data (e.g. "right ear" vs. "RT ear"). Additionally, even
though the system offered the capability for surgeons (or someone in their behalf) to
insert the operating lists electronically, most of them preferred to continue to use paper,
and instead give the lists to the Main ORs front desk and have them update the system the
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day before the procedure. However, a particular surgeon might have already known
ahead of time that he was going to introduce a change into his operating list. After all, if
the patient wasn't already an inpatient, he or she would have had to have made
arrangements to come to the hospital for the procedure. Instead, the information is shared
on paper only the day before, and the Main ORs have to consistently make last minute
adjustments in the preparation of surgical kits, staffing of anesthesiologists, etc.
"The technology currently supporting theatres is woeful and despite them introducing
[the Main ORs information system]"
Hospital ABC ORMB Chairman
Finally, since different information systems aren't integrated, all sorts of inefficiencies
may arise. We have already noted the issue of ORs going unused because surgeons didn't
share their updated operating list in a timely fashion. Also, OR staff may find themselves
preparing surgical kits for operating lists that are no longer in effect. Additionally, junior
doctors wanting to make sure that they get their patient into an available OR slot, may be
tempted to lie about whether or not a piece of information is indeed already available (e.g.
the result of a lab test, or imaging, or patient consent, etc). Furthermore, junior doctors
find themselves pushing paper and walking great distances from their senior surgeon's
office to the Main ORs front desk in order to deliver/pick up paper-based operating lists.
All in all, Hospital ABC's electronic information systems capability was extremely
limited and required extensive use of alternative modes of information sharing, that not
only were error prone and introduced system delays, but also required extensive human
resource dedication and ultimately demanded more of them both physically and mentally.
Finally, the absence of accurate workflow information systems made the Main ORs
further rely on tacit knowledge (or rather guesstimates) in terms of planning each day's
operating list for each OR.
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8.5.8 Administrative Support Services analysis summary
In this section we presented our analysis of the Administrative Support Services which
not only concern the Main ORs, but also Hospital ABC as a whole. A total of five
recorded interviews were conducted with both clinician and non-clinician management
stakeholders. Specifically, these were the SCC Division Director, the Main ORs
Coordinator, the Anesthetic Delivery Manager, the Hospital ABC's internal Lean Team
Director, and finally the ORMB Chairman. Additionally, evidence included observation
at non-participatory meetings of the ORMB and the ORISG interdepartmental
management boards, as well as internal reports on service unit performance (i.e. Main
ORs, Cardiac ORs, and Neuro ORs).
Overall, the analysis of the Administrative Support Services was consistent with the
characterization of Hospital ABC's Main ORs sub-architecture, and established that
several of its elements were replicated throughout the hospital enterprise. However, there
were also other elements that emerged and that weren't replicated. The different elements
emerged as the Administrative Support Services not only concerned the Main ORs, but
also other OR groups (e.g. Cardiac ORs, Neuro ORs, etc) as well as Hospital ABC in
general (e.g. the internal Lean Team supported not only elective surgery sites but also the
emergency department, and the ancillary service, and the clinics; the ORMB and ORISG
concerned not only elective surgery sites but also the inpatient service units; etc). As such,
Figure 8-6 is the characterization presented earlier of Hospital ABC's enterprise
architecture beyond its Main ORs1 82 .The coloring of the elements in the figure is a
visualization technique to readily compare this sub-architecture with that of the Main
ORs previously discussed in section 8.4.3. Specifically, black denotes no change from the
Main ORs sub-architecture; red denotes new elements; orange denotes previous elements
which have changed in some regard. Furthermore, in the descriptions that follow we also
directly make comparative references to the Main ORs sub-architecture'83 .
182 See section 8.5.
183 For additional detail on each of the Main ORs elements referred to, please see section 8.4.3.
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Figure 8-6: Hospital ABC Enterprise Architecture characterization beyond its Main ORs
The following summary analysis concerns the new elements (i.e. red in Figure 8-6) that
were identified as compared to the Main ORs sub-architecture:
Extended enterprise management constraints: interviewees broadened the analysis of
the Main ORs value stream beyond Hospital ABC's campus boundaries, as they correctly
understood that they needed to somehow manage the extended enterprise, or at least be
sensitive to its potential effects. On one hand, they described how patient pre-assessments
were being made much too early which contributed to the likelihood of procedures being
cancelled at the last minute, given that patients may have changed symptoms in their long
wait. On the other hand, third party service providers responsible for equipment
sterilization weren't being able to offer a service at the level that was required. Notably,
the extended enterprise management constraints reinforced some of the previously
characterized elements in the Service EA View, namely an increased likelihood of patient
cancellation further compromised patient experience and patient flow stability.
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Fragmented IT architecture: previously we had already established that Hospital ABC
made extensive use of paper in its information systems. However, in broadening the
analysis beyond the Main ORs we established that there was also fragmentation in their
IT architecture. Specifically, different functions within the SCC division (i.e. Main ORs
Coordinator and Anesthetic Delivery Manager) and across Hospital ABC (i.e. hospital
admissions) used different IT systems. Some of these systems were off-the-shelf
solutions, others had been internally developed by third party providers, and yet others
were being independently maintained by their users (i.e. excel sheets). Notably, the IT
architecture fragmentation reinforced some of the previously characterized elements in
the IT EA View, namely the prevalence of paper-based systems, and the existence of
poor data quality.
Limited process measurement capability: interviewees had to rely on guesstimates in
order to evaluate and manage different parts of Hospital ABC's patient flow. Examples
we discussed included the inability to assess automatically whether a surgeon's proposed
operating list was indeed over ambitious given that particular surgeon's past performance,
as well as an overarching inability to measure patient flow and identify problem areas
within and beyond an individual service unit. Notably, the limited process measurement
capability allowed for potential reinforcement of some of the previously characterized
elements in the Process EA View, namely the existence of negative local process
optimization behavior which remains visibly concealed, and the prevalence of
undesirable processes such as the guesstimating we already mentioned.
Narrow enterprise process improvement: the Lean Team Director in particular, but
also several of the other interviewees, gave evidence of a narrow enterprise process
improvement approach. Examples we discussed included the use of specific lean tools
(e.g. 5S) within specific service units, while end-to-end improvements such as operating
list scheduling were never tackled. Notably, the narrow enterprise process improvement
approach reinforced some of the previously characterized elements in the Process EA
View, namely the existence of undesirable processes (i.e. improvements driving local
efficiency and not tackling enterprise effectiveness) and negative local process
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optimization behaviors (i.e. silo based improvements are unable to consider/assess value
stream impacts of local processes).
Cross departmental and service unit management boards: two mechanisms had been
recently instituted (i.e. ORMB and ORISG) to improve performance in the interaction of
various service units. Specifically, the intent was to eliminate the back and forth between
different management structures (i.e. address Hospital ABC's fragmented divisional
structure), share information openly and appropriately (i.e. reverse the "us vs. them"
culture), and implement solutions that improved performance across Hospital ABC's
value streams, and ultimately reduced the stress in each service unit. Notably, the ORMB
was led by a well respected surgeon but senior leadership wasn't as involved as felt
necessary to attain senior clinician buy-in across Hospital ABC. ORISG exhibited a good
working relationship amongst nursing staff from various service units, as well as with the
middle management personnel attending those meetings. However, ORISG solutions
tended to be targeted at a process level and to be simple in nature. Finally, two service
units were consistently singled out as being better/worse performing, as measured
perceptually and objectively by Hospital ABC's scorecard, namely the Cardiac ORs and
the Neuro ORs.
The following summary analysis concerns the previous elements (i.e. orange in Figure
8-6) which have changed in some regard, as compared to the Main ORs sub-architecture:
Variable service architecture awareness/appreciation: previously we characterized the
Main ORs as having poor service architecture awareness/appreciation. In examining the
Administrative Support Services data we established that different stakeholders had
different levels of service architecture awareness/appreciation. Examples we discussed
include the ORMB Chairman's understanding that enterprise transformation and process
improvement plans shouldn't only be focused at process level or within an individual
service unit. Similarly, the Lean Team Director, although responsible for the narrow
enterprise process improvements, recognized that his efforts had failed to address end-to-
end processes. Hence, there was variable service architecture awareness/appreciation
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when considering our characterization of the Main ORs and now that of the
Administrative Support Services.
Narrow enterprise transformation: previously we characterized the Main ORs as
having been narrowly transformed (e.g. adding beds to the recovery area). In examining
the Administrative Support Services data we established that such characterization is also
appropriate beyond the Main ORs. Moreover, we verified and extended our finding from
the Main ORs. Examples we discussed included interviewee assertions that senior
leadership had only focused on adding beds in the recovery area, and was now thinking
of adding an OR to the Neuro ORs, however staff levels had remained the same, and
attention hadn't been given beyond the ORs (e.g. patient pre-assessment phase).
Variable organizational learning capability: previously we characterized the Main
ORs as having poor organizational learning capability. In examining both the data and the
reasoning behind the cross departmental and service unit management boards, we
established that the Cardiac ORs were said to be following practices akin to those of
organizational learning. Furthermore, the very decision to replicate said practices at a
hospital enterprise level via the already mentioned management boards, is in itself
evidence of Hospital ABC early steps towards potentially becoming a learning
organization. Hence, when comparing the sub-architectures of the Main ORs and the
Administrative Support Services, it is evident that there was a variable organizational
learning capability at Hospital ABC. Notably, as per the data from this embedded unit of
analysis, it seems that the Cardiac ORs are also further evidence of this variability8 4 .
In examining the above elements, both new and changed, as well as the ones that
remained unchanged, as with our characterization of the Main ORs sub-architecture, it is
apparent that several EA View interactions are taking place at an enterprise level. The
previously described EA View interactions (see section 8.4.3) are still applicable, while
the following are additional:
184 The Cardiac ORs are examined in detail in the next section.
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e Senior leadership's poor service architecture awareness (i.e. Service View) was
informing their narrow enterprise transformation (i.e. Strategy View) as well as
driving them to institute narrow enterprise process improvements (i.e. Process
View) and holding the Main ORs as the primary source of the waiting lists
problem, which reflected Hospital ABC's "us vs. them" culture and further
contributed to the Main ORs stressed climate (i.e. Organization View).
e Senior divisional management understood that enterprise change couldn't only be
done at the process level (i.e. Process View) and that incentives had to be in place
to support both the required changes, as well as the general concept of
maximizing patient throughput (i.e. Organization View).
e As with the case of the Main ORs the NHS 18 Weeks pressure (i.e. External /
Policy View) ultimately lessened Hospital ABC's ability to generally support
organizational learning practices (i.e. Knowledge View). Similarly, service units
already working flat out and under stressful conditions (i.e. Organization View)
have less availability to track performance data (i.e. Process View), thus further
lessening both organizational learning (i.e. Knowledge View) and service
architecture awareness (i.e. Service View), and ultimately not informing senior
leaders' transformation plans (i.e. Strategy View), or the Lean Team's process
improvement plans (i.e. Process View), or the cross departmental and service unit
management boards (i.e. Organization View). Finally, these EA View interactions
were further exacerbated by the inherent limitations of Hospital ABC's
information architecture capability (i.e. Information View).
* The predominant paper-based and fragmented IT systems across service units (i.e.
Information View) require that the scheduling and rescheduling of operating lists
(i.e. Process View) have extensive and stressful human intervention (i.e.
Organization View), which is error prone, more likely to generate inefficient
solutions, and ultimately affects information and patient flows, as well as patient
and physician experience (i.e. Service View).
e The preceding description needs to be balanced with the fact that some clinicians
elected to use paper even though they could use the electronic system, which
would allow to centralize at least all scheduling related information. Hence,
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clinicians' local process optimization behaviors (i.e. Process View) weren't
making full use of Hospital ABC's information architecture capability (i.e.
Information View). Additionally, the fragmented Hospital ABC divisional
structure (i.e. Organization View) reinforced the fragmentation of its IT
architecture (i.e. Information View) as different service units adopted different IT
solutions across redundant functions.
e The previously noted fragmented divisional structure (i.e. Organization View) is
conducive not only to the potentially negative local process optimization
behaviors (i.e. Process View) but also the poor service architecture awareness/
appreciation (i.e. Service View) and if not also the lessened organization learning
practices, then most certainly the inability for Hospital ABC as a whole to
progress towards becoming a learning organization (i.e. Knowledge View).
e The decision to institute cross departmental and service unit management boards
was early evidence of practices akin to those of a learning organization (i.e.
Knowledge View) as they were attempting to replicate the practices of a service
unit that had higher performance. Specifically, they hoped to bridge across the
different management structures (i.e. Organization View), build a shared
awareness/appreciation of the service architecture (i.e. Service View), and drive
enterprise level process improvements (i.e. Process View).
All in all, our enriched understanding of Hospital ABC's enterprise architecture allowed
us to further establish that the Main ORs issues neither resided only at a process level nor
only within its boundaries. Additionally, we determined that several of the Main ORs
enterprise architecture dysfunctional elements were also present in other service units and
divisions of Hospital ABC, and had impacts beyond those identified previously (e.g.
limited process measurement capability and narrow enterprise process improvement).
However, we also characterized EA View characteristics that were aligned with lean
enterprise principles (e.g. cross departmental and service unit management boards;
service architecture awareness; organizational learning; etc). Notably, several of these
lastly mentioned EA View characteristics were said to have been the result of Hospital
ABC wanting to replicate the practices of the Cardiac ORs, which were said to have led
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to the service unit's improved performance. Conversely, the Neuro ORs were
consistently singled out as the worse performing service unit. Hence, our exploratory
research proceeded to examine in detail the sub-architectures of the Cardiac ORs and
Neuro ORs, and hopefully make further progress towards answering this thesis'
remaining research question, namely: Can hospital performance be improved through
an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture and if so, how?
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8.6 Theoretically Sampled Operating Rooms
Over the course of the previous sections we identified that the Main ORs had different
organizational arrangements compared with other ORs housed in different divisions. The
Main ORs are part of the Surgery and Critical Care (SCC) division, and are shared by
several surgical specialties. Notably, specific surgical specialties (e.g. cardiac and neuro)
are part of their own divisions (e.g. Cardiac and Neurosciences) and have dedicated ORs,
which may or not be managed by their own division directly. For instance, the Cardiac
and Neurosciences division have dedicated ORs, but these are managed by the Main OR
Coordinator, who ultimately is accountable to the division director of SCC. Furthermore,
as previously noted, some specialties with dedicated ORs may share OR space provided
by the Main ORs. Finally, in our analysis of the Administrative Support Services we
determined that the Cardiac ORs were considered to have higher performance, which
stemmed from its practices that were now being replicated by the ORMB and ORISG
management boards, whereas the Neuro ORs were regarded at the opposite end of the
performance spectrum. In this section we examine in further detail the sub-architecture of
each of these service units.
8.6.1 Cardiac ORs
The Cardiac ORs are part of the Cardiac and Neurosciences division and are considered
to be the best performing elective surgery service unit at Hospital ABC. They are located
on the same physical floor as the Main ORs, and have two dedicated ORs as well as a
cath lab, and don't use any of the operating rooms in the Main ORs. However, Cardiac
ORs' physical plant, as well as nursing staff, is dependant on a different division (i.e.
SCC). A total of two interviews were conducted with Cardiac ORs staff, namely with the
lead surgeon and its clinical coordinator 85 . Both interviewees allowed for audio
recording and observation of Cardiac ORs operations (i.e. service unit functioning as
186
opposed to actual OR procedures)' .
15 It is important to note that the interviewee was a senior nurse which practiced in the ORs and also
coordinated operations. However, she ultimately had to answer to the Main ORs Coordinator.
186 The Chapter's main text will include key interview excerpts to support the findings from the analysis.
For additional excerpts please refer to c.
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Figure 8-7 is an overview of our characterization of Hospital ABC's Cardiac ORs sub-
architecture which emerged from the data analysis presented in the next subsections. This
characterization concerns both local enterprise architecture characteristics (i.e. pertaining
specifically to the Cardiac ORs) as well as enterprise level (i.e. pertaining to Hospital
ABC as a whole), and reflects our enriched understanding of hospital enterprise
architecture (i.e. leverages our enriched version of the NREAF discussed at the end of
Chapter 7187). The circle placement of the EA Views is meant to illustrate that they are
interconnected. 88
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Figure 8-7: Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs sub-architecture characterization89
187 See section 7.7.2.
188 The placement of the EA Views in a circle isn't intended to illustrate how they interconnect. Moreover,
the EA Views don't simply connect in a sequential manner with the adjacent EA Views in the circle. In
section 8.6.1.8 we describe dominant EA View interactions that emerged from the data, and demonstrate
the non-sequential nature of said interactions.
189 In section 8.6.1.8 we compare and contrast this section's sub-architecture characterization with the one
previously discussed in the context of the Main ORs. In our comparison we leverage the use of data
visualization techniques to help the reader readily identify key similarities and differences across the sub-
architectures.
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8.6.1.1 Cardiac ORs External/Policy View
In describing Hospital ABC's external environment both the lead surgeon and the clinical
coordinator shared the perspective previously described by the Main ORs (see section
8.4.2.1) in that they were under pressure to meet the NHS' 18 weeks target, so much so
that surgeons would share the procedural load amongst them in order to make sure that
they met the target. In general, interviewees felt that they were successfully meeting the
targets and that Hospital ABC's senior leadership was happy with their performance.
In describing their regulatory environment both surgeon and nurse noted that they
followed evidenced based medicine guidelines, and it wasn't merely the case of keeping
them in mind, but rather actively studying them and keeping themselves up-to-date.
8.6.1.2 Cardiac ORs Strategy View
Only the lead surgeon referred to Hospital ABC's strategy. It is important to note that the
surgeon also accumulated the function of Medical Director, hence he was part of senior
leadership and actively practiced in the Cardiac ORs.
In terms of Hospital ABC's strategy content, the cardiac surgeon provided a similar
assessment as his colleagues in the Main ORs. Specifically, he elaborated on the
hospital's mission to serve the surrounding community, while at the same time striving to
maintain its clinical excellence and international recognition. However, he commented
that stakeholders generally agreed with the hospital's mission of placing the patient first,
but he questioned whether everyone had a similar interpretation as to what it meant, and
whether or not they consciously followed it in their own practice. As for training, the
cardiac surgeon's assessment was slightly different given that the NHS had recently
narrowed the number of available training positions in cardiac surgery, therefore the
department wasn't planning to grow its existing training program.
"Ifyou pinned it to thefront door here "the patient comes first" nobody would
disagree... the real challenge for us is what does that mean? What does that mean for
you? Your behavior? Your attitude? And how would you do that with other people?"
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
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Additionally, the cardiac surgeon shared interesting insights with regards to Hospital
ABC's strategy process. To begin with, he described the hospital, along with the NHS in
general, as being traditionally risk averse and instituting a philosophy of having to go
through several business cases before trying anything. The surgeon felt that Hospital
ABC didn't take full advantage of it being a Foundation Trust, and that it spent a
considerable amount of time in the planning stage and that it should consider shortening
its execution cycles (i.e. instituting a trial and error approach). Furthermore, he
commented on how senior leadership seemed to be detached and/or unaware of its
enterprise capabilities and organization, as evidenced in their inability to roll-out
initiatives beyond two or three departments.
8.6.1.3 Cardiac ORs Service View
The Cardiac ORs' inflow interacts extensively with the Main ORs as it uses its Holding
Bay (i.e. they are located on the same floor next to each other) in order to receive patients
from the inpatient service units. In terms of outflow, the Cardiac ORs have their own
Cardiac Recovery Area which interact directly with the inpatient service units. Therefore,
Cardiac ORs are also interdependent within Hospital ABC's overall service architecture.
The Cardiac ORs staff had a shared concern towards patient experience and a common
perspective on how to deliver it
Both interviewees were consistent in their concern towards the patient experience and
their assertion that seamless patient flow is essential. The following are examples of this
phenomenon:
* Either the clinical coordinator or one of her nurses waits next to the patient before
their procedure, and explains to them what they should expect to happen.
Moreover, they make sure that patients feel comfortable and less anxious.
Furthermore, surgeons and anesthesiologists are aware that patients tend to forget
things just before and after a procedure, hence they make sure to involve their
families, and repeat things several times..
" Recognizing that the Main ORs Holding Bay doesn't always function as it should
(i.e. it refuses to call patients in a timely fashion so as to avoid holding them for
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too long), the clinical coordinator makes sure that the patients are called for well
ahead of time (i.e. 1 hour)'90 . Furthermore, she created an additional space buffer
just outside the ORs, thus further reducing the potential for the Holding Bay to
hinder patient flow.
* The surgeon expressed an interest in maximizing the usage of ORs and that he
would keep them running longer if he could. However, he also observed that it is
unreasonable to demand of patients to undergo procedures too late or too early in
the morning. Moreover, enhanced throughput shouldn't come at the cost of
patient experience.
" Both clinical coordinator and surgeon stated everyone's commitment in the
Cardiac ORs to do all their effort to avoid cancelling a procedure because of the
negative impact caused on patients and their families.
"Ifyou get the impression that not everybody in the team is committed to maximizing the
output for the patient, the benefit for the patient, and above all else, the second worse thing
that can happen to an operative patient, other than the operation not going well, is
cancellation. You are pumped up in every way, your family are pumped up, the phones are
ringing all over the country,' how is he doing?, it is real!' And then they say 'Oh it is not
happening! And they are not sure when it will and the surgeon doesn't have a list until next
week!' and vrrrrrrummmmm it is like a souffl hitting the ground"
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
The Cardiac ORs staff demonstrated extensive service architecture awareness in day-to-
day operations
Unlike the specialties in the Main ORs, clinical staff in the Cardiac ORs demonstrated
extensive service architecture awareness in their day-to-day operations. Both surgeons
and nurses made an effort to compensate for the misaligned schedules across service
units, and were committed to finding ways to support seamless patient flow. The
190 The Cardiac ORs calling patients well ahead of time didn't necessarily mean that they were gaming the
system (i.e. saying that they were planning to have the procedure earlier than the actual start time). Instead,
it was a proactive decision to enhance the communication between the Cardiac ORs and the inpatient
service units, as well as with the Holding Bay in the Main ORs, and allow them to give themselves time to
ready the next patient, or to update them on how well the Cardiac ORs were running (e.g. letting inpatient
service units know if they were running behind/ahead schedule).
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following are examples of this phenomenon:
e Surgeons as well as junior doctors interact extensively with patients both in
outpatient settings (i.e. clinic) as well as inpatient service units and the Cardiac
ORs. An effort is made to use the same clinical team to perform a procedure and
to round on the patients in the morning. As such, surgeons who have the first
procedure of the day will come to the hospital earlier in order to round on the first
patient. Notably, surgeons alternate operating lists so that each takes equal share
of morning and afternoon lists, therefore making the work effort comparable
across surgeons and their teams. Furthermore, cardiac instituted a practice of
patient pre-assessment within 5 days of their scheduled procedure. A shorter pre-
assessment timeframe allowed for test results to remain viable for the day of the
procedure. Conversely, the Main ORs didn't have a standard pre-assessment
timeframe and it contributed to last minute patient cancellations due to health
status changes.
e Surgeons don't generate ambitious operating lists as they understand the potential
negative implications of doing so (e.g. overrunning lists; cancelling patients;
repeating tests; etc). Furthermore, the clinical coordinators verify each proposed
list and will warn and indeed resist surgeons, if the lists are overloaded.
" Role definitions are clear with regard to who should call the Main ORs Holding
Bay for the next patient, and whom should call the Cardiac ORs Recovery Area.
Both types of calls are made in a timely fashion so as to avoid patient flow delays
and last minute solutions.
* Clinical coordinators arrive at 6.30 am in order to check available beds in
different service units (i.e. inpatient and ICU). Coordinators make arrangements
to reserve beds and ensure that there aren't any late procedure starts due to lack of
beds. Furthermore, they plan ahead any required patient moves from cardiac
recovery to the ICU, in order to make room for an additional cardiac procedure.
Moreover, they engage other service units in a timely manner and negotiate bed
availability in order to maximize patient throughput.
* Clinical coordinator instituted the practice of calling for patients well ahead of
time, and created a space buffer just outside the ORs in order to keep patients
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temporarily. As such, the Main ORs Holding Bay, as well as the inpatient service
units, has a reduced potential of slowing down its patient flow.
* Clinical coordinator changed the practice of nurses accompanying
anesthesiologists with patients to the recovery area. Instead she instituted the
practice of junior doctors assisting anesthesiologists in that task. As such, an
additional nurse became available to help with the OR cleaning, turnaround, and
patient prepping.
* The Cardiac ORs are faced with the same constraint as the Main ORs in terms of
not having dedicated inpatient service units. In other words, often times patients
are discharged from the cardiac recovery area to a different inpatient service unit
than where the patient originally came from. Hence, the same issue exists of not
being able to centralize expertise, easily round on patients, and share information
seamlessly. However, the lead surgeon instituted two operating nurse assistants
who essentially work as physicians and visit the relevant inpatient service units
each night and discuss with them what is going to happen the next day in terms of
Cardiac OR procedures. The result is that inpatient service units are better able at
having patients ready on time and at making room and retrieving them on time.
* The cardiac lead surgeon said that the Cardiac ORs were already running with
high efficiency and that several adjustments were continuously made to support
the interactions with other service units, and maximize throughput with them as
well. However, he warned of the issue that higher throughput means less time to
clean, greater potential for infections, and ultimately may jeopardize Hospital
ABC's effectiveness as a whole. Ultimately, he suggested that if Cardiac ORs
were to run longer even greater patient throughput could be achieved, but then
additional recovery and inpatient beds would be necessary.
"if getting the patient ready is not a rate limiting step, or in theory it shouldn't be, that is
what the holding area is... you put the space in a non critical, non costing, and non
revenue based area. Don't waste time not operating because the patient wasn't ready...
get the patient ready early... that is costing us nothing... and hold them. Hold them in
readiness so that the minute you call... vrrummm."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
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"if it is an overloaded list I can say that I am not happy to do that list because I cannot
accommodate that many cases in one day. I can speak with the consultant and say that I
am not able to do 7 cases in one day, rather than cancelling on the day. Usually 99% of
the time we are okay but I always check to see if there is a problem with the list."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Clinical Coordinator
"Extend the theatre list, more cases get done, more recovery is needed, more wards are
needed, more ICU is needed, more of everything is needed. It does not have to be quite
like that because ifyou look at the specialties it does not always work in that way.[..]. if
we do another 9% more inpatient work next year there will have to be in bunk beds and
on the roof and a lot of other things follow. Ifyou use those beds as fast as we do,
cleaning goes down, infections go up, s*** happens, you are in the papers... the system is
running very fast"
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
"When you talk to surgeons the thing that bothers them most is what they believe to be
restrictions on their ability to do things 'The system won't let me!'. And very often they
will say that the system does not allow me to offer my patient optimal care..."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
8.6.1.4 Cardiac ORs Process View
Service architecture dysfunctionalities generate localized process optimization behaviors
which may have a positive global impact
As with the analysis of the Main ORs, the Cardiac ORs exhibited localized process
optimization behaviors in response to service architecture dysfunctionalities. The key
difference is that Cardiac ORs optimizations were mindfully devised to improve
interactions with other interdependent service units.
Additional Cardiac holding area: the clinical coordinator explained that a key
contributing factor for the Cardiac ORs not having procedure cancellations was the
creation of a mock patient holding area. Only two patients would be held in the area at
any given time (i.e. cardiac only has two ORs) and they wouldn't be held there for longer
than 10 minutes. That in turn relied on the clinical coordinator calling the Main ORs
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Holding Bay in an adequate timeframe (i.e. had to call them soon enough but not too
soon, otherwise the patient would take up space in the Main ORs). Finally, the area itself
was a previously unutilized area just outside the ORs. The end result was that the Cardiac
ORs were able to reduce the potential of other service units slowing down its patient flow
influx.
Empowered physician assistants: although the term doesn't exist in Hospital ABC, the
lead surgeon referred to nurses as physician assistants, in that they were able to make
decisions that Hospital ABC normally required physicians to do. Specifically, Cardiac
ORs added/converted two operating nurse assistants to visit specific inpatient service
units each night and discuss with them what was going to happen in the next day in terms
of Cardiac OR procedures, and how they needed to interface. The end result was that the
Cardiac ORs assisted the inpatient service units with additional information so as to make
sure that they readied patients on time and made beds available as well as retrieved
patients on time after the procedure.
Earlier work hours: both surgeons and the clinical coordinator start their day earlier
than the clinicians in the Main ORs. This allows for them to interface with other service
units in the morning and address any potential issues that might have arisen during the
night (e.g. emergency patient took over a bed; patient catching a cold; etc). The end result
was that the Cardiac ORs took it upon themselves to become better aligned with other
service units and further support information exchange and patient flow.
The Cardiac ORs had a prevalence of process standardization and clear role definitions
The Cardiac ORs followed a practice of standard processes and clear role definitions so
that not only every stakeholder knew what was meant to happen at any point in time, but
they would also execute it in an efficient manner as possible. The following are key
examples:
Standard surgical kit prep: the Cardiac ORs had standardized surgical kit cards
specifying the required instruments for any procedure and for each particular surgeon.
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Surgical kits for each day were prepared the previous evening and constituted the nursing
staff's last activity for the day. In the event that an instrument wasn't available to
complete a surgical kit, the nurses would leave a clear note to that effect, so that the
clinical coordinator in the morning could sterilize the instrument or find an alternative
solution. Surgical kits were seldom prepared incomplete the night before as clinical
coordinators kept close inventory of each surgical kit, and had continuously adjusted it to
reflect the required procedural volume.
Standard process definitions: both nurses and surgeons know who is responsible for
calling the cardiac recovery area, as well as the Main ORs Holding Bay, in order to share
information both upstream and downstream. A clear communication protocol is
established inside the OR, starting with the surgeon and the anesthesiologist agreeing that
the patient can be woken up, who then communicate with the OR nurse who will contact
directly cardiac recovery, and will have the clinical coordinator contact the Holding Bay.
Standard workflow checklists: the Cardiac ORs had a series of standardized workflow
checklists applicable to both within and beyond their boundaries. For instance, before
calling the Holding Bay for the first patient, the clinical coordinator checks if the surgical
kit is ready, if there has been any last minute staff changes, etc. Similarly, the cardiac
recovery area only calls for the inpatient service units to pick up patients once they
verified that the post operating notes have been written by the surgeon, and a porter is
available to help transfer the patient.
Standard procedure lists: both surgeons and clinical coordinators have an empirical
based estimate as to how long each type of procedure is likely to take. They also take into
account the individual surgeon's characteristics (i.e. surgeons vary in their speed). As
such, knowing that they have a fixed number of ORs, and a mostly fixed number of
procedures (i.e. there may always be an emergency case that requires list adjustments),
procedure lists are scheduled with an adequate load. Both lead surgeon and clinical
coordinator have to agree on the next day's procedure list volume.
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Standard procedure start times: all clinicians shared the understanding that the first
procedure of the day should start at 8 am, and that everyone had to be present on time.
Similarly, in the event of a clinical team changeover (e.g. two teams operating in the
same OR in one given day), these would take place at an agreed time (i.e. depended on
the length of the previous procedure) and everyone would be ready.
"And it should be a standard also at what time people start... some people come late...
some people come early... there was no standard protocol. I said that everybody should
start at 8 o'clock. It does not matter who".
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Clinical Coordinator
The Cardiac ORs' process improvement and planning practices were constrained by
enterprise level fragmentation
As previously noted, the Cardiac ORs took it upon themselves to change processes in
order to better support patient throughput and ensure an adequate patient experience. To
that effect, they specifically adopted solutions that they had control over. These process
improvements were planned in the context of the Cardiac ORs required patient
throughput (i.e. to meet the NHS 18 Weeks target) and a continuous assessment of areas
requiring adjustment, both within and beyond their physical walls.
We have already described several of these improvements, including the careful
standardization of processes, as well as clear role definitions, and cardiac staff tasked
with physically assisting interactions with other service units (i.e. visiting them onsite,
sharing information, troubleshooting, etc).
However, despite the Cardiac ORs efforts, there were improvement and planning
limitations that emerged at an enterprise level. Essentially, the lead surgeon explained
that each division would function independently of each other, often times pursuing
different goals and implementing changes without external input. Similarly, the Cardiac
ORs would have liked to be able to influence the adoption of standardized practices at
other service units, so that they in turn would function in a stable manner and require less
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intervention from Cardiac ORs staff.
"This is typical of [Hospital ABC] because, there are possibly, and I say possibly
because I only know of 3, there are possibly 5 groups trying to do the same thing in their
own area at the same time and that is one of the big symptomatic things about [Hospital
ABC], because several things follow from that. [..]They are not able to pinpoint the
outcomes of the changes because other things are changing around them."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
The Cardiac ORs experienced performance measurement process and content issues due
to enterprise level constraints. However, the service unit had implemented good local
performance measurement practices beyond those required or enabled at enterprise level
As with the Main ORs surgeons, the lead Cardiac ORs surgeon expressed an interest in
accessing financial related data (e.g. how much income is the department generating for
Hospital ABC?) but was consistently denied access by senior management. Notably, the
lead surgeon was also the Medical Director 91 for Hospital ABC, and he still didn't have
access to the financial data.
"The thing you need tofocus most on is that money follows the patient. I get paid when I
work. IfI don't do the work we won't get paid, end of story. We are in business. Now that
business is not clear enough. Ifyou could tell me this is your activity, this is your
financial input, this is your cost, because your salary is very high compared to everybody
else. Make that 100% crystal clear to me [...]I don't get told what my financial return for
this institution last year was... I would like to. All surgeons would like to."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
Additionally, the lead surgeon commented on how management uses a narrow
measurement of performance by exclusively focusing on the operations dimension. In the
context of the Cardiac ORs it isn't much of an issue because of the level of efficiency and
high throughput. However, as Medical Director the surgeon commented on how
management pressured Main ORs, and other areas, solely in terms of the number of cases
performed by individual surgeons, and with no mentioning of outcomes.
91 US equivalent of Chief Medical Officer.
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"There are some surgeons that are fast... there are some surgeons who are slow... there
are some surgeons who are very good... and there are some who might not be so good...
but they are not the same four groups. We have very slow surgeons who are very good
with very good results. Should they be penalized for being slow? I am not so sure. Do
their patients go home with less complications and less readmission? Possibly.
[..] Carving them [surgeons] into minutes that really isn't going to work. "
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
Ultimately, the Cardiac ORs had different performance measurement practices than those
of the Main ORs, and would mostly remain untouched by management due to its higher
performance. For instance, cardiac clinical coordinators and surgeons had a baseline
understanding of the length of each procedure (depending on its type and the surgeon
performing it) and would not only plan their operating lists accordingly, but also raise a
flag to inspect why things deviated considerably from any initial plan. Furthermore, the
Cardiac ORs would every month assemble as a group, including all relevant stakeholders
(e.g. surgeons, head of nursing, division director, head of perfusion, nurses), and discuss
any issues and/or opportunities to further improve the patient experience and throughput.
8.6.1.5 Cardiac ORs Organization View
Hospital ABC had a fragmented divisional structure and experienced a considerable
organizational divide amongst senior leadership, management, and clinicians
The lead cardiac surgeon characterized at length how Hospital ABC had become
compartmentalized and how senior leadership was perceived by clinicians. To begin with
he explained how Hospital ABC is comprised of three main structures with different
cultures associated to each one of them. Specifically, there is senior leadership, followed
by the division management layer, and finally the clinicians who are associated with
different divisions. As a surgeon for Cardiac ORs and Medical Director for Hospital ABC,
the interviewee shared insights that cut across all three structures. Notably, said insights
were verified once again by triangulating the evidence with that of interviewees from the
remaining embedded units of analysis (i.e. the ORMB Chairman, the SCC Division
Director, the Main ORs Coordinator, and the two Main ORs surgeons).
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As previously noted, Hospital ABC is comprised of eight divisions which may have
dedicated and/or shared resources. Each division functions as a semi-autonomous
financial management hub, and no clear reconciliation exists between the different
divisions and senior leadership. As such, each division decides how they are going to
achieve a particular objective, and doing so with no concern over how they may affect
other divisions. All that matters is meeting the bottom line set by senior leadership.
Understandably, the cardiac surgeon was of the same opinion of the Main ORs clinicians
in that a significant divide existed between clinicians and the other two structures (i.e.
senior leadership and management). Additionally, the cardiac surgeon held senior
leadership accountable for having created a governance model that allowed for
regionalized autonomous structures. The end result was that Hospital ABC didn't have a
way of doing things, and the absence of said standard further contributed to the
fragmentation of relationships and ideas across the divisions.
"They allow different systems to develop all over the place because of this degree of
almost autonomy of these different areas and knowledge does not get shared, best
practice does not get shared, economies of scale, or whatever... but also on top of that
there is afeeling of relevant independence... there is no sense that this is the way we do
things at [Hospital ABC]."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
With the strengthening of the autonomous divisions senior leadership began having
difficulty in rolling out strategic initiatives (e.g. lean transformation teams). More often
than not the lean projects would be deployed in two or three areas, and they would fail to
propagate elsewhere within the enterprise. Similarly, divisions generally resist senior
leadership requests to cut their budgets in equal measure across the divisions. Apparently
division management argued that their functions and associated systems were different,
hence required a customized approach that didn't fit with an enterprise wide initiative.
Furthermore, senior leadership was criticized for only supporting its initiatives with top-
down emails instructing division management that projects should cascade into other
areas. In other words, senior leadership was only involved at the beginning and failed to
motivate and empower projects across the enterprise.
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"The adverse of that is ifyou say you must do this tomorrow... I don't care what it is...
you must save 2% ofyour budget instantly or were in trouble... they all think 'hey you,
buzz off leave me alone"'
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
Finally, the cardiac surgeon made observations regarding the performance measurement
practices of both management and senior leadership. First, he explained that surgeons had
been denied access to the financial dimension that would allow them to assess the
revenue and cost structure of their activity. Second, as previously noted, the lead surgeon
commented on how management uses a narrow measurement of performance by
predominantly focusing on the operations dimension (e.g. increasing patient throughput
without also considering outcomes).192
"The whole of my time here trying to change the culture, and not a lot else, and boy is it
impossible."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
The Cardiac ORs had a strong local organizational culture and stable climate
In examining the nurse and surgeon responses, as well as in considering the observational
data gathered at the Cardiac ORs, there were several elements contributing to a strong
local organizational culture and climate. We highlight two of them below followed by
more detailed descriptions of the remaining ones.
Balance plant maximization with patient experience commitment: both nursing and
surgeon spoke of a local culture of staff being fully committed to do whatever possible to
avoid cancelling procedures. Careful attention was given to identify waste (i.e. "dead
air") and make sure that everyone was on the same page with regards to prompt start
times, turnarounds, patient transfers, etc. Similarly, surgeons propose operating lists that
192 Notably, Hospital ABC's senior management narrow measurement of performance is related to our
findings pertaining to RQ 1 and RQ2 from Chapter 6. Specifically, the weren't aligned with our
recommendations of "Adopt[ing] a multidimensional performance construct that considers value
expectations and contributions of relevant stakeholders within and beyond hospital infrastructural
boundaries" and "Measur[ing] performance dimensions holistically while adopting practices that manage
and influence relevant stakeholders within and beyond hospital infrastructural boundaries".
Page 519 of 759
are reasonable and unlikely to overrun. Additionally, even when a case does overrun due
to unforeseen complications, both the surgeon and the nurses stick together and make
sure that they work the additional 2 or 3 hours in order to finish the list. Also, the clinical
coordinators will readily join a procedure in order to take over for a last minute shortage
of staff. More broadly, everyone shares the core objective that patient care comes first
and that any cultural differences amongst clinicians need to be addressed and resolved in
a timely manner. Finally, if someone persistently is unsupportive of the local culture of
balancing plant maximization and patient experience, both the clinical coordinator and
the lead surgeon will let them know that such is the case and advise them to consider
working elsewhere' 93 . All in all, the Cardiac ORs made the necessary effort to avoid
patient cancellations, and in doing so they attended to the patient's experience (i.e.
avoided cancellation) and to making the most of their available plant (i.e. conduct as
many procedures as possible). However, they were cognizant that if taken to extremes
one objective could deteriorate the other (e.g. maximizing throughput could potentially
imply less humane care); hence their culture of balancing the two elements.
"Ipersonally think our theatres should run from 7 in the morning to 9 at night, not
necessarily with the same surgeon, you wouldn'tfly a plane like that either, but we
should maximize the use of the plant. [..]As long as everybody is trying to avoid that
situation [i.e. cancellations] then we are all happy, and when things happen, then we just
have to say 'I am sorry we couldn't do it'. But when you get the feeling that somebody
just doesn't want to go the extra mile, doesn't care, isn'tfocused on that, and is really
just trying to get home early and have a beer, that really pisses everybody off!"
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
"I say 'if anybody not happy to follow my lead, you can go anywhere'. I can tell them to
go somewhere else. It is not my decision to say whether they can work here or not, but I
let them know that perhaps it is best for them to think of working somewhere else."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Clinical Coordinator
13 The clinical coordinator was explicit in clarifying that she was unable to fire someone who wasn't
performing. However, she did say that the Cardiac ORs peer pressure and culture was such that people
would eventually move on their own account.
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Psychological safety: a clinical coordinator feels comfortable to disagree with an
operating list proposed by a given surgeon and will openly argue that he must shorten the
number of procedures. In other words, the cardiac surgeons respect the clinical
coordinators and work closely with them. Similarly, the lead surgeon will identify
inappropriate or persistently inappropriate behaviors, whether from nurses or surgeons,
and expose them indirectly to the general environment so as to subtly modify their
behavior and give them an opportunity to redeem themselves.
"We talk about patientfocus... in reality what it means in a complex organization is not
'I must be my best' of course I must be my best, but our inter relationships are intense,
complex, continuing, so we must somehow be our best together for patient care"
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
The Cardiac ORs had an experienced and dedicated clinical coordinator which was well
respected by surgeons
The Cardiac ORs clinical coordinator had earned several nurse excellence awards at
Hospital ABC and was openly recognized by the cardiac lead surgeon as instrumental for
the service unit's high performance and cohesive teamwork. It was clear that the cardiac
coordinator was appreciated by surgeons quite in the opposite way than the Main ORs
coordinator was.
"[The Cardiac ORs clinical coordinator] is a livewire! She is good at herjob. You give
her a task, she will do it. If she needs to change something she will change it. And if she
needs to tell you 'you are being impossible' she'll say 'you're being impossible' [..]the
one thing that she made clear at the start, and she has not given up on since, is that she
will do whatever she can to do our reasonable quota of work and avoid cancellations".
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
The clinical coordinator's came through in her explanations as to how she followed a
series of planned steps in order to change the culture and the underlying processes of the
Cardiac ORs. When she first joined Hospital ABC she studied the operations for six
months and identified multiple dysfunctionalities and opportunities. At the same time she
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engaged with her nursing staff and asked them what their role was and whether they had
suggestions on how to improve operations. Prior to her intervention, each OR was only
able to do one or two cases at most per day. Today it was common to do three cases per
OR and sometimes four. She instituted formal role descriptions, standard process
protocols, staff inductions, surgeon communication, etc. However, before any change
could take place the clinical coordinator worked towards earning each surgeon's trust and
respect, hence she worked (and still does so today) alongside them and made sure that she
did at least one case a week with each one of them.
"I do at least one case a week with each one of the consultants, so I do 6 cases, because
they need to see that I am part of them.[..] I just worked with the staff They shouldn't
recognize me only as a manager. I work along with them and then they will get the trust
with me, and they will see that I am along with them even though I am both [manager
and nurse]. I do cases, I'll clean the theaters, prep the patient to move... it was all to get
the staff to know me and my abilities"
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Clinical Coordinator
In addition, the clinical coordinator also leads by example in her commitment towards the
Cardiac ORs. As described previously (see section 8.6.1.3), she is the first person to
arrive onsite at 6.30 am in order to check last minute changes in bed availability, surgical
kit availability, etc and facilitate both intra and inter service unit flow. If need be she will
replace a nurse last minute and will often work alongside them in both the most complex
and the simplest of tasks. Ultimately, she is committed, supportive of others, and expects
everyone to be aligned and deliver on the same objectives.
The Cardiac ORs exercised substantial control and influence within and beyond their
service unit boundary
The existence of an experienced and dedicated clinical coordinator allows the Cardiac
ORs to function reliably and independently. The clinical coordinators are responsible for
ensuring the timely and safe throughput of patients, as well as checking that equipment
are set, and that nursing staff is both knowledgeable and motivated. Furthermore, the
clinical coordinators have the responsibility of assigning the nursing staff to each
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procedure, as opposed to having a surgeon demand specific personnel, or having people
solely dedicated to one particular OR.
Although the Cardiac ORs are responsible financially and managerially to the Main ORs,
it is important to note specific organizational characteristics which lent it with additional
control. To begin with, cardiac anesthesiologists are specialized to such an extent that
they are dedicated to the Cardiac ORs, thus lessening the burden of staff scheduling.
Similarly, nursing staff although also belonging to the SCC division, are only dedicated
to the Cardiac ORs as well. Furthermore, the characteristics of cardiac patients are such
that the Cardiac ORs have a dedicated recovery area staffed with specific beds and
nursing staff. Moreover, in terms of staffing the Cardiac ORs have dedicated resources
and local control as to how to best apply them.
Additionally, the Cardiac ORs are only comprised of two ORs and a cath lab, which is
different from the 10 ORs managed by the non-clinical Main ORs Coordinator. The
smaller scale and dedicated resources allow the clinical coordinator to not only control its
resources more closely, but also to participate actively in the staff training and assisting
surgeons during procedures. Coincidently, the lead cardiac surgeon made the case that the
Main ORs have a top-down management approach with fragmented management
structures which cripple its ability to reproduce the level of performance of the Cardiac
ORs.
"Now the bigger you get the harder it isfor people to negotiate that mess in their own
area. 10 theatres divided into several specialty cares, ifyou manage the whole lot at that
micro level from the top, you can't do it, you can't get the buy in, you can't get the people,
you can 't get the credit. But ifyou have a team based approach, ifyou have the right
people, you will."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
Finally, despite its smaller scale and dedicated resources, as noted previously, the Cardiac
ORs took it upon themselves to institute a series of process and organizational practices
which ultimately allow it to function more seamlessly with the remainder of the hospital.
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The Cardiac ORs had instituted adequate boundary spanners between themselves and the
Main ORs, and inpatient service units
The Cardiac ORs had three key practices that enabled it with adequate boundary spanners
to help manage its dependencies with other service units. We have previously described
these, namely, the clinical coordinators, the empowered physician assistants, and the
consistent rounding/surgery teams. Succinctly, the clinical coordinators arrived early in
the day and facilitated information availability with other service units, as would also be
the case in the afternoon when they collected the final operating lists for the next day.
The empowered physician assistants functioned as physicians in visiting specific
inpatient service units each night and discussing with them what was going to happen in
the next day in terms of Cardiac OR procedures, and how they needed to interface.
Finally, the surgeons that rounded on patients at their inpatient service units, would also
perform the designated procedures, thereby further improving communication across
service units.
"We have two operating assistants who are nurses, and we have two ward assistants who
are nurses but not doctors but they are [behaving like] the doctor. So they are like PAs in
America, they are Physician's Assistant. [They go to the] ward the night before and say
your patient is going to have X tomorrow and we'll need this and this... it is notjust to
see the patient, get consent, etc but to talk to the ward as well... this is what it is likely to
be, this is what we will need, ifyou have your patient cleaned, washed, ready, and in a
gown at 9, we are likely to call at 10, but could you please have the patient fully ready for
9. Instead they [the Main ORs] adopted a just in time approach, oh I think it is 10, lets try
to get him ready at 5 to 10, and more often than not it is 10 past 10, and the call comes
and they say 'oh he is not ready yet... we... we... weren't sure when you were coming in'
that sort of thing."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
Team familiarity was said to help build culture and performance
As with the case of the Main ORs, both clinical coordinator and lead cardiac surgeon
valued the ability to foster team familiarity in their service unit. A stable team helps build
a likeminded culture and also drives efficiency and quality of care.
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"What works well is knowledge. When you have a core ofpeople who know the surgery...
know the people... know what they are doing. [...] It is a lot about people... ifyou are in
a team... and the team is good and stable... everybody knows it. Everybody knows the
things not to say to each other because they know that isjust going to drive him crazy...
Or it doesn't have to be the doctors... it could be anybody... You learn that there are
ways of behaving together."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
"There is no time for the surgeon to ask give me knife, etc. You should know what you are
supposed to do"
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Clinical Coordinator
The Cardiac ORs staff had multiple individual incentives but generally considered them
to be insufficient. Additionally, they regarded NHS' salary structure and labor laws as
inadequate, and that these constrained its ability to adequately reward or punish clinicians
according to their effort. Finally, the Cardiac ORs emphasized the importance of
respecting all staff members
Several of the Cardiac ORs interviewees observations with regards to individual
incentives at Hospital ABC were similar to those of the Main ORs. Both the clinical
coordinator and the cardiac surgeon were strongly drawn to providing patient care and in
working in a prestigious organization such as Hospital ABC. They also mentioned the
existence of staff awards which openly recognized the better performing and more
dedicated staff members. Additionally, they shared the view that Hospital ABC's salary
based system didn't adequately reward people and that not everyone worked as well or
with the same commitment.
However, the Cardiac ORs shared additional viewpoints on incentives. They were
particularly concerned with respecting all employees (similar to Toyota's respectfor
people principle) and making sure that they had a safe work environment, and that they
weren't consistently being asked to work late and compensate for overrunning lists.
Furthermore, they felt it was essential to cater for each individual's sense of self-worth in
fulfilling their job at Hospital ABC. To that effect, they were particularly concerned with
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their limited ability to keep their best employees at Hospital ABC, as these felt that there
were limited career progression possibilities. Closer inspection revealed that the issue
was wider to NHS's career structuring standards rather than to Hospital ABC alone.
Essentially the NHS instituted a band (i.e. level) system that was the same everywhere in
the UK, where people would earn the same salary everywhere, and where the number of
available slots in each band per each hospital was controlled by the NHS. As a result,
some of the best staff would leave looking for better opportunities in other hospitals.
"I don't agree with the nurse band progression at all."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Clinical Coordinator
The clinical coordinator uses alternative means of rewarding her staff by using
international training opportunities sponsored by vendor companies. Also, both of the
interviewees believe that a respectful and well functioning workplace will keep the best
nurses and surgeons loyal to the Cardiac ORs, as they will be less likely to find similar
working conditions elsewhere in the NHS.
Interestingly, they also noted the opposite case where it is difficult to manage employees
who don't fear for their jobs. Usually it happens when nurses or surgeons reach their
highest rank, and years of experience no longer confer them additional progression.
"Fear of destitution, fear of not surviving, fear of not coping, fear of losing yourjob, fear
that the organization will collapse or get rid ofyou or whatever... and under a socialist
system youjust don't get that... and you don't get that in the whole of Europe, not just the
UK. If we underperform in our division what will they do? Will they get rid of us? Will I
be sacked tomorrow? Will my pay go in the national pay scale? [Managers] have very
few instruments for demeriting somebody. In theory they could take your performance
awards away from you and in practice almost never done."
Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs Surgeon
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8.6.1.6 Cardiac ORs Knowledge View
In previous subsections we have noted phenomena pertaining to the Cardiac ORs
Knowledge View. The following are key insights:
Hospital ABC as a whole isn't a learning organization
The fragmented divisional structure of Hospital ABC prevents it from defining its way of
doing things, and instead each division independently strives towards meeting its own
bottom line, without sharing information with the remaining divisions, and disregarding
potential impacts elsewhere in the service architecture. Similarly, divisions may be faced
with a similar problem or objective, but they fail to share their learning, hence often times
spending valuable resources reinventing the wheel. Also, divisions were said to be unable
to pinpoint the outcomes of their changes given that several parts could be changing at
any given moment without their knowledge. Furthermore, those initiatives that are meant
to be enterprise wide seldom reach more than two or three departments, as senior
leadership aren't active sponsors beyond the initial broadcasting email. Also, leadership
sponsored improvement initiatives are associated with putting out fires 194 inside specific
divisions, rather than accomplishing an enterprise wide result. Finally, senior leadership
and management elected to keep financial information from clinicians who had
repeatedly asked for it in the past. Instead, clinicians feel pressured by management with
operational metrics (i.e. number of procedures). Moreover, information isn't shared
across enterprise levels and performance isn't examined holistically, even though its
information content may exist somewhere in Hospital ABC.
The Cardiac ORs had experienced clinical coordinators
Unlike the Main ORs coordinator who is regarded as an ineffective manager by the
surgeons and anesthesiologist, the Cardiac ORs coordinator is considered a key pillar in
maintaining the service unit's higher performance. Her clinical knowledge (and personal
commitment) allowed her to gain the trust of both surgeons and nurses in the Cardiac
194 The initial exploratory question proposed by leadership for this research is indeed indicative of that (i.e.
"How to improve productivity in the operating rooms?"). With a greater understanding of Hospital ABC's
enterprise, one can see that the question emerges in the context of the NHS' pressure of 18 Weeks waiting
lists and the potential penalties from not meeting that target.
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ORs. With that trust she was able to openly discuss system dysfunctionalities and
opportunities for improvements. Together with surgeons, the clinical coordinator
instituted standard processes, clear role definitions, and a training program for recent
hires.
The Cardiac ORs exhibited learning organization behavior
Despite the enterprise level constraint of fragmented divisions, the Cardiac ORs
embraced a series of organizational learning practices both within and beyond their
service unit boundary. To begin with, every staff member, whether a surgeon or a nurse,
shares the same overall objectives of balancing patient experience with plant utilization
maximization. Each team member has a well defined role and carries out standardized
processes which are available in document format. Similarly, every team member
undergoes rigorous training to learn the Cardiac ORs environment as well as how it
interacts with other service units. Additionally, regular meetings are held with all
members of staff in order to review performance data, improvement suggestions, and any
issues that might have arisen. Everyone is encouraged to submit pertinent data and is
required to attend these meetings. Said meetings also foster familiarity and improves
work relationships. Finally, recognizing the enterprise level constraints of fragmented
divisions, the Cardiac ORs began testing and eventually standardizing new roles and new
processes that helped information visibility and supported patient throughput.
The Cardiac ORs followed evidence based medicine guidelines
Both nursing and surgeon staff expressed the importance of following explicit knowledge
guidelines set by the UK's NICE guidelines and only making deviations if in the context
of a wider discussion amongst colleagues. For instance, as opposed to some of the Main
ORs surgeons, in Cardiac ORs they consistently performed timeouts. Also, more often
than not the surgeons doing a procedure would greet the patient immediately before they
were put to sleep, and if it wasn't the senior surgeon doing so, then it would be the most
senior surgeon trainee. Finally, the previously mentioned rigorous training for new staff
members was also said to follow evidenced based medicine (e.g. different coloring of
tubes; participating in a timeout; thorough cleaning between procedures; etc).
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8.6.1.7 Cardiac ORs Information View
In previous subsections we have noted phenomena pertaining to the Cardiac ORs
Information View. From an infrastructure capability standpoint these were similar to
those that were previously described in the Main ORs (see section 8.4.2.7). Specifically,
the existence of paper-based patient records, the absence of an electronic workflow
information, etc, meant the prevalence of paper-based information systems, and the need
for extensive human resource intervention (e.g. pushing paper, using the phone, etc). For
instance, the clinical coordinator received via email every Friday the list of procedures
for the following week. Said list would also be edited by hand every day by mid-
afternoon and require surgeons and junior doctors to plan it, edit a form by hand, and
eventually deliver it physically in the Main ORs. Similarly, information wasn't readily
available in terms of inpatient service unit availability, and required alternative modes of
information sharing.
However, unlike the Main ORs, the Cardiac ORs was able to sustain a stable and high
patient throughput while maintaining a visible flow of information within and beyond its
boundaries. Also in the previous subsections we highlighted several characteristics that
enabled the Cardiac ORs to perform as such. Among others, these included the
prevalence of standard processes and clear role definitions (Process View), the existence
of boundary spanners (Organization View), service architecture awareness (Service
View), and learning organization behavior (Knowledge View). All in all, the absence of
an electronic based information system isn't in itself a reason why a hospital enterprise
shouldn't be capable of high performance. Indeed, the ability to readily share, search, and
execute information, is of added value for hospital enterprises (e.g. care givers can focus
on caring for patients rather than pushing paper; anomalies can be more readily detected;
etc). However, as evidenced in the Cardiac ORs, one can have higher performance even
in the absence of highly sophisticated EMR and electronic workflow systems. Notably,
this conclusion replicates our finding of multiple internal architectural configurations
from Chapter 7. Specifically, in Hospital XYZ we also found a higher performing
internal architectural configuration which had made decisions that compensated for the
inherent limitations of its enterprise electronic information systems (i.e. instituted
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boundary spanners; routinely collected data on its interaction performance with other
service units; physicians and nurses collaborated closely to share information more
effectively; etc).
8.6.1.8 Cardiac ORs analysis summary
In this section we presented our analysis of the Cardiac ORs. A total of two recorded
interviews were conducted with Cardiac ORs staff, namely with the lead surgeon and its
clinical coordinator, as well as evidence collected from observing their operations.
Figure 8-8 is the overview of Hospital ABC's Cardiac ORs sub-architecture
characterization presented earlier'9 5 and pertains to the analysis of the previous
subsections. The coloring of the elements in the figure is a visualization technique to
readily compare this sub-architecture with that of the Main ORs previously discussed in
section 8.4.3. Specifically, black denotes no change from the Main ORs sub-architecture;
red denotes new elements; orange denotes previous elements which have changed in
some regard. Furthermore, in the descriptions that follow we also directly make
comparative references to the Main ORs sub-architecture and the Administrative Support
Services sub-architecture' 96.
The characterization of the Cardiac ORs sub-architecture concerns both local enterprise
architecture characteristics (i.e. pertaining specifically to the Cardiac ORs) as well as
enterprise level (i.e. pertaining to Hospital ABC as a whole), and reflects our enriched
understanding of hospital enterprise architecture (i.e. leverages our enriched version of
the NREAF discussed at the end of Chapter 7 197). The circle placement of the EA Views
is meant to illustrate that they are interconnected.
195 See section 8.6.1
196 For additional detail on each of the Main ORs elements referred to, please see section 8.4.3. Similarly,
for the Administrative Support Services elements referred to, please see section 8.5.8.
197 See section 7.7.2.
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Figure 8-8: Hospital ABC Cardiac ORs sub-architecture characterization
The Cardiac ORs sub-architecture characterization is similar to that of the Main ORs
insofar as the Strategy, External / Policy, and Information EA Views are concerned. The
service unit is faced with similar external pressures and is aware of the same strategic
charter set by Hospital ABC's senior leadership. Furthermore, the similarity of its
Information EA View denotes Hospital ABC's overarching information systems
limitations which were the same to all of its divisions and service units. Additional
similarities emerged from the data regarding other EA Views. In terms of the
Organization EA View, similarities persisted regarding the fragmented divisional
structure of Hospital ABC and how such contributed to the "us vs. them" culture among
senior leaders, managers, and clinicians. Also, further insight was shared with regards to
the inherent difficulties of the NHS' salary system, and how it was both difficult to retain
the best employees, and penalize those that didn't work their fair share. Finally, the
Cardiac ORs equally denoted a desire to have access to financial related information, but
reportedly had been denied by senior leadership, which coincided with the Main ORs
characterization.
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The majority of the new elements (i.e. in red in Figure 8-8) that were identified from the
Cardiac ORs data pertained to the Organization and Process EA Views, but also included
other EA Views, as follows:
Enterprise history and culture: one of the effects of Hospital ABC's fragmented
divisional structure was that it lacked "a way of doing things", and such was considered
essential to guide the enterprise as a whole. Notably, this element is equally pertinent to
the Main ORs.
Local leadership and service unit importance: both the lead cardiac surgeon and the
coordinator were leaders in the Cardiac ORs. The interviewed coordinator led by
example and had amassed considerable buy-in from surgeons, as well as from the nursing
staff. Similarly, the lead cardiac surgeon was well respected and accumulated the role of
Medical Director for Hospital ABC. Together, lead surgeon and coordinator were able to
shape a strong local culture, and engage with service units beyond the Cardiac ORs'
boundaries. Conversely, the Main ORs didn't have the benefit of such clear clinician
leadership.
Cohesive, stable, and harmonious local culture: the Cardiac ORs didn't have an
internal "us vs. them" culture. In fact, they had quite the opposite. Nursing staff and
surgeons worked closely together towards the common goal of maximizing plant
utilization and avoiding at all costs cancelling a patient procedure. Examples we
discussed included the sharing of work load, the use of reasonable operating lists, prompt
procedure starts, the existence of peer pressure to keep everyone engaged and
contributing towards the common goal, and the benefits of team familiarity.
Service unit boundary of control and influence: the Cardiac ORs had a dedicated
Recovery Area, two dedicated ORs, and dedicated staff. However, they were
managerially and financially accountable to the Main ORs, and relied not only on the
Main ORs Holding Bay, but also on the inpatient service units, and ancillary services.
Hence, locally the Cardiac ORs scaled and aligned their resources to efficiently and
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effectively deliver on the 18 Weeks operating target. However, realizing their
dependence on stakeholders beyond their service unit boundaries, they also instituted
specific practices to engage them, support them, and ultimately influence them.
Mitigated extended enterprise management constraints: the Cardiac ORs influence
beyond their boundary was particularly evident in how they engaged the pre-assessment
service unit and influenced them to change their practices. By holding pre-assessments
within 5 days of a scheduled procedure they were better able to avoid procedure
cancellations due to patient symptom changes. Notably, this practice allowed for the
reinforcement of the remaining Service EA View characteristics, as well as to other EA
Views.
Evidence based medicine guidelines: unlike the Main ORs which had several surgeons
who were dismissive of evidenced based medicine guidelines, the Cardiac ORs embraced
them at both the nursing and surgeon levels. In fact, these guidelines informed several of
their process related practices.
Competent Cardiac OR coordinators with implicit and explicit knowledge: the
existence of competent Cardiac OR coordinators was significant beyond their ability to
function as effective boundary spanners (detailed further below). Unlike the Main ORs
Coordinator, which lacked clinical training and was poorly regarded by both clinicians
and some managers, the Cardiac OR coordinators managed and practiced medicine
alongside clinicians, and were very well regarded. Furthermore, the Cardiac OR
coordinators led by example, supported and shaped the local culture, and very
importantly, were able to engage and confront surgeons if necessary. Ultimately, the
Cardiac OR coordinators were instrumental towards enabling the service unit's
performance.
Fragmented IT infrastructure: as with the Administrative Support Services, the
fragmented IT infrastructure emerged from the data as the Cardiac ORs accumulated
local management responsibilities (e.g. list scheduling; performance tracking) which both
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contributed and reflected the IT infrastructure (e.g. excel sheets, proprietary software,
etc).
Enhanced process measurement capability: unlike the Administrative Support
Services, and despite similar information system limitations, the Cardiac ORs had
instituted local practices that enhanced its process measurement capability. Examples we
discussed included: tracking reasons for cancellation/delays; tracking procedure length
times by surgeon; regular service unit meetings with everyone present to review
performance and discuss deviations; etc.
Non-holistic performance measurement: despite Cardiac ORs enhanced local process
measurement capability they were denied access to financial related data, hence their
performance measurement wasn't able to leverage the content which existed elsewhere in
the enterprise. Furthermore, it was noted that senior leadership predominantly focused on
measuring them, along with other ORs, in terms of the operations dimension (e.g. number
of procedures).
Effort towards enterprise process improvement: consistent with the Administrative
Support Services characterization of the Cardiac ORs, we established that the Cardiac
ORs had made successful process improvements that not only impacted their local
operations but also those of other service units. Moreover, their approach was
distinctively different from that of Hospital ABC's internal Lean Team which focused at
a process level within each service unit (as in, not across units).
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The following summary analysis concerns the previous elements (i.e. in orange in Figure
8-8) which have changed in some regard as compared to the Main ORs sub-architecture:
Extensive service architecture awareness/appreciation: previously we characterized
the Main ORs as having poor service architecture awareness/appreciation. In examining
the Cardiac ORs data we established that stakeholders were consistent in their high
service architecture awareness/appreciation. Examples we discussed include the
influencing of the pre-assessment service unit, the Main ORs, and the inpatient service
units. However, several of the Cardiac ORs internal practices were also evidence as they
were aware of how their own actions could negatively impact others in the service
architecture.
Focus on meeting patient/staff experience: stakeholders in the Cardiac ORs had a
common goal of maximizing plant utilization and avoiding at all costs cancelling a
procedure. Furthermore, they instituted the core value of self-worth and being respectful
towards each other. Examples we discussed include surgeons and anesthesiologists
engaging patient family members, nurses sitting next to patients before their procedure,
and a shared willingness and commitment towards avoiding procedure cancellations.
Enhanced flow stability: the Cardiac ORs had a significantly smaller cancellation rate
than the Main ORs (i.e. <2% vs. 9%), experienced fewer disruptions to their flow (i.e.
last minute rescheduling; delays), and had the highest throughput.
Enhanced information flow transparency and timeliness: despite having the same
information system limitations as the Main ORs, the Cardiac ORs had instituted practices
both within and beyond its boundaries, which ultimately enhanced its information flow
transparency and timeliness. Notably, this element also reflects both the extensive service
architecture awareness/appreciation and the mitigated extended enterprise management
constraints, and ultimately reinforces the enhanced flow stability and ability to deliver on
the patient experience.
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Prevalence of standard processes: unlike the Main ORs, the Cardiac ORs not only had
standard processes in place, but also followed them. Examples discussed included:
operating lists had to be reasonable and red flags were raised if needed; clear role
definitions as to who is responsible for triggering a process (e.g. calling recovery area or
holding bay); workflow check lists; prompt start times; etc.
Positive local process optimization behavior: unlike the Main ORs, the Cardiac ORs
also exhibited local process optimization behavior, but with positive results and whilst
aware of their service architecture; hence, although these were local decisions they
generated global improvements. Examples we discussed included: the changing of
schedules to align capabilities across service units; the placing of effective boundary
spanners (discussed below); the timely warning/updates shared with other service units;
the improvised local holding bay; the consistent tracking of workflow data; etc.
Effective boundary spanners: unlike the Main ORs, the Cardiac ORs had effective
boundary spanners in place. Examples we discussed included: competent coordinators
that not only facilitated local operations but also interactions with other service units;
empowered physician nurse assistants tasked with physically visiting and coordinating
inpatient service units every evening; consistent surgeon team rounding and performing
procedures. Moreover, the Cardiac ORs understood the importance of managing their
operation within Hospital ABC's overall service architecture, and hence put in place
boundary spanners to that effect in key operations interfaces.
Extensive organizational learning capability: unlike the Main ORs, the Cardiac ORs
exhibited an extensive organizational learning capability which is best characterized in
the context of EA View interactions. Moreover, the service unit's organizational learning
capability is the combined result of several decisions that they had made in the context of
other EA Views.
Overall, the Cardiac ORs had similar enterprise level constraints as the Main ORs as
evidenced in the consistent characterization of key elements pertaining to the Strategy,
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External/Policy, Organization, and Information EA Views (i.e. elements pictured in black
in Figure 8-8). However, it is clear that while existing within the same Hospital ABC, the
Cardiac ORs had made decisions that resulted in a sub-architecture significantly different
from that of the Main ORs. Moreover, we characterized several new elements as well as
several elements that were different in some regard, as compared to the Main ORs.
Furthermore, a holistic analysis of these differences in terms of the EA View interactions
they produce, allows us to establish how the Cardiac ORs had gradually developed an
enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture, and had made decisions
which improved not only their local performance but also enhanced its interactions
with other service units upstream and downstream. The following are key EA View
interactions of the Cardiac ORs sub-architecture which support our finding:
* The NHS 18 Weeks pressure (i.e. External / Policy View) drove senior leadership
to set it as a core strategic objective (i.e. Strategy View). The Cardiac ORs local
leadership (i.e. Organization View) exhibits extensive service architecture
awareness/appreciation (i.e. Service View) and understands that its unit exists
amid Hospital ABC's fragmented division structure, within which the Cardiac
ORs boundary of control and influence is defined (i.e. Organization View). To
begin with, the Cardiac ORs influenced the practices of the pre-assessment clinic
to eliminate cancellations due to patient symptoms changing over time (i.e.
Service View). Internally, the Cardiac ORs local optimization process behaviors
only became standard (i.e. Process View) if their outcome was positive both at a
local level and beyond the unit's boundaries. Similarly, the Cardiac ORs created
new positions at key interfaces so that the unit had effective boundary spanners
(i.e. Organization View). The changes made at the Process and Organization EA
Views, allowed for the Cardiac ORs to improve information flow, enhance patient
flow stability, and reinforce its focus in meeting not only patient's expectations
but also those of its employees (i.e. Service View). Finally, the benefits attained at
the Service EA View subsequently reinforce those of the Process and
Organization EA Views (e.g. standard processes need not be broken at the last
minute; local climate remains positive and culture strengthens; etc).
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e However, the Cardiac ORs local leadership (i.e. Organization View) exhibits not
only extensive service architecture awareness/appreciation (i.e. Service View),
but also an understanding of both the capabilities and limitations inherent in
Hospital ABC's EA, and specifically made decisions to avoid having frustrated
employees saying "the system won't let me!". In addition to the practices
described in the previous bullet point, Cardiac ORs leadership also elected to
recruit a competent coordinator (i.e. Knowledge View) who not only was
responsible to manage operations but also to practice alongside clinicians.
Together, local leadership and coordinators were able to build a cohesive, stable,
and harmonious culture (i.e. Organization View) which embraced service
architecture awareness, encouraged consensus and participatory decision making,
and practiced organizational learning in the pursuit of continuous improvement
(i.e. Knowledge View). Furthermore, the Cardiac ORs also adopted practices that
enhanced their process measurement capability so as to inform their improvement
efforts (i.e. Process View). All in all, the Cardiac ORs sub-architecture was
capable of successfully delivering on the goal of maximizing plant utilization and
focusing on patient experience (i.e. Service View) whilst aware of Hospital
ABC's overall capabilities and limitations.
All in all, we theoretically sampled the Cardiac ORs for their higher performance, as well
as for having triggered the creation of the cross departmental and service unit
management boards described in our Administrative Support Services analysis (see
section 8.5). We determined that the Cardiac ORs had a significantly different sub-
architecture than that of the Main ORs, and that such differences were the result of
decisions which reflected local leaderships' enriched understanding of hospital enterprise
architecture, and ultimately contributed to the Cardiac ORs higher performance.
Next, we proceed to examine the Neuro ORs who were consistently singled out as the
worse performing service unit in terms of the previously examined perceptual and
objective data (see sections 8.5.3 and 8.5.8). Our intent is to further test our finding that
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an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture can inform decisions that
ultimately contribute to higher hospital performance.
8.6.2 Neuro ORs
The Neuro ORs are part of the Cardiac and Neurosciences division and are considered to
be the least performing elective surgery service unit at Hospital ABC. They are located
on the physical floor below the Main ORs, and have three dedicated ORs, and also use an
operating room in the Main ORs. Furthermore, similar to the Cardiac ORs, the Neuro
ORs' physical plant, as well as nursing staff, is dependant on a different division (i.e.
Surgery and Critical Care (SCC)). A total of two interviews were conducted with Neuro
ORs staff, namely with the lead surgeon and the lead anesthesiologist. Both interviewees
allowed for audio recording and observation of Neuro ORs operations (i.e. service unit
functioning as opposed to actual OR procedures)' 98.
Figure 8-9 is an overview of our characterization of Hospital ABC's Neuro ORs sub-
architecture which emerged from the data analysis presented in the next subsections. This
characterization concerns both local enterprise architecture characteristics (i.e. pertaining
specifically to the Neuro ORs) as well as enterprise level (i.e. pertaining to Hospital ABC
as a whole), and reflects our enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture
(i.e. leverages our enriched version of the NREAF discussed at the end of Chapter 7199).
The circle placement of the EA Views is meant to illustrate that they are
interconnected.200
198 The Chapter's main text will include key interview excerpts to support the findings from the analysis.
For additional excerpts please refer to d.
'99 See section 7.7.2.
200 The placement of the EA Views in a circle isn't intended to illustrate how they interconnect. Moreover,
the EA Views don't simply connect in a sequential manner with the adjacent EA Views in the circle. In
section 8.6.2.8 we describe dominant EA View interactions that emerged from the data, and demonstrate
the non-sequential nature of said interactions.
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Figure 8-9: Hospital ABC Neuro ORs sub-architecture characterization20
8.6.2.1 Neuro ORs External/Policy View
In describing Hospital ABC's external environment both the lead surgeon and the lead
anesthesiologist shared the perspective previously described by the Main ORs and
Cardiac ORs (see sections 8.4.2.1 and 8.6.1.1) in that they were under pressure to meet
the NHS' 18 weeks target. In general interviewees felt that they were unable to meet the
demands asked of them and they offered several reasons:
e Neurosurgery was unable to turn away patients referred by the primary care
physicians (PCPs) and had to see each and every patient in a specialist consult
setting. Apparently, PCPs were inadequately referring patients that should
otherwise be treated by PCPs and some combination of physical therapy.
* The European Work Directive considerably reduced the amount of hours that
junior doctors were allowed to work. Previously they would work as many as 98
201 In section 8.6.2.8 we compare and contrast this section's sub-architecture characterization with the one
previously discussed in the context of the Main ORs. In our comparison we leverage the use of data
visualization techniques to help the reader readily identify key similarities and differences across the sub-
architectures.
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hours in a week, and now they could only do 48 hours. As a result there were
fewer residents available to do night call, fewer residents to support with
procedures, etc, and ultimately adding to the responsibilities of senior surgeons.
Furthermore, both interviewees felt that the residents were no longer being trained
well enough for the responsibilities that they were expected to have after
completing training.
* Evidenced based medicine guidelines were beginning to be introduced at the
Neuro ORs, which allowed for more robust processes, but also lowered patient
throughput. Also related was that malpractice insurance for spinal procedures had
become considerably expensive for private orthopedic surgeons; hence they were
no longer doing such procedures, and instead referring them to the NHS.
8.6.2.2 Neuro ORs Strategy View
In terms of Hospital ABC's strategy, the neurosurgery clinicians had similar observations
to those of the Main ORs. Specifically, they emphasized that there was strategic tension
between serving the surrounding community and at the same time striving to remain at
the forefront of clinical excellence. The end result is that they were using a highly
expensive plant for both simple and complex cases. Moreover, Hospital ABC's
neurosurgery clinical care delivery platform wasn't aligned with the proposed strategy.
"Get simple patients through an infrastructure designed for complicated patients. We
have assumed that all patients are massively complicated."
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Surgeon
Furthermore, they noted that their mission as a leading academic medical center was also
under threat given that the NHS 18 Weeks target was pressuring them to maximize
throughput, therefore making it increasingly difficult to accommodate trainees who are
inherently slower conducting procedures.
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8.6.2.3 Neuro ORs Service View
The Neuro ORs interact more with the Main ORs than do the Cardiac ORs. The primary
reason for this interaction is because neurosurgery felt it needed to share an OR from the
Main ORs, in addition to its three dedicated ORs. However, as with the Cardiac ORs,
they also rely on the Main ORs Holding Bay in order to act as the initial interface
between them and the inpatient service units. In terms of outflow, similar to the Cardiac
OR's, the Neuro ORs have their own Recovery Area which interacts directly with the
inpatient service units. Therefore, Neuro ORs are also interdependent within Hospital
ABC's overall service architecture. Overall, the service architecture dysfunctionalities
that emerged from the Neuro ORs are very similar to those of the Main ORs. However,
there were additional insights as well.
Neuro ORs have the highest rate of procedure cancellations in Hospital ABC
Both neurosurgery clinicians offered similar numbers in terms of the rate of procedure
cancellations. Specifically, the ORs would function five days a week and have at least
one cancellation a day, and two cancellations in the same day twice a week. Moreover,
there were at least seven procedure cancellations every week, which explains Neuro ORs
20218% cancellation rate
Misaligned processes and poor information visibility beyond Neuro ORs compromised
patient care and flow
Untimely patient assessments contribute to cancellation rate: The long waiting list for
the Neuro ORs has had the implication that patients are pre-assessed too long ago, hence
more often than not their symptoms will have changed, and surgeons can only realize that
once they present themselves for the surgery at Hospital ABC, and have to cancel them.
202 An NHS operating list at Hospital ABC is comprised of 3 slots for each day and each Neuro OR.
Therefore, the Neuroscience division with its 3 Neuro ORs together with its additional OR in the Main ORs,
should ideally be able to conduct 12 procedures every day, or 60 procedures a week. Instead they were only
doing 49 cases a week, which meant an 18% cancellation rate. However, they were averaging 1.8 cases a
day in the Main ORs and 2.6 cases a day in the Neuro ORs. Hence a 38% and 12% cancellation rates
respectively. Clearly, their throughput in the Main ORs was extremely poor, but their Neuro ORs
cancellation was also still higher than the Main ORs 9% and much higher than the Cardiac ORs < 2%.
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Inpatient service unit patient transfers are unpredictable for Neuro ORs: Both
neurosurgery clinicians complained that the inpatient service unit patient transfers were
unpredictable and largely because of the Main ORs Holding Bay not functioning in the
way they should. As with the Main ORs surgeons (see section 8.4.2.3), the neurosurgery
clinicians said that there was a cultural issue in that nurses didn't want to use the holding
bay to hold patients. They gave the same argument as before in that nurses preferred to
delay calling for patients in order to avoid having them sit uncomfortably in the Holding
Bay. However, interviewees said the end result were late starts and cancelled procedures.
Inpatient service units fail to work up patients appropriately: The neurosurgery
anesthesiologist explains that it isn't uncommon for the required blood tests not to be
ready at the time of the surgery. He holds responsible the junior doctors who are spread
thin on the inpatient service units and are unable to send the blood samples in a timely
manner to the ancillary services. He also emphasizes that the European Work Directive
prevents the junior doctors from starting work earlier, hence further contributing to the
potential delay in getting patients adequately worked-up for the surgery. Ultimately, the
junior doctor's work (blood drawing and beyond) may shift itself to an already
overburdened senior surgeon or anesthesiologist.
Weak patient handoffs between Neuro ORs and inpatient service units: Both
neurosurgery clinicians admitted that they don't always make available the postoperative
notes, or somehow they never make it to the patient record. As such, inpatient service
unit nurses don't know whether patients are allowed to eat, or whether they should try to
walk, etc. A compounding effect is that the physicians rounding on the patients in the
inpatient service units, are not the same as the ones doing the procedure. Hence, neither
nurses nor physicians on the inpatient service units know at times how to care for a
patient who has recently undergone a procedure. Ultimately, the patient handoffs between
inpatient service units and the Neuro ORs aren't as robust as they should be, and not only
may they adversely impact patient experience, but also further compromise patient flow.
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The Neuro ORs staff demonstrated poor service architecture awareness in day-to-day
operations
Although the neurosurgery clinicians were generally aware of both inflow and outflow
limitations inherent in the service architecture, we found them to be nonetheless similar
to the Main ORs in terms of a poor functioning of their day-to-day operations.
Fragmented multispecialty care: Despite neuroscience, neurology, and neurology being
closely related specialties which often comprise a multispecialty care team for a given
patient, the communication between them was said to take place only over fax. Also,
interactions with other specialties, such as general surgery, were described in the same
manner.
Neuro ORs detached from their service architecture: Confronted with its poor
performance levels, the lead neurosurgery anesthesiologist argued that the Neuro ORs
had dedicated knowledgeable teams, and provided that everything was in place, these
would be able to perform efficiently. Moreover, the Neuro ORs considered themselves
efficient and the source of trouble was specifically in its interactions with other service
units, and generally for reasons beyond its control. So much so, that the anesthesiologist
confessed that he didn't have a systems view beyond his own service unit.
"we don't have a big picture of how main theatres work. It seems that there are lots of
difficulties that I can see from on the outside."
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Anesthesiologist
8.6.2.4 Neuro ORs Process View
On the whole, the Neuro ORs Process View analysis was very similar to that of the Main
ORs (see section 8.4.2.4).
Service architecture dysfunctionalities generated localized process optimization
behaviors
Faced with the pressure of ever increasing procedure waiting lists and the existence of
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service architecture dysfunctionalities, stakeholders within the Neuro ORs found
themselves optimizing processes locally without regard to the potential implications
stemming from their behavior. As with the case of the Main ORs, the Neuro ORs
struggled with incomplete surgical kits because of the last minute procedure cancellations
and having to create new kits on the fly (i.e. poaching instruments wherever available).
Also, the staggering and increasing long waiting list was driving surgeons to generate
over ambitious lists, which as with the case of the Main ORs disrupted flow (i.e. 18%
cancellation rate) and added pressure to an already anxious OR staff. Similarly, some
neurosurgeons would consistently fail to submit their post-operative surgical notes, which
would require Recovery Area nurses, as well as those from the inpatient service units, to
track down the surgeons in order to complete a handoff. All the while, patients would
either remain unnecessarily in a given location, or experience delays in their treatment
once back at the inpatient service units.
"Things seem to go surprisingly wrong sometimes... you think ifyou would have the
same list and cases all the time that they would have enough kit, operating equipment,
and stuff like that, but sometimes you willfind that some things are missing, and that
things are disorganized"
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Surgeon
Service architecture dysfunctionalities caused last minute suboptimal decisions
In some cases, rather than generating systematic localized process optimization behaviors,
service architecture dysfunctionalities call for last minute decisions, which ultimately
also have suboptimal results. Once again, similar to the Main ORs, the reshuffling of
procedures in the Neuro ORs implied a potentially untimely pressure on inpatient service
units and ancillary services (i.e. external service units would have to scramble in order to
attend to readying an unscheduled patient). Additionally, surgeons could find themselves
operating in a sequence which wasn't according to their preference (e.g. having to do a
simple case first, rather than a hard one) and in some cases even taking risks that could
potentially harm the patient (e.g. doing a procedure without a spinal orthopedic surgeon
being present as there wasn't enough time to get them to the procedure).
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External policies significantly constrained key Hospital ABC processes
As with the Main ORs, the neurosurgery clinicians made reference to the constraints
imposed by the European Work Directive20 3 and how they had to do more with less. For
instance, junior doctors responsible for doing patient blood drawing and sending them for
analysis, wouldn't be readily available to do so, thus causing procedure delays or even
requiring senior clinicians to do the blood drawing for them. Similarly, they realized that
their handoff with inpatient service units wasn't as robust as it should be given that post
operative surgical notes would fail to make their way to patient medical records, and
there wasn't a failsafe in place because there weren't enough work hours to allow for the
same people to operate and round on the same patients.
"Blood drawing is a little chaotic... frequently patients will come to us and their second
blood sample has not been done. Because the house officers are doing whatever they are
doing they say they can't draw the sample, etc, so we'll have the anesthesiologist do it.
Houseman does not do his job because it is too late, he is overworked, or had to go home,
so the workload gets shifted to consultant "
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Anesthesiologist
OR scheduling complexity required considerable effort to make adjustments
The Neuro ORs rescheduled approximately 1 in every 5 procedures and each time they
would undergo a complex process which required considerable effort. The source of
complexity is the same as the one previously described for the Main ORs. Specifically,
many factors had to align themselves perfectly across multiple service units and
organizational structures in order to make any readjustment. Additionally, going through
such readjustments didn't always mean that the procedure would indeed be carried out
because it might be that it is too late in the day to start a new procedure.
However, in examining the Neuro ORs we further uncovered some of the implications of
the fragmented divisional structure described in the analysis of the Main ORs and
203 We first referred to the European Work Directive in section 8.4.2.1. Succinctly, junior doctors were no
longer allowed to work as many as 100 hours a week as before. Instead, they could only work a maximum
of 48 hours a week.
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Cardiac ORs. With the case of the Neuro ORs having to reschedule cases, these
implications were even more pronounced as 25% of their OR physical capacity belonged
to the Main ORs which in turn were managed by a different division. We will examine
these implications in close detail in the next subsection.
8.6.2.5 Neuro ORs Organization View
The Neuro ORs' local organizational climate was characterized as its staff being
generally frustrated and tired (i.e. worn out)
The pressure of the NHS' 18 Weeks target together with Hospital ABC's senior
leadership and management constantly reminding the Neuro ORs that they were
underperforming, is best summarized in the following quote:
"we have kind of one of the most extensive waiting lists, and have been outside the realm
of the possibility of over 300 patients waiting for neurosurgery, and 10 patients a week
put on the schedule for the surgery, so that we can kind of keep our heads above water
with all sorts of acrobatics and extra lists and extending lists and Saturday lists, but we
are slowly losing the battle because the clinical loads just keeps on increasing and the
flood gates have been kept open and other hospitals are now sending spine patients to us,
so we are kind of in the losing end of the 18 week target [...]People are pretty much
working flat out and we are losing the battle..."
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Anesthesiologist
The staff in the Neuro ORs is said to be working nonstop while trying to make the most
use of its ORs in order to decrease the size of its waiting list. Both interviewees felt
frustrated with the rate of cancellations, and the neurosurgeon in particular, held
responsible Hospital ABC's fragmented divisional structure.
204 Notably, the fragmented divisional structure emerged as phenomena of interest in all of the previous
sub-architectures (i.e. Main ORs, Cardiac ORs, and Administrative Support Services); hence, it prompted
further inquiry. Specifically, we found that Hospital ABC had originally created two divisions, which
essentially either housed surgery related subspecialties (i.e. performed procedures) or medicine related
subspecialties (i.e. treatment and observation based care). Over time, with the advent of medical
specialization and with Hospital ABC being able to attain its differentiated clinical excellence status,
additional divisions were created so as to make operations more manageable. Specifically, with the increase
of specialization, Hospital ABC's senior leadership thought it would be best to create separate independent
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"Essentially we are being setup to fail on that by Critical Care. Fantastic! They win all
way around! "[Note: interviewee used extremely sarcastic tone in this quote]
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Surgeon
The Neuro ORs culture was supportive of Hospital ABC's strategic tension and mission
Both interviewees were in general supportive of Hospital ABC's strategic objectives (i.e.
serving surrounding community; striving for clinical excellence; teaching) but they
argued that the hospital didn't have a care delivery platform capable of efficiently
handling the inherent strategic tension. Specifically, every patient, whether requiring
simple or complex care, was undergoing exactly the same steps. However, the
requirements of each patient population are fundamentally different. Simple cases
generally require less OR time, less surgical kit, less scheduling (e.g. no need for an
orthopedic surgeon consult), less resources (e.g. faster patient recovery; smaller OR
teams; etc). Conversely, complex cases not only require more of each of the categories
just mentioned, but are also more unpredictable (e.g. unknown complications become
visible during the procedure) and require a greater amount of ancillary tests. As such, the
interviewees considered Hospital ABC's platform overly wasteful and suggested that two
fundamentally different structures should be in place. One structure would handle routine
care, while another structure would be targeted at the most complex cases. As for junior
doctors, they would be rotated across both structures as they progressed in their training.
All in all, both neurosurgery clinicians felt that it was unrealistic to successfully meet the
18 Weeks target and at the same time satisfy all of senior leadership's strategic objectives.
Hospital ABC had a fragmented divisional structure and experienced a considerable
organizational divide amongst senior leadership, management, and clinicians
The separation amongst Hospital ABC's organizational structures was strongly
divisions, and to that effect created divisions pertaining to specific human organs (e.g. liver; cardiac; brain;
women's health; etc). However, not only was there redundancy at a support function level (e.g. each
division had its own human resources, procurement, admissions, etc) but also in terms of medical activities
(e.g. each division would have its own department of surgery which didn't share information, equipment, or
staff with other surgery departments in other divisions). Additionally, each division had its own
management layer, which was responsible for allocating resources to its own departments, and its own
nursing and physician layers. Over time, Hospital ABC begun experimenting with sharing resources across
divisions (e.g. the SCC division managed all the anesthesiologists used in all divisions). However, the vast
majority of resources remained dedicated to each division and prevented easy sharing amongst them.
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emphasized by the neurosurgery clinicians and they associated it vehemently with the
Neuro ORs poor performance.
To begin with they argued that senior leadership didn't encourage clinical involvement,
and clinicians had to face the choice of either practicing medicine or becoming one of
them. Also, in the little exposure they had had to management roles, they found these to
be overly time consuming which made clinical leadership difficult to sustain.
"There is a management led management structure at [Hospital ABC] which hasn't
encouraged clinical involvement."
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Surgeon
Our analysis of the Main ORs and the Cardiac ORs had already identified the issue of
Hospital ABC's fragmented divisional structure which allowed for, and motivated,
compartmentalization that led to suboptimization, and ultimately compromised
effectiveness as a whole. In analyzing the Neuro ORs, such dysfunctionalities were even
more pronounced given that they had to physically share OR space with the Main ORs.
Specifically, neurosurgery's overall performance was poor, however, when using space
in the Main ORs, its productivity was only 70% of what it was capable of doing in the
Neuro ORs space. Indeed one element of waste was the inability of centralizing
equipment and having to move between floors, etc. However, there were deeper issues
than mere logistical complexity.
First, unlike the Cardiac ORs anesthesiologists which are dedicated to the Cardiac ORs
due to their level of specialization, the neurosurgery anesthesiologists are shared with
other specialties that function exclusively within the Main ORs (e.g. orthopedics,
pediatrics, etc). All of the anesthesiologists are managed by the SCC division (i.e. none of
them belongs to the division of Cardiac and Neurosciences). However, the neurosurgeon
argued that whereas the Cardiac ORs was able to build a sense of loyalty, including its
anesthesiologists, the Neuro ORs weren't able to do so and that its anesthesiologists were
instead loyal to the Main ORs.
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Second, given that the Neuro ORs were managed through a different division, the lead
neurosurgeon felt that they were competing against them. Specifically, the Neurosciences
division had to pay the SCC division for each and every OR slot it reserved, regardless of
whether it was used or not. For instance, given the difficulty in rescheduling procedures,
it was common for cancelled procedures to cause an OR slot to go unused. However, the
Neuroscience division would still be fully charged for the slot, and the SCC would not
only make a profit but also try to reassign the slot and associated staff to another of its
Main ORs procedures. Ultimately, the neurosurgeon felt that the SCC division
management along with its anesthesiologists, had a vested interest for the Neuro ORs to
cancel procedures. Similarly, the Main ORs' nursing staff supporting neurosurgery lists
were said to be encouraged not to accept working on overrunning operating lists.
"At the moment the neuro theaters management is through critical care, who in many
ways are competitors to us, ifwe regard it very bluntly, if a neuro theater is empty it still
gets paid for... if we have a list scheduled that does not get used, Critical Care make a
profit out of it, we make a loss out of it, so there will always be within the whole fabric of
the system a tension there."
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Surgeon
Finally, both interviewees also spoke of a divide amongst Hospital ABC's different
specialties. One type was understandable given that both orthopedics and general surgery
were housed under the SCC division (which they argued was competing against the
Neurosciences division). However, it was surprising to learn that neuroscience, neurology,
and neurosurgery, all of which housed under the same Neurosciences division, were also
described as distant from one another and only shared patient information over fax.
Finally, interviewees observed that senior leadership had done away with "consultant
sitting rooms" as these were deemed elitist. However, the adverse effect was that
physicians and surgeons had even less opportunity to engage in cross-specialty
discussions.
"there is no discussion across specialties, and that is undoubtedly a big problem in this
hospital. [...] when neurosurgery gets referred a case from general medicine for an
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opinion we don't really want to go down there, and we don't talk to their physicians, they
don't talk to us, and we don't care, and that is the mentality that is setup by not having
any cross specialty talk. You have the same difficulty within neuroscience, neurology, and
neurosurgery, almost the same specialty really becomes pulled apart mostly because we
operate on different days, there is no discussion, so we end up with curt referrals by fax
and it doesn't work well."
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Surgeon
The Neuro ORs exercised limited control and influence beyond their service unit
boundary
As with the Main ORs, the Neuro ORs found operating list scheduling adjustments
complex and human resource intensive because of the number of organizational
structures and the various levels within them. Therefore, not only the Neuro ORs feel that
another division is competing against them, but they are also faced with their limited
ability to control and influence stakeholders beyond their service unit boundary. For
instance, late retrieval of patients from inpatient service units is said to be one of the key
reasons for neurosurgery cancellations. However, in order to resolve an interface issue
between the porters and the Holding Bay, the neurosurgeon would have to go up his
management structure, across to another structure, and then finally down again. To
further complicate things, the Neuro ORs didn't have their own coordinator, and had to
rely instead on the Main ORs Coordinator to manage their patient flow to and from the
inpatient service units. The lack of a dedicated coordinator was thought to be yet another
opportunity for the SCC division to pressure the Neuro ORs.
Ultimately, the neurosurgeon felt that its divisional manager should be more present in
the field in order to protect their interests and pressure both the inpatient service units and
the Main ORs to be more supportive of Neuro ORs' operations, or at least stop working
against them.
Neuro ORs local organizational culture was inconsistent amongst different roles
We have already described the existing organizational divide between the Neuro ORs and
both senior leadership and management. An analysis within the Neuro ORs identified
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specific tendencies in the relationships amongst various stakeholder roles:
* Overall the Neuro ORs felt pinned by the SCC division. At the very least, both the
neurosurgeon and the anesthesiologist felt that the Main ORs weren't supporting
them adequately with patient flow and they felt frustrated with the sheer number
of procedure cancellations. Additionally, they both thought poorly of the Main
ORs Coordinator and her ability/interest in supporting their patient flow.
e The Neurosciences division had a clear preference for its autonomy within its
dedicated Neuro ORs, and said they weren't enthusiastic about the opportunity for
sharing space in the Main OR's in order to curb their long waiting lists. However,
there had been recent talk about building an additional OR dedicated for
Neurosciences, and that in turn was said to have been very well received by
neurosurgeons.
e The interviewees represented different roles and spoke differently of each other.
The neurosurgeon generally regarded anesthesiologists to have vested interests as
they were associated with the SCC division. The anesthesiologist was more
positive in his assessment and considered that Hospital ABC provided a level
playing field (i.e. similar salary and hierarchical status) between anesthesiologists
and surgeons, which was conducive to productive work relationships.
" Both surgeon and anesthesiologist appreciated the efforts of the nursing staff.
They felt that the nurses most consistently staffed to the Neuro ORs were indeed
on the same side as them2 05 and would be supportive of the need to overrun
operating lists.
"An anesthesiologist would have within their system a hidden vested interest in saying 'I
am not going tofill the list' because their management structure actually rewards that
somehow. [..] So in the background, despite what I said about working reasonably well
together as a small group, actually within the management structure we are competitors
and that is a fundamental problem in the background all the time"
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Surgeon
"[There are] very good relationship between surgeons and theater staff [...] There is
205 Whenever the Neurosciences division used an OR from the Main ORs, it would be fully staffed with
Main ORs nurses, and these were thought to be on the Main ORs side as opposed to theirs.
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good cooperation and flexibility amongst this group of people that concentrate aboutjust
doing neuro and the benefits of having that relatively small group of people working on
the same side, works well"
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Surgeon
Team familiarity was said to help build culture and performance
As with the case of the Main ORs and the Cardiac ORs, both neurosurgery clinicians
valued the ability to foster team familiarity in their service unit. A stable team helps build
a likeminded culture and also drives efficiency and quality of care.
"people are familiar with the system, people are familiar with the cases, they have people
who always work in the sessions, they get to know the surgeon, the surgeon knows you,
there is interaction outside, there is a confidence that is built, there is knowledge of
ability and inability of each party, you know, things that make the system work better."
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Anesthesiologist
However, whereas the Main ORs also observed that there was insufficient operational
flexibility because of the fixed staff scheduling (i.e. staff are assigned to specific ORs on
specific days), the neurosurgery clinicians only spoke positively of staff scheduling
practices. Nonetheless, the data indicates that the Neuro ORs were struggling with
cancellations and were largely unsuccessful in making the necessary operating list
adjustments in order to avoid losing the OR time slot. Hence, one could argue that the
Main ORs and the Neuro ORs were experiencing the same tension between team stability
and operational flexibility. Conversely, the Cardiac ORs had a very low cancellation rate,
kept stable teams, and had a high throughput rate.
The Neuro ORs staff had multiple individual incentives but generally considered them to
be insufficient. Additionally, they regarded NHS' career progression opportunities as
limited, and it salary structure as constrained
In describing what drove them to perform at Hospital ABC, both interviewees were
largely consistent with what the clinicians in the other OR service units. They valued
Hospital ABC's brand and upheld the importance of caring for the surrounding
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community. However, as previously noted, they observed that Hospital ABC's care
delivery platform wasn't adequately designed, as it considered every patient to be a
complex patient, and such introduced considerable waste into the system, which in turn
affected their desire to practice in an efficient environment.
Additionally, they expressed a similar interest in instituting procedure volume based
incentives in order to motivate clinicians to contribute towards a higher throughput. Both
interviewees felt that not everyone was working as hard towards helping the Neuro ORs
meet its 18 Weeks target. The neurosurgeon observed that he had visited a leading
hospital in the US and that he was convinced that a volume based incentive was a useful
mechanism to define a clear unit of currency.
"Operations was very clearly [the US hospital's] unit of currency, the more operations
the more money, and everything was designed around that. I think we struggle slightly in
what our unit of currency is."
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Surgeon
Furthermore, as with the case of the Cardiac ORs, they observed that there were limited
career development opportunities at Hospital ABC and the NHS in general, and specially
so once an individual reached the highest pay grade in his or her role. Moreover, the lack
of career opportunities together with a fixed salary model, were associated with less
commitment towards patient throughput, or perhaps Hospital ABC in general.
"There is very limited career development and there is no creativity and learning that
you can move on to a higher level... there is no kind of long range vision... people bump
their head into the ceiling."
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Anesthesiologist
8.6.2.6 Neuro ORs Knowledge View
In previous subsections we have noted phenomena pertaining to the Neuro ORs
Knowledge View. The following are key insights:
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Hospital ABC as a whole isn't a learning organization
In examining the previous Neuro ORs subsections we further substantiate our assessment
that Hospital ABC, as a whole, isn't a learning organization. The absent way of doing
things at Hospital ABC, stemming from its fragmented divisional structure, was
particularly negative for the Neuro ORs 206. The Neurosciences division struggled with
high cancellation rates both in its dedicated ORs and in the one shared with the Main ORs.
The lead neurosurgeon argued that the divisional structure fostered competition and that
high cancellations were the direct result of said competition. Clearly, said behaviors
aren't in line with those of a learning organization which would have otherwise engaged
in joint problem solving activities that might have been deployed locally, but within the
context of the overall enterprise. Finally, the Neuro ORs provided further insight into the
constraints of limited career development opportunities within NHS' band system, which
compounded the effect of lack of motivation due to fixed salaries.
The Neuro ORs hadn't instituted a coordinator of their own, and instead relied on the
Main ORs Coordinator
Whereas the Cardiac ORs had experienced clinical coordinators which were strongly
associated with the service unit's higher performance, the Neuro ORs had to share the
same Main ORs Coordinator which was once again deemed ineffective. When analyzing
Main ORs data it was clear that clinicians considered their coordinator inadequate
because of her lack of training and inability to sway senior physicians towards facilitating
flexibility and increasing patient throughput. In the case of the Neuro ORs, the Main ORs
coordinator's incentives were put in question, as she was regarded as a mechanism to
force procedure cancellations for the Neuro ORs. However, considering both data sets
one could argue that the Main ORs coordinator was faced with several system
architecture dysfunctionalities which simply kept her from assisting the Neuro ORs.
Nonetheless, the fact still remains that the Neuro ORs didn't have in place a
knowledgeable clinical coordinator capable of assisting in all matters related to patient
flow and instituting and enforcing standard practices in their Neuro ORs.
206 Notably, a way of doing things doesn't in itself imply that it is better since the wrong things may
constitute the "way of doing things".
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The Neuro ORs didn't exhibit learning organization behavior
Whereas the Cardiac ORs had instituted practices targeted at influencing and improving
flow beyond their boundaries of control, the Neuro ORs hadn't done anything to a similar
effect. However, the neurosurgery clinicians had detected several dysfunctionalities and
admitted that they lacked a full picture. Arguably, they could have presented evidence
that they had tried to address these limitations. Instead, they were seemingly content on
blaming the SCC division for all of their performance issues. However, even within their
own division they seemed to be fragmented, as similar specialties meant to provide team
based multispecialty care, did so over fax.
The Neuro ORs experienced considerable knowledge training constraints
As with the Main ORs, the Neuro ORs had a clear concern towards their ability to
adequately train physicians in the presence of restrictive European Work Directives. They
felt that trainees weren't clocking as many training hours as necessary and would either
have to face even longer training programs or potentially endanger the delivery of care.
Similarly, amid the pressure of 18 Weeks the neurosurgeon admitted that their processes
within the OR weren't as robust as they should be. He admitted that timeout (an
evidenced based medicine guideline) weren't always carried out and that every year they
would have at least one serious case of operating the wrong side of the head. Furthermore,
financial incentives were once again mentioned, and that there wasn't an incentive to
even start a journal club2 7 , let alone a grand rounds lecture. However, interviewees also
suggested that management was more interested in having everyone always working in
the ORs, rather than spending time with such knowledge opportunities.
"As you see the European Work Directives coming in... the amount of responsibility
being pealed away... the amount of hours being pealed away... the night call being
pealed away... the concern of the faculty here is that they are being deskilled or in some
sense detrained... There is a generalfeeling that they are getting fewer hours on the
ground and that when they get into the positions of responsibility they won't quite have
207 Journal clubs are a common practice in US academic medical centers. In effect, both medical residents
and physician attendings organize themselves into both separate and shared groups where they jointly
collect and analyze recent journal publications so as to keep up to date with the developments in their given
specialty.
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the same degree of experience when they get out the other end. ( ... ] Keep everybody
working, keep everybody in the OR, and I think that is not a good thing in medicine."
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Anesthesiologist
"I think we could work better with things like avoiding wrong side surgery or operating
on the wrong side of the head. We have a system which is not very robust to deal with
that. We have a case like that at least once a year."
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Surgeon
8.6.2.7 Neuro ORs Information View
In previous subsections we have noted phenomena pertaining to the Neuro ORs
Information View. From an infrastructure capability standpoint these were similar to
those that were previously described in the Main ORs (see section 8.4.2.7). Specifically,
the existence of paper-based patient records, the absence of an electronic workflow
information, etc, meant the prevalence of paper-based information systems, and the need
for extensive human resource intervention (e.g. pushing paper, using the phone, etc).
The lack of information flow in the Neuro ORs was further exacerbated by their reliance
on the Main ORs Coordinator to support their operations. However, as previously
mentioned, they also had issues in sharing information across specialties within their own
division (i.e. they shared patient information over fax).
Furthermore, the interviewees reiterated the issues stemming from constrained staffing
schedules and absent post operating notes, which ultimately compromised information
flow, patient throughput, and patient experience. The following quote captures
particularly well the clinicians frustration with their information systems capabilities:
"The key is the availability of the appropriate information at the bedside. That operation
note exists and is filed in a set of notes like this [picks up big paper medical record]...
there they are, patient came back from theater, volume one, so probably the operation
note is in volume two which is somewhere else [inquisitive voice]. But lets find an
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operation note here... hopefully... there it is... ah! Nothing written on it!!!!"
Hospital ABC Neuro ORs Surgeon
8.6.2.8 Neuro ORs and analysis summary
In this section we presented our analysis of the Neuro ORs. A total of two interviews
were conducted with Neuro ORs staff, namely with the lead surgeon and the lead
anesthesiologist, as well as evidence collected from observing their operations. Figure
8-10 is the overview of Hospital ABC's Neuro ORs sub-architecture characterization
presented earlier 208 and pertains to the analysis of the previous subsections. The coloring
of the elements in the figure is a visualization technique to readily compare this sub-
architecture with that of the Main ORs previously discussed in section 8.4.3. Specifically,
black denotes no change from the Main ORs sub-architecture; red denotes new elements;
orange denotes previous elements which have changed in some regard. Notably, all of the
new elements presented have already been characterized in the context of the Cardiac
ORs. Furthermore, in the descriptions that follow we also directly make comparative
references to the Main ORs sub-architecture, the Cardiac ORs sub-architecture, and the
Administrative Support Services sub-architecture209
The characterization of the Neuro ORs sub-architecture concerns both local enterprise
architecture characteristics (i.e. pertaining specifically to the Neuro ORs) as well as
enterprise level (i.e. pertaining to Hospital ABC as a whole), and reflects our enriched
understanding of hospital enterprise architecture (i.e. leverages our enriched version of
the NREAF discussed at the end of Chapter 7210). The circle placement of the EA Views
is meant to illustrate that they are interconnected.
The Neuro ORs sub-architecture characterization is almost identical to that of the Main
ORs. So much so, that the Strategy, Information, and Process EA Views were unchanged.
Hence, the summary analysis previously provided for the Main ORs (i.e. EA View
208 See section 8.6.2
209 For additional detail on each of the Main ORs elements referred to, please see section 8.4.3. Similarly,
for the Cardiac ORs elements referred to, please see section 8.6.1.8. Finally, for the Administrative Support
Services elements referred to, please see section 8.5.8.
210 See section 7.7.2.
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individual and interaction descriptions) is also applicable to that of the Neuro ORs (see
8.4.3). Notably, the new elements identified emerged from our targeted probing that
reflected our findings from the Administrative Support Services and the Cardiac ORs (i.e.
there aren't new elements that emerged exclusively from the Neuro ORs), and are equally
relevant to our previous characterization of the Main ORs.
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However, new phenomena did indeed emerge whilst examining the Neuro ORs and their
relationship with the Main ORs and the SCC division in general. Specifically, we
established that not only there were limitations pertaining to individual incentives (i.e. as
with the Main ORs and Cardiac ORs) but also with those tied to the fragmented
divisional structures. Moreover, there was potential for Main ORs vested interests to
contribute to the Neuro ORs cancellation rate whenever it used an OR slot in the Main
ORs. However, the fact still remained that the Neuro ORs performance in their dedicated
ORs was still worse than the Main ORs and Cardiac ORs.
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All in all, we theoretically sampled the Neuro ORs for their lowest performance, and
similar to the analysis of the Main ORs, our enriched understanding of Hospital ABC's
enterprise architecture, and in particular that of its Neuro OR's sub-architecture, led us to
determine that the service unit's throughput issues neither resided only at a process level
nor only within its boundaries. As such, senior leadership's envisioned investment plan in
building an additional Neuro OR, and its continued narrow improvement plans, will not
address the core enterprise architecture issues that prevent it from delivering value
efficiently and effectively.
Given the Neuro ORs similarity to the Main ORs, comparing them to the Cardiac ORs
generates a similar output as the previous comparison between Cardiac ORs and Main
ORs (see section 8.6.1.8). This outcome is further evidence of our previous finding
that an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture can inform
decisions that ultimately contribute to higher performance. Specifically, both the
Cardiac ORs and Neuro ORs belonged to the same division (i.e. Cardiac and
Neurosciences), had dedicated surgeons who earned the same compensation, interacted
with the same inpatient service units and ancillary services, and had a similar plant scale.
Indeed there were small differences pertaining to Neuro ORs anesthesiologists not being
exclusive to their operations (i.e. the Cardiac ORs had exclusive anesthesiologists)m, and
also the fact that the Neuro ORs shared one OR with the Main ORs (i.e. the Cardiac ORs
didn't use OR slots in the Main ORs). However, whereas the Cardiac ORs' local
leadership made decisions that affected their local operations, as well as their interface
with other service units, the Neuro ORs could have arguably implemented similar
decisions (e.g. hiring a clinical coordinator, standard processes, aligned schedules,
boundary spanners, process measurement, etc). Instead, the Neuro ORs didn't even align
themselves across related subspecialties within their own division (i.e. Neurology,
211 Although the Neuro ORs anesthesiologists were shared with the Main ORs procedures, a subsequent
targeted probing interview with the Anesthetic Delivery Manager revealed that the Neuro ORs
anesthesiologists, although shared, remained the same. Furthermore, although the Cardiac ORs did indeed
have exclusive anesthesiologists, these belonged nonetheless to the SCC division, as were the
anesthesiologists servicing the Neuro ORs. Finally, given the fixed salary model inherent in the NHS, the
anesthesiologists would earn the same regardless of their procedure volume and whether they worked in the
Neuro ORs or Cardiac ORs. Therefore, one could argue that the Neuro ORs complaint about nonexclusive
anesthesiologists is irrelevant when comparing the Neuro ORs to the Cardiac ORs.
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Neurosurgery, and Neurosciences) and elected to reinforce the existing fragmented
divisional structure and "Us vs. Them" culture at Hospital ABC (i.e. such was the
behavior of the Main ORs as well). Moreover, the Cardiac ORs' local leadership had both
an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture, and a predisposition to act
upon it to improve performance, while the Neuro ORs exhibited neither of these.
8.7 Hospital ABC Enterprise Architecture
At Hospital ABC's senior leadership request, our research began with the
characterization of the Main ORs, and we gradually increased its scope and added several
embedded units of analysis as new insights emerged from the data. Figure 8-11 is a visual
summary of the four sub-architectures that were studied in detail2'2
The study of each sub-architecture had a different service unit as a focal point, but the
analysis not only studied their internal characteristics and interdependencies with other
service units, but also addressed common enterprise level elements (e.g. senior leadership,
information infrastructure, NHS pressure, etc) and leveraged internal strategy and
operations documents. As such, in Figure 8-12 we characterize Hospital ABC's overall
enterprise architecture. Notably, in our following EA View descriptions we first focus on
the predominant characteristics throughout the enterprise, and subsequently briefly
discuss EA View interactions, and the existence of multiple internal architectural
configurations within Hospital ABC.
212 For further detail please refer to sections 8.4.3., 8.5.8., 8.6.1.8., and 8.6.2.8.
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Figure 8-11: Overview of Hospital ABC's sub-architecture analysis summaries
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8.7.1 Hospital ABC EA View Analysis
Hospital ABC External/Policy eA View
Hospital ABC's external and policy environment was consistently described in terms of
the NHS' 18 Weeks pressure (i.e. elective surgery timeframe forced upon hospitals across
the NHS), the constraining European Work Directive (i.e. a recent labor law change only
allowed junior doctors to work 48 hours a week, as opposed to the previous non-
restrictive work hours), and evidence based medicine guidelines. Notably, interviewees in
general were dedicated in treating patients with the best care possible, however they
didn't regard them as a source of external pressure as such. Overall, the external and
policy environment strongly influenced Hospital ABC as evidenced in the strategic
objectives set by senior leadership, and existing constraints on operations (e.g. processes
and organization).
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Hospital ABC Strategy EA View
Hospital ABC's enterprise strategy elements were consistently described in terms of
providing high quality care to the surrounding community, pursuing clinical excellence
with national and international recognition, and sustaining its leading training programs.
Notably, Hospital ABC was a leading hospital in the UK, but the NHS' 18 Weeks policy
had left it struggling to find a way to shorten its elective wait lists and avoid the potential
penalties of doing otherwise. Hence, meeting the NHS' 18 Weeks target had become the
strategic imperative for Hospital ABC. However, such an imperative exacerbated the
strategic tension amongst its strategy elements. Specifically, Hospital ABC's enterprise
architecture was generally configured to support its pursuit of clinical excellence.
However, the result was that every patient, whether simple or complex, was treated with
the same resources as a complex patient (i.e. it is wasteful to treat a simple patient as if
(s)he were a complex patient, but the delivery platform was geared towards complex
cases only). This setup was further compromised with the need to increase patient
throughput and shorten elective wait lists. Moreover, Hospital ABC's strategy elements
and strategic imperative were misaligned with its delivery platform. Finally, the
investments and initiatives implemented by senior leadership had proven to be narrow
and inadequately executed. Examples we discussed included narrow investments in
adding capacity in specific areas within different service units, but failing to consider the
different value streams as a whole, as well as other important elements (e.g. staffing,
incentives, etc). Similarly, although a potentially useful resource was created via the
internal Lean Team, its charter was set at process level and targeted at individual service
units (e.g. lean initiatives targeted within the Main ORs had generated minimum results).
Ultimately, it is important to note that Hospital ABC's characterization from a Strategy
EA View necessarily reflects the effect of EA View interactions. For instance, senior
leaders are in themselves part of the Organization EA View, and the predominant
fragmented divisional structure and inherent "Us vs. them" culture, contributed to
strategy decisions that demonstrated poor service architecture awareness/appreciation.
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Hospital ABC Information EA View
Hospital ABC had limited information architecture capability as evidenced in its
fragmented information systems characterized by a prevalence of paper and non-
integrated IT solutions, which contributed to several data quality issues, and didn't allow
for an end-to-end workflow analysis. Additionally, information was not only fragmented
in terms of type (e.g. electronic vs. paper-based) but also in terms of function (e.g.
vacation book ledgers; admissions book ledgers; staffing excel sheets; etc). Hence, even
within each division, finding information proved to be a cumbersome and human
resource heavy task. All in all, extensive use of alternative modes of information sharing
were required that not only were error prone and introduced system delays, but also
required extensive human resource dedication and ultimately demanded more of
individuals both physically and mentally.
Hospital ABC Organization EA View
Hospital ABC was an organization centric enterprise as evidenced in its dominant
characterization as having a fragmented divisional structure. Examples we discussed
included the arm's length relationships between senior leadership and senior clinicians.
Similarly, senior managers didn't feel supported by senior leaders in addressing and
enforcing necessary unpopular decisions that impacted senior clinicians. Hence,
clinicians and managers didn't have integrated relationships. Finally, evidence of "Us vs.
them" was also found within the different clinician hierarchies (e.g. nurses and senior
surgeons). Other examples of structural fragmentation concerned the replication of
functions across different divisions (i.e. each division had its own procurement,
scheduling, etc) and the use of incentives that reinforced silo thinking (e.g. incentives
were distributed independently to each division, as opposed to distributing them across
value streams). As a result, Hospital ABC was described as "not having a way of doing
things". Notably, having a way of doing things doesn't necessarily entail a better
outcome either, as the way of doing things can be the wrong way by definition.
Furthermore, the additional pressure to meet the NHS 18 Weeks target, together with
Hospital ABC's enterprise architecture dysfunctionalities, created an organizational
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climate of frustration and stress amongst clinicians and managers in the various divisions
and service units.
Further examination of Hospital ABC's fragmented divisional structure revealed the
importance of understanding each service unit's boundary of control and influence, as
well as the strength of their local leadership and inherent service unit importance to the
overall enterprise. Different service units had different levels of leadership strength, a
different culture (i.e. ranging from cohesive to "Us vs. them"), and different
organizational arrangements (e.g. boundary spanners, rounding/surgery teams, etc).
Finally, there was consistency across service units in terms of managers' inability
establish incentives based on meritocracy as opposed to seniority. Moreover, existing
NHS labor laws made it difficult to retain the best people or to encourage those with
room for improvement.
Hospital ABC Process EA View
Hospital ABC's process architecture was predominantly characterized as having
undesirable processes, negative local process optimization behaviors, limited process
measurement capability, and narrow enterprise process improvements. Examples we
discussed of undesirable processes included the last minute reshuffling of operating lists,
the existence of inconsistent process descriptions, stakeholders varying process
requirements, etc. As for negative local process optimization behaviors, examples we
discussed included service units calling for patients too early, poaching of surgical kits,
creating unreasonable operating lists, transferring unready patients, etc. In term of
process measurement capability we established that the limited information architecture
capability significantly hindered performance measurement and operations management
(e.g. use of guesstimates to evaluate operating lists, predominance of lagging indicators
such number of procedure cancellations, etc). Furthermore, the information that was
indeed tracked by Hospital ABC, was neither reviewed regularly (i.e. only monthly) nor
shared across different stakeholders (i.e. senior leadership didn't give senior clinicians
financial data access). Finally, as previously noted in the Strategy EA View description,
the internal Lean Team was chartered to pursue initiatives at a process level and targeted
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at individual service units. Furthermore, the existence of local process optimization
behaviors and non-standard processes, together with the previously described fragmented
divisional structure, contributed to improvements being predominantly narrow in scope
and failed to address Hospital ABC's overall service architecture.
Hospital ABC Service EA View
Hospital ABC's service architecture was predominantly characterized as having poor
information flow transparency and timeliness, having compromised flow stability, having
extended enterprise constraints, and ultimately being unable to adequately deliver on
either patient or employee experience, as evidenced in the long wait lists and frustrated
service unit staff. Hospital ABC's dominant extended enterprise constraint were the pre-
assessment clinics, as their independent scheduling generally contributed to
inappropriately long waiting lists which in turn allowed for patient symptoms to change,
and potentially force a procedure cancellation. Finally, there was variable service
architecture awareness/appreciation across Hospital ABC. As noted, senior leadership
had limited awareness, as did several clinicians and managers who instituted local
practices without concern towards potential negative effects upstream or downstream.
However, there were also stakeholders who did indeed have an extended service
architecture awareness/appreciation as evidenced by their decisions.
Hospital ABC Knowledge EA View
Hospital ABC as a whole isn't a learning organization. However, there was evidence of
extensive organizational learning practices at a sub-architecture level (i.e. Cardiac ORs),
and efforts were underway to replicate said practices to Hospital ABC at large (i.e. cross
departmental and service unit management boards). Notably, Hospital ABC as a whole
evidenced predominantly non-learning organization behavior.
As noted already, the fragmented divisional structure of Hospital ABC prevents it from
defining its way of doing things, and instead each division independently strives towards
meeting its own bottom line, without sharing information with the remaining divisions,
and disregarding potential impacts elsewhere in the service architecture. Similarly,
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divisions may be faced with a similar problem or objective, but they fail to share their
learning, hence often times spending valuable resources reinventing the wheel. Also, in
general, divisions were unable to pinpoint the outcomes of their changes given that
several parts could be changing at any given moment without their knowledge.
Furthermore, those initiatives that were meant to be enterprise wide seldom reached more
than two or three departments, as senior leadership weren't active sponsors beyond the
initial broadcasting email. Also, leadership sponsored improvement initiatives are
associated with putting out fires inside specific divisions, rather than accomplishing an
enterprise wide result. Finally, senior leadership and management elected to keep
financial information from clinicians who had repeatedly asked for it in the past. Instead,
clinicians feel pressured by management with operational metrics (i.e. number of
procedures). Moreover, information isn't shared across enterprise levels and performance
isn't examined holistically, even though its information content may exist somewhere
inside Hospital ABC.
8.7.2 Hospital ABC EA View Interaction Analysis
In chapter 3 we clarified that the meaning of holistic pertains not only to an enlarged
number of EA views used a framework but also to an "understanding of the interactions
of the views [which] becomes of increased importance" (Rhodes and Nightingale 2008).
As noted before, this research adopted an enterprise diagnostic mindset and held no pre-
conceived notion of organizational element interactions including strength and direction.
Such an approach reflects the described nascent phase of EA theoretical development and
allowed for the iterative improvement of our understanding and characterization of each
of the EA views both individually and holistically while comparing and contrasting
empirical results within and across cases.
Notably, hundreds of EA View interaction instances were documented over the course of
our analysis, as evident in the detailed descriptions for each of Hospital ABC's sub-
architectures. For instance, already in our descriptions in the previous subsection we
highlighted the effects of some EA View interactions. The dominant EA View
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interactions that emerged from the exploratory case of Hospital ABC were previously
highlighted in sections 8.4.3., 8.5.8., 8.6.1.8., and 8.6.2.8.
8.7.3 Hospital ABC multiple internal architectural configurations
In our exploratory research of Hospital ABC we gradually theoretically sampled several
service units and characterized their sub-architecture both in terms of local characteristics
(i.e. pertaining specifically to the service unit), as well as enterprise level (i.e. pertaining
to Hospital ABC as a whole), whilst leveraging our enriched understanding of hospital
enterprise architecture. In doing so, we determined that the Neuro ORs and Main ORs
sub-architectures were almost identical, and both of them had poor performance as
measured with both perceptual and objective data. Conversely, we determined that the
Cardiac ORs had a significantly different sub-architecture than that of the Main ORs and
the Neuro ORs. Furthermore, we established how the Cardiac ORs had gradually
developed an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture, and had
made decisions which improved not only their local performance but also enhanced
its interactions with other service units upstream and downstream. Finally, we also
determined that the Cardiac ORs performance had triggered the creation of cross
departmental and service unit management boards (see section 8.5) which were tasked
with replicating and facilitating the Cardiac ORs practices to Hospital ABC at large.
8.8 Chapter 8 Summary
In this chapter we presented the second of our two in-depth exploratory studies of leading
multispecialty hospitals, as we empirically and theoretically enriched MIT's emerging
Nightingale-Rhodes Enterprise Architecture Framework (NREAF), and having replicated
Chapter 7's key findings, we conclude that hospital performance can be improved
through an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture.
We followed our hybrid research design which consisted of qualitative and quantitative
data collected from multiple levels of the organization, and assessed multiple dimensions
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of performance, using both subjective and objective data. A total of 20 interviews were
conducted, recorded, transcribed, and subsequently coded. Several walkthroughs, hosted
by various clinical staff members, were made throughout different areas of Hospital ABC,
as well as a series of non-participatory observations made at different days of the week
and at different times of day. Finally, we used internal documentation such as meeting
minutes, email communication, and Hospital ABC's overall scorecard which detailed the
performance of each of its service units.
We determined that Hospital ABC's Main ORs were indeed struggling to fully leverage
plant capacity. However, rather than it being a matter of simply increasing the
productivity in the Main ORs, as initially proposed by senior leadership, we found that
several dysfunctionalities also stemmed from the Main ORs interactions with inpatient
specialties, inpatient service units, and pre-assessment clinics. Furthermore, we
established that Hospital ABC's lean initiatives had only been targeted at a process level
and within the Main ORs, which wasn't aligned with lean enterprise principles, and had
consequently only been able to derive small and short lived efficiency gains.
A close examination of the collected evidence, together with the insights generated from
Chapters 2 and 3, and the in-depth exploratory study of Hospital XYZ, gave rise to a total
of 24 main categories and 53 subcategories in the enrichment of MIT'S NREAF (i.e.
previously described in section 7.7.2). Leveraging our enriched version of the NREAF,
the data was reanalyzed, comparing and contrasting findings within and across cases, and
ultimately identifying dominant EA View interactions, which further characterized
Hospital ABC's EA and the extent to which an enriched understanding of hospital EA
was present.
We also replicated our first in-depth study finding that a hospital enterprise may consist
of multiple internal architectural configurations, and that these in turn may generate
different levels of hospital enterprise performance, where performance is measured as a
multidimensional construct, both in terms of dimensions and stakeholders. Specifically,
we established that unlike the Neuro ORs and the Main ORs, the Cardiac ORs had
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gradually developed an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture,
and had made decisions which improved not only their local performance but also
enhanced its interactions with other service units upstream and downstream.
We also determined that the Cardiac ORs performance had triggered the creation of cross
departmental and service unit management boards which were tasked with replicating
and facilitating the Cardiac ORs practices to Hospital ABC at large. Hence, although not
yet a learning organization, Hospital ABC had began taking its first steps in identifying
local organizational learning successes, and attempting not only to replicate them, but
also magnify their impact at a wider scale within Hospital ABC. Ultimately, we also
replicated our first in-depth study finding that an architectural deficiency in one or more
EA Views (e.g. Hospital ABC's limited information architecture capability), may be
compensated by the particular configuration of the remaining EA Views.
Finally, we also replicated our finding that integrated multispecialty providers, although
regarded in the literature as better able to offer efficient higher quality care, and indeed
having been sampled for their strong financial numbers and the multiple awards given by
third party organizations, have significant room for improvement, starting with
addressing their internal fragmentation at several levels.
In the following, and final, chapter we provide additional specific recommendations to
assist hospital leaders in developing and leveraging an enriched understanding of hospital
EA while making decisions that are more likely to ultimately improve hospital
performance. Additionally, we will review our findings in the broader context of the
thesis, summarize our work, and identify avenues for future research.
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9. Conclusions, Contributions and Future Work
In this concluding chapter, we will present our findings concisely and tie them back to
our research questions. We will also provide specific recommendations to assist hospital
leaders in developing and leveraging an enriched understanding of hospital EA while
making decisions that are more likely to ultimately improve hospital performance. Finally,
we summarize the contributions that this work makes and identify areas where targeted
additional work could further illuminate our understanding of enterprise architecture in
general and refine our recommendations for hospital enterprises in particular.
9.1 Research Motivation and Research Questions Summary
The overarching motivation for this research was to respond to the National Academy of
Engineering and the Institute of Medicine's joint call to promote the application of
"principles, tools, and research from engineering disciplines associated with the analysis,
design, and control of complex systems" (Reid 2005). Lean enterprise principles and an
enterprise architecture framework (EAF) are examples of such principles, tools, and
research which are under development at MIT and were used in the context of this
research.
The US spends 16% of its GDP on health care expenditures, including 30 - 40% of US
health care spending which is believed to be wasteful (Reid 2005), and the largest source
of expenditure, namely over 30%, is hospital expenditures (Kaiser Foundation 2007).
Similarly the United Kingdom's (UK) highest source of healthcare expenditures are
hospital services and infrastructure (National Health System 2008). Consequently, the
strategies and operations developed and implemented by hospitals have a significant
effect on access, quality, and cost of care (Devers, Brewster et al. 2003). However, US
health care reform discussions have centered on insurance with standard benefit packages
(Cortese and Smoldt 2007) or deep-in-the-weeds debates over technical details (Murray
2010). Some state that once the existing reform debates are over, hospital managers are
once again left with the task to design more effective and efficient approaches for
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delivering health care (Bohmer 2009). Hence, considering all of these factors, hospitals
became the focal unit of analysis in this research, whilst nonetheless including macro-
level contextual considerations (e.g. regulation, payment models, etc) and micro level of
care delivery (e.g. emergency department, patient wards, etc).
Amid the waste and pressure faced by hospitals, today "one would be hard pressed to
find a hospital in the United States that is not aware of lean principles and considering
some sort of lean program" (Liker and Morgan 2006). However, the approach has been
generally flawed as evidenced by popular examples of healthcare literature's reported
hospital lean successes (Spear 2005; Kim, Spahlinger et al. 2006; Muto, Herbert et al.
2006). These tend to narrowly focus on a few lean tools (e.g. 5S, visual management, etc)
at the process level (Bhasin and Burcher 2006) and within individual silos (Allen,
Nightingale et al. 2004). Furthermore, under pressure to deliver concrete and actionable
operational effectiveness, managers have adopted a best practice mentality and sought
the advice of business publications and consultants that often ignore the need to have a
strategy (Porter 1996) thereby lacking an enterprise architecture perspective. Ultimately,
it is important to keep in mind that "lean is not so much about the individual principles
and practices, but [rather] their effective integration and application" (Nightingale
2002).
Interestingly, Donald Berwick, former chief executive officer of the Institute for
Healthcare Improvement (IHI), and current head of the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid (CMS), emphasized that the problem of healthcare redesign becomes
increasingly "harder and the evidence weaker as one moves from the microsystem to the
organization"21 3 (Berwick 2002). Additionally, widespread implementation of policies is
said to be hindered by the "heterogeneity ofpractice settings, with their varying data
systems, organizationalforms, and degrees of readiness to change" (Hussey, Eibner et al.
2009). Similarly, "the evolving organizations are too different to put forward any isolated
techniques as uniform resolutions to management problems" (Evashwick and Weiss
213 The microsystem refers to the care given at service unit level (e.g. emergency department), whereas the
organization is the care provider facility (e.g. hospital) that supports one or more microsystems.
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1987). Furthermore, others have acknowledged that hospital specific organizational
structures may be relatively efficient and/or more conducive to higher performance,
however, in the absence of the necessary in-depth data it has remained impossible to
"gauge impacts of [a hospital's] organization on various dimensions ofperformance"
(Sloan 1980). Ultimately, a group of health care experts charged with setting a research
agenda aimed at improving the US health care system, defined as their highest research
priority the understanding and improvement of hospital performance measurement and
the identification of key organizational characteristics from high-performing hospitals
(Fernandopulle, Ferris et al. 2003).
All in all, in adopting a systems thinking approach we set ourselves to elevate the
traditionally narrow hospital definitions of lean health care and explore the broader
concepts of lean enterprise principles and enterprise architecture (EA) while enhancing
our knowledge of hospitals' socio-technical complexity and underlying performance.
Determining what constitutes a Lean Enterprise Architecture, or any theory of the
business, may sound deceptively simple but it involves several years of empirical
experimentation before reaching a clear, consistent, and valid theory for a given
organization (Drucker 1994). Hence, given the nascent phase of development of MIT'S
NREAF (Nightingale 2009) another key motivation for this research was to empirically
and theoretically enrich the framework.
The following are the four main research questions which were defined and gradually
refined in the context of this research whilst addressing the above described research
motivation:
" RQ1: How is hospital enterprise performance currently measured?
" RQ2: How could hospital enterprise performance measurement be improved
using lean enterprise principles?
e RQ3: Can one create an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise
architecture?
" RQ4: Can hospital performance be improved through an enriched understanding
of hospital enterprise architecture and if so, how?
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9.2 Research Structure and Methodology
9.2.1 Research methodology
In order to answer the four research questions outlined previously, and given the
theoretical maturity of the principles and tools proposed to be used in this research, we
devised a research design that allowed for continuous and iterative inductive and
deductive research cycles. Such an approach had three important characteristics:
e First, a hybrid research design was adopted, comprising the use of both qualitative
and quantitative data, and the pursuit of triangulating multiple sources of evidence
to verify our collected data, and validate our findings.
" Second, different research questions entailed different data samples. RQ 1 and
RQ2 specifically pertained to a representative hospital sample made of seven
leading hospitals in Massachusetts. RQ3 and RQ4 were addressed with two in-
depth case studies, with multiple embedded units of analysis, where both cases
were leading large multispecialty hospitals. The two data samples reflected
extensive literature reviews of the healthcare literature. Specifically, the
derivation of a hospital typology and criteria to select the seven Massachusetts
hospitals, and the identification of multispecialty hospitals as the literature's
preferred delivery platform model.
* Third, research cycles refined and strengthened our findings. Specifically, the
research conducted was non-sequential in nature and our writings on the compare
and contrast analysis, within and across hospital cases, reflect how phenomena
emerged and underwent refinement. Furthermore, a multidisciplinary review of
the literature was conducted not only in the initial phase of this research, but also
throughout each in-depth hospital case, as we furthered our understanding of
hospital enterprise architecture and enriched MIT's NREAF.
What follows is an overview of the data collection and analysis techniques used while
conducting the two in-depth hospital case studies. As we will briefly explain below our
research strategy gradually progressed from an exploratory nature towards explanatory 2 14
214 Please refer to Chapter 5 for full detail on the research methods used in this thesis.
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In both cases we began by interviewing senior leadership and establishing initial
exploratory questions and the desired point of intervention. In Hospital XYZ, senior
leadership directed our research to their emergency department (ED), and we preliminary
posed the question "How to speed patientflow in the ED?". Similarly, in Hospital ABC,
senior leadership directed our research to a specific service unit, namely the Main ORs,
and we preliminary asked "How to increase productivity in the Operating Rooms?". In
both cases, senior leadership had singled out a service unit within their organization, and
held it primarily accountable for its poor results. Succinctly, the ED was said to be
overcrowding with patients, whereas the Main ORs were said to be making poor use of
their plant capacity.
The type of preliminary questions asked, and indeed the research questions formulated in
this thesis, concerned a contemporary set of events over which we had little or no control.
Such characteristics prompted the use of case studies, as recommended by research
methods scholars (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994; Edmondson and McManus 2007). In
effect, we used multiple sources of evidence (i.e. interviews, observation, documents, and
archival records) which were qualitative and quantitative in nature, and allowed for
triangulation to verify data validity, as well as to test our proposed explanations for the
observed phenomena of interest.
In both cases we verified that the initially studied service units (i.e. ED, Main ORs) were
indeed experiencing poor performance as measured by both perceptual (i.e. interviews
and observation) and objective data (i.e. archival records and/or internal documents).
However, we also established that both service units were being significantly affected by
their interactions with stakeholders beyond their unit boundary; hence, our data collection
and analysis scope was enlarged in both cases, and began reflecting our use of lean
enterprise principles to inform our research (e.g. holistically exploring each hospital).
Once again, and consistent with the recommended research methods previously
referenced, we proceeded with collecting and analyzing data from multiple embedded
units of analysis within each case study, and applied similar sampling criteria to select
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each additional unit. Specifically, we followed a theoretical sampling2 15 technique
(Glaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz 1983; Eisenhardt 1989; Strauss and Corbin 1990;
Edmondson and McManus 2007) and selected both service units and support functions
which could provide further evidence towards describing and explaining our preliminary
conclusions (i.e. ED and Main ORs shouldn't be held solely accountable for their poor
performance). In both cases we collected data from senior leadership, administrative
support services (e.g. quality and safety function; process improvement function;
planning function; etc), clinical support services (e.g. pharmacy; laboratory; etc), and
specific service units. Furthermore, the selection of specific service units was based on
polar case sampling which is a type of theoretical sampling where units of analysis have
distinctive characteristics pertaining to the phenomena of interest. In our polar case
sampling we were specifically interested in exploring why certain service units had been
consistently singled out, in both perceptual and objective data, as high performers or low
performers in each hospital case:
e In Hospital XYZ, we identified and verified that, for whatever reason (which we
later were able to explain), the ED experienced variable performance in its
interaction with different inpatient service units. Specifically, we integrated
Hospital XYZ's disparate information systems and were able to analyze the
patient flow from the ED onto each inpatient service unit. Our analysis found that
units of similar size (i.e. number of beds), and of similar characteristics (i.e.
centralized patient populations; receiving patients from the ED, ORs, and clinics;
housing specialties that significantly contributed to Hospital XYZ's inpatient
revenue), either were consistently slow or consistently fast, in admitting ED
patients. Hence, we sampled four inpatient service units.
* In Hospital ABC, we did not find any consistent characterization of the Main
ORs interaction with inpatient service units. Furthermore, we didn't have the
benefit of archival record analysis to quantitatively characterize said interactions
(i.e. as was done in our Hospital XYZ case). However, we did established that
different OR clusters, with similar characteristics (i.e. number of ORs; non-
5 "The goal of theoretical sampling is to choose cases which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent
theory. In contrast, traditional, within experiment hypothesis-testing studies rely on statistical sampling, in
which researchers randomly select the sample from the population" (Eisenhardt 1989)
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centralized inpatient populations; same division), were consistently characterized,
both perceptually and objectively (i.e. historic performance scorecards), with
different levels of performance. Hence, we sampled the Cardiac ORs and the
Neuro ORs.
While collecting and analyzing data from each embedded unit of analysis, in each
hospital case, we characterized both local enterprise architecture characteristics (i.e.
pertaining specifically to the embedded unit) as well as enterprise level (i.e. pertaining to
the respective hospital as a whole), and gradually developed and leveraged our enriched
understanding of hospital enterprise architecture (i.e. summarized in RQ3 above). Our
findings from each embedded unit of analysis were compared and contrasted within each
hospital case study, and subsequently across both hospital case studies. In effect, in
triangulating the lessons within and across case studies, a common explanation emerged
(Yin 1981) and we developed and tested our answer to RQ4.
In section 9.3 we review our conclusions pertaining to each of this thesis' four research
questions. However, we first provide a specific summary of the dissertation immediately
below.
9.2.2 Research structure
To provide a specific summary of the dissertation, the chapters' content is summarized
below in some detail.
In Chapters 2-4 we described our extensive longitudinal multidisciplinary literature
review which generated and informed each of our research questions. Specifically:
e In Chapter 2, we examined the concept of organizational effectiveness, including
different theoretical perspectives, as well as how hospital enterprise performance
measurement has been characterized in the literature. Furthermore, in line with
the literature's recommendation in deriving useful best practices, we theoretically
enriched each of LAI's seven lean enterprise principles, which originally were
primarily empirically and expert opinion based.
Page 578 of 759
" In Chapter 3, we determined that MIT's emerging NREAF is the most complete
framework representation of enterprise architecture. In doing so, we established
that previous characterizations of the organizational design literature as
stovepipped, weren't entirely accurate. Similarly, we identified how different
frameworks have used different heuristics and theories in studying interactions
amongst framework elements (e.g. strategic choice, population ecology,
information processing theory, coordination theory, etc). Therefore, we elected to
follow an enterprise diagnostic mindset and proposed the use of lean enterprise
principles in deriving and interpreting holistic and rich enterprise architecture
descriptions (i.e. while studying EA View interactions). Finally, we also explicitly
established the need to theoretically and empirically enrich MIT's NREAF so as
to identify specific constructs for each of its EA Views, and further support our
study of hospital enterprise architectures.
" In Chapter 4, we studied the US health care industry in general, and hospitals in
particular. In doing so we also identified: a hospital typology to inform our
sampling; hospital heterogeneity and the call for in-depth hospital studies; large
multispecialty hospitals are the preferred delivery platform model, and hence
constituted the sample of our in-depth hospital case studies.
In Chapter 5, we described in detail both the rationale and the elements of our research
design pertaining to each research question. We explained the construct of
methodological fit and how in adopting it as an overarching design criterion for this
research, we established the need for a hybrid research design with research cycles.
Additionally, we discussed in detail the sampling techniques, for both the seven
Massachusetts hospitals and the two in-depth hospital cases, and we enumerated the
different sources of evidence for each data sample, as well as the different data analysis
techniques used to verify and strengthen our findings (e.g. crossing organizational levels
of analysis to improve validity; performing content analysis on interview transcripts;
using multiple types of quantitative questionnaires; etc).
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Chapter 6 presents our findings and recommendations from studying the seven leading
Massachusetts hospitals while addressing RQ 1 and RQ2. We compare and contrast our
findings with the literature and explicitly identify both consistencies and points of
departure. Furthermore, we examine both explicit and implicit performance measurement
practices used by the sample hospitals' CEOs, and assess them in terms of their
alignment with lean enterprise principles. Finally, grounded in our empirical findings and
extensive literature review, we make five specific recommendations as to how hospitals
can incorporate and benefit from lean enterprise principles. Additionally, for each of our
recommendations we propose diagnostic questions for hospital leaders to evaluate
whether or not they are following our recommended practices, and where appropriate, we
also suggest both existing as well as new specific metrics to further inform hospital
leaders' performance measurement.
Chapters 7 and 8 present our findings from studying in-depth the two large
multispecialty hospitals while addressing RQ3 and RQ4. Notably, our analysis also
pertained to our findings in Chapter 6, and vice-versa. In both cases, we began our
exploratory study with senior leadership interviews and initially focused in one specific
service unit in each hospital (i.e. Emergency Department, and Main Operating Rooms),
as per each senior leadership's request. The concurrent data collection and analysis
allowed to present, at various points, preliminary findings to senior leadership and in
applying systems thinking principles, we gradually enlarged the scope of our analysis to
include other embedded units of analysis which were sampled according to both
perceptual and objective data pertaining to their performance (i.e. polar cases of high or
low performing service units). Each embedded unit of analysis was examined both
locally and in the context of its respective overall hospital enterprise architecture.
Furthermore, emergent phenomena of interest were compared and contrasted both across
embedded units of analysis within each case, as well as across cases (i.e. Hospital ABC
and Hospital XYZ). Finally, each hospital's EA is described both in terms of each EA
View, and the dominant EA View interactions that emerged from the data, while already
leveraging our enriched version of MIT's NREAF.
Page 580 of 759
9.3 Conclusions
We present our conclusions from the research described above by responding to the
initial research questions as formulated in Chapter 1.
9.3.1 RQ1: How is hospital enterprise performance currently
measured?
In our preparatory research phase (see section 5.2.2) we conducted exploratory hospital
studies and determined that despite a hospital's favorable external ranking, there were
dysfunctionalities that were neither captured by the metrics of the external entities, nor by
those of the hospital itself. As such, we conducted the literature reviews presented in
Chapters 2 and 4, to determine how we should measure hospital enterprise performance.
In doing so we identified a trend in that, the number of performance dimensions
considered in published articles increased over time, following the maturation of the
performance management literature that recognized the need for multidimensional
performance measurement. However, the literature review also characterized an inverse
relationship between the number of performance dimensions considered and the inclusion
of empirical data in the studies (i.e. beyond a conceptual contribution on how to measure
hospital performance). Moreover, as the number of performance dimensions included in
the studies increased, the inclusion of data in such studies decreased. Furthermore, we
determined that the performance dimension most often used in the literature was hospital
operations, followed by finance, and quality of care. Ultimately, there was sparse
empirical evidence as to how hospitals currently measured enterprise performance, and
hence the formulation of RQ 1.
In studying the seven leading Massachusetts hospitals (see Chapter 6), using both
qualitative and quantitative data, we established that they not only adopted a
multidimensional performance construct but also defined hospital enterprise performance
as remaining viable organizations whilst scoring well in as many performance
dimensions as possible. Furthermore, despite typological differences across the sampled
hospitals, we determined that their mission elements and key stakeholders considered
were largely consistent.
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Additionally, having studied both explicit and implicit performance measurement
practices of each hospital, we identified 11 key practices and found that these were
inconsistently aligned with lean enterprise principles (see Figure 9-1).
Lean Enterprise Principles
(J Z 0
4, '-0 41 AD:Observed Performance Measurement Practice ,. Z C 0
1. Multiple stakeholder value expectations and contributions were being considered
II. Senior leadership were aligning stakeholders with hospital mission
Ill. Effectiveness was (partially) considered before efficiency
IV. Service unit interdependencies were being accounted for despite cost
center analysis
V. Service unit interdependencies were not evident in transformation plans : ; 0 0:
V. Performance benchmarking process was fragmented
VIl. Outflow interactions were minimally accounted for
Vill. External stakeholders were predominant influence in hospitals' strategic
and operational direction
IX. Senior leadership supported and drove enterprise behaviors
X. Hospitals had an organizational learning predisposition, albeit unmeasured
XI. Hospital practices were predominantly inconsistent with those of learning
organizations
I~~~~Tr LeedOGodai Sm lmeni * Poor aiiqnniei
Figure 9-1: Summary of 7 MA hospitals key practices alignment with lean enterprise principles2 16 ,2 17
Figure 9-2 summarizes the evidence that we showed pertaining to each key practice. The
following is a short summary of some of these practices and their alignment with lean
enterprise principles:
0 Multiple stakeholder value expectations and contributions were being considered:
the sampled hospital identified relevant stakeholders and determined their value
propositions accordingly.
216 A simple coloring scheme was used to help readily visualize the alignment of hospital enterprise
practices with lean enterprise principles (i.e. green denotes good alignment, whereas yellow denotes some
alignment, and red indicates poor alignment and most room for improvement).
217 The 5 th lean enterprise principle (i.e. ensure stability and flow within and across the enterprise) didn't
emerge as a dominant phenomena of interest in the analysis. However, we argued by inference, and from
principles 1 and 4 in particular, that the sampled hospitals likely weren't well aligned with the 5th principle
either, or at least they weren't consciously and proactively addressing it. Notably, evaluating an
organization in terms of the 5 th principle lent itself to the RQ3 and RQ4 in-depth study approach.
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7 MA Hospitals Evidence Summary j Observed Key Practices
Leaders feel responsible for any patient that seeks care at their facility regardless of - - - - - -
ability to pay, residence location. ethnicity, etc
Hospital mission elements address multiple stakeholders (Table 6-5. Table 6-6 and Multiple stakeholder value expectations and
Table 6-T) contributions were being considered.
Hospitals define performance in terms of doing well on multiple dimensions that
address different stakeholders (Table 6-8)
Leaders understood potential stakeholder value misalignments and felt the need to Senior leadership were aligning stakeholders
explain the hospital's value proposition & how everyone could contribute (Table 6-17) with hospital mission.
Hospitals define as mission elements offering broad array of services while delivering Effectiveness was (partially) considered before
them in an optimum anner and remaining viable (Table 6-9) %efficiency.
Leaders use cost-center accounting and are unable to measure residual contributions Service unit interdependencies were being
amongst service units, but are aware that hey do exist (Table 6-11 and Table 6-13) accounted for despite cost center analysis.
Leaders demanded that service unit investments had to either attract additional patient Service unit Interdependencies were not evident
volume or capture higher revenue, and essentially pay for itself (Table 6-14) In transformation plans.
Leaders used internal and external benchmarks. However, different benchmarks were Performance benchmarking process was
used for different dimensions, precluding holistic characterization of performance fragmented.
,p.utflow interactions were minimally accounted for'
External demanded metrics outweigh by far Internal metrics (Table 6-10). Internal
metrics focus on patient inflow (e.g. volume) and disregard patient outflow interactions
Hospitals adversarial relationship with payer (Table 6-2) External stakeholders were predominant
Leaders greatly concemed with payment reform and global payments (Table 6-3) influence in hospitals strategic and operationaldirection.
Process level payer demanded metrics trigger proliferation of ean initiatives to
implement & improve meftics, without clear overarching integrated plan (Table 6.14)
Leaders focused in providing a safe and productive work environmenta with an Senior leadership supported and drove
emphaisoncommuicaton._cltureandemploeesaisfationTable6_18 enterprise behaviors.
Although unmeasured and poorly self assessed, leaders upheld some management j IHospitals had an organizational learning
practices consistent with organizational learning (Table 6-19, Table 6-20,u Table 6-21) npredisposition, albeit unmeasured.
Leaders described organizational learning practices focused on external stimuli, with a Hospital practices were predominantly
process level impetus, and primarily anchored atmiddle and upper organization levels inconsistent with those of learning organizations .,
Figure 9-2: Summary of 7 MA Hospitals Evidence and Observed Key Practices Alignment with lean
enterprise principles (adapted from Chapter 6) 218
" Senior leadership supported and drove enterprise behaviors: senior leaders were
mindful towards shaping an enterprise environment conducive of higher
performance by keeping employees satisfied, communicating clearly, nurturing
and sustaining the desired culture, and ultimately focusing on the delivery of
excellent patient care.
L Service unit interdependencies were being accounted for despite cost center
analysis: senior leaders recognized that interdependent service units may have a
residual contribution towards each other. However, their systems not only didn't
measure said interdependence, but also had a narrow focus (e.g. volume per
service unit; volume per procedure; metrics per DRG; ete) and were tied to
narrow incentives (i.e. motivating individualistic behavior rather than
218 The f 2ll detail on each lean enterprise principle, as well as the assessment of the hospital key practices in
terms of said principles, was described in section 6.5. 1.
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cooperative).
* Performance benchmarking process was fragmented: hospitals used both internal
and external benchmarks to compare themselves with similar facilities. However,
not only did they use different benchmarks for different performance dimensions
(i.e. precluded holistic baseline performance measurement content), but also
different managers were responsible for monitoring and improving different
performance dimensions (i.e. precluded holistic performance measurement
process).
e External stakeholders were predominant influence in hospitals' strategic and
operational direction: not only the number of externally demanded metrics
significantly outweighed the internal hospital metrics, but also senior leaders
defined as strategic objectives the implementation of externally demanded metrics,
and the improvement on the specific processes measured by said metrics.
Furthermore, a clear overall process improvement rationale was absent; hence,
hospitals predominantly focused on improving local efficiencies, and potentially
compromised overall hospital effectiveness.
" Hospital practices were predominantly inconsistent with those of learning
organizations: although hospitals had organizational learning capabilities, they
had inconsistencies that prevented them from behaving as learning organizations.
For instance, improvement empowerment was focused at senior leadership and
management levels (i.e. front line employees weren't by definition empowered to
seek improvements). Also, improvement efforts predominantly stemmed from
external stimuli (i.e. adaptive learning) and didn't include generative learning (i.e.
figuring out how to improve a process even though said process isn't directly
monitored/demanded by external entities). Additionally, improvement efforts and
transformation plans tended to be narrowly focused inside service units, and
didn't have a description of potential enterprise level effects and opportunities to
replicate results.
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In the next research question we made recommendations that not only leveraged the good
key practices that emerged from the sampled leading hospitals, but also addressed the
practices that had room for improvement while using a systems thinking perspective.
9.3.2 RQ2: How could hospital enterprise performance
measurement be improved using lean enterprise principles?
In line with the literature's recommendation in deriving useful best practices, we
theoretically enriched each of LAI's lean enterprise principles, which originally were
primarily empirically and expert opinion based (Nightingale 2009). As such, we
conducted a literature review included in Chapter 2219, and studied key publications
spanning across six decades to find theoretical support for each lean enterprise principle.
Notably, the in-depth cases studied (i.e. Hospital XYZ and Hospital ABC) also prompted
revisiting the literature to further clarify each lean enterprise principle, and in some cases
make suggestions for their refinement (e.g. the 7th lean enterprise principle should
emphasize becoming a learning organization, rather than merely emphasizing
organizational learning). Arguably, some of the principles could have had a list of
thousands of articles to characterize them, as their concepts have been independently and
prolifically developed in multiple fields. As such, we clarified that the seven lean
enterprise principles weren't novel in themselves, but in combination they are the most
complete as compared to other listings of lean principles in the literature.
In answering RQ 1, we identified 11 key practices and found that these were
inconsistently aligned with lean enterprise principles. Hence, in line with the overarching
motivation previously described (see section 9.1) we set ourselves to improve hospital
enterprise performance measurement while using lean enterprise principles.
We defined 5 specific recommendations as to how hospitals can incorporate and benefit
from lean enterprise principles (see Figure 9-3). In doing so, we introduced a core
concept of service architecture awareness which should be embedded at all levels of the
hospital enterprise and inform the planning and execution of lean improvement initiatives,
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219 See section 2.4.6.1 and Appendix I
transformation plans, organizational learning, and performance measurement in general.
Notably, this construct also emerged as a central phenomenon of interest in the analysis
of the two in-depth hospital cases addressed in RQ3 and RQ4, and became embedded in
our enriched version of NREAF's Service EA View (i.e. Service Architecture
Awareness/ Appreciation).
Observed Key Practices
Multiple stakeholder value expectations and
contributions were being considered.
Senior leadership were aligning stakeholders
with hospital mission.
Effectiveness was (partially) considered before
.efficiency -
'Service unit interdependencies were being
accounted for despite cost center analysis.
Service unit interdependencies were not evident
in transformation plans.
Performance benchmarking process was
fragmented.
putow interactions were minimally accounted for'
External stakeholders were predominant
influence in hospitals' strategic and operational
direction.
Senior leadership supported and drove
!enterprise behaviors.
Hospitals had an organizational learning
predisposition, albeit unmeasured.
* Hospital practices were predominantly a
inconsistent with those of learning organizations. I
Our Recommendations
Adopt a multidimensional performance construct that considers
i value expectations and contributions of relevant stakeholders
within and beyond hospital infrastructural boundaries
-----------------------------
Measure performance dimensions holistically while adopting
i practices that manage and influence relevant stakeholders within:
and beyond hospital Infrastructural boundaries
Develop, manage, and nourish service architecture awareness
across the hospital enterprise
Attend to payer demands and opportunities in enterprise
I transformation and lean improvement plans that are coherent
and aligned with hospital strategy and service architecture
Communicate and empower organizational learning practices
across the hospital towards becoming learning organizations
Figure 9-3: Lean Enterprise Principle Recommendations for Hospitals (from Chapter 6)220
A total of 26 diagnostic questions were suggested for senior hospital leaders to evaluate
whether or not they are currently following our 5 recommended practices which are
informed by lean enterprise principles.
Additionally, we identified 22 specific metrics for the 8 performance dimensions we
recommended (i.e. quality, finance, operations, patient satisfaction, employee satisfaction,
220 The full detail on each recommendation, including proposed diagnostic questions and metrics, was
described in section 6.5.2.
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organizational learning, strategy/operations alignment, and social equity)21. Furthermore,
9 new metrics were suggested specifically to measure service architecture awareness in a
hospital context.
All in all, in answering RQ 1 and RQ2 we made good progress towards our research
motivations of elevating the traditionally narrow hospital definitions of lean healthcare,
and of both characterizing and improving hospital performance measurement in particular.
In doing so, we also became more knowledgeable to conduct our in-depth hospital studies.
Specifically, most of our suggested diagnostic questions and metrics were used to inform
the analysis of the two in-depth hospital case studies summarized in the next two research
questions.
9.3.3 RQ3: Can one create an enriched understanding of hospital
enterprise architecture?
In our longitudinal multidisciplinary literature review analysis of Chapter 3, we
determined that MIT's emerging Nightingale-Rhodes Enterprise Architecture Framework
(NREAF) is the most complete framework representation of enterprise architecture (EA),
and thus was selected to guide the data collection of our two in-depth hospital case
studies. However, we also established the need to adopt an enterprise diagnostic
mindset222 and also theoretically and empirically enrich the NREAF beyond its early
diagrammatic representation (Nightingale and Rhodes 2007) and succinct EA View
descriptions (Nightingale 2009)223. Moreover, the NREAF represented preliminary
12 The sampled hospitals' highest ranking metrics per performance dimension were described in Table 6-
24 and in section 6.5.2. Also, please refer to Appendix II for the full list of metrics that were dominant in
the literature, and were then presented to all of the hospital CEO respondents. The 22 metrics identified
were consistently ranked highest by the CEO respondents.
222 An architecting mindset is implicit in the heuristics of EA View interactions depicted in the NREAF.
However, our literature review in Chapter 3 uncovered frameworks whose element interactions (i.e. EA
View interactions) were consistent, inconsistent, and also additional (see section 3.5). Hence, in line with
our research motivation of furthering the nascent development of MIT'S NREAF, we elected to follow an
enterprise diagnostic mindset, and in doing so, we didn't limit our EA View interaction analysis to any
particular set of pre-defined heuristics and allowed instead for the phenomena of interest to emerge from
the data. Notably, having conducted our exploratory in-depth hospital case studies and enriched MIT'S
NREAF, we also propose general recommendations (i.e. we adopt an architecting mindset) for hospitals in
section 9.4.
223 The author's NREAF starting point, both in terms of its representation and its EA View descriptions,
was explained in detail in section 3.4.3.
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generalized results from several years of empirical studies and should also be adapted to
the specific context of each enterprise under analysis (Rhodes, Ross et al. 2009).
Having leveraged and enriched the NREAF while conducting our two exploratory in-
depth hospital case studies, we showed that one can indeed create an enriched
understanding of hospital enterprise architecture. Specifically, we identified 24 main
categories and 53 subcategories for MIT'S NREAF (see Figure 9-4 and Figure 9-5).
Each of the categories emerged consistently in the analysis of the qualitative and
quantitative data from both in-depth hospital case studies. Grounded theory techniques
(e.g. initial coding, focused coding, categorizing, memo writing, sorting, coding
visualization, etc) were used in the identification of each of the categories enriching
MIT'S NREAF for hospital applications in particular. Throughout the data collection
and analysis we were informed by our findings in RQl and RQ2, as well as by the lean
enterprise principles, and additional literature reviews to aid in our categorization and
interpretation of the data. Notably, in collecting and analyzing the enlarging data sets (i.e.
54 interviews, 15 non-participatory meetings, 9 walkthroughs, electronic medical records,
420+ literature publications, and internal documents), we gradually upgraded from
analyzing data on paper, to Microsoft Excel, and finally to a specialized tool for
qualitative data analysis (i.e. MAXQDA 10).
224 The full detail on each main category and subcategory was described in section 7.7.2.
12 An overview of the data analysis process was described in section 5.4.
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External I Policy
- Industry history and
context
- External stakeholder value
requirements
In frmadon
- Information systems
integration
- Hospital enterprise
information systems
- Information systems
sustainability
Knowledge
- Learning organization
capability
- Knowledge codifiability
and transferability
- Information retrieval and
access
Organizadon
. Enterprise history and
culture
. Enterprise organizational
climate
. Service unit organizational
climate and subculture
+ Modes of service unit
coordination
Process
- Process measurement
capability
- Holistic performance
measurement
- Enterprise process
improvement and planning
- Process standardization
and transparency
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Figure 9-4: Main Categories of Enriched NREAF (from Chapter 7)
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Figure 9-5: Subcategories of enriched NREAF (from Chapter 7)
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Sub Categoay
- Regulatory requirements and oversight
- Surrounding community oversight
- Payer system influence and pressure
- Provider referral influence and pressure
- Provider competition
- Patient behavior and impact
Sub Categnoy
- Data reliability (Insertion / visualization)
- Information timeliness
- Information systems organization and integration
- Prevalence of paper information systems
- Electronic workflow information system
- Electronic medical record
- Information systems user friendliness
Information capability upgrades
Sub Categosy
- Nurturing of enterprise knowledgeable employees
- Intra and inter service unit learning
- Implicit and explicit knowledge
- Information transfer mode
- Information retrievability
- Information access privileges
,Sub Caegoiy
- Enterprise cultural harmony
- Senior leadership acceptance by internal stakeholders
e Local organizational climate
- Leadership and service unit enterprise importance
- Psychological safety
- Workforce stability
SIndividual and divisional incentives (financial and beyond)
- Local organizational culture (silo vs enterprise)
- Boundary spanners (role and support)
- Cross departmental and service unit management boards
- Service unit boundary of control and influence
- Team familiarity
- Role definitions and organizational structure
Sub Cahhgoy
- Holistic performance content
- Holistic performance process
- Prevalence of undesirable processes
- Local process optimization behavior
- Process complexity and flexibility
Sub Caegosy
- Referral network management
- Patient and family management
- Supplier management
- Modes of clinical coordination (single build/ sequentiall
network)
- Service sustainability (patient and employee experience)
- Stability and leveling of flow
- Flow information transparency and timeliness
In total, over 8000 coding instances were generated in the software and underwent the
abovementioned grounded theory techniques that led to each of the main categories and
associated subcategories for each EA View. Furthermore, the software supported data
triangulation across data types (e.g. interviews and observation), and across embedded
units of analysis (e.g. emergency department and inpatient service unit), as well as testing
of results replication across the two in-depth hospital case studies (i.e. Hospital XYZ and
Hospital ABC). Finally, the software also supported us in characterizing relationships
among subcategories within and across EA Views, and in effectively building a log of
EA View interactions in each of the in-depth hospital case studies. Notably, the EA
Views in Figure 9-4 and Figure 9-5 are ordered alphabetically as we remained consistent
with our elected diagnostic enterprise mindset.
The following is a summary list of key EA View refinements made whilst enriching
MIT's NREAF:
* The External / Policy EA View was characterized not only in terms of regulatory,
political and societal considerations (i.e. as originally described in the NREAF),
but also in terms of the enterprise industry history and context. Furthermore, we
felt it was necessary to also explicitly include the effects of competition. Notably,
several of this view's identified subcategories pertain specifically to the
healthcare industry (i.e. patients, referring providers, payers, surrounding
community).
" The Information EA View was characterized not only in terms of the
information needs of the enterprise (i.e. as originally described in the NREAF),
but also in terms of the reliability of the information, its timeliness, its
organization, and its integration. Furthermore, we explicitly denoted the existence
of information systems that are either paper-based or electronic. Specifically, as
with any other enterprise, we found that hospital information flowed in both types
of systems, and in some cases only in one of them. Additionally, we added
information systems sustainability in terms of their ease of use, and an
enterprise's ability to upgrade them (e.g. off-the-shelf solutions vs. internally
developed). Notably, some of this view's subcategories pertain specifically to the
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healthcare industry (i.e. electronic medical record). Finally, we also explicitly
characterize electronic workflow information systems, as these emerged as a core
capability which hospitals should ideally have in place. Similarly, we determined
that state-of-the-art electronic medical records aren't necessarily conducive on
their own to better information flows; conversely, we also identified paper-based
practices that indeed adequately supported information flow.
" The Knowledge EA View was characterized not only in terms of implicit
characteristics (i.e. as originally described in the NREAF), but also in terms of
explicit codified knowledge (e.g. evidence based medicine). Furthermore, we
added the core learning organization capability, which reflects the 7th lean
enterprise principle, and one of our RQ2 recommendations in particular 22 6, and
assesses whether or not the enterprise is nurturing enterprise knowledgeable
employees and promoting intra and inter service unit learning. Notably,
organizational learning practices (e.g. trial and error adjustments) pertain to the
Process EA View. However, as clarified elsewhere in this thesis227 organizational
learning practices are a necessary but insufficient condition for an enterprise to
develop into a learning organization. Finally, we also consistently identified
information retrievability and access privileges as core constructs defining the EA
Knowledge View (e.g. knowledge existed in the enterprise somewhere but
stakeholders were either explicitly denied access to it, hence limiting learning
capability, or it couldn't be readily tapped, whether in explicit or implicit format).
e The Organization EA View remained largely consistent with the originally
described NREAF; however, we added several constructs which reflect and
emphasize an enterprise's multiple levels of analysis. At an enterprise level we
characterized its history, culture, overall cultural harmony, and the acceptance of
senior leadership by internal stakeholders. At a local level we identified and
leveraged a series of widely published constructs (e.g. psychological safety, team
familiarity, boundary spanners, boundary of control and influence, local
organizational culture, etc). Furthermore, we explicitly added individual and
226 The specific recommendation was: "Communicate and empower organizational learning practices
across the hospital towards becoming learning organizations".
227 See section 6.4.3.
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divisional incentives, financial and otherwise, as these helped explain behaviors
within and across service units.
" The Process EA View, although not described in detail in the original NREAF,
features constructs which have been described extensively elsewhere2 28 . Hence,
several of the categories which emerged from the data were related to the original
constructs described in the NREAF (i.e. process measurement capability, holistic
performance measurement content, enterprise process improvement and planning).
However, additional constructs also consistently emerged from our data analysis.
Specifically, the holistic performance process accounts for two of our RQ2
recommendations 229, whereby performance measurement content and process are
explicitly characterized (e.g. different managers were responsible for monitoring
and improving different performance dimensions, thus although holistic content
was available, it wasn't holistically analyzed). Furthermore, we characterized the
existence of prevalent undesirable processes (which might be standard or
otherwise), as well as local process optimization behavior (which might have a
positive or negative impact).
* The Product EA View wasn't dominant in our characterization of hospital
enterprise architectures. There were indeed products being developed (e.g.
surgical kits are comprised of multiple medical instruments put together for a
particular procedure and surgeon); however, hospitals predominantly deliver
services within and across service units, and very few products were characterized
in the data analysis. As such, the Product EA View couldn't be enriched in the
context of our research.
* The Service EA View is a distinguishing characteristic of the NREAF as
determined in our literature review framework comparison2 30 ; however it also was
228 The core leadership, lifecycle, and enabling processes are integral constructs from LAI's Lean
Enterprise Self-Assessment Tool (LESAT). See: ht-- lean.n it. edu products lean enterprisslf-
assessmyernt-tool-lesa downiload-lesat.lrtrnl
229 The specific recommendations were: "Develop, manage, and nourish service architecture awareness
across the hospital enterprise" and "Measure performance dimensions holistically while adopting practices
that manage and influence relevant stakeholders within and beyond hospital infrastructural boundaries".
230 A synthesis of the comparison of MIT's NREAF to 10 influential frameworks was presented in section
3.5 and Table 3-4 in particular.
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one of the most succinctly described EA Views in the original NREAF 231. Hence,
all of the Service EA View's main categories and associated subcategories now
featured in the enriched NREAF, consistently and specifically emerged from the
data (i.e. service architecture awareness/appreciation, extended enterprise
management, service architecture management, and service continuity (patient
lifecycle care)). The emerged categories are related to one of our RQ2
recommendations in particular 232 . Notably, the service architecture
awareness/appreciation and the service sustainability constructs, reflect core
phenomena which consistently emerged from the data (e.g. whether or not people
make decisions whilst aware of their potential impact downstream and upstream,
and ultimately to the patient and employee experience).
The Strategy EA View was characterized not only in terms of goals, vision, and
metrics (i.e. as originally described in the NREAF), but also in terms of enterprise
strategy alignment, enterprise strategy scope, and enterprise awareness and
appreciation. The emerged categories are related to two of our RQ2
recommendations in particular2 33 . Notably, these categories reflect core
phenomena which consistently emerged from the data (i.e. tension between
strategy portfolio and hospital delivery platform; service unit residual contribution
unappreciated by senior leaders; narrowly focused transformation plans).
In Chapter 3 we clarified that the meaning of holistic pertains not only to an enlarged
number of EA views used in a framework but also to an "understanding of the
interactions of the views [which] becomes of increased importance" (Rhodes and
Nightingale 2008). As noted before, this research adopted an enterprise diagnostic
mindset and held no pre-conceived notion of organizational element interactions
including strength and direction.
231 The Service EA View was originally succintly described as: "Services(s) delivered and or supplied by
the enterprise, including in support ofproducts" (Nightingale 2009).
232 The specific recommendation was: "Develop, manage, and nourish service architecture awareness
across the hospital enterprise".
233 The specific recommendations were: "Adopt a multidimensional performance construct that considers
value expectations and contributions of relevant stakeholders within and beyond hospital infrastructural
boundaries" and "Attend to payer demands and opportunities in enterprise transformation and lean
improvement plans that are coherent and aligned with hospital strategy and service architecture"
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Using our enriched version of MIT's NREAF we identified hundreds of EA View
interaction instances, including direction and to some extent strength, over the course of
our analysis, as evident in the detailed descriptions for each in-depth hospital case study.
A total of 23 dominant EA View interactions emerged from our analysis of Hospital ABC
and Hospital XYZ, which further enriched our understanding of hospital enterprise
architecture 234 . Notably, our descriptions of the dominant EA View interactions included
a range of three to all seven EA Views. In effect, we derived multiple holistic
descriptions for each hospital's enterprise architecture, and reached closure (i.e.
theoretical saturation was attained as the analysis of additional embedded units only
revealed small marginal improvement (Eisenhardt 1989)).
In the next research question we leveraged our enriched understand of hospital enterprise
architecture and explored whether the in-depth hospital case studies had such an
understanding, and if so, whether they had made decisions which reflected said
understanding and improved their performance.
9.3.4 RQ4: Can hospital performance be improved through an
enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture
and if so, how?
In both cases we verified that the initially studied service units (i.e. ED, Main ORs) were
indeed experiencing poor performance as measured by both perceptual (i.e. interviews
and observation) and objective data (i.e. archival records and/or internal documents).
However, we also established that both service units were being significantly affected by
their interactions with stakeholders beyond their unit boundary. Furthermore, we found
that different service units were consistently characterized, again with both perceptual
and objective data, either with poor or high performance, and warranted analysis. In
comparing each of the embedded units of analysis, within and across case studies, we
found that an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture, can inform
decisions which ultimately improve hospital performance (see Figure 9-6).
234 The dominant EA View interactions were described in sections 7.3.3.2, 8.4.3., 8.5.8., 8.6.1.8., and
8.6.2.8.
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In both cases we found that a hospital enterprise may consist of multiple internal
architectural configurations, and that these in turn may generate different levels of
hospital performance, where performance is measured as a multidimensional construct,
both in terms of dimensions and stakeholders. Specifically, we established that:
e In Hospital XYZ, unlike its inpatient service unit 5W (i.e. worse performer), the
inpatient service unit 7C had gradually developed an enriched understanding of
hospital enterprise architecture, and had made decisions which improved not only
their local performance but also enhanced its interactions with other service units
upstream and downstream.
* In Hospital ABC, unlike its Neuro ORs and Main ORs (i.e. worse performers),
the Cardiac ORs had gradually developed an enriched understanding of hospital
enterprise architecture, and had made decisions which improved not only their
local performance but also enhanced its interactions with other service units
upstream and downstream.
In comparing the overall enterprise architectures of both hospital cases, we derived the
following additional key insights:
e Fragmented multispecialty hospitals: the healthcare literature considers
integrated multispecialty providers as being better able to offer efficient higher
quality care, as compared to what is traditionally described as the provider cottage
industry (i.e. the majority of providers consists of physician group practices of
five or less elements). Both hospitals were clearly successful as evidenced by
their strong financial numbers and multiple awards given by 3rd party
organizations. However, our characterization of multiple internal architectural
configurations shows that each hospital had some service units which, although
interdependent with others, made decisions and operated independently from
them. Additionally, we found that information systems weren't integrated and
largely so because of localized decision making, which contributed to the
fragmentation within each hospital.
Page 596 of 759
235 See section 4.5.3.
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Figure 9-6: Overview of Hospital ABC's sub-architecture analysis summaries (from Chapter 8)
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* Senior leadership's poor service architecture awareness/appreciation: both
cases started within specific poorly performing service units which were being
held primarily accountable by each hospital's senior leadership. Furthermore, we
identified that transformation and improvement plans in both cases hadn't
adequately reflected each hospital's service architecture. In effect, senior leaders
in both hospitals would stand to benefit from adopting the following RQ2
recommendation: "Develop, manage, and nourish service architecture awareness
across the hospital enterprise".
* Similar operational and strategic issues: the in-depth hospital cases took place
in the US and UK respectively; hence the sampled hospitals had significantly
different characteristics at their External / Policy EA Views (e.g. different
payment model and different regulatory constraints). However, we found that
both hospitals were similarly experiencing tension between their strategy portfolio
and their care delivery platforms. Specifically, in both cases there was tension in
terms of teaching vs. efficient throughput, and also in terms of treating the
surrounding community vs. striving for clinical excellence. Notably, these
tensions are similar to those of cutting edge research institutions like MIT, who
also want to teach undergraduate programs, which more often than not, aren't
related to the research agenda2 36
" EA Views may either constrain or support each other: as noted above, both
hospitals had significant constraints with predominantly non-integrated
information systems. However, in characterizing the high performing internal
architectural configurations of each hospital, we found that local leaders had
consistently made changes to other EA Views, which ultimately compensated for
their Information EA View related constraints. In effect, they embodied several of
our RQ2 recommendations.
* Different levels of enriched understanding of hospital enterprise
architecture: as noted previously, both cases had high performing internal
architectural configurations with a similar enriched understanding of hospital
236 The author hereby acknowledges that the comparison with MIT was originally noted by Professor
Joseph Sussman.
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enterprise architecture. However, when comparing across cases, we found that
they had different levels of enriched understanding of hospital enterprise
architecture as a whole. Specifically, we established that Hospital ABC not only
had a service unit with an enriched understanding of hospital enterprise
architecture (i.e. Cardiac ORs), but had also recently recognized and instituted
changes (i.e. cross departmental and service unit management boards) to replicate
and facilitate throughout Hospital ABC, the practices developed by the Cardiac
ORs. In effect, Hospital ABC was further along in becoming a learning
organization and ultimately a lean hospital enterprise.
9.4 Additional Specific Recommendations for Hospitals
In answering RQ 1 and RQ2 we proposed several general recommendations, diagnostic
questions, and metrics for senior hospital leaders to improve their performance
measurement practices in particular, and inform their management practices in general.
With the benefit of having answered RQ3 and RQ4, what follows is a series of specific
recommendations which leverage our findings from the two in-depth studies, and
hopefully will further assist senior leaders and their management and departmental
leaders in architecting solutions more likely to improve their hospital enterprise
performance:
Develop adequate information systems that support workflow performance
measurement: more often than not electronic medical records are primarily used
to support the clinical and billing processes in hospital operations. Notably, a
baseline requirement for information flow is that such systems be integrated
seamlessly, in real time, and with as little human intervention as possible.
However, information pertaining to workflow should also be specifically tracked.
In both in-depth studies we determined that neither hospital had enterprise wide
systems in place to support workflow. Over the course of our research, while
sharing our findings with senior leadership, they made specific decisions that
reflected our workflow analysis. For instance, they halted the purchase of
expensive self-check-in kiosk for the emergency department as they realized that
such represented less than 3% of patient throughput time. Similarly, they
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supported the analysis beyond the initial service unit, as they became aware of the
variability in inter-service unit interactions. However, it is important to note that
we emphasize the need for adequate information systems as these may also be
less sophisticated systems (e.g. paper-based, Microsoft Excel) provided that
processes are in place to standardize data insertion, systematically aggregate
information, and without burdening care givers. For instance, the high performing
service units had instituted simple data tracking surveys to continuously measure
their interaction with other service units, and devise solutions to address
consistently poor interactions.
Leverage existing lean teaching courses to build service architecture
awareness: nowadays hospitals are more commonly offering lean teaching
courses either facilitated by an internal team or external consultants. In general,
having an internal team sharing their knowledge built on past successes is closer
to the practices of learning organizations. However, whomever the course
facilitator(s), it is important that these not only implement traditional lean
methods (e.g. 5S, visual management, kaizen, etc) but also look towards building
service architecture awareness across organizational levels. Indeed Gemba
(Japanese term for "the real place") raised the importance of taking the lean class
room to seeing where things are really happening. However, it is important that
they think beyond the process level, and see beyond the individual service unit.
Think of ways of how the course attendees could readily understand the
importance of service architecture awareness, and suggest their own mechanisms
to implement in their work area, so as to reflect such awareness. Alternatively,
help them understand how their local optimization behaviors, albeit devised with
the intent of mitigating service architecture deficiencies, had invariably resulted in
a worse off hospital enterprise as a whole. Notably, perhaps a similar exercise
would be useful for an executive class whilst examining their enterprise
transformation and improvement plans, and assessing whether or not these reflect
a service architecture awareness.
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* Implement flexible incentives which encourage cooperative relationships:
incentives in place should encourage cooperative relationships across
interdependent service units. Moreover, service units should be encouraged and
recognized for their joint effort in supporting patient throughput and quality of
care. For instance, an emergency department (ED) not only provides urgent care
to a surrounding community, but also supports the inpatient specialty services
provided by a hospital, and whose payment mechanisms might not necessarily
readily recognize the ED's contribution to inpatient revenue. Additionally,
although salaried care givers are more likely to be less prone to misalignments
induced by external financial incentives (e.g. hospitals are paid a flat fee
regardless of length of patient stay, whereas physicians may be being paid at a per
diem rate), they aren't necessarily without their own issues also. For instance, in
both of our in-depth studies there were suggestions that some care givers didn't
have an incentive to support throughput, as they would earn the same salary
regardless of effort. However, we also observed individuals were highly
committed to mitigating system dysfunctionalities, but were perhaps being
stretched too far. Beyond throughput volume based incentives (i.e. the more you
do the more you earn) it is also important to consider implementing non-financial
incentives. Examples may include allowing employees to accumulate their
additional work hours and take time off at a time of their choosing. Another
example might be sharing resources across service units when one of them is
experiencing downtime.
* Create cross departmental and service unit management boards led by well
respect individuals and with visible senior leadership support: the notion of
integrated product development teams has been extensively used in other complex
system environments (e.g. aerospace and automotive manufacturers), and in our
research we saw such a mechanism beginning to be implemented. Such
mechanisms are important to facilitate communication across service units, enable
transparency, encourage accountability, share lessons learnt, and devise solutions
that consider the service architecture as a whole, rather than only a segment of it.
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However, it is important that such management boards be either led by well
recognized care givers (i.e. as in, not pure managers, who even might have been
clinicians at some point), or jointly led by well recognized care givers and a
clinically knowledgeable manager with good people skills. Furthermore, it is
important that senior leadership provide visible support to the management board,
so that the local leadership of each service unit recognize the legitimacy of the
board, and more readily engage in its endeavors. Additionally, the management
board should encourage the sharing of lessons learnt and assess whether or not
these make sense to replicate, and in what order, across the hospital service
architecture. Finally, the previous recommendation of flexible incentives that
encourage cooperative relationships is particularly pertinent to support the
functioning of those participating in the management boards.
* Nurture and leverage hospital enterprise knowledgeable employees: hospitals
generally have career pathways which allow for employees to progress within the
organization. Nurses for instance may gradually train from an inpatient service
unit setting towards a higher level of specialization such as the intensive care unit
or the emergency department. Medical students rotate across different service
units as they complete their training. Medical residents similarly rotate across
service units, albeit more concentrated in their given specialty. However, once
fully trained, physicians are not only likely to practice in a different setting than
where they were trained, but also are likely to remain extremely insolated in their
own practice setting (e.g. hospital department and/or clinic). In the case of
medical residents, it would seem highly pertinent to institute policies which
leverage their enterprise knowledge in interacting in different service units, with
different physicians, and different nurses. Notably, medical residents may also act
as a buffer between nursing and senior physician staff (i.e. more often than not
nurses and physicians either have arm's length relationships, or experience poor
psychological safety amid an organizational blame culture). In general, it would
seem appropriate and advisable to allow for different stakeholders to circulate
across service units (i.e. beyond the purpose of training), so as to build and
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maintain their understanding of the enterprise and its service architecture, as well
as foster informal collaborative relationships.
* Place knowledgeable and dedicated boundary spanners across the service
architecture: boundary spanners are those individuals who facilitate key
information beyond the boundary of their particular service unit. However, in a
hospital context the term needs further refinement. Specifically, hospital
operations rely on care givers to share information via their information systems,
in person, or through some other means, whenever they execute a patient handoff
or carry out a patient consult. However, our recommended boundary spanners are
individuals who systematically and proactively engage with other service units in
order to support information and patient flow across the service architecture (i.e.
not just because it is the end of a shift or because they need to transfer a patient).
In this research we uncovered the examples of the Cardiac ORs clinical
coordinator (i.e. Hospital ABC) and that of the Charge Nurse of 7C (i.e. Hospital
XYZ). Both of them went above and beyond their job requirement and routinely
engaged and facilitated interactions with other service units. Notably, the Cardiac
ORs also created boundary spanner positions, although of a lesser hierarchical
position, to specifically support the interaction with inpatient service units via
cardiac nurses.
9.5 Contributions
As a way of summarizing, we suggest that the contributions of this research are as
described below:
In this research we contributed to the study of enterprise architecture and hospital
enterprises in particular.
We did so by:
(i) conducting longitudinal and multidisciplinary literature reviews:
a. Comprehensive coverage of the literature on lean principles whilst
theoretically enriching LAI's seven lean enterprise principles (Chapter 2).
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b. Providing an overview and comparison of enterprise architecture
frameworks and explicitly using lean enterprise principles in deriving and
interpreting holistic and rich enterprise architecture descriptions (Chapter
3).
c. Synthesis of the healthcare literature on hospital performance
measurement (Chapter 2) and hospital characteristics (Chapter 4).
(ii) enriching MIT'S NREAF with 24 main categories and 53 subcategories, and
identifying 23 dominant EA View interactions (Chapters 7 and 8).
(iii) introducing service architecture awareness and multiple internal architectural
configurations constructs, to support in the diagnosis and architecting of
enterprises (Chapters 7 and 8).
(iv) enriching our understanding of hospital enterprise architecture while
holistically describing two different hospital enterprise architectures and
several of their internal architectural configurations (Chapters 7 and 8).
(v) elevating hospitals' traditionally narrow lean understanding by providing them
with lean enterprise based recommendations, diagnostic questions, and
metrics, as follows: 5 recommendations, 26 diagnostic questions, 22 metrics
addressing 8 performance dimensions, and 9 new metrics to specifically
measure service architecture awareness (Chapter 6).
(vi) developing a set of specific architecting recommendations for hospital leaders
to consider (Chapter 9).
9.6 Promising Areas of Future Work
A deliberate strategy in this research was to leverage lean enterprise principles whilst
exploring enterprise architecture in the context of hospitals. The choice of the healthcare
context was deliberate in order to not only address the joint call for research by the NAE
and the IOM, but also to introduce and explore MIT'S NREAF in a new domain.
Furthermore, the investigation was further designed to reflect literature recommendations
of focusing on a single domain (Galbraith 1974; Van de Ven and Ferry 1980), and also
carefully sampling using key factors (i.e. hospital typology used in Chapter 6, and
multidisciplinary hospitals used in Chapters 7 and 8) within the chosen domain (Ginsberg
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and Venkatraman 1985). However, a limitation of this research remains that it is only
focused in healthcare, and therefore, the first opportunity for future work is to extend the
research into other large-scale complex engineering contexts in other industries in order
to validate and build on the current insights in this thesis.
Another opportunity for future research is in leveraging our enriched version of MIT's
NREAF to design structured questionnaires to be administered to a wider hospital sample.
The focus in this research was on building an enriched understanding of hospital
enterprise architecture, while elevating hospitals' traditionally narrow definitions of lean,
and furthering the development of MIT's emergent NREAF. To that effect we followed
the literature's recommendation of conducting more than one case study with embedded
units of analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1990; Yin 1994), and doing so in an in-depth
manner (Campbell 1977; Sloan 1980), while cognizant that hospitals' information
capabilities generally pose a severe limiting factor given the cost of collecting data
(Mehrotra, Lee et al. 2003). Nonetheless, we coded over 8000 coding instances stemming
from 54 interviews, 420+ literature publications, internal documents and observations
done at two large multispecialty hospitals, totaling 13 embedded units of analysis, and
24,200 electronic patient records237. The design of structured questionnaires informed by
our enriched version of the NREAF, as well as our proposed diagnostic questions, will
allow to substantially reduce the cost of data collection, and to study a wider hospital
sample. This would directly extend the current research by measuring the main categories
and subcategories of each of the EA Views, while using a wider hospital sample, so as to
identify potential patterns across EA Views, within and across hospitals. In effect we
would be closer to addressing the question: how does hospital enterprise architecture
relate to hospital enterprise performance? Furthermore, in our healthcare literature review
(i.e. Chapter 4) we observed that scholars had questioned research and policy approaches
that ignored the heterogeneity of healthcare practice settings (e.g. data systems,
organization structure, culture, etc), and expected that isolated policies and techniques
could uniformly address the full array of hospitals (Evashwick and Weiss 1987; Flood
237 Electronic medical records were integrated across three separate systems at Hospital XYZ to provide for
an end-to-end patient flow analysis.
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1994; Hussey, Eibner et al. 2009). Hence, the importance of this future work would also
then be to further inform our enriched understanding of hospital enterprise architecture,
and assist us in recommending improvement initiatives and policies not only for hospital
senior leaders, but also for regulatory agencies.
Yet another opportunity for future research is in further examining the UK's NHS 18
Weeks hospital treatment intervention, which specifically targeted each individual
hospital, not only by issuing penalties for each and every patient that wasn't treated in the
designated time period, but also by publically sharing their compliance records and
influencing patient referral patterns. Notably, one would be hard pressed to find patients
in the US who would consider reasonable waiting for 18 Weeks for their hospital
treatments, let alone anything longer than that, hence it is understandable that the UK's
public pressured the NHS into taking action. However, the analysis in this thesis found
that the 18 Weeks policy had had both positive and negative impacts on Hospital ABC,
and perhaps the regulatory agency should reconsider its approach. On one hand, we
found that, unlike Hospital XYZ (i.e. US hospital), Hospital ABC (i.e. UK hospital) had a
clear sense of direction set by one external key stakeholder (i.e. the NHS) as opposed to a
vastly fragmented payer-mix and regulatory agencies. We also found that 18 Weeks was
not only strongly present in senior leadership's thinking, but also at all levels of the
hospital enterprise, which further provided for a common goal and direction. On the other
hand, as noted in our literature review in Chapter 2, if inadequately designed,
performance metrics can have unintended consequences. For instance, Hospital ABC was
already struggling with coping with the European Working Time Directive which had
drastically reduced working time to 48 hours a week, hence it had even less resources
(notably junior doctors) to treat patients. Also, the 18 Week policy revolved around time
to treatment, and said nothing about the outcome of said treatment. Effectively, to what
extent were treatment decisions replacing patient care urgency with 18 Weeks sanction
avoidance? Also, it would be interesting to examine how patients' hospital length of stay
changed, as hospitals attempted to increase patient throughput. Finally, it would also be
interesting to examine other policy alternatives towards shortening elective care waiting
lists whilst doing so with high quality. For instance, could it be that the sanctions (and
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incentives) ought to not only target hospitals but also include the primary care physicians
doing the referrals so as to curb undesirable behavior (e.g. inadequately referring patients
for hospital treatment)? Alternatively, could it be that patients would be willing to wait
longer if it meant that they could be treated at a more reputable hospital? Ultimately, the
importance of this future work would then be in examining the 18 Weeks policy with a
multidimensional performance construct, while bringing to light the adverse implications
of its original construct, and exploring potential solution not only within an individual
hospital's boundary but also across the service architecture.
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Appendix I: Detailed Literature Review Supporting Lean Enterprise Principles
Reference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Paper Note
(March, X Org theory "When we describe the chief participants of most business organizations, we generally
Simon et al. limit our attention to the following five major classes: employees, investors, suppliers,
1958) distributers, and consumers"
(Drucker X Strategy "What is the major problem? It is fundamentally the confusion between effectiveness
1963) and efficiency that stands between doing the right things and doing things right. There is
surely nothing quite so useless as doing with great efficiency what should not be done at
all. Yet our tools--especially our accounting concepts and data -- all focus on efficiency.
What we need is (1) a way to identify the areas of effectiveness (of possible significant
results), and (2) a method for concentrating on them"
"every analysis of actual allocation of resources and efforts in business that I have ever
seen or made showed clearly that the bulk of time, work, attention, and money first goes
to "problems" rather than to opportunities, and, secondly, to areas where even
extraordinarily successful performance will have minimal impact on results."
(Perrow X X Org theory [1] "attempts to conceptualize the organization as a whole, rather than to deal only with
1967) specific processes or subpart"[5] "The other relevant characteristic of the raw material, besides the understandability
of its nature, is its stability and variability; that is, whether the material can be treated in
a standardized fashion or whether continual adjustment to it is necessary. Organizations
uniformly seek to standardize their raw material in order to minimize exceptional
situations."
(Herzberg X Management "The only way to motivate the employee is to give him challenging work in which he
1968) can assume responsibility. [...] Removing some controls while retaining accountability.
Increasing the accountability of individual for own work. Granting additional authority
to an employee in his activity [ ... ] Introducing new and more difficult tasks not
previously handled. Assigning individuals specific or specialized tasks, enabling them to
become experts"
(Skinner X Manufacturin "The connection between manufacturing and corporate success is rarely seen as more
1969) g than the achievement of high efficiency and low costs. [ ... ] Few top managers are aware
that what appear to be routine manufacturing decisions frequently come to limit the
corporation's strategic options, binding it with facilities, equipment, personnel, and basic
controls and policies to a noncompetitive posture which may take years to turn around."
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(Miles, Snow X Org theory "the organization cannot unilaterally choose its domain. There must be some degree of
et al. 1974) consensus among those with whom the organization comes into contact-either resourceproviders or critics of the organization's proposed activities-regarding the desired arena
of activity, and this process of attaining domain consensus frequently constrains what
activities the organization undertakes"
(Etzioni X Org theory P218/219 ""The explosive energy created by a nonconformist leader, recruiting
1975) followers to a cause at odds with the organization, is highly threatening to the
organization's stability and routine, and in some instances to its continued viability. By
the same token, the moral involvement sparked by allegiance to a charismatic leader can,
when the leader is committed to the organization, provide the strongest possible bond
linking lower participants to organizational goals"
P231 "In organizations the higher ranks tend to support the cultural system; participants
lower in rank vary widely in their orientation to it""
(Shortell X Healthcare "Currently, there appears to be a general demand for greater organizational
1976) responsiveness and accountability, but little recognition that these demands frequently
come from different groups with varying notions of accountability, often placing the
___ ___organization in the position of having to reconcile incompatible objectives."
(Sugimori, X X Lean [2] "a system of respect for human, putting emphasis on the points as follows: (1)
Kusunoki et elimination of waste movements by workers; (2) consideration for workers' safety; and
al. 1977) (3) self-display of workers' capabilities by entrusting them with greater responsibilityand authority."
[5] "Leveling of production: Provided that all processes perform small lot
production and conveyance, if the quantity to be withdrawn by the subsequent
process varies considerably, the processes within the company as well as the
subcontractors will maintain peak capacity or holding excessive inventory at
________________  ___ ___ ___all times."
(Hayes and X Management "guided by what they took to be the newest and best principles of management,
Abernathy American managers have increasingly directed their attention [to] short-term cost
reduction rather than long-term development of technological competitiveness"w"their devotion to short-term retus and 'management by the numbers,' many of them
have effectively forsworn long-term technological superiority as a competitive weapon.
In consequence, they have abdicated their strategic responsibilities."
"the predictable result of relying too heavily on short-term financial measures - a sort of
managerial remote control - is an environment in which no one feels he or she can afford
a failure or even a momentary dip in the bottom line."
"It may provide a quick, short-term boost to ROI figures in the next annual report,
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but it may also paralyze the long-term ability of a company to keep on top of
technological change."
(Van de Ven X Org theory "a measurement of performance does not require that different people agree on
and Ferry effectiveness goals, criteria, and standards. Consensus may in fact be an unrealistic
euphemism to attempt to achieve. An organization assessment simply requires that the1980) unique and conflicting definitions of performance be made explicitly and that the
organization analyst determine at the outset whose value judgments and criteria will be
operationalized and measured."
(Iii and Leifer X Org theory "Work units typically are expected to accomplish a number of different tasks that may
1983) vary in terms of their complexity and predictability. At the same time, they must cope
with an internal environment-for example, other work units-as well as with external
environmental factors such as government regulations, suppliers, and technological
changes. It seems unlikely that a single structure would be capable of effectively
handling this complex array of factors, all of which must be dealt with simultaneously."
(Shrivastava X Org theory "It is useful to distinguish between various levels at which learning occurs in systems.
1983) Cantley and Sahal (1980) identify five hierarchical levels of learning in socio-technical
systems, comprising of:
(a) the unit level (individual or single equipment),
(b) the plant level,
(c) the organizational or company level,
(d) the industry level, and
(e) the societal level."
"Organizational learning is an organizational process rather than an individual process.
Although individuals are the agents through whom the learning takes place, the process
of learning is influenced by a much broader set of social, political, and structural
variables. It involves sharing of knowledge, beliefs, or assumptions among individuals."
(Freeman X Org theory "A stakeholder is any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the
1984) achievement of the organization's objectives"
(Schein 1985) X Org theory P5 "the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture; that
the unique talent of leaders is their ability to understand and work with culture"
(Skinner X Manufacturin "The very way managers define productivity improvement and the tools they use to
1986) g achieve it push their goal further out of reach."
"Chipping away at productivity... is mostly concerned with direct labor efficiency,
although direct labor costs exceed 10% of sales in only a few industries. Thus even an
immense jump in productivity - say 20% - would not reverse the [problems of various
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industries]"
"An obsession with cost reduction produces a narrowness of vision and an organizational
backlash that work against its underlying purpose."
(Donabedian X X Healthcare "It is not intended to identify wrongdoers but to promote the effectiveness of the whole.
1988) It does so by focusing on important problems amenable to improvement."
(Drucker X Strategy "Starting with the mission and its requirements may be the first lesson business can learn
1989) from successful nonprofits. [... ]It alone can prevent the most common degenerativedisease of organizations, especially large ones: splintering their always limited resources
on things that are 'interesting" or look "profitable" rather than concentrating them on a
(Fawcett Xvery small number of productive efforts"
(Fawctt XLeanJapanese auto manufacturers favor long-term considerations over short-term
1989) profitability.
(Fry and Cox X X Performance [1,3] "The use of local productivity measures to direct the long-term success of the
1989) measurement organization must be eliminated; an organization's success can only be assured by
concentrating on global system-wide performance."
[1,3]"...we recommend studying the impact of these measures on other functional areas
and production departments. Measures should be synchronized from vendor to customer,
from short run to long run, and from operational measures through tactical to strategic
___ __ ___advantages."
(Ragin 1989) X X Research P24 "Parts are not viewed in isolation but in context of the whole they form. To change
method one or more elements often changes how the whole is perceived or understood, which, in
Lean___ 
___ turn, has an impact on the meaning of each individual part"
(Berwick X Healthcare "Few can improve without the help of the medical staff."
1989)___ 
__ _
(Venkatraman X Strategy Quote (Miller and Friesen 1977) "There is something holistic and ordered about the pat-
1989) tern of attributes" and note that "such a pattern could provide useful insights into a
powerfatl concept of equifinality or the feasible sets of internally consistent and equally
[ .effective configurations."
(Tsui 1990) X X Performance "Based on the open-systems logic, subunits within organizations may be conceived of as
measurement micro-organizations that must adapt to their environment for survival. The elements in
this environment may consist of other formal subunits and informal groups inside the
organization, as well as elements in the larger organization's external environment."
(Wisner and X X Performance [1 3] "By focusing on the short-term efficiency information produced by traditional
Fawcett 1991) measurement measurement systems, opportunities to improve competitiveness are overlooked. For
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example, a typical response to increased competitive pressure is a directive to "cut
costs", often resulting in decision to reduce capital investment, minimize research and
development, cut back on preventive maintenance, and lay-off workers. Each of these
decisions may reduce the firm's long-term competitiveness. Therefore, the development
of an overall performance measurement system that directs the firm's productive
resources to enhance its value-adding capabilities is needed."
(Meyer, Tsui X Org theory "Organizational structures and management systems are best understood in terms of
et al. 1993) overall patterns rather than in terms of analyses or narrowly drawn sets of organizationalproperties."
"the holistic nature of organizational phenomena. It is the patterning of organizational
elements that should be the focus of inquiry rather than bivariate [analysis]"
(Ostroff and X Org theory "Although the best- performing organizations are both effective and efficient [...] there
Schmitt 1993) may be trade-offs between the two"
"Efficient but ineffective organizations were characterized by a greater emphasis on
structural context, goals, and rules, a pattern consistent with the rational goal and open
systems models. Although these features may contribute to efficiency, the overemphasis
on structure, control, and cost minimization can diminish energy, trust, and morale and
hence reduce the effectiveness of an organization."
(Peters and X Best practice "The social validity of a proposed best practice should be assessed as a means to
Heron 1993) theory evaluate the acceptability or viability of an intervention."
(Drucker X X X Strategy [1, 4] "The assumptions about environment, mission, and core competencies must fit
1994) reality. [...]The assumptions in all three areas have to fit one another"[6] "The theory of the business must be known and understood throughout the
organization."
[6] "Traditionally, we have searched for the miracle worker with a magic wand to turn
an ailing organization around. To establish, maintain, and restore a theory, however,
does not require a Genghis Khan or a Leonardo da Vinci in the executive suite. It is not
genius; it is hard work. It is not being clever; it is being conscientious. It is what CEOs
are paid for."
(Fjortoft and X Org theory "Mission agreement refers to the level of consensus that exists among organizational
Smart 1994) members regarding their view of the purpose of the institution, while mission
consistency refers to the congruence between institutional activities and the espoused
mission. Both of these elements of institutional mission have been found consistently to
be related to the effective performance"
"organizational culture may be created and influenced through such specific behaviors as
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what leaders pay attention to on a regular basis, how leaders react to critical incidents,
what criteria leaders use to allocate resources, and the qualities of individuals who are
recruited by and promoted in the organization."
"well crafted mission statements alone are insufficient to promote effective performance;
equal attention must be devoted to assure that the actual programs and activities of
institutions are consistent with their stated missions."
(Flood 1994) X - -Healthcare "a hospital needs to attract and retain clients. Broadly speaking, 'clients' can include
patients (receiving inpatient care, same-day surgery, or outpatient care) who may
consider amenities and price in addition to quality; physicians (typically not employees
and not committed to one hospital, and perhaps attracted by convenience or special
facilities); and insurers seeking special prices in return for encouraging patients to use
the particular hospital"
(Womack and X X X -Lean [4] "[lean enterprise] will entail radical changes in employment policies, the role of
Jones 1994) functions within companies, and the relationships among the companies of a value
stream. Managers will have to concentrate on the performance of the enterprise rather
than on the performance of individual people, functions, and companies."
[2, 4] "Unfortunately, industrial history is replete with stories of companies that have
used their leadership positions to extract advantage from upstream and downstream
partners."
[2,3,4] "Getting managers to think in terms of the value stream is the critical first step to
achieving a lean enterprise. Managers who have taken this first step, however, have often
run into stiff resistance from employees and functional units as well as from other
companies in the stream. Individuals, functions, and companies have legitimate needs
that conflict with those of the value stream. Anyone aspiring to a lean enterprise must
first understand these needs and bow to satisfy them."
(Clarkson X Stakeholder "corporations manage relationships with stakeholder groups rather than with society as a
1995) theory whole"
"it is important to distinguish between social issues and stakeholder issues"
"all the corporations being studied had relationships with various groups or
constituencies, which could be defined as stakeholder groups, and that these
relationships were either being managed, or not being managed, for better or worse.
Whether these groups of customers, employees, shareholders, etc., were classified as
internal or external stakeholders was irrelevant, just as it was irrelevant for the
companies themselves whether these groups were described as stakeholders at all."(Denison and X Org theory "As many organizations have discovered, declaring a new organizational mission does
not necessarily imply the support and commitment of organizational members, and high
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Mishra 1995) involvement among an organization's members does not necessarily imply a clear sense
of direction."
(Drucker X Strategy "The command-and-control organization that first emerged in the 1870s might be
1995) compared to an organism held together by its shell. The corporation that is now
emerging is being designed around a skeleton: information, both the corporation's new
integrating system and its articulation."
(Neely, X X Performance [1] "One prime reason for the marketing/manufacturing conflict is that the two functions
Gregory et al. measurement are evaluated on the basis of different criteria and receive rewards for different activities.On the one hand, the marketing people are judged on the basis of profitable growth of
1995) the company in terms of sales, market share, and new markets entered. Unfortunately,
the marketers are sometimes more sales-oriented than profit-oriented. On the other hand,
the manufacturing people are often evaluated on running a smooth operation at minimum
cost. Similarly unfortunately, they are sometimes more cost-oriented than profit-
oriented."
[3] "Take, for example, Nissan, where the espoused business strategy is "to build
profitably the highest quality car sold in Europe". If Nissan's purchasing manager were
to decide independently to buy low-cost, low-quality components then Nissan could end
up following a strategy radically different to the one it had planned to adopt."
[3] "Effectiveness refers to the extent to which customer requirements are met, while
efficiency is a measure of how economically the firm's resources are utilized when
providing a given level of customer satisfaction. This is an important point because it not
only identifies two fundamental dimensions of performance, but also highlights the fact
that there can be internal as well as external reasons for pursuing specific courses of
action"
(Grant 1996) X X X Org theory "Viewing the firm's primary task as integrating the specialized knowledge of multiple
individuals suggests that, even with goal congruence, achieving effective coordination is
problematic for organizations."
(Porter 1996) X X X X X Strategy [1] "A competitor seeking to match an activity system gains little by imitating only some
activities and not matching the whole. Performance does not improve; it can decline"
[3] "The pursuit of operational effectiveness is seductive because it is concrete and
actionable. [...]Caught up in the race for operational effectiveness, many managers
simply do not understand the need to have a strategy."
[3] "Constant improvement in operational effectiveness is necessary to achieve superior
profitability. However, it is not usually sufficient. Few companies have competed
successfully on the basis of operational effectiveness over an extended period, and
staying ahead of rivals gets harder every day."
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[3] "While operational effectiveness is about achieving excellence in individual
activities, or functions, strategy is about combining activities"
[4] "Competitive advantage arises from fit across activities"
[4,5] "Continuity fosters improvements in individual activities and the fit across
activities, allowing an organization to build unique capabilities and skills tailored to its
strategy. Continuity also reinforces a company's identity." [continuity used similarly to
stability]
[5] "Strategic continuity, in fact, should make an organization's continual improvement
more effective."
[6] "The challenge of developing or reestablishing a clear strategy is often primarily an
] organizaitonal one and depends on leadership."
(Womack and X X X X Lean [1] "While thousands of companies worldwide have been engaged in the Lean
Jones 1996) transformation for five to ten years or more, most have achieved only modest levels ofimprovement - typically in only one part of the business such as operations"
[4] The value stream: identify every step needed for each product family and eliminate
waste whenever a step doesn't create value.
[5] Flow: value creating steps should take place in tight sequence so that value flows
smoothly to the customer.
[7] Perfection: lean is a never ending process which continuously seeks perfection
through the elimination of waste so that every value stream step creates value.(Worley, X X Org theory ""both short term and long term performance requires executives to manage extenal and
Hitchin et al. internmal considerations simultaneously and to comprehend both the challenges in the
1996) marketplace and those within their organizations."
(Grant 1997) X X X Org theory [2,7] "agency theory and much management theory view firms as owned and controlled
by their stockholders, where the fundamental management problem is how to align the
objectives of managers and workers with those of the owners. The knowledge-based
view suggests that, if knowledge is the preeminent productive resource, and most
knowledge is created by and stored within individuals, then employees are the primary
stakeholders. The principal management challenge is not reconciling divergent goals, but
establishing the mechanisms by which cooperating individuals can coordinate their
activities in order to integrate their knowledge into productive activity."
[4] "The principles of knowledge management can play an important role in optimizing
the design of such modular systems. A key distinction here is between the 'component
knowledge' required by the sub-systems and the 'architectural knowledge' required for
the linking of the various sub-systems"
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[7] "Total quality management is a non-hierarchical, team-based organizing technology
that permits an organization to access and utilize individuals' knowledge located at low
levels of the organization."
(Hauser and X Performance "Pitfall 7. Thinking too narrowly [...] But why do we need a telephone service center in
Katz 1998) measurement the first place? What if we designed our products so that they were so easy to use that
customers never needed to call our service center?"
(Lockamy Iii X X Performance [1, 3] "many of these articles focused on the local optimization of the functional area
and Spencer measurement with little regard for how either other functions or the business unit itself may be
1998) impacted."
(Nancy 1999) X Lean "In the global race for higher quality, faster delivery, and lower costs, your company will
not stand a chance against the competition if your idea of running a lean business
___________extends no further than the factory floor."
(Hauser 2001) X Management "A critical role of central management is to establish and foster a culture that motivates
and rewards product development teams to allocate the right amount of effort toward
____________achieving those metrics."
(Richard and X X X Org leaming [5,7] "Teams that learned rapidly deliberately required stability of both the teams and the
Amy 2001) operating room processes as they gained initial experience with the new technology."[6,7] "local leaders can facilitate learning-in-action by inviting input, asking questions,
acknowledging their own infallibility, and challenging everyone to strive for continuous
improvement. In both of our studies, the behavior of the team leader set the learning
climate for the team. Moreover, team leaders have to communicate the need and the
opportunity for learing-especially in the case of double-loop learning opportunities-as
individual practitioners have been trained to address these shortfalls in a reactionary
way. Senior leaders can also set an agenda of system refore."
[6,7] "First, leaders must recognize the need for collective learning, rather than just
individual-based learing, and they must help institute structures and processes that
encourage it. Second, leaders must help to create and nurture organizational cultures in
which learning can occur-that is, in which human fallibility is understood as a fact of life
and the climate is psychologically safe for admissions of ignorance and error. Third,
those in positions of leadership at the local level-of an operating room team, or a patient
care unit, for example-must lead learning by example."
(Carroll and -X X X X Org leaing [4] "Leaders are more effective when they take a broad view of the interdependencies
Edmondson among individuals, teams, task flows, systems, and cultural meanings."[5,7] "Healthcare organisations are adept at local learning, but many practitioners resist
2002) acnw d gi lis a their owninf andatchnallenglinvrynens to ti orontin
_______ [6,7] standrst agdelis t cgethe neetfon levlectinflrningmnt onather profejssna
Page 643 of 759
standing. Standardisation also can drive out innovation. Even
the best teaching hospitals have ad hoc work practices that vary from department to
department and tend to lionise surgeons who exemplify the individualistic culture.
However, the kind of standardisation that is needed is not telling surgeons
how to operate, but rather developing systems of communication and work practices that
ensure that patients get the right drug at the right time, the right test at the right time, and
that the right kinds of conversations are encouraged to support feedback and discovery."
[6] "Just as safety is a property of a system rather than solely the result of individual
skill, leadership is also a system property. In a time of rapid changes in technology,
demographics, markets, and organisation forms, leadership is an essential function to
prepare and mobilise organization participants for change [..]Mention of "the leader"
should not, however, be taken to mean the CEO or other executives. Leadership must be
distributed broadly if organisations are to increase their capacity for learning and change
and therefore to flourish in a complex and changing environment. Specifically, we
discuss executive or strategic leadership at the top of an organisation, line leadership
from managers in the middle, and informal or network leadership from individuals
throughout the organisation."
[7] "Organisational leaming is a process of increasing the capacity for effective
organisational action through knowledge and understanding"
(Drucker - - X Maaeet "xctvswlhaet e-----anagem nt Executives will have to l arn what the effective department head in the university or2002) the successful conductor of the symphony orchestra have long known: The key to
greatness is to look for people's potential and spend time developing it. To build an
outstanding university department requires spending time with the promising young
postdocs and assistant professors until they excel in their work. To build a world-class
orchestra requires rehearsing the same passage in the symphony again and again until the
first clarinet plays it the way the conductor hears it. This principle is also what makes a
research director in an industry lab successful."
(Inamdar and X - X Performance Suggest as core principles that organizations should:
Kaplan 2002) measurement [3]"Translate the strategy into operational terms";
[6] "Align the organization to the strategy"; "Make strategy a continual process"; and
"Mobilize change through executive leadership"
(Murman, X X X X Lean [I] Fully realize lean value only by adopting an enterprise perspective
Allen et al. [2] Deliver value only after identifying stakeholder value and constructing robust value
propositions
[3] Create lean value by doing the right job right and by doing the right job
[4] Address the interdependencies across enterprise levels to increase lean value
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(Nightingale X X X X Systems [1,3,4,5] "To create value efficiently, various elements of any enterprise - processes,
2002) thinking information, organizations, and enabling infrastructure - need to be appropriately linked
and integrated. There is a great tendency for organizations to function as a group of
'silos', with each sub-unit (for example, procurement or engineering) acting
independently of the other sub-units. Often, sub-unit performance excels, but the
enterprise as a whole fails to achieve its full potential. It is important to understand what
elements require full integration vs. interfacing and/or effective communication flow."
(Needy, X Lean "Companies often make broad statements claiming that people are their greatest assets.
Norman et al. Upon closer examination of the practices of these companies, one often finds that the
2002) company pays lip service with this statement. Companies that value human capital oftenfall short when systematically assessing it"
(Benner and - X X Org theory [2,4] "Customers include not only external consumers of the organization's products or
Tushman services but also a series of internal recipients at linkage points between processes, as
outputs from upstream processes become the inputs for subsequent processes."
[4] "The process revolution has been marked by a shift from the view of organizations
as a collection of departments with separate functions and outputs to a view of them as
systems of inter- linked processes that cross functions and link organizational activities"
(Rouse and X Performance "Stakeholders include owners, employees, partners (just-in-time suppliers and
Putterill measurement customers), and the community. Their requirements and expectations define the
environment and general constraints that the organisation must recognise in its
2003)
operations"
"Organization goals embody the vision or mission, which are expressions of its response
to stakeholder expectations and requirements."
"Much of the recent work in performance measurement has argued that stakeholder
expectations encompass both financial and non-financial dimensions of the
organisation."
(Bazzoli,-- -Healthcare "we define value to include efficiency and financial performance because these are
Dynan et al. important to shareholders of for-profit health organizations and also to managers and
trustees of nonprofit health firms. Value also encompasses the benefits derived by
consumers in the marketplace, including access to care, cost effectiveness, quality, and
satisfaction. Other players in the market could derive value from organizational change,
including physicians who may receive better administrative service or financial support
as their affiliated hospitals undertake certain changes or health plans that are better able
to transfer risk to a restructured health organization"
(Liker 2004) X X X X X Lean [1] "Principle 1. Base your management decisions on a long-term philosophy, even at the
I I_ I expense of short-term financial goals."
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[2] "Principle 11. Respect your extended network of partners and suppliers by
challenging them and helping them improve."
[2] "Generate value for the customer, society, and the economy-it is your starting point.
Evaluate every function in the company in terms of its ability to achieve this."
[5] "Principle 2. Create a continuous process flow to bring problems to the surface.
Redesign work processes to achieve high value-added, continuous flow.
Strive to cut back to zero the amount of time that any work project is sitting idle or
waiting for someone to work on it. Create flow to move material and information fast as
well as to link processes and people together so that problems surface right away.
[...]Make flow evident throughout your organizational culture. It is the key to a true
continuous improvement process and to developing people."
[5] "Principle 6. Standardized tasks and processes are the foundation for continuous
improvement and employee empowerment. Use stable, repeatable methods everywhere
to maintain the predictability, regular timing, and regular output of your processes. It is
the foundation for flow and pull."
[5] "Create a strong, stable culture in which company values and beliefs are widely
shared and lived out over a period of many years. Train exceptional individuals and
teams to work within the corporate philosophy to achieve exceptional results. Work very
hard to reinforce the culture continually."
[5] "Make flow evident throughout your organizational culture. It is the key to a true
continuous improvement process and to developing people."
[5] "Protect the organizational knowledge base by developing stable personnel, slow
promotion, and very careful succession systems."
[6] "Principle 9. Grow leaders who thoroughly understand the work, live the philosophy,
and teach it to others. Grow leaders from within, rather than buying them from outside
the organization. Do not view the leader's job as simply accomplishing tasks and having
good people skills. Leaders must be role models of the company's philosophy and way
of doing business. A good leader must understand the daily work in great detail so he or
she can be the best teacher of your company's philosophy."
[7] "On a daily basis, engineers, skilled workers, quality specialist, vendors, team
leaders, and-most importantly-operators are all involved in continuous problem
solving and improvement, which over time trains everyone to become better problem
solvers."
[7] "Principle 14. Become a leaming organization through relentless reflection
(hansei) and continuous improvement (kaizen). Once you have established a stable
process, use continuous improvement tools to determine the root cause of inefficiencies
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and apply effective countermeasures."
(Roos, de X X -- - Systems [1] "System architecture and design of next generation infrastructure require a holistic,
Neufville et thinking enterprise wide perspective rather than the reductionist top-down approach of traditional
al. 2004) engineering design."[2] "Evaluative complexity occurs because the multiple stakeholders who are involved
with or impacted by the infrastructure systems have different perspectives. Each
stakeholder has a different objective function and different values, so it is difficult (some
would say impossible) to generate a solution that satisfies all stakeholders"
(Barki and X Org theory "In addition, 01 [Organizational Integration] is reflected by responsiveness, i.e.,
Pinsonneault interdependent organizational components rapidly and adequately responding, adjusting,
or adapting to the demands of other components. [...] when the sales of a product
2005) increase unexpectedly, a responsive production and operations department will rapidly
adjust its output to the new requirements."
"A distinction can be made between the integration of the processes that are internal to
an organization and those that are external"
(Becker 2005) X X Org theory [5,7] "The stability that recurrent interaction patterns provide plays an important role for
learning: it enables learning by providing a stable baseline against which to assess
feedback, compare and draw implications. Recurrent interaction
patterns provide a baseline against which to compare, and, more generally
speaking, to learn. Where such a baseline does not exist, drawing inferences is difficult.
Where the baseline changes rapidly, there is the risk of overreacting to noise and to
foreclose the experimentation necessary to discover good alternatives. A stable baseline,
therefore, is an important precondition for learning."
(Emiliani and X X X X X Lean [1] "Senior managers typically understand Lean as a 'manufacturing thing', and not as a
Stec 2005) comprehensive management system. Thus, the application of Lean principles and
practices is limited to only a portion of the company's activities such as operations"
[1] "It is common today among senior managers of publicly owned businesses to be
focused on the short term. While most senior managers say they care a lot about the
future of the company, they instead support business practices, metrics and behaviors
that actually reduce competitiveness over time."
[2] "The result of productivity improvement is often unemployment. This action
undercuts the desire of the remaining people to participate in future improvement
activities. Not surprisingly, the pace of improvement is greatly slowed."
[2] "The 'respect for people' principle is the key to making the Lean management
system work"
[2] "Lean is a stakeholder-based system of management, not a management practice that
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favors shareholders over all other stakeholders"
[2] "Senior managers of many publicly owned businesses are obsessively
focused on shareholders, and usually make decisions that come at the expense
of other stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, or local communities. It is
impossible to achieve a Lean transformation with shareholders as the singular focus.
Instead, managers must balance the interests of key stakeholders"
[1,3] "In most cases, Lean activities do not directly link to corporate strategy and goals.
Kaizen is often applied haphazardly; fantastic improvements are achieved in activities
that only provide "local" benefits, not system wide gains or benefits to its end-use
customers"
[4] "Supply chain. It is difficult for suppliers to practice Lean effectively if their
customers do not. Applying Lean throughout a supply chain requires the sponsorship and
participation of large buying organizations that correctly apply Lean principles and
practices to their own internal activities"
[6] "Every senior manager says they support Lean, but in reality most believe they
should be doing other things, or claim they are too busy to get involved with continuous
improvement activities - either as team leaders or as team members. The lack of
personal participation in improvement activities sends the message that Lean
implementation is the job of lower-level workers, and that senior managers do not have
to get involved"
[6] "senior managers often exhibit wasteful behaviors, while at the same time telling
workers to eliminate waste. People notice this inconsistency, and silently question senior
management's commitment to Lean."
"the application of these various [lean operations] best practices must be embedded
Liman within an overall vision"
Mansar 2005)
(Liker and X X - X Lean [I] "Many manufacturing companies have learned the hard way that the isolated
Morgan 2006) application of lean tools and techniques does not lead to sustainable improvement. The
broader organizational culture of the firm separates the short-term improvements from
the long-term lean enterprises. And, to be effective, lean thinking cannot stop at the shop
floor."
[5] "The foundation of the house needs to provide the overall stability on which just-in-
time systems can be built and the system constantly adjusted by stopping to fix
problems. [...]Stable, standardized processes are necessary, or just-in-time production
will mean no production."
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[5] "[JIT] relates to making material flow through processes very fast, getting the right
part to the right place at the right time."
[7] "Surfacing problems is only valuable if people working on the process have the tools
and are motivated to first contain the problems and then solve them at the root cause. It
is an endless journey of improvement."
[7] "The journey is far more complex than applying a few tools or holding some classes.
It truly is a cultural transformation. It truly is a PDCA learning process. You need to start
on the learning journey and then keep going and never stop. You need to practice deep
reflection and learn. Toyota is continually learning. They are far from perfect-and
would become very nervous if anyone thought they were. What we can take away from
Toyota is the importance of becoming a humble, learning organization."
(Folan, X- Performance "[firms] regard localised, rather trivial statistics as being somehow intimately linked with
Browne et al. measurement their strategic directives [..] In this error, which is an error of trying to be too exacting
2007) with the general rule that suggests a casual hierarchical link between operationalperformance measures to strategic performance measures at a higher level, the
performance measurement literature, it must be confessed, must take some blame as it
seems to have popularised a general principle that can easily be perverted in practice."
(Bhasin 2008) X Lean "In this context, policy deployment (or Hoshin) has become an acceptable method to
communicate quality and productivity goals throughout a lean organisation. It is used by
Toyota and leading western organisations such as Intel and Ford. The principle suggests
that by communicating common objectives the organisation can secure commitment. The
main stages look at the current state, the changes necessary and the vision or future
state"
(Rhodes and X Systems "While enterprise principles initially focused heavily on the client, more recent
Nightingale thinking enterprise research has revealed that the critical success factor for today's enterprises is
to balance the needs of all stakeholders. It is critical that these multiple stakeholder
2008) views and contributions to the enterprise be considered in its design to achieve desired
performance objectives and deliver value."
(Valerdi, X Systems "the enterprise context may require stakeholders to suboptimize their organization for the
Nightingale et thinking sake of global optimization of the enterprise."
al. 2008) 1 1
(Hussey, X Healthcare "All savings represent lost income for somebody, and affected stakeholders have
Eibner et al. successfully blocked, weakened, or circumvented past attempts at cost control."
2009)
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Appendix II: Research Question 1 Interview Protocol and
Quantitative Questionnaires
Research Question:
"How is hospital enterprise performance currently measured?"
Interview Protocol
Question # Description
Category
Interviewee 1 What is your role?
function 2 What responsibilities do you have?
3 How long have you been in the organization?
Mission and 4 What is your hospital's mission?
strategy 5 What is your hospital's strategic vision?
6 Who are your key stakeholders?
7 What are the key stakeholder expectations you strive to meet? Are
these always in alignment? How so?
8 How well do these stakeholders in turn meet your own expectations?
Performance 9 What is your definition of hospital enterprise performance?
definition and 10 What performance dimension(s) do you consider?
measurement 11 What are the key metrics that you use to assess overall hospital
performance?
12 What would constitute high or low hospital enterprise performance?
13 How do you measure hospital enterprise performance?
14 What are your performance improvement objectives?
Service units 15 Which service units contribute the most to your bottom line?
16 Which service units perform better and why? Which ones have more
room for improvement than others and why?
17 How do you compare the performance across different service units?
Extended 18 How do you assess the performance of the interaction of your hospital
enterprise with other healthcare providers?
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Quantitative Questionnaire 1
Please assign relative weights to the performance dimensions using multiple pair wise
comparisons. These performance dimensions are drawn from a longitudinal analysis of
multiple bodies of literature addressing hospital performance measurement.
The intent is to determine the relative importance of each pair wise performance
dimension comparison while addressing the question: "How do I currently measure my
hospital's performance?"
Sample metrics for each performance dimension are provided on a separate sheet. Please
note that the performance dimensions are in alphabetical order on the diagram.
Relative weight Performance No.
Dimension
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Customer Satisfaction 1
8 7 6 5 4 3 2
2
8
2
7
38
26
37
48
25
36
47
8
24
35
46
57
68
23
34
5 45
56
7 67
87
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Employee Satisfaction
Equity (Social)
Finance
I Operations 15
Organizational Learning
1 Quality 17
Strategy / Operations 8
Alignment
I I I
Quantitative Questionnaire 2
In the table below please assign relative weights to performance dimensions using
simultaneous comparisons such that they all add to 100%.
Once again please conduct this exercise while addressing the question: "How do I
currently measure my hospital's performance?"
Sample metrics for each performance dimension are provided on a separate sheet. Please
note that the performance dimensions are in alphabetical order on the table.
Performance Dimension Relative Weight
Customer Satisfaction
Employee Satisfaction
Equity (Social)
Finance
Operations
Organizational Learning
Quality
Strategy / Operations Alignment
Total 100%
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Sample metrics for each performance dimension:
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No. Performance Metrics
Dimension
1 Customer Patient satisfaction. Patient likelihood to recommend provider in
Satisfaction the future. Responsiveness to community expectations.
2 Employee Absenteeism. Turnover. Employee tenure. Nurse and physician
Satisfaction satisfaction.
3 Equity (Social) Stratified measures in terms of age, gender, income, race, payer,
etc.
4 Finance Market share. Total operating margin. Return on assets. Cash
flow to revenues ratio. Cost per discharge. Cost per patient day.
Net patient revenues.
5 Operations Length of stay. Bed occupancy. Number of ambulatory visits.
Number of emergency visits. Number of inpatient days. Number
of outpatient surgeries.
6 Organizational Training hours per employee. New technology investment.
Learning Employee development programs.
7 Quality Mortality. Morbidity. Technical quality of care. Number of
patient readmissions. Quality of interpersonal relationship with
patient. Number of malpractice claims.
8 Strategy / Service unit consensus on goal priorities. Inter service unit
Operations cooperation.
Alignment
Questionnaire 3: Performance Dimension: Customer Satisfaction
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Metric Metric Metric name Metric formula
used? rank?
Average time for complaint
resolution
Patient intent in recommending
facility in the future Would you recommend this hospital to your friends and family?
Using any number from 0 to 10, where 0 is the worst hospital
Patient satisfaction possible and 10 is the best hospital possible, what number would
you use to rate this hospital during your stay?
Responsiveness to community Evaluated by selected respondents from the community (EMT,
expectation police, fire department, health dept) with knowledge about or
contact with each service unit.
Questionnaire 3: Performance Dimension: Employee Satisfaction
Metric Metric Metric name Metric formula
used? rank?
Absenteeism
Average employee tenure
Using any number from 0 to 10 where 0 is the least
Employee satisfaction survey satisfied possible and 10 is the most satisfied
possible, what number would you use to rate your
satisfaction at this hospital?
Incidence of non fatal occupation injuries and illnesses [number of injuries and illnesses / total hours worked
by all FTEs in a calendar year] x 200,000)
Nursing turnover
Perceptual assessment of harmony in the service unit
Perceived professional autonomy and opportunity to
Perceived professional autonomy exercise meaningful influence over the work and the
operation of the service unit on the part of the
medical and nursing staff.
Physician turnover
Staff safety in terms of excessive weekly working time.
Staff satisfaction with personal goal attainment
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Questionnaire 3: Performance Dimension: Equity (Social)
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Metric Metric Metric name
used? rank?
Patient mix by geography
Patient mix by payer group
Percentage of staff from underrepresented groups
Stratify all measures into subpopulations that differentiate by gender, age, income, or racial groupings.
Questionnaire 3: Performance Dimension: Finance
Metric Metric Metric name Metric formula
used? rank?
[Net income (operating and non operating sources) + annual
Cash flow to total revenues ratio depreciation/amortization/interest expense] / total revenues
Total expenses (salary and equipment) / total number of
Cost per discharge index discharges
Cost per inpatient day Total costs (salary and equipment) / total number of inpatient days
t .r . Total costs / total number of patient visitsCost per patient visit
Market share Total hospital patients days / total county patient days
Proportion of payroll expense Total salary cost / total operating expenses
o .f Net inpatient revenue / net total patient revenueProportion of inpatient care revenue
Total operating margin (total revenues - total costs) / total revenue
Total operational expenses
Return on assets Net income / total assets
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Questionnaire 3: Performance Dimension: Operations
Metric Metric Metric name Metric formula
used? rank?
Total number of inpatients days / total number of discharges
Average length of stay (including deaths)
Number of ambulatory visits
Number of emergency visits
Number of inpatient days
Number of inpatient surgeries
Number of outpatient surgeries
Responsiveness of service unit Perceptual data from service unit managers on each other's
interaction response timeliness
Service unit efficiency (discharge Total patients discharged for a given service unit / service unit #
rate) ofbeds
% of emergency visit admissions Admitted emergency patients / total emergency patients
% bed utilization Total patient days / (number of beds x 365 days)
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Questionnaire 3: Performance Dimension: Organizational Learning
Metric Metric Metric name Metric formula
used? rank?
Average training hours per
employee Total training hours for all employees / total employees
Employee training expenditure Direct cost for all activities dedicated to staff training / average
number of FTE
Proportion of employees with Total employees with personalized development plans / total
personalized development plans employees
Proportion of new technology
investment Total new technology investments / net income
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Questionnaire 3: Performance Dimension: Quality
Metric Metric Metric name Metric formula
used? rank?
Effectiveness of clinical care Series of evidence based medicine process checks [e.g. %
(objective data) children immunised, % mammography in target population, etc
Total number of deaths per type of procedure / total number ofMortality ratio per type of procedure ts per type of procedure
Number of complications and/or Post operative infections, post operative hemorrhage,
adverse events nosocomial pneumonia, etc
Quality of inter personal relationship
with patient (e.g. privacy, As perceived by nursing staff, physician staff, and by patients
confidentiality, informed choice, themselves
empathy, honesty, tact, sensitiiy _______________________________
Patient time spent waiting (e.g. in ED)
Physician perception of technical Hospital physicians from other service units rated the quality of
medical care quality medical care in the service unit under study
Rate of patient readmission (within 30 Total number of readmissions / total number of patients
days of previous discharge) discharged
Registered nurse perception of Registered nurses rating of the quality of medical management
medical care quality patient receive in service unit under study
Average waiting time for a patient to have a specialistSpecialist appointment wait time appoitment
Total malpractice claims
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Questionnaire 3: Performance Dimension: Strategy / Operations Alignment
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Metric Metric Metric name Metric formula
used? rank?
Detect overuse or underuse of specific procedures,
Balanced physician incentives pharmaceuticals, etc per physician
Perceptual assessment of
cooperation with other service units
in the hospital.
Staff consensus on goal priorities
for each service unit.
Appendix III: Organizational Learning Capability Scales
Organizational Learning Survey Scale (Goh and Richards 1997)
Dimension Scale Description
Item
Clarity of 1 There is widespread support and acceptance of the organization's mission
Purpose and statement.
Mission 2 I do not understand how the mission of the organization is to be achieved
3 The organization's mission statement identifies values to which all employees
must conform.
4 We have opportunities for self assessment with respect to goal attainment.
Leadership 5 Senior managers in this organization resist change and are afraid of new ideas
Commitment 6 Senior managers and employees in this organization share a common vision
and of what our work should accomplish.
Empowerment 7 Managers in this organization can accept criticism without becoming overly
defensive.
8 Managers in this organization often provide useful feedback that helps to
identify potential problems and opportunities.
9 Managers in this organization frequently involve employees in important
decisions.
Experimentation 10 I can often bring new ideas into the organization.
1 I From my experience, people who are new in this organization are encouraged
to question the way things are done.
12 Managers in this organization encourage team members to experiment in
order to improve work processes.
13 Innovative ideas that work are often rewarded by management.
14 In my experience, new ideas from employees are not treated seriously by
management
Transfer of 15 I often have an opportunity to talk to other staff about successful programs or
Knowledge work activities in order to understand why they succeed.
16 Failures are seldom constructively discussed in our organization
17 New work processes that may be useful to the organization as a whole are
usually shared with all employees.
18 We have a system that allows us to learn successful practices from other
organizations.
Teamwork and 19 Current organizational practice encourages employees to solve problems together
Group-Problem before discussing them with a manager.
Solving 20 We cannot usually form informal groups to solve organizational problems
21 Most problem solving groups in this organization feature employees from a
variety of functional areas.
The Organizational Learning Capability Scale (Jerez-G6mez, Cspedes-Lorente et al. 2005)
Dimension Scale Description
Item
Managerial 1 The managers frequently involve their staff in important decisionmaking
Commitment processes.
2 Employee learning is considered more of an expense than an investment.
3 The firm's management looks favorably on carrying out changes in any area
to adapt to and/or keep ahead of new environmental situations.
4 Employee learning capability is considered a key factor in this firm.
5 In this firm, innovative ideas that work are rewarded.
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Systems 6 All employees have generalized knowledge regarding this firm's objectives.
Perspective 7 All parts that make up this firm (departments, sections, work teams, and
individuals) are well aware of how they contribute to achieving the overall
objectives.
8 All parts that make up this firm are interconnected, working together in a
coordinated fashion.
Openness 9 This firm promotes experimentation and innovation as a way of improving
and the work processes.
Experimen 10 This firm follows up what other firms in the sector are doing, adopting those
tation practices and techniques it believes to be useful and interesting.
11 Experiences and ideas provided by external sources (advisors, customers,
training firms, etc.) are considered a useful instrument for this firm's
learning.
12 Part of this firm's culture is that employees can express their opinions
and make suggestions regarding the procedures and methods in place for
carrying out tasks.
Knowledge 13 Errors and failures are always discussed and analyzed in this firm, on all
Transfer and levels.
Integration 14 Employees have the chance to talk among themselves about new ideas,
programs, and activities that might be of use to the firm.
15 In this firm, teamwork is not the usual way to work.
16 The firm has instruments (manuals, databases, files, organizational routines,
etc.) that allow what has been learnt in past situations to remain valid,
although the employees are no longer the same.
The Organizational Learning Capability Scale (Hult and Ferrell 1997)
Dimension Scale Description
Item
Team 1 Cross-functional teamwork is not a common practice here
Orientation 2 Individuals in teams are often defensive about their particular functional
specialty?
3 A team spirit pervades our ranks.
4 Around here, cross-functional teamwork is the common way of working rather
than an exception to the norm.
5 Measurement and reward systems are linked to team achievements, not just
individual achievements
6 There is a commonality of purpose in the purchasing process
7 There is total agreement on our organizational vision across all levels, functions
and divisions of the purchasing process.
8 The purchasing department is committed to sharing their vision for the
purchasing process with our SBU.
Systems 9 As our SBU representative, I have a good sense of the interconnectedness of all
Orientation parts of the purchasing process
10 As our SBU representative, I understand the purchasing process' basic value
chain and how my work fits into that chain
11 All activities that take place in the purchasing process are clearly defined.
12 As our SBU representative, 1 understand where all activities fit-in in the
purchasing process
13 As our SBU representative, 1 am always attempting to develop new ways of
looking at the purchasing process
Learning 14 As our SBU representative, I am committed to the goals of this purchasing
Organization process
15 As our SBU representative, I basically agree that our ability to learn is the key to
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improvement in the purchasing process.
16 The basic values of this purchasing process include learning as a key to
improvement
17 The collective wisdom involved in the purchasing process is that once we quit
learning, we endanger our future
18 The sense around here is that employee learning is an investment, not an expense
19 Learning in my SBU is seen as a key commodity necessary to
guarantee efficiency of the purchasing process
Memory 20 As our SBU representative, I have specific mechanisms for sharing lessons
Orientation learned in the purchasing process from project to project (unit to unit, team to
team)
21 As our SBU representative, I always audit unsuccessful purchasing endeavors
and communicate the lessons learned widely
22 There is a good deal of organizational conversation which keeps alive the lessons
learned from history.
23 We have formal routines that we use to uncover faulty assumptions that we may
have made about the purchasing process.
Appendix IV: Hospital XYZ Additional Resources
I. Sample chief complaints per patient acuity severity index
The table below contains a sample of Chief Complaints associated to each patient acuity
severity index. The acuity severity scale ranges from 1 to 5. A level 1 patient is the most
severe and consists of a trauma patient who needs immediate attention so as to preserve
life and avoid loss of any potentially endangered limb. Levels 4 and 5 are considered
minor injury patients, whereas levels 2 and 3 although in a more serious condition,
although not as serious as a level 1.
Sample chief complaints per patient acuity severity index
Patient Acuity Severity Index Chief Complaint
5 Toe infection
Suture removal
Scratched eye lid
Rash on hands
Medication refill
4 Right knee injury
Pulled groin
Lower back pain
IV antibiotics
Finger laceration
3 Vomiting blood
Severe abdominal pain
Rectal bleeding
Kidney stone
Back pain
2 Suicidal
Shortness of breath
Severe chest pain
Fever and disorientation
Blood clot in right lung
1 Stroke
Motor vehicle crash
Cardiac arrest
Brain attack
Bicycle accident / hit head
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ii. Estimating inpatient revenues
In 2006, as well as at the time of writing this thesis, three broad main categories of
payment systems were in place to reimburse US hospitals for their rendered inpatient
services. Notably, at any one time, hospitals will operate on multiple of these systems,
depending on the payer organizations they hold contracts with.
* Capitation: The first category is capitation whereby a hospital is paid a fixed
amount per patient per month, regardless of any costs incurred while treating
capitated patients in either outpatient or inpatient settings. The set amount is
negotiated between hospitals and private insurance companies.
" Medicare DRG: The second category is the prospective payment system used by
Medicare, whereby hospitals are reimbursed a fixed amount for inpatient services
based on Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs), and regardless of any costs incurred
while treating patients. Hospitals receive a single payment for all the services
provided, based on the specific DRG assigned to a patient after discharge. The
fixed amount per DRG is set by Medicare and isn't open to negotiation.
* FFS: The third category, is similar to the previous category, but is more generally
referred to as the fee-for-service (FFS) model, whereby hospitals negotiate with
private insurance companies a fee schedule for each of the services that they
provide.
In terms of Medicare payments, a series of adjustments are applied for each hospital
provider in particular. These include:
* Hospital is recognized for serving a disproportionate share of low-income patients
* Hospital is an approved teaching hospital which facilitates Indirect Medical
Education (IME). Hospital XYZ had an adjustment factor of 6.7%, meaning that
each Medicare payment was added 6.7%
* Hospital used a new specific technology for the specific case
* Hospital wage index
* Hospital geographic adjustment factor
In 2006, Medicare, and private insurance companies, had a policy whereby hospitals
weren't reimbursed for their outpatient services if a particular patient was admitted
afterwards within 72 hours. As such, when an ED decided to admit a patient, the ED
services weren't billed separately, and instead were considered part of the DRG inpatient
bill. Similarly, policy holders who have to pay a copayment per ED visit, don't have to
pay said copayment if they are admitted to the hospital (they would pay their inpatient
hospital copayment instead). Therefore, accounting and senior leadership at Hospital
XYZ didn't calculate any revenue generated by the ED when its patients were admitted to
the hospital. Notably, they also didn't calculate the % of total inpatient revenues accruing
from patients that were admitted from the ED.
Finally, it is common for hospitals to set their FFS negotiation prices with private
insurance companies as an additional % from what Medicare pays for each DRG.
Specifically, the Chief of Strategy of Hospital XYZ explained it the following way:
"Lets say we have 100,000 patients who are insured by [Xcompany], the number of
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services we might render to those patients number in the thousands. We do not negotiate
rates service by service for thousands of services, there is afee schedule, and the fee
schedule is usually based off a Medicare fee schedule and it is some percentage of
Medicare plus x percentage."
Hospital XYZ Chief of Strategy
Hospital XYZ's inpatient electronic medical record (i.e. MediTech) included data fields
which allowed to estimate the total revenue charge capture from Hospital XYZ's
medically related inpatient services. The specific fields used were "Principal Diagnosis
Description", "Principal Procedure Description", and "DRG". Using these fields we were
able to leverage online DRG calculators in order to determine what Hospital XYZ
received for each DRG.
Three DRG calculators together with the Medicare website, were used as follows:
" APPHC: Allows to search for a particular hospital provider, and for a particular
DRG description, and automatically calculates the total amount that said hospital
receives for the particular DRG (i.e. includes teaching, wage, and geographic
factors) while using 2006 payments. httpmap!heoi nptient-acutearedrg-
calculator/
* IRC: Allows to search by principal diagnosis and principal procedure to
determine the specific DRG and baseline DRG payment (i.e. no adjustments
included). Littp: csl.clainshop net grouper demo groupe main.asp
" ADA: Allows to search by DRG using 2006 payment data, to determine the
baseline DRG payment (i.e. no adjustments included)
* CMS: Includes the baseline payments per DRG in 2006, together with each of the
adjustment indexes used for Hospital XYZ payments.
https. \7vwwsn.gov AcutelnpatientPPS,'1 overview.asp#Top(fPage
Using the above resources we calculated the reimbursement for the inpatient services
rendered by Hospital XYZ to each of its 24,200 patients in 2006. Notably, one limitation
of this method is that it assumes that Medicare and private insurance companies pay
Hospital XYZ the same amount for the same services rendered. As previously noted,
although hospitals are unable to negotiate with Medicare, they are indeed able to
negotiate with private insurance companies, and will thus theoretically, charge greater
prices for their services. Furthermore, different insurance companies will contract with
the same hospital and pay different prices for the same procedures. Ideally, such
contractually agreed values would have been used for our calculations, but
understandably they are very sensitive and we thus resorted to Medicare's DRG as a
proxy to enable the financial dimension of our holistic performance measurement.
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iii. Patient volume distribution per inpatient specialty and
inpatient service unit
The table below describes Hospital XYZ's patient volume distribution per inpatient
specialty and inpatient service unit. For readability, the inpatient specialties of interest are
highlighted in green. Furthermore, the top three sources of patients for each inpatient
service unit are highlighted in blue. Notably one can also validate the assertions that
cardiology centralizes its services in 5W, whereas neurosurgery and orthopedics
centralize their services in 7C. Additionally, one can confirm that general internal
medicine cares for the largest number of patients in Hospital XYZ, and that these are
distributed across the inpatient service units, but in the case of 6S (also highlighted
previously in our analysis) it represents as much as 55.6% of its patient volume.
Patient volume distribution per inpatient specialty and inpatient service unit
H/C Service 1H 5WESTIH 6CENT H 6EAST H 6EASTSIH 6SOUTHIH 6WEST H 6WEST:H 7CENT H 7EASTIH 7000TH H 7WESiH rCENT
H CARD
H_COLS
H_COMM
H_ENDO
HGAST
H_GENS
H_GERI
H GIMC
H GYNC
H HEMA
H HEPA
H INFD
H IRAD
H MISC
HNEPH
HNESG
H_NEUR
H_ONCO
H_OPTH
H_ORTH
H_OTOL
H_PAIN
H_PLAS
H_PULM
H_RHEU
H_THOS
H_TRAU
H_UROL
H_VASM
H VASS
61 94%
005%
2,86%
0 12%
022%
0 32%
0.47%
2939%
0 10%
020%
007%
007%
000%
0 00%
0 15%
0 12%
0 39%
0 02%
0 00%
0 17%
0.00%
000%
0 00%
1 568%
007%
0 15%
0 00%
0 12%
1 16%
0.25%
0.08% 12,31%
1049% 1,39%
211% 261%
0,12% 0,27%
11.77% 096%
23.86% 394%
012% 0,21%
15 40% 26 62%
109% 027%
023% 021%
2230% 0.37%
012% 0 16%
000% 0,00%
0.04% 000%
0.19% 0.53%
234% 048%
055% 107%
0,27% 021%
000% 000%
058% 0.75%
070% 0,16%
000% 000%
055% 016%
168% 2,03%
004% 0 11%
008% 28 09%
000% 005%
355% 160%
012% 149%
1.64% 11.94%
667%
000%
000%
0.00%
000%
0,00%
0.00%
0,00%
000%
000%
0.00%
000%
000%
000%
0.00%
1 67%
667%
000%
000%
0.00%
000%
000%
000%
000%
000%
23 33%
0,00%
000%
0 00%
61 67%
5.74%
2.84%
4.82%
0.21%
2 84%
4,33%
1 06%
55 60%
1 56%
078%
0,64%
0.21%
000%
0 00%
0,64%
2,34%
2.55%
0 78%
000%
1 35%
0.43%
0.00%
0 14%
596%
0 14%
000%
000%
2 77%
092%
1 35%
6.03% 2 99%
1 38% 0,00%
390% 000%
027% 00%
146% 299%
328% 13 43%
0,62% 075%
44.72% 13 43%
1 55% 000%
0,62% 0.00%
049% 0,75%
0 13% 000%
000% 0,00%
000% 000%
0.31% 0.00%
204% 2612%
20,19% 1045%
044% 000%
004% 000%
1 15% 0.75%
044% 4.48%
004% 0,00%
031% 0 75%
661% 2164%
022% 000%
0,22% 075%
0.04% 000%
1 46% 0 75%
067% 0 00%
1.33% 0.00%
003%
0 76%
1 89%
0.03%
0 73%
874%
0,23%
1183%
061%
0 17%
0.09%
0 12%
0.09%
0 00%
0.15%
29.52%
2,36%
0.29%
006%
37.54%
035%
0 00%
1 49%
1 34%
0.06%
0 00%
0 00%
1 02%
0 15%
0.35%
0.20%
21 29%
1 02%
078%
1 88%
7,66%
0 41%
831%
090%
0 04%
0 20%
004%
000%
0,00%
1 39%
0 29%
029%
008%
000%
0 20%
008%
000%
0,20%
082%
008%
004%
000%
53 19%
004%
0 53%
475% 0 16%
234% 0 72%
623% 286%
0,21% 04%
177% 103%
368% 382%
0,64% 040%
53,61% 2530%
1.56% 2681%
042% 632%
021% 000%
0,50% 028%
000% 000%
0,00% 0,00%
057% 0.28%
4 11% 091%
220% 692%
050% 632%
000% 0,12%
2.97% 0.36%
092% 740%
0,00% 000%
064% 1,39%
4 18% 569%
0,28% 0 12%
0 14% 0 16%
000% 000%
595% 1 51%
064% 0 16%
099% 048%
17.00%
000%
1 58%
000%
0 40%
1.58%
0.00%
9.09%
0.40%
1.19%
6 72%
0,40%
0 00%
0 00%
0,00%
0.00%
1 58%
0 79%
0,00%
0.79%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
54 15%
1.19%
0.40%
0.00%
0.40%
2.37%
000%
H 2EAST H OTHER Grand Total I
233%
1006%
0.00%
000%
0,00%
33 33%
0 00%
2,33%
233%
0,00%
6 20%
0.00%
000%
000%
0 00%
11.63%
078%
000%
000%
0.78%
6 20%
000%
000%
2 33%
0 00%
8,53%
000%
698%
0 00%
6.20%
1101%
1 88%
1 21%
0 13%
054%
6 17%
0.00%
17.85%
6.44%
0 13%
2 55%
0 13%
0 40%
0 13%
0 13%
1007%
1 74%
027%
000%
9 80%
3 76%
0 13%
2 15%
1 21%
0 00%
3 76%
0 13%
12,21%
0 67%
5 37%
1364%
4,26%
2 74%
0 25%
2 29%
6 79%
040%
26.18%
3 80%
094%
283%
0 15%
0 03%
0.01%
0.40%
5.93%
3 74%
0.92%
003%
6.45%
1 25%
001%
0 61%
354%
0 12%
2 59%
001%
754%
0 58%
1.98%
Grand Total I 100.00% 10000% 10000% 10000%j 10000% 100 00% 10000%[ 100.00% 10000% 10000% 10000% 10000% 10000% 10000% 100.00%
Source: The data from the above table was extracted from Hospital XYZ's inpatient EMR and represents a
longitudinal sample of one year where a total of 24,200 patients were discharged.
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iv. Sample Qualitative Data Excerpts
a. Clinical Support Services
Clinical Sup ort Services External / Policy View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Pharmacy "there has been a consolidation of surrounding hospitals, and Surrounding hospital
Director people continue to get sick at the same rate as they always do. So closures led to ED
volumes are way up. We joke that the good news is that we still overcrowding
have a job. The bad news is that the volumes are way up so we
have to do more with less."
Pharmacy One approach is to say that we are closed, namely closing the ER, Regulatory
Director but regulatory wise they don't want that because everybody would requirements and
say that is wrong, and they keep track of how many patient you oversight / regulation
handle in the ER, so Hospital XYZ really doesn't want to do that keeps track of ED
numbers
Pharmacy An ER is allowed regulatory wise, by the joint commission, to have Regulatory
Director meds more or less on a stock basis, because they know that if that requirements and
guy comes in with a heart attack you don't go through the normal oversight / regulation
mechanism where the doctor places an order, the pharmacist on admitted boarded
reviews it, makes it available,... that is not how it works in the ER, ED patients
where they wheel you in and they have the meds in stock, and the
regulators say that is ok.
But what happens when the ER deals with the patient and they
place him in the room in the back where he must stay maybe for a
day or two days? They are no longer ER patients, they are
inpatients. Regulatory wise you are no longer allowed to get the
meds as you need them to treat those patients. There are all sorts of
studies out there that demonstrate that it is more dangerous to allow
that to happen. If a nurse or whoever just reaches over and grabs
something the odds that a mistake will happen is much higher than
if it goes through the normal process, which is why the regulators
say that the normal process must include the sort of interim people,
which includes the pharmacist, that are able to detect potential
problems of allergies, etc. You accept that that [allergies] might
happen in the ER, but no one talks about it and more frequently
patients are getting meds that they are allergic to, they are getting
meds that they weren't supposed to, because you have to given the
circumstances [emergency, no time to check].
However regulatory said that that has to stop once you are in the
holding bed to go upstairs.
Pharmacy So in the old days this would not happen because you would keep Industry history and
Director people in the ER and in a little while they would go upstairs. Now evolution
there is this whole section in the ER where people are kind of put
on hold, so they are waiting for a bed to go upstairs, and that is
challenging both for the ER and for the pharmacy. Because the
mentality is different, if the patient is bleeding put a patch on him
and then send him upstairs, where they will take care of him long
term.
Pharmacy Inpatient pay more like per diems or DRGs. The idea there is that Payer system
Director you are going to use the least work you can consistent with getting influence/pressure
the person out of the hospital with a certain level of care. But you
don't want to have an expensive drug used when a cheaper drug
would suffice. That is basically the rules. They are cost based. So if
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you spent 15 million on drugs, then that is 15 million that you just
spent. So if I could get that cost down to 5 million and go to
administration, they would see that as a 10 million in savings.
[...]
From the outpatient side we would still like to do it because a lot of
times it constitutes better care but the financial product is simply
not there.
Pharmacy Inpatient hospitals have been on the edge of unprofitable for some Industry history and
Director time, since the mid 80s, and you have to be pretty vicious to evolution
survive.
Clinical Support Services Strategy View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Pharmacy "So now why do we have all these patients [...]. One reason is that Enterprise
Director [Hospital XYZ] went out and aggressively pursued new specialties transformation
like liver transplant." strategic scope/ New
specialties led to ED
patient overcrowding
Clinical Support Services Service View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Laboratory We also have outside facilities that use our lab. Extended enterprise
Director management
Laboratory The ED and ORs have their own system to see the results... but Service architecture
Director they all still have to order through the arcaic LCMC system. I don't management / flow
know why, we call it the LCMC. information
transparency and
timeliness
Laboratory Often there isn't an order for a given specimen and we have to call Service architecture
Director them [the physicians] and ask them what they want. awareness / shared
understanding of
downstream &
upstream effects
Pharmacy This is very inefficient. The nurses that are in that holding area are Service architecture
Director more trained [expensive]. The other problem is that patients that go management /
through surgery and wake up they don't expect to wake up in the inefficient use of staff
recovery room. But with the current situation [overload] you may
need to stay in the recovery room for a day or two, waiting for Service sustainability
something to open up upstairs, so that you can go there. That is / Patient experience
extremely inefficient because the recovery nurse is a very negatively impacted
expensive nurse, it is very expensive care, and you cannot simply by ED overcrowding
think that "well they get paid for that anyway" because they are a
cost item geared for other things. And we absorb that cost because
the patient needs to stay in the recovery room because we don't
have room for them elsewhere.___________
Pharmacy I would say there is generally a disjointed view of this Service architecture
Director organization. It is so big that the left hand does not know what the awareness! shared
right hand is doing. Communication is becoming a bigger issue understanding
than what I am used to. It isn't always an issue but... It is hard to downstream &
get anything out to everybody. It is hard for everybody to upstream effects
understand where we are going with this or that. 
__________
Pharmacy What has happened with the increased workload hitting the Service sustainability
Director hospital and we have all been squandering to figure out how it / Patient experience
works when it is that busy. And one of those things is within the negatively impacted
ED. It used to be that you come in and they would decide that you by ED overcrowding
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need to be admitted or that you need to go home. In the old days
when they decided you needed to be admitted they would say you
need specifically an IC (intensive care) bed, or that you need a
telemetry bed, or that you need a regular bed, or whatever, and
then they would send you there, and this would happen within an
hour or two. Now what has happened is that there is a third group
of patients where we are deeply clogged up upstairs and we wont
have the kind of bed that this guy needs.
Pharmacy Here we have a sort of outpatient world attached to the Service architecture
Director organization, and that is a bit disconcerting to people who have awareness /
been in the business for a long time. Most places aren't that way. outpatient services
Most places a hospital is a hospital. You know, an inpatient not fully integrated
hospital. with inpatient
Pharmacy there is a tendency for nurses to go and steal meds from the other Service architecture
Director machines awareness/ shared
understanding
downstream &
upstream effects
Service sustainability
/ Patient experience
potentially negatively
impacted due to
localized process
optimization behavior
Clinical Support Services Process View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Laboratory The laboratory has priorities. The OR, the units, the ED, those Degree of process
Director specimens are handled as a priority so that we can turn around standardization and
results as quickly as possible. That said the ED, bought a new transparency
system called the T-System so that they can see their results appear
on their board when they are ready. That is one of the areas that is
innefficient as we don't know when an insular area has checked the
test [on the arcaic system]
Laboratory Often there isn't an order for a given specimen and we have to call Service unit process
Director them [the physicians] and ask them what they want. optimization
behavior /
stakeholders ignore
standards to locally
optimize their system
Pharmacy However regulatory said that that has to stop once you are in the Enterprise process
Director holding bed to go upstairs. Therefore we had to setup a process to improvement and
deal with this situation. [...]In the ER we have Pyxis machines. The planning scope /
part of the ER where it is like an emergency, those are served with evidence of narrow
candy machines because they need to give the meds right away, bolt-ons
without need of sending an order to the pharmacy, so they can list
up all the meds that are available in the candy machine and get what Degree of core
they need. But the regulators didn't allow us to that in the other process complexity
section [holding area] because in reality patients in there are no
longer in an emergency status and rather in an hospital setting.
Pharmacy there is a tendency for nurses to go and steal meds from the other Service unit process
Director machines optimization
behavior /
stakeholders ignore
standards to locally
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optimize their system
Clinical Support Services Organization View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Pharmacy Here we have a sort of outpatient world attached to the Enterprise cultural
Director organization, and that is a bit disconcerting to people who have harmony / clinical
been in the business for a long time. Most places aren't that way. staff unhappy with
Most places a hospital is a hospital. You know, an inpatient Hospital XYZ's
hospital. commitment to
surrounding
community
Pharmacy In the ER we have Pyxis machines. The part of the ER where it is Organizational
Director like an emergency, those are served with candy machines because climate / job
they need to give the meds right away, without need of sending an satisfaction (relates to
order to the pharmacy, so they can list up all the meds that are ED nurses frustrated
available in the candy machine and get what they need. But the with caring for
regulators didn't allow us to that in the other section [holding area] boarded patients)
because in reality patients in there are no longer in an emergency
status and rather in an hospital setting.
Pharmacy So Hospital XYZ clinic started as a Hospital XYZ clinic... their Enterprise History
Director heart and soul was an organization that functioned as a clinic, and enterprise run by
an outpatient center. A lot of the old administrative people came physicians who built
from downtown where they started the clinic. In essence they were a hospital, as opposed
like a big private practice of docs, so that whenever someone to a hospital who
needed to send a patient to a hospital they would send him to purchased a group
[ABC] Hospital or whatever and that place would function as the practice
hospital. So you can kind of visualize this place being a kind of
doctors practice in those days.
So Hospital XYZ in fact did the opposite of a lot of people. So in
1980, they said that we are losing control of our patients and
instead of sending them to Brigham, we should build our own
hospital. I can tell the difference. So Hospital XYZ sees itself as a
big doctors partners that went and bought a hospital, so there is a
different mindset from a hospital that adds an outpatient function.
We are very much a doctor's hospital here. We are very much
owned and operated by physicians. Most hospitals are not owned
and operated by physicians. Most hospitals are operated by another
party and doctors have some control of what is going on, but it is
largely the administrative side that handles a lot of the procedures.
Here [Hospital XYZ] physicians do a lot of things. They are on the
board of governors. This is good because physicians keep a focus
on patient care issues, which sometimes administrators say this is
how we make money, and doctors are interested in that too, but
they do not want to give up the patient care part of it.
Clinical Support Services Information View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Laboratory The ED and ORs have their own system to see the results... but Information systems
Director they all still have to order through the arcaic LCMC system. I don't integration
know why, we call it the LCMC.
Laboratory The laboratory has priorities. The OR, the units, the ED, those Information systems
Director specimens are handled as a priority so that we can turn around integration
results as quickly as possible. That said the ED, bought a new
system called the T-System so that they can see their results appear Information
on their board when they are ready. That is one of the areas that is timeliness
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innefficient as we don't know when an insular area has checked the
test |on the arcaic system] IT user friendliness
Laboratory The lab has its own computer system and we are interfaced with Information systems
Director the main hospital computer system. The main hospital [lab] integration / lab has
computer system is arcaic. It is homegrown and its been here state-of-the-art
forever. If I need to order five tests on you, I have to go in five system while hospital
times to choose the test, not you [as] I have chosen you once, [but] services have
I have to go in five times and then five times, it has to be already homegrown solution
accepted by the physician who ordered it, [and] I have to say the
priority, I have to say if there is anything else to do, ... in the
laboratory we order five tests all at once, they put them all together IT user friendliness
in one session number.
Laboratory However thousands of results are displayed and physicians have to IT user friendliness
Director remember which code they have already read and which one is for
their particular patient.
Laboratory There are some [specimens] that are considered to be critical, that Data reliability
Director we need to alert somebody immediately. So the laboratory does a
phone call, or lots of phone calls to students, physicians, etc maybe Information
their case is where they expected a result because they know the timeliness
patient who is in a crisis. Other times they have no idea about this
patient having critical tests being done on them. Efficiency wise it Workflow
is sometimes hard to find the right person because the patients information system
sometimes go from this floor, now they are in the OR, or went
down to radiology, they are all over the place.
Sometimes it is hard to find where the patient is so that we can
send the result to them. Each floor will say "we sent him there"
then you call here and they say "we sent them there".
Laboratory In our core lab there are a lot of pneumatic tubes and these Data reliability
Director pneumatic tubes are connected to areas like the emergency room,
the OR suites, actually a lot of hospital areas, and when they Prevalence of paper
collect specimens they send them right down the pneumatic tube. information systems
We get them and supposedly most of them should be with the
order in the tube already so that we know what they went from us. IT user friendliness
But every once in a while there are some that come without orders,
or with difficult hand writting, etc. It is an arcaic lab system where
it is more laborious to insert the order in the computer than it is to
write it by hand.
Pharmacy It was interesting because the other day there were 4 doctors trying Prevalence of paper
Director to understand another doctor's writing. This is acceptable in a information systems
mechanic garage setting where he is full of grease and stuff so he
cannot use a computer. But in our world one of these drugs could Data reliability
potentially kill you, therefore we need to move away from the (visualization)
current world [towards more technology solutions] but it is
difficult to do that. It is frustrating because we don't even barcode
our drugs.
b. Administrative Support Services
Administrative Support Services External View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Associate The nurses focus a lot on patient falls because you know it is a Regulatory
Chief Nurse national patient safety goal. But that information does not requirements and
Med/Surg necessarily get back to the nursing leadership. oversight: national
goals affect what
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nurses care about
Process The problem here is that I get dictated what I need to do. There is Regulatory
Improvement a lot of requirements. Books and books of requirements. Really a requirements and
Project lot. Requirements can be separated into two categories. The first oversight
Manager category is the "do good organizations". There is probably 5 to 7
of them, they mean very well, like Leapfrog, you don't have to do Payer system
it, you raise your hand and you'll do it. [the other category] Then influence/pressure
you have to do what the Joint Commission tells you. The
department of public health you have to do what they say. And
CMS, government stuff, you have to do what they say.
Quality and Personally I am not going to work any less hard because I am Payer system
Safety expecting a bonus for something. However, pay for performance influence/pressure
Director does help the organization focus on in terms of what is important.
So I may not work any harder because I know we need to
improve these quality scores on this five items by 50%. I am
going to do that anyway. But what it does force is the
organization [chuckle] to declare what are we going to work on
improving next year. It helps focus.
Quality and The community would never accept having a tertiary medical Surrounding
Safety center in this area without an ED. They would feel that we community oversight
Director weren't meeting the needs of the community. If [Hospital XYZ]
had its way it wouldn't have an ED. It would primarily be a
surgical facility and a specialty hospital, in the sense that not
every specialty here is a surgical specialty, so there is still a
commitment to and a focus on medical specialty. But even
among the specialties my opinion is that the surgeon in terms of
stature is higher than the other medical specialty. The CEO is a
surgeon, the prior CEO is a surgeon, ... generally the operative
services generate more revenue than the medical services.
Planning All the care that we are supposed to provide and we measure are Payer system
Director defined in terms of the core measures. Strict definitions, national influence/pressure
definitions, about what you look for, what has to be documented,
and what you are supposed to do. Pneumonia needs antibiotics 4
hours, a heart attack needs an aspirin, etc.
Quality and Some health plans are beginning to include quality measures into Payer system
Safety the contracts. I don't do contracts [chuckle] I just worry about influence/pressure
Director performance, so I don't know how much is tied to each measure.
For example improving our pneumonia vaccine rate we had some
dollars tied to that.
Quality and Now they have added these three measures and now we have to Payer system
Safety focus on this, versus being run by our strategy and an influence/pressure
Director understanding of our processes. Some of the chaos is that you are
trying to run your organization well, but you are kind of in this
reactive mode as things are changing externally. These CMS core
measures [time to aspirin, etc] we are paid right now because we
capture these measures and we report them publically. So as long
as we capture it and report it to CMS we get paid. Right now our
incentive to do well on CMS measures is only public perception.
Process When we find holes using Leapfrog data it is not clear that we Payer system
Improvement jump on those and do something. Leapfrog is pretty wonderful. It influence/pressure
Project could be that we are just overwhelmed with all these
Manager requirements. So when a do good organization asks you to do
these [additional requirements] you say "unless it is not required,
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don't ask me right now".
[...]1
90% of the stuff on our plate is a requirement. Out of the 90%,
70% is hand washing, what you have to do is very clear, maybe
20% is that senior management has to do things to mitigate
patient flow issues, and then [the remaining] 10% is something
that we put on there that no one is requiring us to do.
Process Then you have to do what the Joint Commission tells you. The Regulatory
Improvement department of public health you have to do what they say. And requirements and
Project CMS, government stuff, you have to do what they say. oversight
Manager
Process 30% of the delays are because family members don't come Patient
Improvement around on time to pick up patients. behavior/impact
Project
Manager
Quality and Between the pending or the current shortages of personnel, the Industry history and
Safety baby boomer generation just hiting higher healthcare needs, and evolution
Director such, I don't know how we are going to be able to handle this. I
think it is going to get much more chaotic before it potentially
gets any better.
Administrative Support Services Strategy View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Associate Chief I am surgical services, the revenue generator for the hospital. I Strategic alignment /
Nurse know you have read all the literature where they say that the conflict
Perioperative elective cases should be cancelled so that we can keep the ER
Services moving. That is not the vision. I really think that Dr. [CEO] or
Dr. [COO] would come up here saying for us not to cancel
elective cases to keep the ER running. If we cancel elective
cases we've now lost revenue. So we have a conflict of
interests.
Associate Chief Every day we run into issues with flow in the ER and with Enterprise
Nurse flow in surgical services. You know you can guess why transformation
Perioperative because patients come into the ED, we have now opened 4 strategic scope: only
Services more ORs, and probably consistingly between 11am and 2pm added ORs
everyday we kind of have this freeze situation where the ED
has patients that go up, the main recovery room that is our
PACU has anywhere between 6 to 8 patients every night that
are down there now who are waiting to go someplace, whether
they are waiting to go to an ICU, whether they are going to an
inpatient area.
Associate Chief We just increased the number of our operating rooms by 4 and Enterprise
Nurse we filled them. What we didn't do at the same time is that we transformation
Perioperative didn't increase our holding area so that when patients came in strategic scope: only
Services the morning we would have more space to hold them before added ORs, didn't
they went into the OR. Also, we have a PACU that is about to adopt phased
open and it should have been open at the same time as the approach
ORs.
Associate Chief You have compitition between the ED and the OR for beds. Strategic alignment /
Nurse [Nursing Manager X's] job is really to figure out who needs conflict
Perioperative the priority at that time.
Services
Associate Chief We run a very interesting report from Pyxis. We have the Information systems
Nurse Med/Surg Pyxis OR management system. So I can give you any statistic strategy: each silo
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that you wanted, and one of the statistics that we decided to runs its own state of
look at was how long do patients wait in the OR. Sometimes the art IT system;
we have as many as 8% of patients waiting in the OR to go to contributes to
the ambulatory PACU. If you correlate that back to the ED I enterprise
bet you'll see a sharing of beds [the ED was getting the beds dysfunctionality
and holding up the OR flow]. "Okay the ED have 15 to 18
patients now, so we have to let the OR hold inside for a while
because the ED is in more of a crisis than the OR". But when
you keep patients in there [OR] for 3 hours all you have is an
anethesiologist watching your airway, you don't have nurse
watching everything else. So we struggle with that.
Quality and Personally I am not going to work any less hard because I am Strategy dilution
Safety Director expecting a bonus for something. However, pay for
performance does help the organization focus on in terms of Enterprise strategy
what is important. So I may not work any harder because I
know we need to improve these quality scores on this five
items by 50%. I am going to do that anyway. But what it does
force is the organization [chuckle] to declare what are we
going to work on improving next year. It helps focus.
Quality and That is the part that you may be cautioned about... because I Enterprise
Safety Director think that the ED in part understands this... It is with some transformation
reluctance that there is investment made in that area, because strategic scope
it is not the engine.
Process I think that someplace in [Hospital XYZ] there is a list of a lot Enterprise
Improvement of committees. transformation
Project Manager strategic scope
Process One of the companies that I worked out... everybody has a list Strategy dilution
Improvement of a million things that they got to do, but what they did every
Project Manager quarter they came out with a list and said "these are the seven
things that are priority for this quarter". So I would put that up
in my wall. So when I knocked in your door you knew that
was 1 to 7. You get more collaboration because you know
what the 7 are. Right now [at Hospital XYZ] there is 100 of
them! There is so much stuff going on! So I knock on
someone's door and I just have to knock louder, be pushy
sometimes, and try to get something up on his radar screen. I
have asked [Chief of Strategy] many times to tell us what the
big seven are.
Planning Decision support data is finalized billing data. Because of the Enterprise strategy
Director way healthcare is managed and billed there is a tremendous
amount of detail that is captured in each transction. We use
250 fields from Meditech
[ ...]
All the measures that people want to do it nationally are based
on something that everybody does. And in order to do that you
need to abstract data from the chart, and use the same coding
for the same procedures, everybody does that, it is called
administrative data. All the national measures are based of
administrative data.
[ ...]I
All the care that we are supposed to provide and we measure
are defined in terms of the core measures. Strict definitions,
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national definitions, about what you look for, what has to be
documented, and what you are supposed to do. Pneumonia
needs antibiotics 4 hours, a heart attack needs an aspirin, etc.
Planning asset is the OR, and I can prove that by shutting it down for a Enterprise strategy
Director day.
Administrative Support Services Service View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Associate "Okay the ED have 15 to 18 patients now, so we have to let the Service sustainability
Chief Nurse OR hold inside for a while because the ED is in more of a crisis (patient experience)
Perioperative than the OR". But when you keep patients in there [OR] for 3
Services hours all you have is an anethesiologist watching your airway,
you don't have a nurse watching everything else. So we struggle
with that.
Associate You have competition between the ED and the OR for beds. Service architecture
Chief Nurse [Nursing Manager X's] job is really to figure out who needs the management:
Perioperative priority at that time. competition amongst
Services shared resources
Associate We just increased the number of our operating rooms by 4 and we Service architecture
Chief Nurse filled them. What we didn't do at the same time is that we didn't awareness:
Perioperative increase our holding area so that when patients came in the transformation efforts
Services morning we would have more space to hold them before they lack understanding of
went into the OR. Also, we have a PACU that is about to open service architecture
and it should have been open at the same time as the ORs.
Associate Often times you find that you don't have the right people at the Service architecture
Chief Nurse right table. Some think that pharmacy and nursing should be awareness/appreciatio
Med/Surg working together as they don't have as good a collaborative n: architecture
relationship and don't see their work dependency. adversely affected by
lack of cultural
harmony
Process I need a patient flow steering committee. We had one 5 months Service architecture
Improvement ago but it got disbanded because it wasn't working as well as it management
Project could and because[the Chief of Strategy] got really busy with
Manager other stuff. I think we need more of the middle managers on this Cross departmental
committee rather than what we had before [too high level]. management boards
Process 30% of the delays are because family members don't come around Extended enterprise
Improvement on time to pick up patients. management
Project
Manager
Administrative Support Services Process View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Associate "Okay the ED have 15 to 18 patients now, so we have to let the Prevalence of
Chief Nurse OR hold inside for a while because the ED is in more of a crisis undesireable standard
Perioperative than the OR". processes (e.g. fire
Services fighting)
Associate You have competition between the ED and the OR for beds. Prevalence of
Chief Nurse [Nursing Manager X's] job is really to figure out who needs the undesireable standard
Perioperative priority at that time. processes (e.g. fire
Services fighting)
Associate We run a very interesting report from Pyxis. We have the Pyxis Process enterprise
Chief Nurse OR management system. So I can give you any statistic that you measurement
Perioperative wanted, and one of the statistics that we decided to look at was capability: unable to
Services how long do patients wait in the OR. Sometimes we have as cross reference info
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many as 8% of patients waiting in the OR to go to the ambulatory
PACU. If you correlate that back to the ED I bet you'll see a
sharing of beds [the ED was getting the beds and holding up the
OR flow]
from OR and ED
systems
Associate Every day we run into issues with flow in the ER and with flow in Prevalence of
Chief Nurse surgical services. You know you can guess why because patients undesireable standard
Perioperative come into the ED, we have now opened 4 more ORs, and processes (e.g. fire
Services probably consistingly between 11am and 2pm everyday we kind fighting)
of have this freeze situation where the ED has patients that go up,
the main recovery room that is our PACU has anywhere between
6 to 8 patients every night that are down there now who are
waiting to go someplace, whether they are waiting to go to an
ICU, whether they are going to an inpatient area. Around that time
in the morning most of us are getting paged, you know I'm getting
paged from the OR "Debbie we are starting to hold patients in the
OR"
Associate Usually around 9.30 today we would gather around a table and we Prevalence of
Chief Nurse sit as nurses, we don't really have physicians sitting with us at that undesireable standard
Perioperative time, and we decide who is going to get them [the beds] now. processes (e.g. fire
Services Hour by hour we are saying who is going to get what. At that time fighting)
an email usually goes out saying to discharge all your patients and
we just hope that we can keep the ED and the OR going. The
physicians aren't involved at all unless I get the impression that
we have to cancel a [elective] case.
Associate I really think that Dr. [CEO] or Dr. [COO] would come up here Leadership Support
Chief Nurse saying for us not to cancel elective cases to keep the ER running. of Operations:
Perioperative If we cancel elective cases we've now lost revenue. So we have a CEO/COO
Services conflict of interests. reinforcing procedure
focused strategy
Associate Dr. [X] on the other side is the Chief of Surgery is going to day Degree of process
Chief Nurse "Debbie we are not cancelling anything. You know what we can complexity and
Perioperative sit down and relook at all this but it is a huge job to take a flexibility
Services [scheduling] block based system and redo it all"
We actually had no block scheduling up until 2 years ago which
made it worse for the nursing staffing because we never knew
who was working when.
Associate Each nursing area has its own process for different types of orders Degree of process
Chief Nurse and that contributes to a silo effect where a nurse only knows how standardization
Med/Surg to do things in a given area even when those things are also done
elsewhere [the information content of each order is different Degree of process
depending on the nursing area where it originates] complexity and
[..] flexibility: flexibility
I see a lot of different silos. Nurses from different departments hindered by lack of
create a lot of standard norms, and these don't get rooted back to standards
any interdisciplinary committee.
Modes of
coordination / cross
department board:
unable to prevent silo
effect that produce
local standards
Associate The nurses focus a lot on patient falls because you know it is a Process enterprise
Chief Nurse national patient safety goal. But that information does not measurement
Med/Surg necessarily get back to the nursing leadership. capability: metrics
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not captured
Planning We are unable to pull data from the OR as they are using their Service unit process
Director own excel sheet systems and we have not been able to integrate optimization behavior
that data.
Process enterprise
measurement
capability
Planning This is a huge system that runs once a month and takes almost 4 Process enterpnrise
Director days to get this data out. It isn't operational data measurement
capability
Planning A coke and chocolate cookies can get you the data from the OR. I Process enterprise
Director stole a file from them like that otherwise I couldn't see what data measurement
they had. The number one asset that [Hospital XYZ] has is its capability
people. The number two asset is the OR, and I can prove that by
shutting it down for a day.
Process The T system data isn't reliable because different nurses write Degree of process
Improvement their notes in different ways. Some write the notes into the T standardization
Project system immediately after the physician sees the patient. Others
Manager write the notes in a batch process and assign the same time of
observation to every patient. It is very difficult to figure out what Lack ofstandard
the precise timings are in each stage of the process. contributes to data
reliability issues
Planning JO: What is planned under teaching and research [as far as Process enterprise
Director metrics?] measurement
That is a good question! I hope to have an answer soon... capability
Planning Decision support for us is that we want to keep a subset of our Holistic performance
Director data and being able to bucket it and categorize it in very different measurement
ways. We want to look at patients that had Harvard Pilgrim
insurance and had open heart surgery. Who did it? How long were
they here? What were the charges? Content is holistic but
process isn't
Planning Decision support data is finalized billing data. Because of the way Holistic performance
Director healthcare is managed and billed there is a tremendous amount of measurement
detail that is captured in each transction. We use 250 fields from Content isfinancial
Meditech based
Quality and Some health plans are beginning to include quality measures into Holistic performance
Safety the contracts. I don't do contracts [chuckle] I just worry about measurement
Director performance, so I don't know how much is tied to each measure.
For example improving our pneumonia vaccine rate we had some
dollars tied to that.
Quality and I have no idea what the financial contribution of the ED is. Holistic performance
Safety [...] measurement
Director Physicians are here to do the high tech really cutting edge stuff.
And surgeries are really what generates revenue here and that is Process enterprise
kind of the sexy work to do. measurement
capability
Enterprise process
improvement and
planning scope
Quality and We haven't spent much time at our organization thinking about Enterprise process
Safety what our key processes are. We have a whole list of processes but improvement and
Director we don't characterize any of them as key. planning scope
Quality and Now they have added these three measures and now we have to Enterprise process
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Safety focus on this, versus being run by our strategy and an improvement and
Director understanding of our processes. Some of the chaos is that you are planning scope
trying to run your organization well, but you are kind of in this
reactive mode as things are changing externally. These CMS core
measures [time to aspirin, etc] we are paid right now because we
capture these measures and we report them publically. So as long
as we capture it and report it to CMS we get paid. Right now our
incentive to do well on CMS measures is only public perception.
Process [The Quality&Safety Director] just owns the quality and safety Enterprise process
Improvement ones. She has her own list of stuff. [The Planning Director] has a improvement and
Project lot of electronic medical records, and another nice page [of things planning scope
Manager to do]. IT has there own page of big stuff to do. Theoretically this
should come from strategic planning. Strategy absent
Holistic performance
measurement
Process We had a few efforts like the discharge appointment process to Enterprise process
Improvement reduce discharge time of day. improvement and
Project planning scope
Manager
Narrow
Process What is going to happen with this new process engineer is that Enterprise process
Improvement they are going to primarily stick this person in the operating improvement and
Project services in the operating room. 80% of that person's time will be planning scope
Manager just doing the OR stuff. The OR they say is where the money
happens. The surgery is a lot more profitable than the medical. Narrow
Process 90% of the stuff on our plate is a requirement. Out of the 90%, Enterprise process
Improvement 70% is hand washing, what you have to do is very clear, maybe improvement and
Project 20% is that senior management has to do things to mitigate patient planning scope
Manager flow issues, and then [the remaining] 10% is something that we
put on there that no one is requiring us to do.
Process One of the companies that I worked out... everybody has a list of a Enterprise process
Improvement million things that they got to do, but what they did every quarter improvement and
Project they came out with a list and said "these are the seven things that planning scope
Manager are priority for this quarter". So I would put that up in my wall. So
when I knocked in your door you knew that was 1 to 7. You get Strategy dilution
more collaboration because you know what the 7 are. Right now
[at Hospital XYZ] there is 100 of them! There is so much stuff
going on! So I knock on someone's door and I just have to knock
louder, be pushy sometimes, and try to get something up on his
radar screen. I have asked [Chief of Strategy] many times to tell
us what the big seven are.
Administrative Support Services Organization View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Associate I am surgical services, the revenue generator for the hospital. I Local organizational
Chief Nurse know you have read all the literature where they say that the climate and subculture
Perioperative elective cases should be cancelled so that we can keep the ER
Services moving. That is not the vision. I really think that Dr. [CEO] or Dr.
[COO] would come up here saying for us not to cancel elective
cases to keep the ER running. If we cancel elective cases we've
I now lost revenue. So we have a conflict of interests.
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Associate You have competition between the ED and the OR for beds. Enterprise cultural
Chief Nurse [Nursing Manager X's] job is really to figure out who needs the harmony: adverse
Perioperative priority at that time. effect of lack of
Services strategic alignment /
conflict
Associate Dr. [X] of course would say "You know just cancel those elective Enterprise cultural
Chief Nurse cases Debbie", and you know he would because his important harmony: adverse
Perioperative piece is the ED. Dr. [Y] on the other side is the Chief of Surgery effect of lack of
Services is going to say "Debbie we are not cancelling anything. You strategic alignment /
know what we can sit down and relook at all this but it is a huge conflict
job to take a [scheduling] block based system and redo it all". So
you have competing high levels because they have vested Local organizational
interests in their own division. climate and subculture
Associate Usually around 9.30 today we would gather around a table and Local organizational
Chief Nurse we sit as nurses, we don't really have physicians sitting with us at climate and
Perioperative that time, and we decide who is going to get them [the beds] now. subculture: stressful
Services Hour by hour we are saying who is going to get what. At that time (we just hope to keep
an email usually goes out saying to discharge all your patients and things going)
we just hope that we can keep the ED and the OR going. The
physicians aren't involved at all unless I get the impression that
we have to cancel a [elective] case.
Associate Usually around 9.30 today we would gather around a table and Modes of
Chief Nurse we sit as nurses, we don't really have physicians sitting with us at coordination / Cross
Perioperative that time, and we decide who is going to get them [the beds] now. departmental
Services management boards
Associate Usually around 9.30 today we would gather around a table and Enterprise cultural
Chief Nurse we sit as nurses, we don't really have physicians sitting with us at harmony: nurses vs
Perioperative that time, and we decide who is going to get them [the beds] now. physicians
Services
Associate What happened in the main recovery room... in the last 2 months I Local organizational
Chief Nurse have lost 7 nurses for working there. When you go to work in the climate: nurses
Perioperative recovery room you want the patients to recover. Like in the quitting because of
Services emergency room, you want to the patients to come into the ED, to role disconnect
be seen, and to home or someplace. So you have nurses that
choose their specific areas [for a given type of patient
population]. A nurse did not choose that area because she thought
she could take care of 18 patients overnight. She thought maybe 2
might, but 18 is too much. So that is huge for us to train now 7
more nurses. To really train a good PACU nurses we can have
them trained in 4 to 5 months.
Chief Nurse Dr. [X ED Director] and Dr. [Y Surgery Director] report Leadership acceptance
Perioperative separately to the CEO. I don't think that the CEO tells them where by internal
Services to go. stakeholders
Associate Each nursing area has its own process for different types of orders Local organizational
Chief Nurse and that contributes to a silo effect where a nurse only knows how climate and
Med/Surg to do things in a given area even when those things are also done subculture: the lack of
elsewhere [the information content of each order is different standards across the
depending on the nursing area where it originates] enterprise reinforces
silo culture
Associate Often times you find that you don't have the right people at the Prevalence of cultural
Chief Nurse right table. Some think that pharmacy and nursing should be silos
Med/Surg working together as they don't have as good a collaborative
relationship and don't see their work dependency.
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Planning When I first came here 2 years ago that [the OR] was a black box, Prevalence of cultural
Director you didn't enter, we are not giving you any data, what the hell do silos: local leadership
you want the data for. That was the kind of response that I got dependant
when I came here 2.5 years ago. In the last six months we have a
new chief of surgery and her response is "what do you mean I
can't have that data? what do you mean I can't have access to that
data?"
Planning Leadership support for data transparency is very variable across Prevalence of cultural
Director specialties. Department like orthopedics, doctor [X] has been into silos: local leadership
data for a long time. I would say if there is a grand daddy of data dependant
collection at [Hospital XYZ] it is probably doctor [X]. In an
access database. It is "their" access database, because that is the
right adjective, and published papers with that data. They look at
what we are trying to do skeptically.
Planning A coke and chocolate cookies can get you the data from the OR. I Prevalence of cultural
Director stole a file from them like that otherwise I couldn't see what data silos
they had. The number one asset that [Hospital XYZ] has is its
people. The number two asset is the OR, and I can prove that by
shutting it down for a day.
Process The philosophy at [Hospital XYZ] is that for each individual Prevalence of cultural
Improvement application we want to get the best software and then afterwards silos
Project we'll figure out how to tie it all together.
Manager Drive IT
fragmentation
Planning My job is to provide clinical data for people so that they can take Individual incentives
Director care of patients better and that is the only reason I come to work
in the morning.
Planning And then you have doctors in the middle who say "listen I am Prevalence of cultural
Director really good at what I do, and I am going to do what I do, and don't silos
bother me with other stuff'.
[ ...]
Nationally physicians have a lot of political clout, they have a lot
of economic clout, and they still have the pen or the keyboard as
to what resources get used.
Quality and Personally I am not going to work any less hard because I am Individual incentives
Safety expecting a bonus for something. However, pay for performance
Director does help the organization focus on in terms of what is important.
So I may not work any harder because I know we need to
improve these quality scores on this five items by 50%. I am
going to do that anyway. But what it does force is the
organization [chuckle] to declare what are we going to work on
improving next year. It helps focus.
Quality and Physicians are here to do the high tech really cutting edge stuff. Individual incentives
Safety And surgeries are really what generates revenue here and that is
Director kind of the sexy work to do. Enterprise history and
... culture
even among the specialties my opinion is that the surgeon in
terms of stature is higher than the other medical specialty. The
CEO is a surgeon, the prior CEO is a surgeon, ... Focus on procedures
[ ...]I
generally the operative services generate more revenue than the
medical services.
Quality and The community would never accept having a tertiary medical Enterprise history and
Safety center in this area without an ED. They would feel that we weren't culture
Director meeting the needs of the community. If [Hospital XYZ] had its
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way it wouldn't have an ED. It would primarily be a surgical
facility and a specialty hospital, in the sense that not every
specialty here is a surgical specialty, so there is still a
commitment to and a focus on medical specialty. But even among
the specialties my opinion is that the surgeon in terms of stature is
higher than the other medical specialty. The CEO is a surgeon,
the prior CEO is a surgeon, ... generally the operative services
generate more revenue than the medical services.
Quality and That is the part that you may be cautioned about... because I think Enterprise history and
Safety that the ED in part understands this... It is with some reluctance culture
Director that there is investment made in that area, because it is not the
engine. Enterprise cultural
harmony
Improvement I need a patient flow steering committee. We had one 5 months Cross departmental
Project ago but it got disbanded because it wasn't working as well as it management boards
Manager could and because[the Chief of Strategy] got really busy with
other stuff. I think we need more of the middle managers on this
committee rather than what we had before [too high level].
Process What is going to happen with this new process engineer is that Enterprise history and
Improvement they are going to primarily stick this person in the operating culture
Project services in the operating room. 80% of that person's time will be
Manager just doing the OR stuff. The OR they say is where the money
happens. The surgery is a lot more profitable than the medical.
Process I need a patient flow steering committee. We had one 5 months Leadership acceptance
Improvement ago but it got disbanded because it wasn't working as well as it by internal
Project could and because[the Chief of Strategy] got really busy with stakeholders
Manager other stuff. I think we need more of the middle managers on this
committee rather than what we had before [too high level].
Administrative Support Services Knowledge View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Associate We run a very interesting report from Pyxis. We have the Pyxis Organizational
Chief Nurse OR management system. So I can give you any statistic that you learning capability:
Perioperative wanted, and one of the statistics that we decided to look at was unable to improve at
Services how long do patients wait in the OR. Sometimes we have as enterprise level due to
many as 8% of patients waiting in the OR to go to the ambulatory fragmented systems
PACU. If you correlate that back to the ED I bet you'll see a
sharing of beds [the ED was getting the beds and holding up the
OR flow]
Associate What happened in the main recovery room... in the last 2 months I Knowledge transfer
Chief Nurse have lost 7 nurses for working there. When you go to work in the requirements
Perioperative recovery room you want the patients to recover. Like in the
Services emergency room, you want to the patients to come into the ED, to
be seen, and to home or someplace. So you have nurses that
choose their specific areas [for a given type of patient population].
An ED nurse did not choose that area because she thought she
could take care of 18 patients overnight. She thought maybe 2
might, but 18 is too much. So that is huge for us to train now 7
more nurses. To really train a good PACU nurses we can have
them trained in 4 to 5 months.
Associate You say it 5 times, and you probably need to say it 5 times more Knowledge transfer
Chief Nurse so that it gets implemented and part of the culture. requirements
Med/Surg
Associate There are processes for nurses to capture information in form Organizational
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Chief Nurse format. However that form gets sent somewhere and sometimes learning capability:
Med/Surg you want to be able to revisit the form and you don't have an easy unable to retrieve
way to access the form. information
Planning Leadership support for data transparency is very variable across Knowledge access
Director specialties. Department like orthopedics, doctor [X] has been into priveleges/restrictions
data for a long time. I would say if there is a grand daddy of data
collection at [Hospital XYZ] it is probably doctor [X]. In an
access database. It is "their" access database, because that is the
right adjective, and published papers with that data. They look at
what we are trying to do skeptically.
Planning A coke and chocolate cookies can get you the data from the OR. I Knowledge access
Director stole a file from them like that otherwise I couldn't see what data priveleges/restrictions
they had. The number one asset that [Hospital XYZ] has is its
people. The number two asset is the OR, and I can prove that by
shutting it down for a day.
Administrativ e Support Services Information View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Associate We run a very interesting report from Pyxis. We have the Pyxis Information systems
Chief Nurse OR management system. So I can give you any statistic that you integrationC isolated
Perioperative wanted, and one of the statistics that we decided to look at was systems prevent cross
Services how long do patients wait in the OR. Sometimes we have as referencing workflow
many as 8% of patients waiting in the OR to go to the ambulatory info
PACU. If you correlate that back to the ED I bet you'll see a
sharing of beds [the ED was getting the beds and holding up the Workflow
OR flow] information system
Associate Usually around 9.30 today we would gather around a table and we Information systems
Chief Nurse sit as nurses, we don't really have physicians sitting with us at that integration: hourly
Perioperative time, and we decide who is going to get them [the beds] now. system updates sent
Services Hour by hour we are saying who is going to get what. At that time over email
an email usually goes out saying to discharge all your patients and
we just hope that we can keep the ED and the OR going. The
physicians aren't involved at all unless I get the impression that
we have to cancel a [elective] case.
Associate There are processes for nurses to capture information in form Prevalence of paper
Chief Nurse format. However that form gets sent somewhere and sometimes information systems:
Med/Surg you want to be able to revisit the form and you don't have an easy hinders org learning
way to access the form. capability
Planning The concern physicians have with transparency is whether the Data reliability
Director data is valid.
Planning The patient left the hospital on September 12th, [the medical Information
Director record] goes to medical records and is coded by the coders in timeliness
medical records. The data gets into meditech and it is held in
meditech until the 1st of October. The 1st of October that data is Prevalence of paper
picked up and sent into Eclipsis. On the 15th of October it is information systems
picked up by us, we run a report out of Eclipsis, and we send it to
Premier. Premirer processes it and within a week sends us back an
error report, and which within a week we have to correct... we
don't know the zip code, we don't know who this doctor is, etc. By
November 1st the patient data is audited and available for the
government. They run about 2 to 3 months behind [the data].
Planning We are unable to pull data from the OR as they are using their Information systems
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Director own excel sheet systems and we have not been able to integrate integration
that data.
Planning Leadership support for data transparency is very variable across Information systems
Director specialties. Department like orthopedics, doctor [X] has been into integration
data for a long time. I would say if there is a grand daddy of data
collection at [Hospital XYZ] it is probably doctor [X]. In an Prevalence of
access database. It is "their" access database, because that is the cultural silos: local
right adjective, and published papers with that data. They look at leadership dependant
what we are trying to do skeptically.
Planning This is a huge system that runs once a month and takes almost 4 Information
Director days to get this data out. It isn't operational data timeliness
Process The philosophy at [Hospital XYZ] is that for each individual Information systems
Improvement application we want to get the best software and then afterwards integration
Project we'll figure out how to tie it all together.
Manager
Process The T system data isn't reliable because different nurses write Data reliability
Improvement their notes in different ways. Some write the notes into the T
Project system immediately after the physician sees the patient. Others
Manager write the notes in a batch process and assign the same time of
observation to every patient. It is very difficult to figure out what
the precise timings are in each stage of the process.
Planning Decision support data is finalized billing data. Because of the way Workflow
Director healthcare is managed and billed there is a tremendous amount of information system
detail that is captured in each transction. We use 250 fields from
Meditech Patient record
[... ] systems
All the measures that people want to do it nationally are based on
something that everybody does. And in order to do that you need External payer
to abstract data from the chart, and use the same coding for the influence
same procedures, everybody does that, it is called administrative
data. All the national measures are based of administrative data.
[... ]
All the care that we are supposed to provide and we measure are
defined in terms of the core measures. Strict definitions, national
definitions, about what you look for, what has to be documented,
and what you are supposed to do. Pneumonia needs antibiotics 4
hours, a heart attack needs an aspirin, etc.
c. Senior Leadership
Senior Leadership External View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
COO There is a company out there that is part of hertz publications that is Vendor
called Zynx, and they publish evidence based guidelines and are influence/pressure
constantly monitoring the literature, and they have a collaborative
workspace environment where groups can collaborate, modify, or
change guidelines, and they have the ability to move you from what
you should do to the evidence if you want to see why they are saying
this is the right thing to do
COO And the other element is that out in the community, economically Provider
physicians are interested in throughput, so a complicated case even referral/influence
if they could do it, it means that it takes them away from churning
out 20 cases, because those are the high margin low effort cases, Why community
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when they get to high effort less margin, that is what they get to
refer to the academic medical centers sometimes because it screws
up their practice. So they don't want to deal with an obese person
who weights 290 pounds who needs their gallbladder out, because
something bad might happen, it is more complex surgery, it is
riskier, so they rather deal with healthy people who need their
gallbladder out, so they refer the complicated case to the academic
center because it is not economically advantageous to them to do all
those complicated cases.
Insurance companies, health plans, think about population based
medicine, we spent a lot of time thinking about this when I was in
the managed care side, and by that what they focus on is, "we've got
a certain amount of money to take care of a population of patients
and they think about what is the best way to invest that money to
prevent illness, to screen and detect illness and treat it quickly before
it gets worse than it needs to be, so if you look at the national
measures of health plan performance, you see things like breast
cancer screening or cervical cancer screening, or colon rectal cancer
screening, or smoking cessation programs, and a whole bunch of that
stuff, pediatric immunization, it is about either preventing disease or
early detection and treatment of disease before it gets down the path,
and a lot of management ideally focused on patient education self
management and out patient management of chronic diseases like
asthma and diabetes, you get an annual eye exam, an annual foot
exam, you manage your blood sugar levels and all that stuff.
[...]
More on the preventive side and they have an incentive to do that
because they want to keep people out of the doctors office, out of the
emergency room, out of the hospitals, because each of those gets
more and more expensive, and if in one patient you have to spend a
lot of money on then you don't have much more money to spend on
other patients, and it drives up costs overall.
[...]
Makes great sense from an overall financial perspective and from a
population health perspective. I don't dispute for a second that the
best things that we could do are to keep healthy people healthy,
keeping them from getting sick, keep sick people from getting any
sicker, manage the chronic diseases, those are the two best things
that you can do. However when we have these contractual
arrangements with insurance companies, in general, not in every
case, but it is very difficult to make money within health patient
primary care practice. That is not how we at [Hospital XYZ] make
money. We don't make money from our patient primary care. We
have a lot of outpatient primary care, but we don't make money
from it. We would make more money from specialty care. We make
our money from procedures, surgeries, from admissions to the
hospital, so exactly the things that the health plans would like to
prevent that is what we make our money from.
hospitals refer to
them
Payer system
influence/pressure
Misalignment
between insurance
companies and
acute care hospitals
COO We are going to find that some of these patients should not spend Patient
any time in the ED. behavior/impact
COO There are a set of variables that patients are interested in and that Patient
you can define. And not every one of them is applicable in each behavior/impact
situation. If you get to the emergency room now. Emergency rooms
do a lot of things, and not all the care that the patient needs is given, Process complexity
even though they show up in the emergency room. So, first you have
how patients come into the emergency room and their expectations,
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Chief of
Strategy
because some of them come in ambulances, some of them are
unconscious, and some of them drive themselves, and some of them
come from work because they have a work related injury. So you
have a whole different set of expectations
COO One of the other really unique things of healthcare as a service Patient
oriented business as compared to manufacturing is that our behavior/impact
customers interfere with our operations and change the process, so if
they come in late, or if they don't want to have their surgery and Service architecture
they rather have medicine... So unlike manufacturing where you management
own and control all the inputs and you put something together, in the (internal and
healthcare case, the input is actually interfering with the process so it external)
becomes a very dynamic role. So that is the second big thing that is
important in healthcare. Our customer has a very big impact in our
operational process and we have to understand that.
It is very difficult to sustain healthcare improvements when you try
to manage a process on top of the existing structure of healthcare.
Healthcare is becoming more and more fragmented. Places like
[Hospital XYZ] have a little better chance of making care integrated
because we start with a group practice and so we collect data on our
physicians both when they are seeing outpatients and when they are
seeing inpatients, so one of the really fundamental characteristics
that we have is that all of the data has always been practiced as a
team, and whether it is in the inpatient or outpatient setting, we have
had ways of keeping data together. So before we had electronic
solutions we all wrote in one medical record and that stands in
contrast if you go to [big competitor A] or the [big competitor B]
where each physician group has an independent practice plan, and
the hospital is an independent corporation from the physicians so
what goes on in the physician office is totally unknown to the
hospital, and what happens in the hospital that information is not in
the physician office, and physicians communicate with each other so
there is more than one way to get good care, so if you go to one
doctor and he wants to send you the next he says "Hi Dr. Jones I
would like you to look at Ms Smith, I have this irregular feeling in
her abdomen. Could you please review it and let me know what you
think?". Then the patient has to make a separate appointment to go
to Dr. Jones office, where he may get some tests, and the doctor sets
a whole new medical record in his office because that is all the
information he has. Then Dr. Jones sends a letter of his findings to
the other office and you store that. So having that information
together we have this integrated view of the world, but the rest of the
world is pretty fragmented and if you are out there in a community
hospital and see Dr. Jones, and he wants you to get an X-ray, you
have to call up the hospital to get an x-ray, wait in line, tell the
hospital to send it to Dr. Jones, then Dr. Jones sees you again and
sends all the information to another doctor, etc. So it is a fragmented
system to begin with.
Industry history,
evolution, and
context
Points towards how
Hospital XYZ
perceives its
competitive
advantage
(integrated, single
record, etc).
Chief of For some time, we were the primary care provider but we would Payer system
Strategy have staff for when someone would want to go to a doctor outside influence/pressure
[Hospital XYZ], we would call them up and work with them to see if
we could meet their needs inside [Hospital XYZ] and keep them Extended enterprise
there. We got rid of those positions now because we don't need management
them. Capitation has gone away so we no longer have the incentive (payment changed,
to keep them here for everything. so enterprise
I boundary changed)
COO We have a tremendous amount of mandates both legal and moral in Regulatory
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COO
terms of our quality. In addition dminis we are trying to improve requirements and
the quality of care. It gets very difficult to sustain a change for an oversight
extended period of time in the healthcare system.
CFO Whatever path one might take, the administrative simplification is Payer system
important. If you think about the healthcare about the healthcare influence/pressure
dollar today, 10 cents on every dollar goes to pay the insurance
company overhead and Administrative cost, and when it comes to Industry history,
the provider community in the hospital 50 cents goes to some sort of evolution, and
overhead, and the physician practice probably comes to 20 to 25 context
cents of overhead, you think about what is left over for the patient
and it is really a little amount. Everything we have come up in this
industry is complex on the administrative side.
CFO Another failure of capitation was the inability to really track what Industry history,
was going on, the lack of predictability, the health plan information evolution, and
was six months off because they didn't share information among context
themselves.
Capitation failure
CFO One of the things that I seem to struggle with all the time I speak Payer system
with health plans and they don't get there is the fact that how they influence/pressure
pay us holds no relationship to what it costs us to deliver. So if you
look at [Hospital XYZ], we have the hospital in patient practice, a Different insurers
hospital outpatient inside practice, and physician group practice, and reward more
[large health insurer A] likes to put their money in the hospital in favorably different
patient side, I think they think they can control that better because it types of care
is lower volume, then the hospital outpatient has the next grade of
payment with the doctors at the bottom end of the scale, and [large Financial numbers
health insurer B] might be completely the other away, and [large not indicative of
health insurer C] might be somewhere in the middle. If you are performance
trying to manage an institution, let us take a look at our department
and see who the winners and losers are... it is a function of where Strategy dilution
insurance companies are putting their money, it is not a function of
how well the physicians are performing, or how productive they are,
or how efficient they are, so we look at this and say we have to be
careful about what type of decisions the insurers make. So we have
tried to explain that to the health plans, in saying that we are trying
to manage the business we would like to be able to apply our cost
accounting standards and look at our reimbursements to truly
understand how we are doing in our different areas in the
organization, and at the end of the day we end up having to take
wherever the money will come from, and I am certainly not going to
say that we don't want all this money to go into inpatient because we
are making a profit there and you are not willing to give it to our
group practice therefore we will forego it, so at the end of the day
we take whatever way we will get it, but at the end of the day I
would like to see a better distribution of how the payments get made
in that regard, and I am sure we are probably not alone in that
analysis.
COO On the cost side, both the employers and the insurers... there is no Industry history,
system of care. As I say, what we have now are random acts of evolution, and
clinical improvement where people decide this year we are going to context
work on this, this year we are going to work on that, ... there is no
systematic approach to healthcare in the united states, either by the Payer system
government or by the healthcare industry, and that is a real problem. influence/pressure
And there are models of improvement that could be applied to
healthcare, which basically say that you start with the sickest people, Lack of direction in
then you move to the less sick, then you move to wellness, then you the US in terms of
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go up to the top. And those are effective models that could be
approved and applied to healthcare. But there isn't any.
It could be AIDS advocates that get the government to spend a
zillion dollars to this, or breast cancer, or heart disease... From the
insurers again, there are short term savings which have to do with
end of life issues and admissions to the hospital. There is a long term
strategy which is keeping people well, so where you want to save
your money is very... trying to understand your goal is very critical
on that regard. It is not all the same. The strategy to save a lot of
money in the short term with the patient is much different, and
society is much different, than saving money in the long term as a
strategy. We are just shooting like a shot gun all over the place and
there isn't any systematic rationale.
Wouldn't it be great if the united states said ok we want every state
to focus on diabetes, and we are going to reduce, everybody is going
to be incentivized to just improve the entire quality of our diabetic
population, or obesity, or pick anything that you want, until you
reach this social goal. And we are going to take every tool that is
available to us, in every state in the united states,... or we are going
to focus on the sickest patients who account for the most money...
or we are going to try to keep everybody well in the next five years
so that they get less sick.
what to improve on.
Different payers
focus on different
things. In a way
fueling Hospital
XYZ strategy of
focusing on multiple
things.
COO The other element is all about brand. If [big competitor A] is Patient
perceived to be best than [Hospital XYZ] for this kind of procedure, behavior/impact
but the objective data says that they are the same. America is built
on advertising and brand recognition, so I still want to go to that Enterprise strategy
other place because in my mind they are better, or they demand Reputation
more money in the market place even though they are less efficient.
COO what is happening now is that we have 15 different things that Payer system
everybody is asking us to do, and they are not all the same, and they influence/pressure
are all trying to tie a reward to them in pay for performance.
[ ... I Strategy dilution
the government is doing it the slightly in the opposite way which
says, if you don't report this we are going to pay you a little less
COO If the word gets out that we have the best product at the lowest cost Payer system
out in the retail world people will buy what we have and more influence/pressure
people will come and I will make a bigger profit and that is sort of
how it works. But in the healthcare world if we are more efficient Ability to negotiate
than the [big competitor A] there still isn't any way of driving more with insurers. No
business to us. incentive to become
efficient because
Suppose our quality is the same as the one provided elsewhere but insurers take that
we can do it for less, society should figure out a way to reward us margin away.
and try to have people come to us for less. But that part of the
equation is still missing a holistic view. What the insurers want to do
is drive the patient to us, so that the cost will go down to our cost,
not to allow us to increase the margin.
[...]
what the government and the insurers want to do is if they pay us
[Hospital XYZ] 15K in order to survive, we figure out how to do it
for 10 K, once they figure out we know how to do it for ten they
lower the reimbursement from 15 K to 10K and say that we
[Hospital XYZ] are making too much.
COO If in the long term you want to keep people healthy, like diabetes, Payer system
that can take up to 20 years to realize the savings, because you don't influence/pressure
get the eye disease, or you don't get the vascular complications,
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things like that... so in the high risk patient population management
side, the notion that 5% of the patients account for 40% of the cost,
it is not a Gaussian curve... if you manage that % of the population
you actually get the immediate savings and the per member per
month cost for those people are 1200 to 1300 per month compared to
60 or 70 for a healthy person... so during capitation that is something
that we did, and we actually did it so well that Blue Cross didn't
believe that we should make all that money under capitation and
then we had our little... [pause] experience. This model was designed
to keep patients away from the healthcare system. We take care of
sick patients really well, but the goal is to keep them away from the
healthcare system because as soon as they get into the healthcare
system they cost a ton of money. And that is a different business of
what we do.
COO For us [Medicare] represents 45% of our business. That is a lot Payer system
because in [our State] we have a lot of elderly people. In other parts influence/pressure
of the country it may only represent 15% and there may be parts of
NY city, or other places, where it might be 55%. But the national
average, probably I bet, less than 20%.
COO If you are an academic medical center the other issue is teaching Payer system
costs. The only insurer that actually itemizes a certain amount of influence/pressure
cost that a payer that pays for teaching people is Medicare. No
private insurance includes for those hospitals that have teaching Enterprise strategy:
programs any additional negotiated cost for the teaching program. Teaching /cost
So Medicare has the burden for paying for all the teaching. And they shifting
obviously keep cutting the cost so we have to try to figure out again
how we can negotiate rates around our private insurers to overcome
that and include the teaching cost, but the private insurers will not
acknowledge that there is such a thing as a payment structure for
teaching.
So Medicare is the only insurer that identifies a certain amount of
money and a formula, based on how many residents and fellows you
have. But it is not limitless. They set a cap. And at [Hospital XYZ]
we are over that cap and we have to eat the cost of all the additional
people.
COO Then there is the government that has a big say on what happens. Regulatory
The government overnight can change healthcare from both a requirements and
regulatory and a payment structure. It has that much influence. oversight
COO Now the way the healthcare system works Medicare continues to Payer system
underpay. We lose money on Medicare patients in the united states. influence/pressure
So the private insurers. We have to negotiate more money for them
to cover the losses we have for Medicare. They get their money from Enterprise strategy:
the employers. So basically the employers are paying higher cost shifting
premiums in order to subsidize the governments health insurance
program. And that is the current state of the model certainly in [US
region X] and probably in the US in general.
We need more than Medicare in order to cover the cost of the
enterprise and that comes from the payers. Now the insurers charge
people premiums but the employers pay on a claims based program,
and the insurance companies make money on the float, so they get
all the premium dollars coming in every month and they invest it,
and then as claims come in they send the bill to the company based
on the claim, and the company pays the insurance company any
difference.
And then every one of the companies has a whole series of
consultants that are constantly trying to sell them a better way to
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save money in their healthcare, from the insurance companies and
us. So that is a whole other industry that they in order to continue to
exist, those consultants, they have to work with the benefit managers
of the companies and say to them "why don't you do that to the
providers!", "why don't you cost shift that to your employees", or
"why don't you do that to the insurers".
COO we are fee for service... but the way the government pays... the way Payer system
Medicare pays for a hospitalization is a DRG, so they give you a influence/pressure
fixed payment based on a severity index, so if you are more efficient
than the average, meaning that your length of stay is lower for
instance than what their payment is based on average, then the odds
are you will be able to have a better margin. And if you have fewer
complication etc...
COO Financials we do have obviously metrics... and those relate Payer system
obviously to the way that we are currently paid influence/pressure
COO [JO: What are some of the main regulation changes that had a Regulatory
significant effect in the way that you provide care?] requirements and
One of them is HIPAA, privacy act, in the recent past. The second is oversight
public reporting requirements. The third would be payment
structures. HIPAA made things better. Public reporting requirements Payer system
made things better. I believe in those. influence/pressure
The payment structure is mixed. It is better because in some areas
where we all agree that we have good measures the idea of paying
for performance makes sense. Where it is bad, is that people are
saying that but their real goal is just to reduce cost, not to really
provide better care.
Where it advances safety and quality and performance it is good, but
where it is a way to save money, from our perspective, it is not good.
And sometimes the payment structure has a perverse alignment,
where it rather than achieving what it desires it actually
incentivizes... it either puts in conflict physicians and institutions, or
it incentivizes the wrong behavior.
[...]
[JO: Do you feel that you can influence regulation?]
[interviewee pauses for 30 seconds]
I don't know the answer to that. I would say that I am an idealist so I
would say yes. But I think that regulation occurs, and I think there
are mechanisms where we do have input so I would say yes. Do I
think that we have an opportunity to regulate industry sufficiently.
That we have as much clout as we should have in terms of protecting
our patients, no.
Yes we have an opportunity to influence regulation. Is our
importance reflected in the weight of that, I would say no.
Chief of [community hospital X] were facing tremendous pressure from Provider
Strategy [downtown hospital network], "send those referrals to us or you are competition pressure
out of our network".
Chief of If you go to the emergency room because you have acute abdominal Patient
Strategy pain, if they discharge you, and you go home, you might pay a $50 behavior/impact
or $100 co-pay if you've got an HMO, but if they admit you and
then remove your gall bladder you don't have to pay anything. It is
probably a covered benefit. You are not going to pay a co-pay for
the emergency room if you get admitted, so no consequences...
which is not to say that it is an elective thing. So the system we have
has disconnected the consumer from the financial consequences.
Chief of we [Hospital XYZ] negotiate with [lists 6 large insurance Payer system
Strategy companies], etc and so we have lots and lots of different contracts influence/pressure
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and the way the contracts are scheduled and the fee schedules, it
could be that 10 different people come in to get an MRI of their hip
and we can get reimbursed 10 different amounts of money for the
exact same MRI because there are contractual differences across the
different insurance companies that we have contracts with.
Managing that complexity, and they each have got computer systems
configured to do this, because they have got a contract on the
insurance side, they have got a contract with us, they have got a
contract with [big competitor A], and guess what, the contract is the
same, not the same amount, so they have to configure once the bill
comes in which benefit plan is it, who is the provider, what is our
contract with the provider, what should we be reimbursing. We have
different contracts with different insurance plans, they have got
different contracts with all the different provider organizations, and
they may have different contracts because on the insurance side
some employers will buy particular insurance products, other
employers will say I am going to be self insured and I don't want
you to insure me and I just want you to process the bills, so there
are going to be administrative services only
So you have the health plans and they have tremendous power
because they control the flow of the money from the employers, who
really don't know much about health insurance, to the providers.
And from an overall system efficiency point of view I will tell you
that a single payer system would absolutely be the most efficient
system. The health plans are just taking the money out of the system
to do administrative work. When I was in a health plan, there are
some thing they do and they are important, but I will come back to
that. When I was working in managed care I actually thought we had
an impact on quality of care. I was deluded. When you come here
you realize that the payers are virtually invisible when it comes to
the impact on the quality of care. The exception is where we have
pay for performance programs, they are financial incentives
pipelines, namely where we negotiate with an insurer that we are
going to do X, Y, and Z, and if we achieve certain performance
targets they will give us additional reimbursements beyond our
contractual agreements. So beyond that, they are invisible.
Hospital XYZ
negotiates different
pricesfor the same
procedurefor
different insurers.
Payer system
influence/pressure
Insurance
companies only
represent
administrative cost.
Only direct impact
on improving things
is via negotiated pay
for performance
contract clauses.
Chief of The other place they [health plans] tend to get involved, though Payer system
Strategy consumers tend to push back, is if they have pre certification or influence/pressure
approval requirements, you know before you can have that operation
the case manager or insurance company needs to approve it, before
you can have the MRI you first need to decide whether it is
medically appropriate, and that is the only other place they get
involved. But by enlarge their power comes through the fact that
they control de flow of money, they don't really impact quality of
care on a very significant scale.
Chief of when Medicare sees utilization of something climbing they say "Ups Payer system
Strategy we have got one pool of money, a finite pie, we see utilization of influence/pressure
something going up, we reduce the reimbursement for it.". It doesn't
matter if the demand is there, if the need is greater. There is no
discussion.
Chief of what we are going to pay. Because that is their size... that is Payer system
Strategy federally legislated... and done. There is no negotiating. Which is influence/pressure
one of the reasons why private employers are subsidizing Medicare
and Medicaid in a big way. I mean that is one of the dirty little Cost shifting
secrets in healthcare. They are subsidizing... the rates we charge...
we have to make sure from a provider end... once you get to the
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Chief of
Strategy
, 
I
provider end... the providers have to make sure they get rates from
the commercial health insurers that will not only cover their cost but
generate a margin to subsidize the things that we do for Medicare
and Medicaid or we lose money.
Chief of Insurance companies know who are the frequent flyers and they Payer system
Strategy have programs in place to manage those people. We used to when influence/pressure
we were in capitation, we had a program in place to manage our
capitated highest risk, high volume utilizers, they are usually people Hospital XYZ used
with multiple chronic conditions and they are in the top 1% to 5% in to curb patient
terms of utilization, consuming 20% to 30% of the resources. behavior in a
capitated
environment
Chief of 5 years ago no community hospital was able to perform a cardio Industry history,
Strategy angioplasty procedure, however it is becoming more of a commodity evolution, and
nowadays, so community hospitals are being able to perform them. context
Commoditization of
medicine. Pressure
to remain cutting
edge
Chief of The economic reason to do the reengineering of healthcare... Industry history,
Strategy Premium rate increases that the insurers are charging employers, evolution, and
they have been double digit increases every year, but it will come a context
time when they will be binned into single digit. When that happens
our expenses will outpace our revenues because medical inflation, Payer system
because drug alluded stent $3000, versus a plane stent of $800. influence/pressure
Laparoscopic surgery is less invasive, faster recovery, back to work
faster, who reaps the financial benefit of that, not us. Laparoscopic
surgery the supplies are more expensive, you are out of the hospital
faster, the OR time is more, so it is a longer case and more expensive
case, you are back to work faster, you get a shorter length of stay,
and we get paid less of a DRG. The economics drive the imperative
to constantly find ways of doing things more and more efficiently
and at lower and lower cost just to survive. If you don't find ways of
doing things differently you are on a collision course with the
flattening out of the premium reimbursement rates of insurance
companies.
Chief of We have many different goals which has partly confused the Payer system
Strategy improvement effort because the improvement effort can be the same, influence/pressure
I can want to improve congested of heart failure in my hospital A,
and someone can want to improve congested heart failure at hospital Strategy dillution
B, but the customer they are doing it for can be completely different.
In some cases they don't even know who the customer is, they are
just doing it because CMS is not going to pay you unless you get
better.
Senior Leadership Strategy View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Chief of We are never going to have pathways, standard orders, evidence Enterprise Strategy
Strategy based treatment recommendations, whatever you want to call it, for
everything. It is not going to happen. There are always going to be Cutting edge starts
either patients that are so complex. We don't just come as a diabetic, at Hospital XYZ
or come as a patient with hyper tension... you may be a diabetic that
has hyper tension, high cholesterol, and maybe a bit of asthma, who
knows! All the evidence based guidelines those are all about "this is
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what we do for diabetes", "this is what we do for asthma", "this is
what we do for COPD". Those things are developed for diseases not
for people. And then there is going to be cutting edge which will
introduce variability to improve.
CFO From a realistic perspective, politically it would be a hard sell here Enterprise Strategy
probably [to hold back on the new ED] because the CEO getting in
and even long before the Board approving the project, told the whole Politics rather than
department "you are getting a new ER". He was way ahead of the rest common sense
of us, and probably, I wish he hadn't gotten so far and so fast. I would
love that most, if not all the time, decisions were made based with
good sense and facts, but unfortunately politics don't lend themselves
to that.
COO And then we targeted a growth strategy for key specialties or service Enterprise Strategy
lines. That is another thing I did 7 years ago, where I divided the
[Hospital XYZ] up into service lines which now people are starting to
talk about. So we had a cardiovascular and a neuroscience, a men's
health, a women's health, and a cancer service line, and we basically
targeted growth in those areas where we thought that
epidemiologically played to the public and also where we could be
very strong.
Chief of when we have these contractual arrangements with insurance Enterprise Strategy
Strategy companies, in general, not in every case, but it is very difficult to
make money within health patient primary care practice. That is not
how we at [Hospital XYZ] make money. We don't make money from
our patient primary care. We have a lot of outpatient primary care,
but we don't make money from it. We would make more money from
specialty care. We make our money from procedures, surgeries
Chief of At the heart of it all [Hospital XYZ] is something that is unique in its Enterprise Strategy
Strategy market place. We are an integrated multi specialty group practice.
Ten years ago there was all this talk about integrated care delivery Industry history and
groups and we were already an integrated care facility. evolution
There were all sorts of mergers and affiliations all designed to cobble
together the different parts of [Hospital XYZ], potentially a very
fragmented healthcare system
Chief of We are really trying to serve two big categories of patients. We Enterprise Strategy
Strategy provide comprehensive care, primary care and tertiary care, for
people who live within 20 miles, we can offer you everything that Strategy conflict
you need in a convenient way. We are not down town. We are
located out of highways. Then in certain targeted areas, where we Most revenuefrom
believe our clinical expertise is so good that we can do this, we are a state
regional and in some cases national center of excellence, to serve a
population that has the need to serve such subspecialty services and is
willing and able to travel to get it.
We cannot easily break down the revenues from each of these two
groups. 80% of patients come from [our State]. 10% come from
[northem State] 5% come from other [adjacent States], and the other
5% from other parts of the country.
CFO I wonder if there is enough new activity in the new ED to pay for a Enterprise
$25M project. This is a heavy weighted project... I still can't get over transformation
the $25M... I have seen the presentation 2 or 3 times and it is not the strategic scope
presentation wasn't good, but when they go away, my mind still says narrow thinking
to myself "that is an awful lot amount of money for this amount of that ED has to pay
space". for itself
service architecture
awareness
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COO One of our ways to develop a specialty network... On selective ways Enterprise Strategy
we opened up our technology to attract private physicians to bring
their patients and we would allow them to use our technology Enterprise history
provided that they had the training or could be trained. This was and culture
different than the [big competitor A] or [big competitor B] model
who considered their doctors a different breed than everyone else and Extended enterprise
that only they could operate with the cutting edge technology. We management
allowed specialists in the community to use the [Hospital XYZ]
technology that wasn't available. And we did the other thing where if
there was a gap in the medical staff in the community hospital, we
sent our specialist out there, to cover the emergency room, do local
cases in the local hospital, and bring the complicated cases back to
[Hospital XYZ].
Chief of [Close by Community Hospital] sends cardiac patients here, the Enterprise Strategy
Strategy medical director of their cath lab is Dr. X, our chairman of Extended enterprise
cardiology, they send us angioplasties, they send us open heart cases management
Chief of Another thing we will do is to partner with other facilities and partner Enterprise Strategy
Strategy with other physician organizations, and have[Hospital
XYZ]physicians go do work in other places in areas where it Enterprise history
complements the other organization. When we do that we give and culture
something to them but we also get something back. The best example
might be neuro surgery since there is a shortage of neuro surgeons in Extended enterprise
the market place, we have six or seven neuro surgeons here. management
[Community hospital X] has no neuro surgeons. We worked out an
arrangement with Emerson hospital where two of our neuro surgeons
go there, they have a clinic there one or two days a week, they will do
some minor neuro surgery patients at [community] hospital and their
OR, any complex cases they bring back here. We are talking with
other hospitals to get our neuro surgeons there. The reason we can do
that is that they are able to handle some neuro surgery cases there and
meet the needs of the community they serve, and we get referrals for
the complex cases that come back here. We get to build a stronger
and larger neuro surgery department because we already have a
critical mass, and are more attractive practice for a neuro surgeon to
come. We have a leg up on the community hospitals to hire neuro
surgeons and are more successful at it, but then we can partner with
the community hospitals. We don't want to put the community
hospitals out of business because we don't want to do all the stuff
that they do. But we can do things that will complement them. And
what we rather do is more tertiary services.
COO If you look at the other models of the [big competitor A], the [big Enterprise Strategy
competitor B], and [competitor C]... over 150 years they have trained
all of these fellows, and then the fellows go out and practice in the Importance of
community, and they know the professor who trained them, and if training doctors
there is a patient they can't handle they refer to him. So these referral
channels.. .a significant number of those referral channels come in
because you train fellows and they go out in the community and they
know you and they refer back. And another set get referred in
because your reputation grows as a physician and as an organization
and people say "that is the greatest place in the world to get your
heart done, I'm going to go there, don't know any doctors but
everybody says that they are great so I'm going to go there". Now
[Hospital XYZ] was very new and it didn't train a lot of fellows at
that time so those relationships are built at a physician and physician
level based on trust. So if we put our physicians there, and they refer
a patient to our doctor, the patient is seen quickly, the medical care
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provided is excellent, and our doctor communicates well with that
physician, and the patient comes back and says "I had a great
experience, that was a great doctor" they are likely to refer another
patient.
COO And another set get referred in because your reputation grows as a Enterprise strategy
physician and as an organization and people say "that is the greatest
place in the world to get your heart done, I'm going to go there, don't Enterprise history
know any doctors but everybody says that they are great so I'm going and culture
to go there".
[...]
[Hospital XYZ] is known as a diagnostic center where if no one can
figure out what is wrong with you, you should come to the [Hospital
XYZ]. And also for tertiary and quaternary care at a very high level
surgical as well as medically the excellence of very complicated
difficult cases.
Chief of We cannot afford to let go the big chunk that we get from our own Enterprise strategy
Strategy [surroundings and State].
There are not enough liver transplants in our market to justify the Geographic reach
expense and keep busy for liver transplant surgeons. So in that case
you have to drive from the big market.
If you look specialty by specialty it varies the extent to which they
drive from the smaller geography or the much larger one.
COO I think that our goal is to advance the model of care that provides the Enterprise strategy
best care to the citizens of the united states, and do that in a way that
we can survive currently, but anticipate that that model will bring us
even stronger financial results as the payment system gets aligned to Hospitalfinancial
that model. And we think... I personally believe that multi specialty incentives
group practices is where America will find its model for care, and
really needs to think about how it can realign the payment practices
to support that model.
Chief of Well, it is still an HMO, but you can go anywhere, and we don't get Enterprise strategy
Strategy paid based on capitation. So our incentive is to work to attract
patients to the services that we excel in and that we make a better Hospitalfinancial
margin from and that are really core to our mission. So we can grow incentives
those services. But for example, since primary care is not the most
lucrative thing, we don't want the biggest primary care practice Payer system
around, we would love to have one of the biggest surgical practices influence: if
around, and so we are focused on growing and attracting patients to primary care was
that because patients have choice. They can go anywhere and they lucrative they would
can come to [Hospital XYZ]. In fact it is part of our advertising invest in it
campaign because for a while people were convinced by their doctors
that they couldn't go outside their doctors network and you used to
think that you had to be somebody special, or that you had to belong
to [Hospital XYZ] to come here. In our adds we say "Do you have to
be somebody special to come to [Hospital XYZ]? No. Anybody can
come to [Hospital XYZ]. Just call this number or go to
www.whatever".
Chief of The reason it [capitation] fell apart is that to do that we really need to Enterprise strategy
Strategy be responsible for all of their care. We can do everything except
obstetrics, so we don't want them going to Winchester hospital. So Enterprise history
we don't want them to go to a gastro enologist that is outside of and culture
[Hospital XYZ]. We want all of their care to be in the[Hospital Capitation failure
XYZ]system. And that created boundaries and barriers that the
patients didn't like, and the patients rebelled against it because it
restricted their choice, and then pushed backed on the insurance
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companies and employers, and capitation is now dead. Gone. We
don't have capitation any longer. Here by enlarge in this state
capitation is dead.
Chief of
Strategy
We want to be the provider. You wont see it written down like this.
There are a bunch of goals about quality and safety, and investing in
technology, etc, some of that is about sustaining the organization. But
our growth priorities really have to do, if you want to think in terms
of market share, or patient volume, our growth priorities are really in
those areas of sub specialty expertise where we are and want to
remain and grow even stronger as a center of excellence. So we are
focused on cardiovascular services, we are focused on neuro
sciences, we are focused on cancer (we are behind there in terms of
our plans and our goals because we have been without a chairman for
a long time to drive that).
So we want to be the provider of choice in certain areas of expertise
and there are various strategies we have in place to do that.
We believe that we have to grow to survive.
Enterprise Strategy
Integrated
multidisciplinary
organization better
able to align itself
to payers
Enterprise Strategy
Strategy dilution
Focus on growing
surgical procedures
Chief of One is expanding, by hiring more doctors, expanding the facility and Enterprise Strategy
Strategy our capability here, in [location X], if we think people are going to
come here for it.
Chief of Another is providing the service closer to where people are. So we Enterprise Strategy
Strategy are expanding. [...] we are now looking at another expansion because
we think we can grow much more. However we are being careful Not to compete with
about what we are going to put in that building. We are going to put community
more sub specialty diagnostics expertise in the areas we want to hospitals.
attract patients. There are other community hospitals in that market,
and we don't want to do what they do. We don't want the heart ED acuity level 3
failure patients, we don't want the pneumonia patients, let them do patients not the
that because that is what they are good at. We want to attract the target population
patients that we think we can best serve.
Chief of We have always been, since 1980, an integrated facility with Enterprise Strategy
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So I think it is a matter of how we provide choice. How we align the
incentives of the providers and the payers focused around keeping
healthy people healthy, keep sick people from getting sicker, and for
those people who have some sort of acute problem, treat it as
efficiently as you can with high quality. Integrated group practices
are better positioned to do that. To manage quality and safety
efficiently, to have operational efficiency. If you go to [big
competitor A], to align all the stakeholders you would need to... well
the emergency room might be the easiest because the emergency
room docs, and the nurses in [big competitor A], work for [big
competitor A]. The surgeons don't work for [big competitor A]. The
people in outpatient clinics or in outpatient practices, who might send
people to the [big competitor A] emergency room don't work for [big
competitor A]. So all the stakeholders in [big competitor A] aren't
part of the same organization, whereas everybody here has the
[Hospital XYZ] logo on their pay check and one way or the other
ultimately is accountable to [Dr. X] our CEO. So we can align things
much more easily than in other situations and we have an incentive,
since we are all part of the same organization, and whether there is an
annual merit increase and things like that, we all have the same
incentive which is for the organization as a whole to be successful.
And even if we don't have a huge personal financial incentive, we
have the incentive for the organization as a whole to be successful so
that we have the capital to reinvest in new technology, new space,
and so forth.
Chief of
Strategy
I
Strategy
We have for years practiced team based medicine. And that manifests
itself in a number of ways. The doctors go to the same cafeteria, they
go to the same meetings, to the same committees, the paycheck has
the same logo on it, and so they know each other, they work together,
they consult with each other, the bigger the organization has gotten,
the more challenging it is.
Any [Hospital XYZ] physician, on a moment's notice, if it is
necessary, can get to the bedside or the exam table, any specialty that
he or she might need. If is not that urgent they can make sure you get
seen within a day, three days, within whatever they think it is
necessary, by a colleague.
If you have an intemist in [place X] in private practice, and he is
going to refer you to a dermatologist in [place Y], and they don't
work with each other, you are not going to see him in 10 minutes. It
may be up to the next 3 weeks, or whenever their schedule allows
them to. It is not the same as [Hospital XYZ].
So people here view[Hospital XYZ]patients as[Hospital
XYZ patients, and not as doctor XYZ patient.
Integrated provider
Single medical
record
Enterprise Strategy
Team based
medicine
Describes collegial
and available
environment
between specialties.
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outpatient practice, primary care, comprehensive diagnostics,
inpatient care, ED, ORs, ambulatory procedures, all in one
organization, all under one roof, the nurses, the doctors, the
administrators, all work for the same organization, so that when the
CEO signs the contract he can speak for 450 different physicians.
When you walk through our door, anything you might need, we can
offer under one roof
[...]
[big competitor A] as a hospital is not a group practice. You walk
down the hall and talk with a doctor, today might be faculty from the
medical school so they get their pay check from the medical school.
Today might be lab technology or radiology reporting to [big
competitor A]. They might be member of an external group with
privieleges at the [big competitor A]. They might be a community
physician that has privileges at the [big competitor A]. They don't all
work for the same organization. When the CEO of the [big
competitor A] signs the contract he cant guarantee that all the doctors
and all the nurses are all going to line up. They work in different
organizations. They may or may not be on the same team. They don't
necessarily eat in the same cafeteria. [big competitor A] is a
workshop for many of the doctors that go there, they don't live there,
it is a place where they do some of their work to drive some of their
income, but they are not part of the whole organization.
[...]
It also means we have one medical record, so that if you go see your
cardiologist today, and you are going to see the orthopedic surgeon
tomorrow, and you are going to see the gastro enrologist next
Wednesday, there are all looking at the same medical record, whether
it is paper or electronic, they all have access to the same information.
So we have an integrated medical record and we have one scheduling
system, so that you can call one number and talk to one person, and
schedule three different appointments from three different specialties,
all in the same day. So we believe that we offer something that is
different from what all the other people offer. All the care you need
under one roof.
Chief of
Strategy
COO In capitation you are paid by the patient, so the more lives you cover, Enterprise Strategy
the more money you get every month. You get so many dollars per
member per month to help take care of people, and you need to have Enterprise history
a large number of lives, because if you just take care of sick people and culture
you lose your shirt, and if you don't keep growing and adding
people you risk your population just getting older and sicker. So
covered lives became important and geography became important.
Because when you go to insurers you want to take care of a
geographic area, that the larger of that area the more you can try to
generate from the insurers because they need you to take care of
people. So geographic spread and covered lives was how you made
your money.
[...]
Capitation aligned things very well with the patients, but the way it
was implemented by the insurance companies, there was a lot of
utilization review, a lot of meddling, a lot of trying to avoid
payments.. it was not a very pleasant thing for providers to be in.
[...]
Some patients considered us their primary care physician even
though they were on the [remote region X], and so if they had an
emergency and went to [remote region X] hospital, we had to pay
[remote region X] hospital's charges out of our capitation. So if you
can't 100% control everything about the patient and you are capitated
you lose your shirt. Even though the insurance company told us "you
can manage the patient" they would tell the patient "you can go
wherever you want to go"
[...]
The insurance plan still kept privelaging and credentialing, they kept
case management, they kept managing the money, so they never
delegated. So it didn't work for us... it was a disaster. We were left
with this large network and one of our strategies was to get out of
capitation as soon as possible
Chief of So we get paid based on encounters, visits, surgeries, admissions, Enterprise Strategy
Strategy procedures, colonoscopies, angioplasties, we get paid based on
volume utilization and so that is what we count, it is what drives our Hospitalfinancial
revenue. incentives
Paid on volume (i.e.
patient encounters),
not on patient
continuity (service
view)
Senior Leadership Service View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Chief of When they measure things at the health plan, they measure things Service continuity
Strategy "whatever per thousand patients". When I came here our (patient care)
measurement systems aren't about patients at all. It is not about
individual people. We don't measure patients. We measure Measurement
encounters. We measure visits to the outpatient clinics by geared towards
department. We measure visits to the emergency room. We have system use, not
36,000 visits to the emergency room per year. I can't tell you that it is patient
36,000 people, if it is 10,000 people, or if it is 5,000 people. I am
certain that we have some frequent flyers who over the course of the
year are here 10 times and we have other people who are here once or
maybe once every three years, but the point is that we don't measure
people. We measure use of our system.
CFO The problem is that [Chair of ED], and others, only control what is Service architecture
inside their environment, so he can make that commitment and management
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implement what he can in his environment, but the things that he
doesn't control which are probably equally as many things as he does Dependant on
control, he may not be able to implement, if we don't influence it boundary of control
early.
COO Average length of stay is 4.6 days, including solid organ Service architecture
transplantation, and no psych and no OB. One of the theories we management
have in terms of looking at the whole enterprise, is not just getting
out of the ED, it is getting out of the hospital. One of the things that Confirmation that
we have found is that there is a body of consultation and testing that ED used when
is part of the ED workup before the patient gets to the floor, and what inpatient services
we have found is that if the patient needs a CAT scan while they are could be used
in the ED, through a care process map, or just being in the ED, instead
getting that test done is basically the single build mode. We have
great concern that if the goal is to get them on the floor quickly and
then order those tests, that then they become in the large queue for
the whole hospital with all the other patients that needs whatever and
in the end the length of stay for that patient in the hospital is smaller.
Having the patient doing those tests in the ED really saves us time on
the LOS.
COO If you have a heart attack today, people feel that within 90 minutes Service
you should be in a cath lab and have a stent put in, once you show up. sustainability
So having interventional cardiology due to myocardial damage is one (patient experience)
thing that needs to happen right away. If you are a trauma patient you Service architecture
need to have done whatever you need to have done immediately. If awareness /
you have a stroke and if you have septis, that is you are in shock appreciation
because you have an infection.
Recognizes that
critical care
patients for
inpatient specialties
come through the
ED first
COO Some of them are simple, like the patient might say, I have a cut and Service
would like to be seen right away and like to get the hell out of here in sustainability
one hour. There are categories: I want access, I want accountability (patient experience)
(meaning I have people who took care of me, I have people who are
going to take care of me, I want communication), I want a good
outcome (I don't want to have any trouble when I leave). That is a
simple one. If I want a stent I might pass through the emergency
room and go right up to a cardiac cath lab, I have all kinds of issues
about informed consent, about my loved ones knowing what I am
doing and where I am going, all this is part of our customer service
piece for the patient. I want to try to understand, or have my family
and loved one understand what my options are, the doctor is going to
tell me what he is going to do to me, so again it is access,
communication ability
COO the doctor: I want to have all my tools, I want a room, I need XYZ... Service
again the tools might be different, dminis process in terms dmini sustainability
expectations dmini inputs, my tools, my medications, the different (patient and
technical personal, the availability of a suite dmini dmin the physician
procedure I am doing, the support in terms of radiology and experience)
laboratory
COO When someone has a code... you are on a bed and suddenly go Service architecture
uncounscious... we do a single build model, we have a code team, management: single
people all over the hospital that has expertise in dealing with the build vs sequential
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code, and we call that and the whole team comes to you. You get all
the care you need to do with that code. And if we are going to do an
intervention on your heart or trauma we do the same thing. We take
you into the operating room, we bring everybody there, we try to
work on you and figure out what you are doing. On the other hand if
you were having elective knee replacement, and you go to the lab and
you get your test, and then you go to radiology, and then you show
up at the pre op and they take care of what they do, then they bring
you into the OR, they take care of what you do, then they bring you
to the recovery room, and they put you on the floor. We don't do
everything at the same time as in a single build.
build (i.e. mobile
cell vs flow)
Chief of We don't measure patients. We measure encounters. We measure Service continuity
Strategy visits to the outpatient clinics by department. We measure visits to (patient care)
the emergency room. We have 36,000 visits to the emergency room
per year. I can't tell you that it is 36,000 people, if it is 10,000 Non patient
people, or if it is 5,000 people. I am certain that we have some centered enterprise.
frequent flyers who over the course of the year are here 10 times and Unable to measure
we have other people who are here once or maybe once every three as such due to
years, but the point is that we don't measure people. We measure use existing IT
of our system. capability.
Chief of The other place that is feeling the pain is the OR. Upstairs is full and Service architecture
Strategy the OR backs up. The last thing a surgeon needs to hear is that you management
cannot do your next case, because we cant get this patient out of the
OR, because the PACU is full because no one can be sent upstairs. OR feeling the pain
Senior Leadership Process View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
CFO We have the means to show the variability of expenditure by Process enterprise
procedure by physician... we have done a little bit of it, but what little measurement
we have done we are getting a lot of push back from the physicians, capability
they don't want to be measured individually, they want to be
measured as a group. It is amazing, once you are performing up here
[makes a sign with the hand at high level] I say to them "I can't
believe that you guys even want to let the ones who are down there
be down there. Why should you be carrying those guys?". But they
seem to be okay with it. [ ...] Leadership has to decide what it wants
to do, to help communicate that to the staff physicians, and I don't
think they are there. I don't think they are there. I still think the
physician leadership still sides with the staff physicians. The
administrators may want to provide more transparency, provide more
information, try to get these guys to understand what their
contribution is or isn't, and that there is opportunity to improve, but
we don't have a physician leadership thinking that way. So there isn't
a meeting of the minds between the two groups, and part of that is
that we are doing well and so there is no sense of urgency.
Chief of We have not been talking about process reengineering generally with Enterprise process
Strategy the doctors, however it is a fundamental strategic initiative. improvement and
planning scope
COO We have a physician who is a champion for evidence based medicine Holistic
program and [Ms. X] is also the administrative person who works performance
with [the physician], and they have begun this process with several measurement
departmental experts looking at several areas.
[ ... I Different people
Our motto there is to try to understand what elements of lean thinking responsiblefor
can apply to the various value streams in healthcare that we have. So different initiatives,
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again we have [Quality and Safety Director] is leading that effort
When they measure things at the health plan, they measure things
"whatever per thousand patients". When I came here our
measurement systems aren't about patients at all. It is not about
individual people. We don't measure patients. We measure
encounters. We measure visits dmini outpatient clinics by
department. We measure visits dmini emergency room. We have
36,000 visits dmini emergency room per year. I can't tell you that it
is 36,000 people, dmin is 10,000 people, or dmin is 5,000 people.
I am certain that we have some frequent flyers who over the course
dmini year are here 10 times and we have other people who are
here once or maybe once every three years, dminis point dminis
we don't measure people. We measure use of our system.
We cannot easily break down the revenues from each of these two
groups. 80% of patients come from [our State]. 10% come from
[northern State] 5% come from other [adjacent States], and the other
5% from other parts of the country.
We track ED physician productivity by the number of encounters per
FTE
and don 't talk with
each other
Process enterprise
measurement
capability
Unable to measure
at patient level, but
rather system use
level
Process enterprise
measurement
capability
Actually they could,
but the IT system
doesn't do it for
them
Holistic
performance
measurement
Senior Leadership Organization View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
CFO The problem is that [Chair of ED], and others, only control what is Local organizational
inside their environment, so he can make that commitment and climate and
implement what he can in his environment, but the things that he subculture
doesn't control which are probably equally as many things as he does
control, he may not be able to implement, if we don't influence it
early.
You put a new computer system in. You put a lot of time into change
and support that process. You get the mission critical applications in
place. Once that is done, you never seem to have the time to go back
and add the bells and whistles, because now you are back to normal
business and you don't have the time. I am forcing people back to
make sure that they keep adding the bells and whistles over time, but
it takes an extreme level of discipline to do that because it is
extremely hard to find the time.
CFO The thing that always worries me, from having been here for so long, Local organizational
is that it is so hard to get the commitment of the medical providers to climate and
change, that if we get too far down the path, even though we have the subculture
simulated models and the concepts designed, and agreement, the
rubber hits the road in implementation, and we often find that we Leadership
can't get there. Part of that is that we are not a top down organization. acceptance by
With 500 physicians it is a consensus building organization. So the internal
CEO might say you know, in the planning process, "absolutely, we stakeholders
are going to do this, and we will make everybody do it, and what a
great idea", and what it comes to the end, when the medical staff go
"oh we don't really want to do that", the CEO goes "ohhh... okay"
[CFO bursts out laughing] and then we have to live with it.
CFO We have the means to show the variability of expenditure by Enterprise cultural
procedure by physician... we have done a little bit of it, but what little harmony
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Chief of Our finance people, our IT people, our supply chain people, they Enterprise cultural
Strategy don't really understand how the delivery system works, and they harmony
work at [Hospital XYZ].
CFO From a realistic perspective, politically it would be a hard sell here Enterprise cultural
probably [to hold back on the new ED] because the CEO getting in harmony
and even long before the Board approving the project, told the whole
department "you are getting a new ER". He was way ahead of the rest CEO attempting to
of us, and probably, I wish he hadn't gotten so far and so fast. I would reach out
love that most, if not all the time, decisions were made based with
good sense and facts, but unfortunately politics don't lend themselves
to that.
cOO [Hospital XYZ began] in the 1920s when all the large group practices Enterprise history
were beginning to form like Mayo Clinic and Cleveland Clinic. Like and culture
those large practices they generally had their origins in surgical
leaderships.
[ ...]I
When [Hospital XYZ] moved out here part of the requirement was
that we also include a primary care presence in the community. So as
soon as we came here [Hospital XYZ] became a success. The state
[made that requirement] as part of building a not for profit, we had to
provide access, it couldn't just be for [Hospital XYZ] patients only.
So we created an emergency room, that anyone could use as a public
good, and that we began to have patients who wanted to get their
primary care at [Hospital XYZ]. This [patient choice for primary
care] didn't really change our model but we responded to it. So we
added a significant a number of general intemal medicine physicians,
and they generated referrals to our specialist, and so we needed to
hire more specialists, so we kept growing and growing, but our
emphasis was always on diagnostic challenges and complicated
complex care requiring highly skilled and specialized physicians, and
that really is our model.
[ ...]I
Our character is specialized care and not to be a community hospital.
[ ...]I
We added primary care as a specialty when we moved out here but
continued to maintain our reputation as a tertiary diagnostic center.
[...]
[Hospital XYZ] even as it moved forward in its origins was a multi
specialty group practice, it really never was a single specialty group
practice.
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'I
we have done we are getting a lot of push back from the physicians,
they don't want to be measured individually, they want to be
measured as a group. It is amazing, once you are performing up here
[makes a sign with the hand at high level] I say to them "I can't
believe that you guys even want to let the ones who are down there
be down there. Why should you be carrying those guys?". But they
seem to be okay with it. [...] Leadership has to decide what it wants
to do, to help communicate that to the staff physicians, and I don't
think they are there. I don't think they are there. I still think the
physician leadership still sides with the staff physicians. The
administrators may want to provide more transparency, provide more
information, try to get these guys to understand what their
contribution is or isn't, and that there is opportunity to improve, but
we don't have a physician leadership thinking that way. So there isn't
a meeting of the minds between the two groups, and part of that is
that we are doing well and so there is no sense of urgency.
[...]
Physicians are salaried and while no one makes the same salary,
basically they have the oversight of lay people who are not directly
involved in the institution and was a public charity. And the
governance model is the staff elect a board of governors, and the
board of governors elect a chair, and the chair is a CEO, and chair
will always be a physician. And the trustees allow the medical
leadership, the board of governors and the CEO, to manage the
affairs of [Hospital XYZ] with lay oversight. But it really is a
physician led group practice, and the group practice decides what it
needs to take care of the patients that it wants to take care of, and the
hospital is an extension of the group practice, as opposed to all the
other places in [city centre] where the hospital existed and individual
physician practices developed to support the hospital.
COO Physicians are salaried and while no one makes the same salary, Individual
basically they have the oversight of lay people who are not directly incentives
involved in the institution and was a public charity.
COO Then [Hospital XYZ] hired a new CEO in 1999 as a result of the old Enterprise history
one leaving, and he was here for about 6 months, and all of the and culture
sudden [Hospital XYZ] started losing money, and so then I became
the COO in December of 1999 Hospitalfinancial
incentives
COO usually people feel that a large impediment for the change is the Enterprise history
physician. At one level that is true because physicians are and culture
conservative, because I don't think you want to go wild on anybody Resistance to
without a lot of care and as much evidence as possible before they do change
something.
COO In healthcare we say that this [his pen] is the most powerful Enterprise history
technology in the world because the only person that can get anything and culture
done on a patient is a physician, a legal person who can write orders
and change things. [...] the physician is directing the care or he is Power of the pen
directing someone else to direct the care, whether it is in the hospital signing off
in terms of orders, whether it is working up a set of symptoms on a
problem you have, or whatever you have
Chief of when we have these contractual arrangements with insurance Enterprise history
Strategy companies, in general, not in every case, but it is very difficult to and culture
make money within health patient primary care practice. That is not
how we at [Hospital XYZ] make money. We don't make money from
our patient primary care. We have a lot of outpatient primary care,
but we don't make money from it. We would make more money from
specialty care. We make our money from procedures, surgeries
Chief of Our doctors here are involved in deciding what the strategic priorities Enterprise history
Strategy of the organization are going to be. In the community hospitals the and culture
CEO often times is the business person, and the doctors in the
community who have used that workshop are constituencies that they Physicians decide
need to keep happy but it is not the doctor's workshop. strategic priorities
Chief of there is an internal motivation that we need to get the constant Enterprise history
Strategy financial pressure, so that we need to do this in order to be able to and culture
create a margin and to be able to take care of more and more patients,
do it efficiently, do it in a high quality way. Hospitalfinancial
incentives
COO Average length of stay is 4.6 days, including solid organ Enterprise cultural
transplantation, and no psych and no OB. One of the theories we harmony
have in terms of looking at the whole enterprise, is not just getting
out of the ED, it is getting out of the hospital. One of the things that Leadership aware
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we have found is that there is a body of consultation and testing that that ED is being
is part of the ED workup before the patient gets to the floor, and what used to support
we have found is that if the patient needs a CAT scan while they are inpatient and
in the ED, through a care process map, or just being in the ED, shorten LOS. But
getting that test done is basically the single build mode. We have still, ED
great concern that if the goal is to get them on the floor quickly and contribution not
then order those tests, that then they become in the large queue for accountedfor.
the whole hospital with all the other patients that needs whatever and
in the end the length of stay for that patient in the hospital is smaller.
Having the patient doing those tests in the ED really saves us time on
the LOS.
Chief of Most people only focus on today, or next month, or next quarter, or Enterprise history
Strategy last quarter, we have done very well. The big challenge that I see for and culture
the re engineering work is that we don't have a burning platform in
terms of organizational results. We grow every year, we attract more No sense of urgency
patients, we have more admissions, more surgeries, financially we to change
have made more money in the last two years than ever before. From a
bottom line perspective we are very successful. The platform that has
embers in it, is that I don't think we can get people to buy in that in
five years from now things are going to be really bad, I don't think
people can look that far out. I think the burning platform we need to
build is that how much stuff gets between them and doing their job.
CFO So there isn't a meeting of the minds between the two groups [i.e. Enterprise history
administrators and physicians], and part of that is that we are doing and culture
well and so there is no sense of urgency. No sense of urgency
to change
CFO How many emergency rooms do we have today? Enterprise history
and culture
Unaware of ED size
even though it is the
samefor the past 20
years
Chief of Even if we don't have a huge personal financial incentive, we have Individual
Strategy the incentive for the organization as a whole to be successful so that incentives
we have the capital to reinvest in new technology, new space, and so
forth.
Chief of there is an internal motivation that we need to get the constant Enterprise history
Strategy financial pressure, so that we need to do this in order to be able to and culture
create a margin and to be able to take care of more and more patients, Hospitalfinancial
do it efficiently, do it in a high quality way. incentives
Chief of We have for years practiced team based medicine. And that manifests Individual
Strategy itself in a number of ways. The doctors go to the same cafeteria, they incentives
go to the same meetings, to the same committees, the paycheck has
the same logo on it, and so they know each other, they work together, Enterprise history
they consult with each other, the bigger the organization has gotten, and culture
the more challenging it is.
I...]
So people here view[Hospital XYZ]patients as[Hospital
XYZ]patients, and not as doctor XYZ patient.
Chief of People work by the hour, they do their time, and then go home. They Individual
Strategy are salaried and don't have the incentive to do more. incentives
Enterprise cultural
harmony
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Chief of Our finance people, our IT people, our supply chain people, they don't Knowledge
Strategy really understand how the delivery system works, and they work at transfer
[Hospital XYZ]. requirements
Chief of We are never going to have pathways, standard orders, evidence Evidence based
Strategy based treatment recommendations, whatever you want to call it, for medicine
everything. It is not going to happen. There are always going to be
either patients that are so complex. We don't just come as a diabetic, limitations
or come as a patient with hyper tension... you may be a diabetic that
has hyper tension, high cholesterol, and maybe a bit of asthma, who
knows! All the evidence based guidelines those are all about "this is
what we do for diabetes", "this is what we do for asthma", "this is
what we do for COPD". Those things are developed for diseases not
for people. And then there is going to be cutting edge which will
introduce variability to improve.
COO We have a physician who is a champion for evidence based medicine Evidence based
program and [Ms. X] is also the administrative person who works medicine
with [the physician], and they have begun this process with several implementation
departmental experts looking at several areas.
Senior Leadership Information View
Interviewee Interview quote(s) Focused Coding
Chief of We cannot easily break down the revenues from each of these two Business
Strategy groups. 80% of patients come from [our State]. 10% come from intelligence system
[northern State] 5% come from other [adjacent States], and the other Process enterprise
5% from other parts of the country. measurement
capability
Actually they could,
but the IT system
doesn't do it for
them
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Senior Leadership Knowledge View
Interviewee I Interview auote(s)
For outcomes we use Evidence Based Medicine based on various
disorders there are evidence now, a lot of it is more empirical now, in
other words there is still an amount of art to evidence based medicine
but over time there are enough studies that are published that indicate
that certain behaviors are better with certain diagnostic or disease
states in terms of treatment.
You start out with a generic view of evidence based medicine and
then you apply your own experts to it. Modify it, and then you come
up with what you believe is evidence based guideline on how to take
care of certain things. And then you try to create order sets and
behaviors and try to monitor how well people conform to those
guidelines, and there are not either or, there are exceptions. So the
metrics around that are basically deviations from evidence based
guidelines and this is somewhat in its infancy.
[...]
There is a company out there that is part of hertz publications that is
called Zynx, and they publish evidence based guidelines and are
constantly monitoring the literature, and they have a collaborative
workspace environment where groups can collaborate, modify, or
change guidelines, and they have the ability to move you from what
you should do to the evidence if you want to see why they are saying
this is the right thing to do
d. Inpatient Service Units
Inpatient Service Units External / Policy View
Interviewee Interview Excerpt Focused Coding
7C Charge I can't simply discharge the patient from the bed to a waiting area. Regulatory
Nurse The other thing that comes in the way is legality. Technically what requirements and
you would have to do is to discharge them from the unit and release oversight
responsibility of them being a patient anymore. There are some
patients who are literally going home because they don't need rehab
because of their age. I mean they can't sit in a waiting area for 3 hours
after they have had their knee replaced 3 days ago. Those patients
should stay in the bed. The patients are really sick these days, it isn't
like the old days where they were ready to go home 2 days before
being discharged. [chuckle]
7C Charge We have an orthopedics survey sheet [paper] we have to indicate on Provider referral
Nurse the day of discharge each day if there is any orthopedic discharge we influence/pressure
have to write down their name, what time they left, and if they left
late why did they leave late? Was it because they didn't get a bed late,
I mean from rehab only calling until late [in the day].
5C Charge Our sheet isn't placed in any system. It is a legal part of the chart, we Regulatory
Nurse have a bed side chart that we keep it in. We have two charts. We have requirements and
the standard chart and then we have the bedside chart that we keep oversight
the vital signs and admit sheets in, and that is just based on
convenience.
5C Charge We try to keep a 4 to 5 patient ratio of staff to patient. Regulatory
Nurse requirements and
oversight
5W Charge the ED will send a consult to our floor, and ask to give that report to a Regulatory
Nurse nurse who will be receiving the patient. If the nurse can't take it requirements and
within those 15 minutes, then the charge nurse will try to take the oversight
report [from the ED] so that the flow can keep moving.
The report [from ED to 5 West] is a handoff requirement by the Joint
Commission and the state department of public health.
Inpatient Service Units Strategy View
Interviewee Interview Excerpt Focused Coding
Cardiology Increasing capacity up here also increases the work that prevents us Enterprise
fellow from getting down there [to the ED] in a timely manner too. transformation
I... Istrategic scope
Another bottleneck is our holding area which wasn't designed with
enough beds for the number of procedures that we are doing [in the
ORs]. We have 5 [cardiology] procedure rooms and we have 7
holding area beds, and we often have a patient in the OR and the
patient that needs to go next [is held in the holding bay], or the patient
before, and we only have 7 beds. The best situation is where someone
comes from here [the cardiology 5 West floor], goes to the holding
area, has the procedure, and then goes back to their original room.
Sometimes patients don't have a bed yet, they come to the holding
area, say they are outpatients or they are a direct transfer, get a
procedure, and no beds have been found yet during the procedure,
and they have to go back to the holding area, and what that does is
that the next patient can't come into the procedure room.
Cardiology The holding area because they are not technically in the hospital. That Enterprise strategy
fellow patient being in the holding area is creating an inability for those 5
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cath labs to function, so you have got to get that patient out.
Cardiology I think that reflects our business model of establishing a lot of referral Enterprise strategy
fellow base.
5W Charge This is a very aggressive service line. Which is probably the premiere Enterprise strategy
Nurse role model for the institution in terms of efficiency, volume,
outcomes, length of stay, you name it... this is a 36 bed unit that on an
average day turns over probably 40% to 50% of the patients on any
given day. So 56 patients on a given day could come through this unit
in terms of workload of the physicians.
6S Another bottleneck in the ER... we spent a zillion dollars... the idea Enterprise
was to improve the ER flow but I think it is a silly idea. So what they transformation
have done is that they have now increased the volume inside the strategic scope
hospital but you still have a very limited access point, it is a small
hole that people still have to squeeze through to get in. So once you
have filled up these beds, which you do, there is like a week long
back sucking these inpatients in it, but once they are in there because
volume is full you are back to the same old bottleneck and do nothing
different than the ER by adding more beds. We are seeing overall
patients but there is no change in flow to the ER. Patients are still
waiting to go upstairs and we are also slowing down our outpatient
ED patients.
[...]
If you can get the power guy, [COO], to actually see really how the
whole system is functioning. Give these guys a real big picture
overview which I don't think they have.
Inpatient Service Units Service View
Interviewee Interview Excerpt Focused Coding
7C Charge Orthopedics and neurosurgery let their patients know when they come Extended enterprise
Nurse in, from our standpoint, the type of elective surgery you are having management
done, indicates you would be going home in the next day, a 24 hour
stay, plan on being out of the hospital at 10 o'clock in the morning, Service architecture
make arrangements, have someone there, and you are going to be out management
of here. They have done this the past year and it improved the flow
significantly.
7C Charge Orthopedics is also doing... they are working on a system that their Extended enterprise
Nurse patient, they let them know ahead of time, you are having a joint management
replacement in 3 days, barring no complications, you will be
discharged from the hospital and you have to be out by 10 o'clock in Service architecture
the morning. We will have all the paper work ready, we will have the management
visiting nurse set up for you, be prepared to go. This is doing really
well.
7C Charge Over the course of the week probably a third [of my patients come Extended enterprise
Nurse from the ED]. Because I would, during the week I would say 25% management
from Mondays to Fridays, overall if you want to look at it from 11 to
7 and over the weekend, that would go to a third [33%]. 75% of
admissions on the weekend are from the ER because the clinics are
closed. All the orthopedics that come in [during the weekend] are
through the ER [as] it is not a scheduled surgery done.
7C Charge if we don't take the patients out of the recovery room, and they don't Service architecture
Nurse get to my floor, then it gets backed up in the OR and they have awareness/appreciat
actually had to stop the OR, because the PACU didn't have a slot for ion
that patient that was done. The PACU was waiting to send us a
I patient.
7C Charge Once you discharge that patient in the system it automatically gets Service architecture
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Nurse
5C Charge
Nurse
kicked into the house keeping pager to clean the patient's room. It is
all done by time frame. If I get my bed clean before 7 East got it clean
is based on time. If my patient is discharged in the computer at 2.15
in the afternoon, and theirs was discharged at 2.30, mine should be
done first. If admitting knows that recovery room needs to get 3
patients within an hour, and they know that 3 of those patients are
booked on our beds, they will put a stat request in for house keeping
to get those beds clean for us. They call it priority cleaning. When the
house keeper finishes cleaning the room they will call, and basically it
is an entry system that they have to put in what room they cleaned.
Last night PACU was waiting for 2 hours to get our bed because it
wasn't clean. But house keeper were so busy trying to take care of
other floors, that finally PACU phoned up admitting, and admitting
had to put it in as a stat, and "go, we really need it done". I don't know
that house keeping have a grasp as to what implication they have... I
still can't get over it... it is just mind blowing. The house keeper was
in the middle of cleaning that room, she knew that she had to be in a
meeting at 9 o'clock, she literally stopped cleaning the room in the
middle of it, left it to go to her meeting and then came back and
finished it. Now, it would have probably taken 10 minutes to finish it
and she could have called her boss saying "I'll be there in 10
minutes". All of the sudden I was like "where did she go?". I think
part of that is language barrier... or they don't understand the
implications.
The computer system is such that when the patient transfer is signaled
in meditech [i.e. the patient is now in a different room], a beeper
message is sent to house keeping to clean the CCU room. That bed
cannot be reoccupied until it goes back into clean mode. Now that
requires, once the house keeper physically cleans the room, to go in
through the telephone line, to call in the room as clean. She could do
the cleaning instantaneously, or she could take half an hour, so there
is great potential for inefficiency right there, because it is very much
dependent on the person that is on that [house keeper] beeper.
[...]
In the scenario of patients coding in there, I would be moving the
patient myself to the other floor, and actually nurses that are here
would end up cleaning that room, and they would do that as fast as
they could, knowing that the cath lab is going to push that patient
from above. The minute I cleared these doors they are calling them
say "bring him!" and they are doing whatever they can to clean that
room and get it ready. It sort of bypasses really house keeping.
awareness/appreciat
ion
Service architecture
management
housekeeping
Service architecture
awareness/appreciat
ion
Service architecture
management
housekeeping
7C Charge I find the beds on this shift because I know for a fact after knowing Service architecture
Nurse how many beds I have left, and when I go downstairs to what they management
call "bed board", two times a day, you pretty much get an overview
from the supervisor in admitting at that point, "you know what, Flow information
recovery room have 17 patients that are awaiting to place, 7 of them transparency and
are yours". timeliness
7C Charge The doctors in the emergency room would know ahead of time if we Service architecture
Nurse [at 7 Central] are on diverge, if we don't have any beds. The doctors management
that are in the emergency room all day long, they know our bed
availability ahead of time. We even have a resident on his own call up Flow information
to us from the ER and they go "do you guys have any beds up there? I transparency and
have a patient down here that needs to be admitted". timeliness
7C Charge It is easier for us if the patients go to their respective floor and that a Service architecture
Nurse large percentage of each type of patient are all in one unit. management
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5C Charge Actual travel time with the elevator would take 15 minutes. The Service
Nurse elevators are not strategically placed. For the emergency room to sustainability
bring a patient up here they are on the west part of the building, and (patient experience)
depending on who brings them up and how they elect to come, they
can come up the west elevators, but they are at the furthest part of the Enterprise history
building, so they would have to come across the hall of the west in and culture
order to come through our doors here, and they have to pass through 5 (physical layout)
West, the patient area, to get here. If they don't want to pass a patient
area they would come all the way to the west wing to the central
elevators which is the back corridor. The difference is not travel time,
but that they are in a separate corridor from the main public, and they
wouldn't have to go through the patient area.
5C Charge This morning when we rounded the physicians decided that based on Service architecture
Nurse the patient's condition he could be transferred, so we called admitting management
this morning and said "we need a 5west tele bed for this gentlemen".
She told us "we don't have any beds at this moment". Now a bed has CCU also unable to
become available, she knows that because she has all the registry of admit to 5W
the hospital, that bed is available because it is empty and it is clean, Adjustment with bed
so she calls us, our unit secretary tells the nurse who has the patient board
that the bed is available.
Cardiology Another bottleneck is our holding area which wasn't designed with Service architecture
fellow enough beds for the number of procedures that we are doing [in the management
ORs]. We have 5 [cardiology] procedure rooms and we have 7
holding area beds, and we often have a patient in the OR and the
patient that needs to go next [is held in the holding bay], or the patient
before, and we only have 7 beds. The best situation is where someone
comes from here [the cardiology 5 West floor], goes to the holding
area, has the procedure, and then goes back to their original room.
Sometimes patients don't have a bed yet, they come to the holding
area, say they are outpatients or they are a direct transfer, get a
procedure, and no beds have been found yet during the procedure,
and they have to go back to the holding area, and what that does is
that the next patient can't come into the procedure room.
Cardiology The holding area [is given priority over an ED patient] because they Service
fellow are not technically in the hospital. That patient being in the holding sustainability
area is creating an inability for those 5 cath labs to function, so you (patient experience)
have got to get that patient out.
Cardiology Something that overrides all of this is the bed crunch. The ER is so Service
fellow busy. We are at 98% capacity [in cardiology] that even if someone sustainability
wrote orders downstairs [in the ED] they would still be there for 6 (patient experience)
hours until someone up here gets to go home. So that kind of makes
other things mute.
Cardiology In the afternoon when the house staff are open to take admissions you Service
fellow would hope that that gives another layer for someone to get down sustainability
there to evaluate the patient. They get several admissions at the same (patient experience)
time. They order them as to how sick they are. Number three on the
list may not be seen for at least three or four hours, sometimes longer, Service architecture
depending on how sick the first two are. And they are in the ER the management
whole time, they are tying up beds down there. So the house staff
goes through patients sequentially because you can only really go No house staff in the
through one patient at a time. morning to help in
I ... 15 W admissions
In the morning patients come in through private services. On the
cardiology side we don't have house staff working with us to admit
patients. The fellows run the consult service, do the admissions for
I the attendings, or attendings have to do it themselves.
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Cardiology The hang up may be that once admitted, to get paper work done, to Service architecture
fellow get them to be seen, and it has to be done by the admitting doctor too management
so that takes some time. We go downstairs, we do our own
evaluation, and rarely do we say "no this patient doesn't have to come
in". We have to do our own evaluation, and write orders, make some
phone calls and all that. I think to do that safely and appropriately
would take 1 hour. From a cardiology fellow standpoint we also get
delayed because we are doing consults on the floors too, and that
sometimes delays things. Then assuming there is a bed, then the
patient can get up [to cardiology from the ED] in an hour or an hour
and a half [after the admit request was triggered by the ED]. Probably
on average that doesn't happen.
5W Charge So they all [in admissions department] try to keep specific patient Service architecture
Nurse populations in the floors because the nurses become much more management
skilled in certain types of nursing, so if you keep the patients specific Keeping similar
to a floor they are going to a floor where the nurses are probably more patients in same
skilled in that type of nursing. units
5W Charge I think there is more teamwork amongst the nursing department than Service architecture
Nurse between the nurses and physicians per se. It is kind of physician management
dependent. There is a lot of teamwork between the mid levels and the
nurses, but not necessarily the attendings as much. The attendings Extended enterprise
spend a lot less time in the units. We have teamwork between the management
interns, and residents, and the nursing staff. However, I think we have
a lot of more opportunity for improvement. I think I would like to see
more formalized times to meet with physicians. They seem to think
for some reason that [such meetings] would be difficult to coordinate,
that it may not work, but it could work well... that could be a huge
opportunity for improvement... which means that nurses, and the
physicians, and coordination of care, and ultimately the patients
because if we can meet say at 9 o'clock in the lounge and go through
all the patients we could all be on the same page. The patients could
know what is going on today. We would know what patients would
be going home. We would know potentially how many beds we can
admit to. Whereas now the physicians don't necessarily communicate
all that well with us, so it can be 3 o'clock in the afternoon and the
physicians can come by and discharge 4 patients that we had no idea
were going home. And that is problematic for the patient as well,
because when they find out, they have to arrange for transportation
and it might be that they can't get a ride home at that time of the day.
[...]
if we knew ahead of time that we were going to have those 4
discharges, we may be able to take beds for patients that were later in
the day for the cath lab, and given them to emergency room patients.
5W Senior I could get started, at least being aware of what is coming, I could Service
Nurse start my paperwork... the paperwork when I do a new admission... the sustainability
paperwork! [grunts] I feel like I am taken from my bedside care (patient experience)
which is why I became a nurse. I feel like I see less of the patient and Service architecture
more of the paperwork. So why am I repeating the same thing that awareness
somebody has done 3,4,5,6 times, when I could be doing spend time Nurses unaware of
at the bed time with the patient. I could pick it up in the process of the the pipeline
admission.
5W Senior Every time the patient comes back he starts from the beginning all Service continuity
Nurse over again. My father now has 4 doctors. He has leukemia so he has (patient care)
an oncologist. He is a diabetic so he has an endocrinologist. He has a
heart condition so he has a cardiologist. And he has severe arthritis so Extended enterprise
he has rheumatoid arthritis doctor. So when something happens with management
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one of the specialties of his healthcare he would like to have all his
doctors know about it, so that when he comes back he says "oh you
didn't know I had a heart attack 3 months ago and was in the
hospital?!!!". So it would be nice if we had a central database that
could flag to all the doctors an update on a patient.
The only person that gets notified when a patient is in the hospital for
any reason is the [patient's] PCP. Now, they receive that
electronically, but we don't know that they actually receive them. It
doesn't work. I emailed the PCP Cardiologist because I know him
because I work here, and I also notified the rheumatologist because
there were issues with the meds that he was taking that they felt was
causing his problem, I just emailed them myself. We called a family
meeting... I orchestrated it, the system didn't orchestrate it. I had all 4
physicians sit at the same table and no information had to be repeated
and joint decisions could be made.
[note: a senior nurse was overhearing the conversation and
acknowledged this was true]
I see the frustration on patient nurse level where there will be
frustrated family members "don't they know what the right hand is
doing, when the left hand is getting information about?". It is almost
like it is too big. I think communication is a major problem.
5W Charge
Nurse
the cath lab might have a busy schedule so they may up front say that
"we already have 12 admissions for you today", and then the
emergency room is often busy but patients that need to come up to a
telemetry floor, so usually first we try and book the cath lab and we
do that because there is nowhere else those patients can go, so we sort
of have a conversation with them in the morning and ask them how
many beds do you think you will need and we try to obviously keep
in mind throughout the day that the cath lab has a very busy schedule
today, so whatever else you try to fit in with patients that may be in
clinic at doctors appointments that they decide need to be admitted
but patients in the emergency room... but at least in the emergency
room they are on a stretcher and they can keep them there if they need
to, but if they are in the cath lab and they are done, they need to come
to a bed.
Service architecture
management
Priority given to
cathlab, then
clinics, and then ED
Inpatient Service Units Process View
Interviewee Interview Excerpt Focused Coding
6S the big picture thinking is sometimes not even remotely there. I have Enterprise process
Hospitalist been siting on this EMR committee for a while, and giving advice on improvement and
how to do things, and somehow it came out that there is no big planning scope
picture plan, they eventually are going to put together 5 or 6 separate
systems and try and knock them together somehow. Everybody has
this little microscopic little view of things and they are not seeing the
big picture. They are totally missing it.
7C Charge We have an orthopedics survey sheet [paper] we have to indicate on Service unit process
Nurse the day of discharge each day if there is any orthopedic discharge we optimization
have to write down their name, what time they left, and if they left behavior
late why did they leave late? Was it because they didn't get a bed late,
I mean from rehab only calling until late [in the day]. Process enterprise
measurement
capability
7C Charge We did a little survey for a while on [ED nurse reports], what time we Service unit process
Nurse get all this information from the emergency room and how long it optimization
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takes for a patient come up here. If it is an orthopedic, if it is a trauma behavior
patient, if it is a neurosurgery patient, then I tell you they usually are
up, from the time we get report they are up within 15 minutes Process enterprise
measurement
capability
7C Charge After the doctor [in 7Central] has written the discharge order and then Service unit process
Nurse the patient either gets transferred to a another facility, whether it be optimization
rehab, or skilled care, or home, or home with visiting nurses... or behavior
another [hospital] facility, that happens, they need different type of
care. The time that they leave, the unit coordinator, or the nurse, will Service architecture
go into the computer and discharge them. If they put it in the system awareness/apprecia
within 15 minutes of the patient leaving it isn't a bad time frame. On tion
my shift, when I am here, [chuckle], I am really bad at it, I am like
"get it done! the sooner we get a patient up here, the sooner we get
the room clean, the sooner our work is going to be done", you are not
avoiding the inevitable.
5W Charge It is more the nurse letting the unit coordinator know [chuckle] the Service unit process
Nurse patient went. Sometimes the nurses will hold out... so that they don't optimization
have to get another admission. That is what I'll say "you're holding behavior
onto the bed". I am not saying that they hold out a long time, like
hours you don't know about it, but sometimes you don't always know. Service architecture
awareness/apprecia
tion
5W Charge They [in admitting] could page us and we might not, we might say Service unit process
Nurse "oh yeah yeah, okay fine" continue with other stuff, no I don't want to optimization
admit another patient yet or whatever! [chuckles] I could be busy behavior
with something else. And then usually we'll get a call from admitting
[chuckle] "you need to assign that bed!", you know, whatever. Service architecture
awareness/apprecia
tion
5C Charge We also have a patient hold up because we can't move a patient out of Service unit process
Nurse CCU to another floor. To put it quite simply is that what very often optimization
happens in this area... we have 8 patients so say after rounds are over behavior
they say 5 patients can go out, so in everybody's mind there is a
potential for 5 beds, notice that I said "POTENTIAL"! They are not Cardiology assumes
gone! [chuckle] there is just potential... so the CCU team know that patients can move
there is a potential because it is their patient, so they know that they out of5C upon
can move out, and they say "oh I have a patient in the cath lab and I discharge
want to bring over". Now they know that these beds aren't empty, or
maybe they are maybe they aren't. We can wait for the system to
work because they have a waiting area in the cath lab. But if
somebody codes in the cath lab, now it has become urgent, that
patient has got to come out of that area to be admitted here, and so
that pushes the system, that means I have a patient, I know I can take
a patient out [from CCU] in 10 minutes time, so I am calling
admitting to say "where can I put the patient?", and they already
know that a code is going on.
5W Charge We have an electronic bed entry system, so right now every morning Prevalence of
Nurse somebody in hospital admissions generates a list of the schedule of undesirable
admissions for the day, and that includes the list of patients that are standards
having surgical procedures. The majority of those patients don't come
to my floor. My floor is a little more difficult to manage. Sometimes
it is very even in terms of the expected discharges and the admissions,
sometimes there are many more admissions that need placement than
there are discharges today, or at least discharges that you know about.
5W Charge They have a big plasma flatscreen down in the hospital admissions Service unit process
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department which displays each floor and it displays all room
numbers, it tells them if the room is vacant or occupied, it tells them
if the room is dirty or clean, so when we discharge a patient it sends a
page to housekeepers to say that that room needs to be cleaned. So as
soon as you discharge the patient electronically, housekeeping gets a
page saying that they need to go clean that room. Admitting doesn't
necessarily wait until the room is clean, ideally that was supposed to
be the case, but there is always such a bed crunch that as soon as they
see that you have discharged a patient they flash the patient up.
optimization
behavior
Bed board and 5W
nurses gaming the
system
I. ]
Part of that is because nurses might want to get some rest. Also, they
might want to game the system because they know that admitting will
immediately flash them a patient without even waiting for the room to
get clean. Therefore they wait until they have two rooms so that
cleaning takes care of both at the same time. Or they try to flag down
cleaning through other channels in order to make sure that the room is
clean.
7C Charge Last night PACU was waiting for 2 hours to get our bed because it Degree of process
Nurse wasn't clean. But house keeper were so busy trying to take care of standardization and
other floors, that finally PACU phoned up admitting, and admitting transparency
had to put it in as a stat, and "go, we really need it done". I don't know
that house keeping have a grasp as to what implication they have... I
still can't get over it... it is just mind blowing.
7C Charge The walking time from the ER to here is 5 to 7 minutes including the Degree of core
Nurse ER ride. But you are going find there is a big difference in time frame process complexity
from getting a medical patient up here, and getting an orthopedic, and flexibility
because what happens, you've got a couple of residents that are just
medical residents that are assigned that night to do admissions
throughout the hospital. These are patients that don't have a private
attending doctor. Any medical patient that comes through the
emergency room, these two doctors have to take care of them. We are
talking chest pain, we are talking pneumonia, we are talking any
medical condition, so... they have a lot of patients to see. I think their
workup takes longer because it is not as specific as looking at a
fracture, sometimes they need to do more diagnostic tests, figure out
what type of care they need, and then, you only have got these two
doctors that have to write all the orders and the HAPs on these
patients. So, if you only have got two doctors... we have actually
booked a medical patient in the system and not got a call from the
nurse until to 2 hours after that with report.
6S The [ER] people who feel that it is essentially theirjob to decide Service unit process
Hospitalist admit or discharge and then pass it on to us, feel that that accelerates optimization
the movement of someone on the floor because they called us sooner, behavior
so that we can get their sooner, so that we can get them out of the ER
sooner. But it is just the converse because we go down there and we Enterprise cultural
find that treatments that need to be done now haven't started yet, you harmony
need more acute evaluation, etc. It actually slows everything down
contrary to what their belief is. It is a touchy subject because you
don't want to be a doctor and have someone tell you that your work
sucks.
[...]
They will have sent for lab work and they have not gotten it back and
yet they will have already called me to come down to pick up the
patient.
I Sometimes the evaluation done in the ER is quite superficial. So the
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Nurse I
sign out that we get is either innacurate or wrong. But if you ask the
ER they will say otherwise. The evaluation accuracy is person to
person dependent in terms of the effort they put in. Some people's
philosophy is that they try to do as thorough workup as they possibly
can. Others view the ER's role as essentially a triage center, and so
beyond the decision admit or discharge, it is not their problem. So it
is physician dependent.
6S A specific set of information should be required of an ER physician Degree of process
Hospitalist before signing out to another physician. For instance, when the ER standardization and
physician signs out to myself [an inpatient hospitalist] he should be transparency
able to know a real diagnosis, I mean what the labs have shown, vital
signs, etc, a strict criteria that should be met.
5C Charge The charge nurse then calls the nursing supervisor and lets her know Degree of process
Nurse that you have been contacted about a bed, and the nursing supervisor, standardization and
I believe, is the one who talks to admitting... they change it several transparency
times. You know if there are problems that have arisen, they will
change the system, and that is the latest revision [chuckle] Inpatient nurse
[ ... Icharged with
They keep changing things on us... as far as I know beds 1 through 6 contacting
are CCU beds, the last two beds here, 7 and 8 have been added to the admissions to
MICU service. receive patient
5W Senior Up here [we asked for the patient information] and we then put it into Service unit process
Nurse a 4 page written note. No it is not computerized. We then do our 4 optimization
page called IPA Initial Patient Assessment. And then quite honestly behavior
as a staff nurse up here, when you get an admission one of the biggest
things is time, and you are like... okay I am going to have to sit down Degree of process
and ask all these questions... and I start out apologizing [to the standardization and
patient] and say "I am sorry, I know you have been asked all these transparency
questions, but now I am going to write it on my piece of paper. The
ED wrote it on their piece of paper and put it in their computer. And
the doctor may or may not have a copy".
[...]
On this floor we are fairly organized. On this floor we use a
disposable piece of paper, it gets thrown away, but it is valuable for
the time that the patient is here. On our unit we have such turnover,
we have 50% of turnover on the floor, I don't have time to go back to
this [patient medical] chart, so we write on our own 4 pager what was
the chief complaint, what is their past medical history, what was done
in the cath lab, what is the plan. We write this down so that we know
where they come from, where they are at, and where they are going.
5W Charge It impacts the flow everyday in the hospital. It seems like there is a lot Degree of process
Nurse of empty beds and no one has a flow problem or every department standardization and
wants to send you patients, transparency
Inpatient Service Units Organization View
Interviewee Interview Excerpt Focused Coding
6S People in the ER have to wait an exceptionally long period of time Enterprise cultural
Hospitalist before they are even seen by the MD so this deteriorates the patient's harmony
health.
6S The ER issue just frustrates the hell out of me. Just make it more Enterprise cultural
Hospitalist efficient. Better philosophy. harmony
6S Their view [ER] is a limited. We work both in the ER because we are Enterprise cultural
Hospitalist going down there picking up the patients that are in the ER, dealing harmony
with the evaluation issue and then bringing them up here. Whereas
their view they don't see what happens up here. They really don't.
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They are very isolated as to what they see. They see first contact and
that is it.
6S
Hospitalist
The people controlling the department I think often don't know what
the hell our opinion is, they don't how it flows, they don't know what
is going on. Really it is odd when you watch what happens. Like you
are putting together an electronic medical record system, and the
people responsible for putting together at baseline don't know
anything about EMRs or about the patient flow.
If you can get the power guy, [COO], to actually see really how the
whole system is functioning. Give these guys a real big picture
overview which I don't think they have.
Local organizational
climate and
subculture
Leadership
acceptance by
internal
stakeholders
[..]
Hospital XYZ is a physician led facility. However the higher up you
get in the structure, the farther away you get from actual patient care.
So the people across the way [the freestanding leadership building
disconnected from hospital] that are in the power structure, are
basically sub specialists, and they are not the guys who are writing
orders for labs, they have at the very least a fellow, and then a
resident under that, and then an intern, and then a medical student.
They are completely insulated from the trenches, which is what the
hospitalists do. The guys up there are completely insulated.
6S The [ER] people who feel that it is essentially theirjob to decide Local organizational
Hospitalist admit or discharge and then pass it on to us, feel that that accelerates climate and
the movement of someone on the floor because they called us sooner, subculture
so that we can get their sooner, so that we can get them out of the ER
sooner. But it is just the converse because we go down there and we
find that treatments that need to be done now haven't started yet, you
need more acute evaluation, etc. It actually slows everything down
contrary to what their belief is. It is a touchy subject because you
don't want to be a doctor and have someone tell you that your work
sucks.
All of them are capable of doing their job correctly. It is that some
ought to stop calling us to soon.
5C Charge I think the biggest holdup between transporting the patient from the Enterprise cultural
Nurse ER, once it is decided, and getting them here, is they need somebody harmony
to accompany the patient and it has to be professional people. Usually
when they come up it is a nurse and an aid. It is always two people.
They have to be monitored and obviously they have to be stable, and I
think that sometimes that becomes the problem. Staff is stretched
taking care of other other things, and they have to wait for a window
when they can free themselves up to be actually able to bring the
patient up. My impression is that from the time we get a report to the
time that the patient arrives is that it is at least half an hour.
5W Charge at least in the emergency room they are on a stretcher and they can Local organizational
Nurse keep them there if they need to, but if they are in the cath lab and they climate and
are done, they need to come to a bed. subculture
5W Charge
Nurse
I think there is more teamwork amongst the nursing department than
between the nurses and physicians per se. It is kind of physician
dependent. There is a lot of teamwork between the mid levels and the
nurses, but not necessarily the attendings as much. The attendings
spend a lot less time in the units. We have teamwork between the
interns, and residents, and the nursing staff. However, I think we have
a lot of more opportunity for improvement. I think I would like to see
Local organizational
climate and
subculture
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,
the cath lab might have a busy schedule so they may up front say that
"we already have 12 admissions for you today", and then the
emergency room is often busy but patients that need to come up to a
telemetry floor, so usually first we try and book the cath lab and we
do that because there is nowhere else those patients can go, so we sort
of have a conversation with them in the morning and ask them how
many beds do you think you will need and we try to obviously keep
in mind throughout the day that the cath lab has a very busy schedule
today, so whatever else you try to fit in with patients that may be in
clinic at doctors appointments that they decide need to be admitted
but patients in the emergency room... but at least in the emergency
room they are on a stretcher and they can keep them there if they need
to, but if they are in the cath lab and they are done, they need to come
to q habd
Local organizational
climate and
subculture
Patient can't wait in
an OR, but okay to
wait on an ED
stretcher
7C Charge Orthopedics and neurosurgery just got to the point that "you know Local organizational
Nurse what, we have got to do something because we want our patients to climate and
get on their floor". subculture
5W Charge Physician rounding is easier because patients are more grouped Local organizational
Nurse together [i.e. patients of the same service does belonging to the same climate and
attending], the nurse physician relationship is better because the subculture
physicians get to know all of the nurse's names and what type of care
they deliver. For instance, if we get a colenrectal patient I think the Teamfamiliarity
surgeons are not necessarily fond of the nurses on 5 West because
they don't perceive us to be surgical nurses, and that is because we are
not, mostly 99.9% of our patients are medical, so by virtue of the fact
that the nurses on 5 West very seldom take care of a surgical patient
they are probably not as good at doing the things that surgical nurses
are used to doing.
7C Charge If you can't take report right now, then I am going to take report for Local organizational
Nurse you because we can't hold up things for 20 minutes until you are climate and
available to take report. If you have any questions then you can ask subculture
the nurse that took report. To speed up the process whether it be from
the recovery room, or the ER, or the clinic, its been the responsibility
now of the charge nurse, or a nurse who is free, to take report for that
nurse [that is busy].
7C Charge I find the beds on this shift because I know for a fact after knowing Modes of
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5W Charge
Nurse
I
more formalized times to meet with physicians. They seem to think
for some reason that [such meetings] would be difficult to coordinate,
that it may not work, but it could work well... that could be a huge
opportunity for improvement... which means that nurses, and the
physicians, and coordination of care, and ultimately the patients
because if we can meet say at 9 o'clock in the lounge and go through
all the patients we could all be on the same page. The patients could
know what is going on today. We would know what patients would
be going home. We would know potentially how many beds we can
admit to. Whereas now the physicians don't necessarily communicate
all that well with us, so it can be 3 o'clock in the afternoon and the
physicians can come by and discharge 4 patients that we had no idea
were going home. And that is problematic for the patient as well,
because when they find out, they have to arrange for transportation
and it might be that they can't get a ride home at that time of the day.
[...]
if we knew ahead of time that we were going to have those 4
discharges, we may be able to take beds for patients that were later in
the day for the cath lab, and given them to emergency room patients. I
how many beds I have left, and when I go downstairs to what they coordination:
call "bed board", two times a day, you pretty much get an overview boundary spanner
from the supervisor in admitting at that point, "you know what,
recovery room have 17 patients that are awaiting to place, 7 of them
are yours".
I don't know that house keeping have a grasp as to what implication
they have... I still can't get over it... it is just mind blowing.
Enterprise cultural
harmony
7C Charge Half the time it is so busy down there [in the ED] that the nurse Enterprise cultural
Nurse giving report doesn't even give you time to ask questions. If we had harmony
the tsystem information prior to the nurse giving report it would make
the handoff a lot more efficient.
5W Charge
Nurse
Local organizational
climate and
subculture
Psychological safety
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7C Charge
Nurse
We have a lot of new nurses so sometimes that makes the teamwork a
little bit less just because when people are new they are very focused
on getting their own job done, and they may not have as much time to
help somebody else.
I had a high vacancy rate last summer but I lost most of the
employees internally [employees went elsewhere within Hospital
XYZ]. Being a telemetry floor 5 West is often a stepping stone for
nurses that want to go to a higher level of care like the intensive care
or the emergency room. So it tends to generate a high vacancy rate
just because of the kind of floor it is. So a high vacancy rate doesn't
necessarily mean anything bad [at a service unit level], it is just a sign
that people have moved on within the institution.
[.. .
I think the nurse physician relationship is better [when specific
patients are sent to specific floors with specific nurses] because the
physicians know you, they know that you take care of that patient
population all of the time, I think that it is far easier to call a
physician that you know than one that you don't know... some of the
new nurses on the floor are right out of school, their confidence level
is not as high as other nurses who have a lot of experience who feel
comfortable in calling a physician or asking questions.
[..]
If you take a new licensed nurse how would she be different from an
experienced nurse? She may look for resources a lot more, I would
expect for her to do mistakes doing a task that she has never done
before, she would be looking to go to an educator on the unit, she
would be looking to ask a more experienced nurse "oh I have never
done this before, can you watch me do this?". On the other hand
newly licensed nurses if they meet a problem, or have to call a
physician about a question, they won't be as organized at obtaining
the information that they need to give the physician, they won't be as
confident in giving the physician the information they are giving, and
they may not be as confident in answering physicians even then, they
don't know whether it is right or wrong, because physicians aren't
always right either and sometimes they might tell you something and
you might not agree with it. An experienced nurse would be I think
very willing to say "I don't think that is a good plan" or "I don't agree
with that".
[...]
As the years go on I think that the turnover is bigger because of a lot
of nurse bum out...
Inpatient Service Units Knowledge View
Interviewee Interview Excerpt Focused Coding
5W Charge We have a lot of new nurses so sometimes that makes the teamwork a Knowledge transfer
,
Nurse little bit less just because when people are new they are very focused requirements
on getting their own job done, and they may not have as much time to
help somebody else.
I had a high vacancy rate last summer but I lost most of the
employees internally [employees went elsewhere within Hospital
XYZ]. Being a telemetry floor 5 West is often a stepping stone for
nurses that want to go to a higher level of care like the intensive care
or the emergency room. So it tends to generate a high vacancy rate
just because of the kind of floor it is. So a high vacancy rate doesn't
necessarily mean anything bad [at a service unit level], it is just a sign
that people have moved on within the institution.
[...]
I think the nurse physician relationship is better [when specific
patients are sent to specific floors with specific nurses] because the
physicians know you, they know that you take care of that patient
population all of the time, I think that it is far easier to call a
physician that you know than one that you don't know... some of the
new nurses on the floor are right out of school, their confidence level
is not as high as other nurses who have a lot of experience who feel
comfortable in calling a physician or asking questions.
[...]
If you take a new licensed nurse how would she be different from an
experienced nurse? She may look for resources a lot more, I would
expect for her to do mistakes doing a task that she has never done
before, she would be looking to go to an educator on the unit, she
would be looking to ask a more experienced nurse "oh I have never
done this before, can you watch me do this?". On the other hand
newly licensed nurses if they meet a problem, or have to call a
physician about a question, they won't be as organized at obtaining
the information that they need to give the physician, they won't be as
confident in giving the physician the information they are giving, and
they may not be as confident in answering physicians even then, they
don't know whether it is right or wrong, because physicians aren't
always right either and sometimes they might tell you something and
you might not agree with it. An experienced nurse would be I think
very willing to say "I don't think that is a good plan" or "I don't agree
with that".
[...]
Most nurses tend to find the type of nursing that they like, and they
navigate towards that type of floor. So it is better satisfaction for
them to take care of the types of patients that they like taking care of.
5W [ED Charge Nurse responsible for bed tracking says:] Knowledge transfer
Cardiologist If he [Cardiologist Fellow] goes to evaluate the patient [in the ED] as requirements
Fellow opposed to house staff [i.e. medical residents] he would be much
quicker at it because of his experience and his stance. There is no
shot for house staff because they are on the learning curve. He is on
the upper end of his learning curve because of his experience. So they
are not equal arguments. X is going to see 3 patients in the same time
that people with less experience will see 1 patient [in the ED].
[Cardiologist agreed]
Having the intern doing the admissions slows down things but that is.
the only way for them to learn.
5W Senior A lot of these papers that you write that transfer from unit to unit is
Nurse not something that you are going to save, it gets lost, it is not part of
the permanent record.
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6S Pathways are a good idea. We have a lot of pathways here. You have Evidenced based
Hospitalist different people rotating through on the inpatient service, people who medicine
don't always do it all the time, and when you don't do something all
the time you are not necessarily as good as it. You don't remember
what you should be doing. So I think that clinical pathways lead to
better quality of care.
Inpatient Service Units Information View
Interviewee Interview Excerpt Focused Coding
5W Senior Up here [we asked for the patient information] and we then put it into Prevalence of paper
Nurse a 4 page written note. No it is not computerized. We then do our 4 information systems
page called IPA Initial Patient Assessment. And then quite honestly
as a staff nurse up here, when you get an admission one of the biggest Information systems
things is time, and you are like... okay I am going to have to sit down integration
and ask all these questions... and I start out apologizing [to the
patient] and say "I am sorry, I know you have been asked all these
questions, but now I am going to write it on my piece of paper. The
ED wrote it on their piece of paper and put it in their computer. And
the doctor may or may not have a copy".
[...]
On this floor we are fairly organized. On this floor we use a
disposable piece of paper, it gets thrown away, but it is valuable for
the time that the patient is here. On our unit we have such turnover,
we have 50% of turnover on the floor, I don't have time to go back to
this [patient medical] chart, so we write on our own 4 pager what was
the chief complaint, what is their past medical history, what was done
in the cath lab, what is the plan. We write this down so that we know
where they come from, where they are at, and where they are going.
5W Senior I have been here 17 years, and one of my main issues is the repetitive Information systems
Nurse questions over and over and over again. Ideally I would like to see an integration
admission assessment start in the ED. All the demographic, why you
are here, initial vital signs, your history, done once, and let that move Service
along with the process to the floor, so that this nurse up here is not sustainability
repeating... because down in the ED that patient has been asked by (patient experience)
the initial assessment doctor, the nurse that received him, any consult
physician that comes in to the room. They can be asked 2, 3, 4 times
the same story, then guess what, they come up here and I am going to
start again [chuckle], the admission doctor up here is going to start
again [more chuckle].
There was one of our nurses who was admitted to the ED and sat next
to a patient who refused to give further information about her meds.
She said "you know what, I am not going to answer you any more. I
have already given you this information. It is somewhere in this
hospital. I am done repeating it. Please leave me alone". Patients are
tired.
5W Senior I could get started, at least being aware of what is coming, I could Prevalence of
Nurse start my paperwork... the paperwork when I do a new admission... the paper-based systems
paperwork! [grunts] I feel like I am taken from my bedside care
which is why I became a nurse. I feel like I see less of the patient and Information systems
more of the paperwork. So why am I repeating the same thing that integration
somebody has done 3,4,5,6 times, when I could be doing spend time
at the bed time with the patient. I could pick it up in the process of the
admission.
5W Senior Right now as it stands the T-System does not interface with any place Information systems
Nurse beyond the ED. So what actually happens is hard copy of the integration
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5C Charge
Nurse
documentation should be produced and come up with the patient. I
should be able to come along, long after the ED nurse is no longer
involved, and go look at the printed file. We can't access the ED
system from here. The file has to be printed locally in the ED
When the patient arrives here we check to see that they are stable, we
write it on a sheet [not on any system], and then our unit secretary
would call whomever on that [attending's] team for the intern and the
resident to come down and examine the patient for themselves to
write the admitting orders. The time stamp of the patient arrival to our
unit is generated by the admitting office, but that time may not be the
correct time, it may be another hour for the patient to be moved from
the ER.
Prevalence ofPrevalence of
paper-based systems
Data reliability
[...]
Our sheet isn't placed in any system. It is a legal part of the chart, we
have a bed side chart that we keep it in. We have two charts. We have
the standard chart and then we have the bedside chart that we keep
the vital signs and admit sheets in, and that is just based on
convenience.
5W Senior A lot of these papers that you write that transfer from unit to unit is Prevalence of
Nurse not something that you are going to save, it gets lost, it is not part of paper-based systems
the permanent record.
[...] Information systems
On this floor we are fairly organized. On this floor we use a integration
disposable piece of paper, it gets thrown away, but it is valuable for
the time that the patient is here. On our unit we have such turnover,
we have 50% of turnover on the floor, I don't have time to go back to
this [patient medical] chart, so we write on our own 4 pager what was
the chief complaint, what is their past medical history, what was done
in the cath lab, what is the plan. We write this down so that we know
where they come from, where they are at, and where they are going.
5W Senior LCMC is where we do order entry for laboratory work, x-rays, cat Information systems
Nurse scans, medicine tests, and that is where we get our results from. The integration
bed tracking is done in a separate system.
5W Charge you can do it within the system, you can pull up all of the information Information systems
Nurse on the patient, their name, their age, their physician, their electronic integration
number, and you go ahead and you assign them and it sends a
message down to hospital admissions "assigned joe jones to room x in Inpatient EMR
5 west" shared with ORs
7C Charge Half the time it is so busy down there [in the ED] that the nurse Information systems
Nurse giving report doesn't even give you time to ask questions. If we had integration
the tsystem information prior to the nurse giving report it would make
the handoff a lot more efficient.
5W Charge And the unit coordinator inputs that [discharge] within 5 to 10 Data reliability
Nurse minutes. It is more the nurse letting the unit coordinator know
[chuckle] the patient went. Sometimes the nurses will hold out... so
that they don't have to get another admission. That is what I'll say
"you're holding onto the bed". I am not saying that they hold out a
long time, like hours you don't know about it, but sometimes you
don't always know.
7C Charge They [in the ER] don't always tell admissions if the patient needs to Data reliability
Nurse be near the desk. Sometimes they write it on the system in a field next
to the patient name. They can say "needs to be near the desk", or
"needs high traffic" [of nurse observation]. They don't always do.
7C Charge We have an orthopedics survey sheet [paper] we have to indicate on Prevalence of paper
Nurse the day of discharge each day if there is any orthopedic discharge we systems
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I
I
have to write down their name, what time they left, and if they left
late why did they leave late?
7C Charge With our computer system... if we could have one program that did Information systems
Nurse everything... we have programs for everything... we have bed integration
tracking, we have meditech, we have xtech to get discharge
summaries and operative notes... xtech only runs up here, the ED has
the tsystem...
[...
Half the time it is so busy down there [in the ED] that the nurse
giving report doesn't even give you time to ask questions. If we had
the tsystem information prior to the nurse giving report it would make
the handoff a lot more efficient.
[...]
Once I know I am getting an admission from the ER, I should be able
to get into the tsystem, take the time to get into the system, read all I
can about them, and then when the nurse calls [to give report] she can
then either give anything that wasn't put in there, or I can ask her
what I want to ask her. You are not spending all the time going over
data already captured in the tsystem.
[...]
Once they have physicians' orders then the nurse calls to our unit to
say that she wants to give report to the nurse. It is a nurse to nurse
report system. This reporting lasts probably 5 minutes. The nurse to
nurse report, a lot of the information we could get on the computer,
but I think the nurse to nurse report, granted it is vital specifics in
terms of their diagnosis in terms of their medical history, and their
vital signs, but I think that a nurse to nurse report gives you that
personalized... basically you're saying that "they are a little agitated"
or "the family was with them"... it is information that isn't easily
captured in the system.
7C Charge emergency room techs that will bring the patient up with whatever Information systems
Nurse paperwork from the ER. Probably any typed or computer printout integration
because we are not hooked up to the T-System. Whatever typed paper
work they have, or paperwork with lab values, or x-rays results, all
that comes up, you know whatever chart was started, comes up with
the patient
[...]
All their [ED] paperwork is done in the computer. We haven't even
done that up here! [chuckle] Eventually each floor will be able to
access the information once they plug in the medical record number.
7C Charge I find the beds on this shift because I know for a fact after knowing Information systems
Nurse how many beds I have left, and when I go downstairs to what they integration
call "bed board", two times a day, you pretty much get an overview
from the supervisor in admitting at that point, "you know what, Can 't see
recovery room have 17 patients that are awaiting to place, 7 of them admissions board
are yours".
6S I have been sitting on this EMR committee for a while, and giving Information systems
Hospitalist advice on how to do things, and somehow it came out that there is no integration
big picture plan, they eventually are going to put together 5 or 6
separate systems and try and knock them together somehow. Enterprise process
Everybody has this little microscopic little view of things and they are improvement and
not seeing the big picture. They are totally missing it. planning scope
5C Charge In order to the ER to admit a patient into this unit, they have to speak Information systems
Nurse with our charge nurse to know the bed availability. integration
5C Charge The ER physician doesn't literally call... very often what they do, is Information systems
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Nurse that everybody has phones and beepers, there is a page system within integration
the computer. They can text message them or they can page them.
And then they can talk with them on the phone. So they are not
literally phoning them. There is a list to say who would be the
attendings that are accepting patients that day in the different
disciplines, so he would know who is accepting.
Appendix V: Hospital ABC Additional Resources
i. Sample Qualitative Data Excerpts
a. Main ORs
Main ORs External / Policy View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Main ORs The other system is the more throughput you have the more bonus you get as
Surgeon 1 part of a bonus system. There is no reason why you shouldn't [have it]. This is
a foundation trust, you can do anything.
Main ORs A timeout is done in the theater... do I take part in it? No... that is the biggest
Surgeon I waste of time there is and I'll tell you why... because if I don't know that
patient and I haven't seen that patient, I don't know what operation I am
doing, then I shouldn't be doing it. I strongly believe that. [...]I do my own
checklist in my head.
Main ORs [chuckles] Okay. Evidence based medicine is a great terminology and how
Surgeon 1 much evidence based medicine do you practice. In theatres most of what I do
tends to move towards evidence based so evidence based tells me that I
shouldn't be putting drains in my operations after surgery... it doesn't make
any difference... they are more painful... and that we shouldn't do them.
Common sense tells me that if I have a pancreatic leak, I then have a drain, it
is a major problem, and I have to then get a drain in place for containing it.
Evidence based is formed on meta analysis not looking at all the work but just
looking at drains in surgery overall. So do I take an overall picture and apply it
to my specific condition, the answer is no. So I don't practice it in that
situation. But... I do think about it.
Main ORs Well consultant here think that you are basically an independent practitioner.
Anesthesiologist So you are basically free to practice the way you think is reasonable. Having
said that you are expected to know the NICE guidelines and [Hospital ABC]
guidelines. So we have internal guidelines too. [...] Continuously there is one
or two audits that compare our efforts to the standards set by the guidelines.
This audit is delegated to one of the consultant anesthesiologist.
Main ORs [JF: How do you measure quality?]
Surgeon 2 [chuckles] That is an embarrassing question... in this department we just
follow the NHS guidance based on some audit tool and mandatory meetings,
like M&M, but overall we don't have quality assurance strategy within
departments.
Main ORs Legally we cannot handover operation instructions to a healthcare assistant, a
Recovery Nurse non qualified staff, so it has to be a registered nurse. Surgeon post operative
instructions have to be given to the registered nurse, and any drugs which the
patient has had intra operatively as well as in post operatively, has to be
handed over with doses.
Main ORs Strategy View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
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Main ORs "[Hospital ABC] serves the local community and it also has a tertiary center and
.
Surgeon 1 has developed very strong tertiary setup over the years."
Main ORs "the[procedure X], there are probably only a handful of surgeons in the country
Surgeon 1 doing that at the moment, and we have pioneered it here."
Main ORs "One is service delivery at the highest level of care and safety for the
Surgeon 2 community... that is clear... and especially in [this area] where we have a strong
diversity population catchment. We have all levels of wealth... it is something
absolutely special..."
Main ORs "we want to be a strong part of the Academic Medical Science Center and we
Surgeon 2 don't want to be the little brother of the family of two other big institutions"
Main ORs "[a] strength of [Hospital ABC] is a strong commitment to training and we know
Surgeon 2 that there are other universities in [this area] that are more prestigious and with
better rank... however at[Hospital ABC] is to be a first choice not only for patients
but as well as for students and for trainees in the future to choose [Hospital ABC]
rather than another place to be trained on."
Main ORs Service View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Main ORs "Quality of care is a patient experience through the whole procedure, where
Surgeon 1 you have given to them what they think is an extremely good service, that they
have been treated effectively and quickly, no more complications, and that the
outcomes were good. As far as I think it is a patient based experience that is
the number one priority"
Main ORs "Have you been at the wards here? If not you will see the cultural shock if you
Surgeon 2 come from another country where you have individual rooms of just two
patients per room... looks an organized corridor... a bit like a hotel... In the
UK you will see the cultural shock because you have the open space... wards
look old... it is really embarrassing... It is a historical choice... it is a building
choice..."
Main ORs "The idea of a holding bay is that they hold a patient until surgery. In terms of
Matron patient comfort and dieting it pays not to leave them down here for a long
time. They want to go to the toilet and we don't have a patient toilet [down
here]. We don't have facilities for them to watch TV. Patients should be
checked in and sent to a theatre [immediately] ideally."
Main ORs "We keep quite tight. We are pretty micro managed. As soon as the patient
Matron arrives the holding bay nurse rings the theatre and tells them that "the patient
is here". If there is a major problem like there is no consent, or there isn't a
high dependency unit bed, we go out and speak with the consultant. So there is
a bit of micro managing because we don't want to lose 1.5 hours and get
another patient in that slot."
Main ORs "Due to holding bay the sending issue is no problem for us... so we can send
Anesthesiologist for a little bit earlier than when we usually need the patient actually. This is a
very helpful device"
Main ORs "It doesn't happen because the ward round doesn't happen until the morning,
Surgeon 1 and you never know what comes in at night. Beds aren't specifically
blocked... there are emergency beds and there are beds for everybody... you
can't block them. You can't say that these 5 beds for laparoscopic surgery."
Main ORs "All our major cases cannot be started on time because we don't know if there
Surgeon 1 is high dependency bay available"
Main ORs "You know it would be lovely if you sat in recovery and see what we have to
Recovery Nurse go through. Of course they know, but for some reason they are either doing
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drugs, or they have gone on their lunch, or it is just one qualified nurse on the
ward... they can't come. [...]We give them 20 minutes notice. And after 20
minutes we ring them again. We can wait up to 2 hours sometimes"
Main ORs "Then you try to have the juniors [doctors] but they don't start until 7.45."
Surgeon 1
Main ORs "they will send someone to their coffee break when they are changing patients
Surgeon 1 around, and that for me is stupidity. When you are setup and in full flight of
surgery you can send someone for a coffee break or a lunch break, so that you
are in the case, you still got one runner [nurse fetching material], and you have
one person to spare, and the other can go for the break. I have no objections to
that. But when you are right in the middle of turning around I expect that turn
around to be quick and I don't want anybody leaving... and that is not
happening."
Main ORs " the thing is if somebody makes a move... I had a list like that with 14
Anesthesiologist patients on it... I would run around and find theater space for those patients to
go to because I don't want to stay here until 10 o'clock at night. So if you
make people aware of that it always works... But there isn't much proactivity
to making people aware, especially of empty theaters"" But! Look! [points at
stacks of paper on Main ORs Coordinator's office]. [She] is absorbed in other
business so she can't run around and she can't spot the slot."
Main ORs [JF: Once the procedure is nearing its end is there any communication
Anesthesiologist with the recovery bay to let them know you are about to finish?]
"Yes... usually 10 minutes. That is the plan... but as usual there is human
error and sometimes it is forgotten to call the recovery bay or it takes
sometimes ages for patients to wake up for no apparent reason, so it takes you
50 minutes to recovery, then they will take another patient, then they would
expect the second call which will not come because they are probably short of
staff again."
Main ORs [JF: Do you feel that the theater staff give you enough warning?]
Recovery Nurse "Sometime they don't ring and they will bring the patient in apologetically.
And then because we don't always have enough nurses, especially at the
moment with staff on maternity leave and sick, it does disrupt the smooth
running because I try to have one nurse to two patients. If theater brings a
patient without notifying us it disrupts us and we have to find a workaround."
Main ORs On the day cancellations. Although we have significantly reduced them we
Matron still have about 9% [...] the odd late cancellation and we are already fully
staffed to conduct that case
Main ORs Patient not pre assessed. My understanding is that a lot of patients don't get
Matron pre assessed properly [...]patients are not fit for surgery because they haven't
been pre assessed or they have been pre assessed but no one bothered to look
at the results [...]they were preassessed and they were fine but now they have
a cold, or because they had a glass of milk
Main ORs not worked up properly would be the most common reason for patient
Matron cancellations. [... ]Patient not consented
Main ORs 90% of the time patients are ready [when they arrive to the holding bay]. What
Anesthesiologist sometimes we have to wait for indeed is surgical consent, which means
discussion with the patient and late start for the list.
Main ORs Quite a few times we wait for blood results. Sometimes they take up to 4 hours
Anesthesiologist to get the results on the computer system, so if the blood is taken at 11 o'clock
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and the operation is scheduled for 10, we might run into trouble there.
Main ORs Process
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Main ORs Due to holding bay the sending issue is no problem for us... so we can send
Anesthesiologist for a little bit earlier than when we usually need the patient actually. This is a
very helpful device
Main ORs And opening the tray and finding that half that what you need is not in it. Or
Matron going to the shelf and realizing it isn't there.
Main ORs We all know that surgeons lie... so we would look at surgery finish time and
Matron anesthesia time to determine real surgery time. Surgeons will say that a triple
A will take only 3 hours, however when you would look at the data you would
see that it actually takes 5.5 hours by the time you have the patient prepped,
with the lines in, etc.
Main ORs [JF: Do recovery nurses check to see if the notes are available before they
Recovery Nurse call the ward to pick up the patient?]
We should do, and I know that is a fault of ours, but sometimes we are so busy
that we might dismiss it, and this always happens at the end of the day. Our
workload in recovery is always multiplied towards the end of the day, the end
of the elective sessions... you know more patients are coming out
Main ORs Everybody [anesthesiologist] has a different system to deal with patients. I like
Matron to see my patients before they go into procedure. I don't want any of my
patients to be taken anywhere before I check them. Or before I see that my
equipment is clean
Main ORs Sometimes it happens that the patient is positioned in a certain way and the
Anesthesiologist surgeon says "ha ha! Well done! But I want it like this today!" So you start
over all over again. You wasted 10 minutes.
Main ORs "we send for the patient... often I will say send for the patient... finish the
Surgeon 1 case... I finished the cholangiogram on a lap chole [laparoscopic
cholecysectomy] and as soon as I have done that I know you can send for the
patient because by the time I turn around, finish this, the next patient should be
there in 15 minutes."
Main ORs Sometime they don't ring and they will bring the patient in apologetically.
Recovery Nurse [...] If theater brings a patient without notifying us it disrupts us and we have
to find a workaround.
Main ORs then we wait for the operation notes from the surgeon. Half the time we have
Recovery Nurse to go looking for them or we then find that the surgeon is gone and nothing
has been written, and that is a big headache. And sometimes we get a ward
nurse to get the patient and she will not take the patient without the notes,
which we can understand. So the patient then ends up in recovery far longer
than is necessary really.
Main ORs The juniors put the lists in, they talk to radiology and tell them that we need
Surgeon 1 imaging... This all depends on the middle grade who basically tell the
housemen what to do and they implement it.... They communicate with other
teams. [...]Last week there were two days that we did not have junior doctors!
Because of the junior doctor hours we have a problem... ... ]I have weeks
when I don't have anybody...
Main ORs I don't pre requisitely say to them this is what I will use, this, this, and this.
Surgeon 1 For the bypasses of a bariatric cycle they should know, it is standardized like a
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factory. I have even drummed it into their heads... I use one eleven port... I
use two twelve ports... three five ports... I use an ND GIA 45... I use six
sixtures... it is precision all the way through, and at the beginning of the
operation they set it up. That they know. But there is some stuff that is a bit
variable and they don't know what I will use. But they will work at it. But if
you put one weak link into that system and it will break down.
Main ORs the bed pressure... there is a bed free there so the patient goes there... There
Surgeon 2 are some preferences, where some wards are a bit more colorectal or vascular
but overall there is a big mix of patients in the ward and no communication
between the wards or little communication with theatres.
Main ORs I don't rely on metrics on a day to day basis... it is more of post information...
Surgeon 2 "this has happened" and we note down the step further action will be taken...
it is far from a daily concern.
Main ORs overall we don't have quality assurance strategy within departments. I am sure
Surgeon 2 that at the Trust level there are some tools... [...]I think that this data possibly
exists somewhere in some higher level... If I open the [Hospital ABC internal]
website you will find nothing.
Main ORs I personally have no major concerns except that sometimes midday we run out
Anesthesiologist of capacity in recovery. Then you have two choices. You can either go to
recovery even though they have no staff and just sit the patient there until
somebody is vacant. Or you wait in theater. And the anesthesiologist
throughout that time is waiting with the patient. [... ]There is always more
space than there is staff [in recovery bay]... so if you want to go there you
can, just to try to get the theater ready for the next one as soon as possible.
Main ORs It is usually I don't have a nurse available, and I will say "okay you can come
Recovery Nurse in but you will have to stay with the patient until there is a nurse available.
The anesthesiologist is usually very happy to stay.
Main ORs Organization View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Main ORs the office... you see we have a beautiful clinical corridor [he is being sarcastic
Surgeon 2 as the corridor is old and nothing glamorous with cringe doors] and then just
there [chuckles and points out through the window] you have a wonderful
management corridor. I would [like to] see some group or small department
manager, their office would be here [at the clinical side]. We never book
meetings at the management offices... We could share offices! If you share an
office you can meet every day and there is no feeling of distance.
Main ORs Last week there were two days that we did not have junior doctors! Because of
Surgeon 1 the junior doctor hours we have a problem...
Main ORs Yes we do get through the work... particularly my team never quibble about
Surgeon 1 work... which is very different from 7 years ago when I first started... If I said
I have to finish a case at 3 o'clock they wouldn't send and I had to cancel the
patient. And this now does not happen because if I say now that I want to
finish the case it happens
Main ORs this is unusual and part of that is the factor of achievement over the years...
Surgeon 1 there is so few little factors that stop me from carrying on... rarely one of the
older anesthesiologists might cancel... but I tend not to face that problem
often. I don't make excessive demands... if I think a case will take longer and
it is the end of the day already we won't do it. That has been one of the
positive things over the years... the willingness to complete whatever it is on
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the list. I have built that space [that culture] with that theatre... the team and
the space... so we can make it work.
Main ORs "Let me tell you something... I do laparoscopic, obesity, and general
Surgeon 1 surgery... When you have one person from the 3 element team that does not
know, that is the weak link, and I have one of them every week that I don't
know"
Main ORs "For pediatric and orthopedic service we have quite good team building
Anesthesiologist because the staff is quite stable. Everybody knows the concepts that are run in
this theatre.
Main ORs "here at [Hospital ABC] there are dedicated teams, which means that the same
Surgeon 2 surgeon team will have nearly on a regular basis the same theatre, the same
staff, the same team, and when I say team, I say even from the holding bay,
where the first type of attention comes, it doesn't change. It is a critical
strength in terms of efficiency because people know each other,
communication, respect, ... [ ... ] Though checklists and processes are safe that
does not replace experience and pleasure to work together
Main ORs In the past I even tried to start and sending at 7 o'clock but that did not go
Surgeon 1 anywhere... the patient is stuck on the ward...
Main ORs "[JF: So how is it [the organization] laid out now?]
Surgeon 2 Well if I detail it I don't even know! What I know is that I am working in the
department of Urology which is part of the... very strange... surgical and
critical care... though it is surgical, there is another department with surgery
with female and pediatric... I don't know the name exactly... and there is
another that is liver surgery... So even our department within care group...
surgeries in different care groups... my feeling is that it should not."
Main ORs You know it would be lovely if you sat in recovery and see what we have to
Recovery Area go through. Of course they know, but for some reason they are either doing
drugs, or they have gone on their lunch, or it is just one qualified nurse on the
ward... they can't come. [...] We give them 20 minutes notice. And after 20
minutes we ring them again. We can wait up to 2 hours sometimes
Main ORs [JF: Do recovery nurses check to see if the notes are available before they
Recovery Area call the ward to pick up the patient?]
We should do, and I know that is a fault of ours, but sometimes we are so busy
that we might dismiss it, and this always happens at the end of the day. Our
workload in recovery is always multiplied towards the end of the day, the end
of the elective sessions... you know more patients are coming out.
Main ORs Also, getting the CSSD instruments without delay. Because they [nurses] have
Matron already enough frustrations in the day without having to constantly
decontaminate and fresh sterilize equipment because they don't have enough.
Main ORs The patient is stuck on the ward... and you are trying to get these things to
Surgeon 1 happen.
Main ORs For a surgeon theatres are extremely important. Main theatres have a wide
Surgeon 1 range of sub specialties and you have a wide range of individuals that each of
which have their own niches in developing tertiary practices. You'll see
surgeons that are doing some new hip replacement, or some new something
else... so everybody is developing a tertiary center as well as serving the local
community. And that is difficult for theatres
Main ORs Currently I ask the anesthesiologist can we call for the next patient? The
Surgeon 1 anesthesiologist will say yes we can call for the next patient, so the
anesthesiologist helper will ask the sister, and the sister will say that she will
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call somebody, and that is where the holdup is, and they never call for the
patient. [...] My personal view is that you [consultant] should direct the
intercom link to the recovery staff or holding bay, you press the buzzer,
"holding bay call for the patient". Get rid of all the nursing staff etc. Straight
to holding bay. Get rid of everybody in the system.
Main ORs
Surgeon 1
"One of the thing that drives me up the wall is... lets say I am changing
cases... I do a case... we send for the patient... often I will say send for the
patient... finish the case... I finished the cholangiogram on a lap chole
[laparoscopic cholecysectomy] and as soon as I have done that I know you can
send for the patient because by the time I turn around, finish this, the next
patient should be there in 15 minutes. What happens? Depends how the staff
are feeling. If they are feeling sort of a bit tired they will slow down and they
won't quite send. The whole thing slows down because the faster they work
the less break they get. They don't get a break. They have to clear the theater.
Wash the theater. It is the same 3 staff. Clean the theater, get the next patient
ready, etc. There is not enough staff to do that."
Main ORs I find [the Main ORs Coordinator] approachable. I think she is approachable.
Recovery Area She has given us an impetus and a feeling that we are working in a good
Nurse environment. Her role is to bring in work and make sure that we keep up with
the amount of work.
Main ORs If I am not getting results with my recovery staff I come to Dot [nurse matron]
Recovery Area and bounce off some ideas. [...] I think that knowing that there is someone in
Nurse authority that you can approach gives you a good feeling.
Main ORs My manager whom I just took over from retired and we all went out together.
Recovery Area I think we see it that we are all working towards the same aim, which is the
Nurse patient, and we work as a team.
Main ORs The surgeons... a lot of them we only know the name but we don't associate
Recovery Area the name with the face. Maybe because they don't come to recovery. The only
Nurse time they may come to recovery is to drop the notes or to say hello to the
patient, but that is not always. [...]With the anesthesiologist we have to work
in close partnership because they rely on us and we rely on them, and I think
we have a very good relationship with them. [...] There is no barrier between
anesthesiologist and nurse, but I feel that there is a barrier between surgeons
and nurses.
Main ORs Approachability... no matter what the problem is you are able to take the
Recovery Area problem to them and that they will be there to help. We have access to beep
Nurse numbers, we have access to the registrar, and to the junior registrar, and we
have 24 access. We can also go around to the operating theater if we have a
problem.
Main ORs Our porters are of a breed here... how to say this politely... I don't know how
Matron to say it... some of them are just plain thick! I believe that if you put porters
through a basic training program we could handle the handoff better. For
instance porters should not bring down patients if they are not consented.
Porters have to be able to speak English and be understood so as to have a
better idea of how to deal with people
Main ORs In surgery basically the surgeons have a quite strong ego and we are quite
Surgeon 2 selfish as well so when a big ego bumps into another big ego there is some
friction, some conflict of interest, some conflict on conditions, that once in a
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while can happen... and I have a culture coming from [the] south of Europe so
I talk directly... and then you see that it isn't working, or if there is not will,
no wish to talk directly ... then I will invite a third party or a third person... a
clinical director... a colleague... or a manager... Fortunately over three years
I have had three problems to solve...
Main ORs Even in the daily department life, we have department meetings every week
Surgeon 2 where I have never seen a ward sister invited to any department meeting...
and that is [Hospital ABC]... and I have never seen that before in my life! It
could be an M&M meeting... by invitation we can have someone invited to
one of these meetings but it is really uncommon and not a formal requirement.
[...] We cannot say that wards are part of the surgical team and I would not
blame anyone... we are the surgeons so we are the source to blame... we
should extend the invitation... even if it is not organized... even if we don't
have a strong structure to help that...
Main ORs "Or they will send someone to their coffee break when they are changing
Surgeon 1 patients around, and that for me is stupidity. When you are setup and in full
flight of surgery you can send someone for a coffee break or a lunch break, so
that you are in the case, you still got one runner [nurse fetching material], and
you have one person to spare, and the other can go for the break. I have no
objections to that. But when you are right in the middle of turning around I
expect that turn around to be quick and I don't want anybody leaving... and
that is not happening."
Main ORs "There is lots of flexibility... the thing is if somebody makes a move... I had a
Anesthesiologist list like that with 14 patients on it... I would run around and find theater space
for those patients to go to because I don't want to stay here until 10 o'clock at
night. So if you make people aware of that it always works... But there isn't
much proactivity to making people aware, especially of empty theaters"
Main ORs The situation is that day by day everybody does the best but in terms of no
Surgeon 2 strong ward culture and no link between ward and theatre, then I say there is
no link... the link is a porter with a form with a ticking box on either side to
make sure everything is safe... but it is not strong. [Inpatient service units
should have] similar activities... I don't say organs... If you do laparoscopic
colon or gold bladder or kidney it is quite the same kind of thing and
explanation to the patient, so similar activities could be on the same ward. And
then once we know from that ward there is a similar activity, then the whole
team can have a better feedback and a better feeling of what is going on the
ward.
Main ORs And have more direct contact... because there is nothing wrong in my opinion
Surgeon 2 that in a normal rotation for ward sister, or ward nurse, or a member of the
ward involved with patients, could accompany the patient to the theatre and
maybe see part of the procedure. Some part of the ward staff time should be
allocated for them to go to the theatres. And the same, a couple of hours in a
month, would not harm for theater staff to have formal contact with a patient
on the ward, and it might not be always the one you have seen in theater, but
why not, and the patient would possibly think it is good...
Main ORs I know that the NHS allows private work out of the NHS time. NHS
Surgeon 2 consultant has a contract in a private provider outside of [Hospital ABC] and
on the evening... and it is amazing because you see normal activity after 5....
So surgeons run a second job. [...] So it is completely private... it is private
insurance... just like you have in the states [US].
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Main ORs
Surgeon 2
[Hospital ABC] has a small unit which is a private wing... where surgeons
with a contract at [Hospital ABC] are allowed to bring their [private] patient
and then it is the same, surgeons are paid privately by the insurers, and it
brings money for [Hospital ABC]of course because on the normal bill 20%
might be for the surgeon and then 80% is for the Trust... but it is not a
massive activity... It is a significant source of income for the Trust and for
surgeons as well. [...] And the surgeons use the same teams as they would in
any other day. However the rule is out of NHS hours... this means after
5.30pm or on Saturdays.
We have the same for meeting targets you can be paid extra PA [Program
Activities]. Each Program Activity is 4 hours and you have a job plan... that
says your job is 1OPA a week, or 11, or 12... for those who are on 12 PA...
usually they would not be [on more than 12PA]... So for longer day or another
half day where you are not supposed to work in theater, those who are on
1 OPA they will get this extra money. Those who are already in 48 hours
contract will get nothing [i.e. 48 hours is 12PA]. But nobody in 12PA will
complaint. I am on 12PA and I will not comnlaint
Main ORs We try to accommodate requested days off as much as possible. Staff can put
Recovery Area requests in the diary and when it comes to us doing the work schedule we try
Nurse to accommodate their request. It is not always possible to get all the requests.
But what we try to say is at least 2 requests per week [are satisfied].
Main ORs In the recovery sometimes we bring food in. We have a diverse workforce and
Recovery Area we try to bring food from each nurse. We have African, Sri Lanka, ... Apart
Nurse from that there isn't much else really.
Main ORs "One of the thing that drives me up the wall is... lets say I am changing
Surgeon 1 cases... I do a case... we send for the patient... often I will say send for the
patient... finish the case... I finished the cholangiogram on a lap chole
[laparoscopic cholecysectomy] and as soon as I have done that I know you can
send for the patient because by the time I turn around, finish this, the next
patient should be there in 15 minutes. What happens? Depends how the staff
are feeling. If they are feeling sort of a bit tired they will slow down and they
won't quite send. The whole thing slows down because the faster they work
the less break they get. They don't get a break. They have to clear the theater.
Wash the theater. It is the same 3 staff. Clean the theater, get the next patient
ready, etc. There is not enough staff to do that. So what incentive is it for them
to try to stress themselves out? None."
Main ORs "the turnaround between theatres is slow and there is no incentive driven
Surgeon 1 approach. Lets say we have three cases and we finish by 2pm... what
happens? Well, you get sent to other theatres or they have to do other things...
they don't go home. Or lets say that you finish late? Well you just carry on
and finish late. So where is the incentive to finish early? [...] The simplest
thing to do is that you say "This is your list. As soon as you finish your list
you go home. We won't expect you to do other things". And that doesn't
happen."
Main ORs "on the Saturday and the Sunday, because the nursing staff get paid per hour
Surgeon 1 they prolong the thing. There is an absolute link between the financial
incentive and productivity. You watch if I put two cases on, on a Sunday,
turnover staff, they are late, or in between there will be an extra hour or
something, and there is a direct knock on effect. [...]The other system is the
more throughput you have the more bonus you get as part of a bonus system.
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[...] There is no doubt if you say... this is our target, achieve 150 cases within
the year, 3 cases a day, whatever, we'll make sure we give you a 10% raise in
your pay pack. But the other important thing is that once people get finished
they can go home and don't have to go into the other theater. That sort of
change will drive efficiency through theatres"
Main ORs we have a system of awards, clinical experience awards. It is a scale of 1 to 9
Surgeon 2 where the first 6 are local awards and the last 3 are national awards. That is a
significant amount of increase of the wage as a bonus. But you have to deserve
it. At the moment the Clinical Experience Award is 20% of my salary. There
is a funding annually for that in the hospital and [chuckle] there is a committee
with some kind of competition you apply for and the committee has people
from the Trust and colleagues. [...] but it is some kind of waiting list or
outcome in performance or a way to say thank you. Those who will contribute
a bit more to the hospital...
Main ORs Knowledge View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Main ORs Our porters are of a breed here... how to say this politely... I don't know how
Matron to say it... some of them are just plain thick! I believe that if you put porters
through a basic training program we could handle the handoff better. For
instance porters should not bring down patients if they are not consented.
Porters have to be able to speak English and be understood so as to have a
better idea of how to deal with people
Main ORs ODAs might be either saying, I am only working in theater 3 but not in theater
Anesthesiologist 8, or they might be saying I am specialized in pediatrics but I cannot do a
general thoracic case. And a coordinator would have the task of juggling that
around and say okay, this person goes here, this person goes here, and that
would make things go much more smoothly [...] You need the capability, the
leadership skill, and you need the knowledge of what the specific nurse or
nurse anesthesiologist can do and cannot do, and should you allot someone
else.
Main ORs Well consultant here thinks that you are basically an independent practitioner.
Anesthesiologist So you are basically free to practice the way you think is reasonable. Having
said that you are expected to know the NICE guidelines and [Hospital ABC]
guidelines. So we have internal guidelines too.
Main ORs [JF: When you are about to put the patient to sleep, how common is it for
Anesthesiologist the surgeon to be present when that happens?]
Less than 10%.
Main ORs "[The Main ORs Coordinator] can't tell the consultant surgeon anything that
Anesthesiologist he won't do right now. It sometimes means that the surgeon has to wait for 10
minutes for something, and he will go mad about that and he will insist "no
this is my list... I want this theater now". At that stage, you need a person who
is capable of saying to another consultant "no, you are wrong, we need the
theater now, and you get theater 5 in 10 minutes". [...] If you have multiple
specialties [in a hospital] you need a consultant anesthesiologist to fulfill the
role of theatre coordinator"
Main ORs "I think the Trust basically needs to think "well, you have not completed 70%
Surgeon 1 of your mandatory teaching" then there needs to be some fine.. .you won't get
any of your study leave money, or your study leave... which is a sort of
incentive that could be quite useful. If you are fulfilling your educational role
Page 733 of 759
within the institution then we shouldn't be sending you up for education
outside of the institution. [...] If you do not fulfill 70% to 80% of your audit,
etc, then you are not eligible to receive Clinical Excellence. This should
include audits and teaching commitments. And all of this should have a Friday
morning teaching commitment where we are all actually in there teaching the
juniors as a team. And that is not happening. [... ]and you know things like
infection control policy, etc, and all these things that everybody forgets every
six months, we would really learn about it."
Main ORs [chuckles] Okay. Evidence based medicine is a great terminology and how
Surgeon 1 much evidence based medicine do you practice. In theatres most of what I do
tends to move towards evidence based so evidence based tells me that I
shouldn't be putting drains in my operations after surgery... it doesn't make
any difference... they are more painful... and that we shouldn't do them.
Common sense tells me that if I have a pancreatic leak, I then have a drain, it
is a major problem, and I have to then get a drain in place for containing it.
Evidence based is formed on meta analysis not looking at all the work but just
looking at drains in surgery overall. So do I take an overall picture and apply it
to my specific condition, the answer is no. So I don't practice it in that
situation. But... I do think about it.
Main ORs A timeout is done in the theater... do I take part in it? No... that is the biggest
Surgeon 1 waste of time there is and I'll tell you why... because if I don't know that
patient and I haven't seen that patient, I don't know what operation I am
doing, then I shouldn't be doing it. I strongly believe that. ... ]I do my own
checklist in my head.
Main ORs I don't rely on metrics on a day to day basis... it is more of post information...
Surgeon 2 "this has happened" and we note down the step further action will be taken...
it is far from a daily concern.
Main ORs [JF: Do you think it would be useful to have it [daily indicators]?]
Surgeon 2 Oh yes! I think that any modern way of thinking, management, or anticipating
is the basis of quality and performance.
Main ORs On any given shift we try to have at least 6 or 7 staff members in the main
Recovery Area recovery. In the obstetrics theatre there is always 1 member of staff on. In the
Nurse neurological theatre there is always 3 members of staff on. In the neurological
recovery you always rotate the staff, you never have 1 member of staff
working there permanently. We rotate so that everybody gets to work in the
different disciplines.
Main ORs Information View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Main ORs Then the [patient] slip which is held in the theatre is taken to the holding bay so
Matron that the holding bay nurse can give it to the porter who in turn will go get the
patient from the ward.
Main ORs We try to accommodate requested days off as much as possible. Staff can put
Recovery requests in the diary and when it comes to us doing the work schedule we try to
Area Nurse accommodate their request
Main ORs The majority of times [the post operative notes are] written by hand. Occasionally
Recovery we are now getting some surgeons using computerized, and we would have to
Area Nurse print that out. They use a word processing package.
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b. Administrative Support Services
Administrative Support Services External / Policy View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
OR In addition to that we have had the implementation of the European Working
Management Time Directive. Now at the risk of sounding like an old fart, when I first started
Board training I finished my first undergraduate degree in 1985, I was scheduled for 112
Surgeon hours a week, scheduled... I am now implementing this year 48 hours max for
my trainees. Now it doesn't take Einstein to work out that there is an awful drop
in clinical experience and exposure from that length of time. It has really been cut
by around about a quarter which is a huge amount! [...]there is an increasing
awareness that we are not training our senior trainees to a consultant level at the
time where they are being appointed to the consultant level with the necessary
expertise and breadth of experience and that is reflective by the number of
consultants who get into trouble in the first few years of their practice, and are
suspended
OR [patient flow] is more and more important because of the 18 week target and
Management clock watching etc.
Board
Chairman
Main ORs Patient flow and all those things matter but today what is very fashionable to
Coordinator Darzi, and all of that, is that whatever you do needs to have a patient experience
focus, and quality of care, and patient involvement. These are very buzz words
which we are trying to underpin what we are doing.
Anesthetic We have to meet national targets... [...]Say I have a sore knee and go to the
Delivery orthopedic clinic and the consultant has a look at my knee and says that you are
Manager going to need surgery for XYZ. That starts your treatment [18 weeks] clock and
you have to be treated within that.
Lean Team 18 weeks has been a big forcing feature... we are clearly understanding it in a
Director way we didn't before about the fact that we haven't got enough capacity to do the
work that we have got to do and therefore we have got to be more efficient in
order to sustain our position... and I think that is the big strategic change.
Surgery and What I did in my specialties... This is a gross simplification but we don't have
Critical Care time to talk about all the details... What I tell my specialties is "look you will not
Director be able to keep your referral base... we will have to chop it off at the knees
essentially if you don't hit 18 weeks...
Administrative Support Services Strategy View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Anesthetic from the point of view of a patient it is the fact that it is a local hospital that can
Delivery provide me with just about any service and I am going to get good care and it is a
Manager good hospital
Surgery and They need to make a surgeon who is top class think that this is a place I want to
Critical Care work.
Director
OR There is a general acceptance that the patients that we are dealing here are getting
Management more and more complex because we are distilling out as a tertiary center, but still
Board you have a big aspect of what you call a district general hospital which provides
Chairman local services to the local population.
Surgery and I think it is a fantastic tertiary but local service focused hospital. It is really
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Critical Care embedded in our population. We lose that at our peril as we might seek other sort
Director of reputation in the national our international scene.
OR The things that could be improved and where resource may be necessary is from
Management right through the system... the way the patient is placed on the waiting list...
Board where their pre assessment is, how they highlight those individuals who fail the
Chairman pre assessment and then get an anesthetic assessment... but because of resource it
means that you have to have an anesthesiologist available to actually pick these
patients up... but it is timed and money well spent in terms of actually allocating
that individual to get the appropriate investigations, etc... and that is more and
more important because of the 18 week target and clock watching etc.
Administrative Support Services Service View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
OR I think there could be an awful lot more coordination between theatres and the
Management wards, and the way the patients are prepared in a timely manner, and coordinated
Board to know that those patients are going to be there
Chairman
OR cardiac came out with the fact that this is how they wanted to run the surgery "I
Management want three cases in the day". Anesthesiologists say "you can't do that". Okay sit
Board in a room and tell us how you might do it and what are the resource implications
Chairman for that together with your business manager, and then came back to us and say
"actually we need an extra recovery bed... we need the theater team to work over
lunch time if we can actually start anesthetizing the second cardiac case as the
other one is still coming off the table
Main ORs So each one of these slots are filed, we know that because that is the timetable,
Coordinator that is the job plan for the consultant surgeon and the job plan for the consultant
anesthesiologist. What is going to interfere with that? Poor communication.
[...]The rule in the country is that if you were treating your elective patients
correctly, the guidelines say that you should give patients at least three weeks
notice. So if we are going to tell Ms. Bloggs to come in three weeks prior,
shouldn't she be on the system? Why should it be a grand surprise? This also
impacts the patient experience.
Main ORs We see ourselves as the piggy in the middle. The patients come from the wards to
Coordinator us, and they go from us to the wards. Many of our issues result from the ward not
preparing... I am not painting them out to be bad... again it is also the fault of pre
assessment. Failures occur in pre assessment and those then pressure the ward
[which in turn pressure us with additional failure]
Main ORs Sterilization of all items is done offsite. That in itself can be a bottleneck. Firstly
Coordinator because it is off site. And because it is offsite the turnaround time is 18 hours
from the time the instruments leave our department and come back. We have
increased our supplies to cope with that turnaround but we still don't have
enough buffer. [...] The areas where we are having a crunch specifically is the
areas that are specialized. Orthopedics, the surgeons are the biggest toy lovers
under the sun. They are prone to the innovation that is going on nationally. They
go off to conferences and speak with their colleagues. So they want the latest
material which is expensive and we don't have many of them to build a buffer.
Main ORs Our peak times early in the morning we never have enough porters. Then once
Coordinator the dust has settle they just sit down all day.
Main ORs Communication is always the fundamental cause [as to why things don't work
Coordinator well]. He didn't tell me bla bla. Generally communication fails within the theatre,
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or with other people outside, ... people assume and assume and assume... 9 time
out of 10 problems are because of communication. [...]Communication breaks
down in between cases... have you called for the patient... have you called the
ward?
Anesthetic You could open up a patient and realize a complication, unforeseen procedure,
Delivery and the list will overrun. Those happen daily but not in huge volume in the
Manager theatres.
Anesthetic Information should be made accessible easily for all the decision making
Delivery stakeholders, and whenever a change takes place, instead of the information
Manager going back to only one stakeholder, it should be made available to all the
stakeholders affected by that change. Ensuring that the flow of the information
and the information are there as a resource.
OR On the whole the concept is on-the-day admission. The intention is that the
Management patients arrive at 6 or 7 in the morning. What hasn't been thought of and I think it
Board is an infrastructure issue, is that the wards staff are trying to give care to patients
Surgeon who are ill, and who need to be gotten out of bed, or whatever, and they are
trying to admit patients at the same time. You know, where is your priority?
Administrative Support Services Process View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Main ORs In First Choice we stipulated that one theater do a difficult case and another
Coordinator theater do an easy case. An example would be for orthopedics to do a hip in one
and a toe in another. They used to do it and it helped scheduling, but now they
seem to have forgotten because they don't open the first choice manual anymore.
So whichever anesthesiologist gets there first, he moves the patient first into the
anesthesiologist room, and that may mean a longer wait time if his case is more
difficult, and during that time the subsequent patient is waiting longer in the
holding bay.
Surgery and Then you hit the problem which is, on one end of the spectrum you've got a lot of
Critical Care people who believe "well we just haven't systemized this... we haven't got the
Director processes in place". Now what we may have been incompetent in isn't for the
want of trying, that is what we have been doing for three years with first choice.
Lean Team Theatres had their own work streams in terms of scheduling, list planning, change
Director over, visual management, 5 S, etc... and we worked incredibly hard for about a
year and a half doing stuff and some stuff stuck... so there is a degree of visual
management in place... 5 S did some good work... scheduling never got off the
ground.
Lean Team The other thing that I think was fundamentally wrong was that there was no
Director strategic approach. Why do we need to do this? What is the benefit of doing this?
What is the better future that this improvement will actually make happen? [...]
So basically what we did was that we crashed landed... with no prior warning...
with no engagement up front... with no strategic direction and just said that we
have got to get in there and start doing stuff... and guess what... the management
team didn't really buy it... the general manager never really got it and didn't buy
it, she was being done too.
Lean Team There was no preliminary engagement with the care group to say "what would
Director your preliminary thoughts about this be? How do you think things might
improve? What was your preferred way of doing this be? What sort of back fill
would you need if you were going to get involved in doing this work?"
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Main ORs [employee xyz] has been charged to finding out every day why patients cancelled
Coordinator a surgery on the day.
Main ORs Galaxy was a new system for the Trust and it is meant to be a patient information
Coordinator and management system, and yet, it does not have the capacity to give us data on
the top ten procedures for each surgeon.
Anesthetic Say I have a sore knee and go to the orthopedic clinic and the consultant has a
Delivery look at my knee and says that you are going to need surgery for XYZ. That starts
Manager your treatment [18 weeks] clock and you have to be treated within that. That
information will then be passed onto an admissions team and a waiting list card is
put together, kept, and that is then used to organize a list according to the
surgeons preference and the urgency to treat the patient. Sometimes some
surgeons just let their admissions team organize it for them and they will just
approve it. The admissions team will then maintain the list appropriately because
every surgeon works differently...
Anesthetic If we have got patients coming off the ward, so they are already an inpatient and
Delivery have not needed to go through the admissions process, the admissions teams
Manager might not know of it... or if there is a last minute change because of an urgent
patient coming in... [...]While doing rounds surgeons may decide to squeeze in
an extra patient for the next day and put the junior doctor to schedule it, however
the admissions team may never get to know about it
Anesthetic From a systems point of view, the entire trust, we have a system called galaxy
Delivery that could be used for electronically scheduling patients, people's [consultant's
Manager paper] diaries are still used and it is a big request of mine because what it would
mean is that you would be able to give access to, or front view access, to anybody
that could log on and see what the list was. So theatres and admission wouldn't
have to have papers going back and forth. It would save in administration's time,
it would spare junior doctors going all around writing up the list for the next day,
permission to get into theatres and then have to spend an hour and a half typing in
medical lines, etc whereas if we had people actually directly inputting it into
Galaxy I think that would make a big difference. Galaxy already has the
capability to do this.
Main ORs The final version [of the OR list] is made available at 3pm the day before. But
Coordinator prior to that we have the galaxy system, and all specialists, neuro, cardio, gyn,
general, everybody, that does not happen here! They need to feed into galaxy all
the data to enable us to plan for the list. [...] They can do it whenever they want.
The rule in the country is that if you were treating your elective patients correctly,
the guidelines say that you should give patients at least three weeks notice. So if
we are going to tell Ms. Bloggs to come in three weeks prior, shouldn't she be on
the system? Why should it be a grand surprise? This also impacts the patient
experience.
Main ORs The day before we get the definite list for the next day. Yesterday, by 3pm the
Coordinator lists flow in by the junior doctors who hand them in at the theatre reception desk.
The lady at the desk, the admin person, collects the lists and puts them all into
Galaxy which produces the workplan for the next day. When the list is prepared
our senior team leaders in here go to the desk in the afternoon, look at the list,
and see if it is a realistic list [are there too many cases], is it too ambitious, etc...
if so they are meant to call the consultant... and say this is too ambitious, you
will not finish this work, ... but 9 times out of 10 when they check with the
ambitious consultant and he will say that he can do it anyway and the list will not
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Main ORs
Coordinator
be changed. That is their role.
junior doctor [staffed at the ward] will need to come physically to the theatre and
book the patient a theatre slot. At that point we give him [junior doctor] a form to
answer all these questions and if he answers "no" to one of them we say "sorry
matty we don't take your booking because the patient has not been prepped and
ready to be operated on, or else we are just queuing up". And guess what the
junior doctor does? He ticks "yes" to all the questions even though half of them
the answer is "no".
Main ORs [Surgeon XYZ] said that he was ill and that he wasn't coming in. Guess what, he
Coordinator showed up! So on Friday there was a big scramble on our service to reinstate that
list. But the patients that were originally scheduled were cancelled. He used that
list to mop up emergencies, and what have you.
ORMB I think that there is a lot to be done in terms of the processes within theatres about
Chairman who has a role, what that role is, and what the system is. There hasn't been that
didactic flow realistically specified. There are people who have had that role but
if you actually look at their job plan and job description, it is not there, and that
has to change.
Administrative Support Services Organization View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Surgery and They also have to do intangibles that are important. They need to make a surgeon
Critical Care who is top class think that this is a place I want to work. They need to make an
Division anesthesiologist feel like I am not just doing a service job here, you know, this is
Director a place where I want to work. It has got to create that atmosphere.
Main ORs It is always the poor junior doctor that is tasked to track the patient and
Coordinator everything else. [...]From our point of view, our staff needs to support the junior
doctors in doing their activities because they need to know the inside out and
upside down of how we work.
Surgery and What I tell my specialties is "look you will not be able to keep your referral
Critical Care base... we will have to chop it off at the knees essentially if you don't hit 18
Division weeks... and to hit 18 weeks use that theatre time... you are not getting paid to
Director do loads of lists at weekends... this is not going to be the gravy train it was for
previous waiting list initiatives... so don't believe that having a long waiting list
is going to end up with you just being paid loads more money.
ORMB Or alternatively budget for the fact that this list is always going to run until 7 and
Chairman staff it appropriately with appropriate resource. That is the problem... they are
doing on the cheap at the moment.
Surgery and One of the problems I had was when I said to the executive 'look unless you are
Critical Care prepared to act like the hard policeman on this one, on occasion, it is made very
Division difficult for me, you know', [Executive answered] 'you are telling me we won't
Director be able to do this work... if you don't hit 18 weeks'. [division director] 'Are you
going to tell the surgeons that?' [Executive answered] 'No. You can tell them'.
Thank you very much."
Anesthetic It takes them nearly 10 years or so to get them to the top of their consultant scale.
Delivery
Manager
ORMB [The SCC division director] helped with this whereby in theory the funding for
Chairman allocation for your specialty for the year were given to you. So if you make
savings on that list in theory you could actually utilize some of that money to
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reinvest in maybe other areas of your specialty, maybe a bit of hardware, a bit of
equipment, this sort of thing.
Main ORs Once a month the Trust has what they call an Audit. It happens for a morning
Coordinator session 8am until 12am. In theatres we use that time to have our team meetings,
information sharing, etc. [...] Once a month is not enough. However in a world
where we are trying to achieve 18 weeks targets, it is precious resources to stand
down. If you think about it, once a month all our theatres stop one morning.
Main ORs The caregroup siloed structure could be an interference, because do remember
Coordinator that theaters, here we are a commonality, but we've got cardiac and neuro that
belong to another caregroup, they belong to cardio and neuro sciences, then
general surgery , orthopedics, and urology belong to critical care and surgery,
then gyn and peds belong to what they call the women's and children care group,
and then liver and renal belong to the liver and renal care groups. But theaters
here manage all these theaters that service all these care groups, and yet they see
themselves as in their own entirety. [...] So all the surgeons belong to each care
group. But the anesthesiologists and the theater staff belong to critical care and
surgery. But the allegiances of these surgeons is to those care groups. But I would
like to think that the allegiance of the theater staff is to me.
Anesthetic Everybody works in silos... is that because you have direct relationship between
Delivery the surgeons and their admissions... they tend to stick very close to their
Manager offices... they don't have to have a phone conversation with someone on the
other end of the hospital. Those silos foster the relationships between them.
Anesthetic you are dealing with clinical staff who have historically been self managed. For
Delivery someone to come in micro managing and request accounts for what each
Manager consultant actually did for an SPA... my feel... you would have a jerked reaction.
Anesthetic I can only speak about my care group and I don't know about the other care
Delivery groups [... ]Where there are shared resources between anesthetics and theatres
Manager that is when you see everybody's needs and priorities, but is there a good
information flow? Is there good work happening in neuro surgery, do general
surgery necessarily know about it? Are we actually duplicating work in the
different Care Groups? Are we purchasing the different systems to do the same
purpose in different areas? Because there isn't a lot of centralization...
Procurement decisions are up to each individual care group. Things that happen
in the ward, for the sake of the patient, is that information passed on to the rest of
the hospital?
Anesthetic The neuro anesthesiologists when you speak with [lead surgeon X], I sometimes
Delivery think that he would very much like to be a complete discrete group. However,
Manager some of their members of staff, the neuro anesthesia and general anesthesia, they
don't conflict, therefore there is room for cross covering, they are still part of the
theatre complex. If there is an issue with anesthesia who is going to support with
the structure within that? If you start moving those groups into isolation then their
voices actually starts getting smaller as well because they don't have the backup
and support from a very large department
Anesthetic Each Cares Group Admission Team... this is the Care Group of Surgery and
Delivery Critical Care, so the surgical specialties that sit with this care group are general
Manager surgery, orthopedics, ophthalmology, and urology. Neuro surgery has their own
team and systems of admissions. Liver has their own team and systems of
admissions. Surgery has their own team and systems of admissions. So there is
lots of different systems... There is not a central admissions resource in this
Trust.
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Main ORs To penalize them financially immediately wouldn't make sense. But we could
Coordinator give them a year to try to get culture to change and run this in shadow mode...
and then you could start penalizing them. Then theaters would start minting
money because it would show!
Main ORs We are using [the ORISG] as the means of communication to bridge the gap and
Coordinator address the issues rather than just complaint, and complaint, and complaint.
Main ORs If a session is cancelled for a non clinical reason, someone in the theater has to
Coordinator tell the matron, who then tells me, and I then talk with the consultant and tell him
that he has to make up for it and overrun if need be. If he says no then I bring [the
care group manager] but it happens rarely. Then the surgeon will complaint [she
mimics the voice] "can't do it... got to collect the children", but [the care group
manager] tells them "you signed up for this list, so some days you go early, some
days you stay overtime!".
ORMB My idea was to have the surgeon, the anesthesiologist, the theater team, and the
Chairman business manager, very importantly, rather than having this conversation five
times over, the anesthesiologist speak to the surgeon, the surgeon speak with the
business manager, back and forth, you need this little cohort groups on how to
best manage and then bring that back to the theater management board and say
"this is what we have done. We are appointing another consultant because that
way it frees up so and so to do this, and do that, etc".
ORMB [The environment between management and surgeons] is usually hostile but that
Chairman is why we try to do it through the Theatre Management Board and see people
respond. This is where it should be discussed. If you have a group that are not
playing ball, that has to go up the line... as it would be beneficial to have
someone with clout at those meetings that people have to listen to, and that takes
away some of the issues with regards to [the Main ORs Coordinator] and the way
this information is being disseminated.
ORMB So people like cardiac came out with the fact that this is how they wanted to run
Chairman the surgery "I want three cases in the day". Anesthesiologists say "you can't do
that". Okay sit in a room and tell us how you might do it and what are the
resource implications for that together with your business manager, and then
came back to us and say "actually we need an extra recovery bed... we need the
theater team to work over lunch time if we can actually start anesthetizing the
second cardiac case as the other one is still coming off the table".
ORMB There was also the fact that the people needed to meet with their business and
Chairman clinical managers because they never really used to turn up for that meeting... it
was nothing for them... they didn't need to worry about that. But actually when
you are being dragged across the cold and say "you're theatre occupancy is
poor... your late starts are poor... your bla... what are you going to do about it?".
All of the sudden "oh right okay".
ORMB Get them [break out groups] to take ownership of their figures and be accountable
Chairman for them, and come back to the [main] meeting. But also then, to discuss with the
lead for anesthetics for that group, the clinical lead of surgery for that group, and
also the theatres teams, to say "okay here are the figures, this is what we aren't
doing very well, how could we possibly change this?"
ORMB The SCC division director sits on the ORMB] occasionally, as the manager for
Chairman critical care and surgery, but usually there is nobody anymore senior than that
position who sits at that meeting.
ORMB We have talked about late starts... on day cancellations... number of lists
Chairman cancelled without notification. These are the ones [issues] that count.
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ORMB There are several individuals who are happy with the status quo and will try to
Chairman disenchant other people coming in, and make sure that it doesn't change, and then
they are going to leave. They are interested in keeping it as is. Our interest is to
make it a more dynamic and flexible work force
ORMB It is on the crest of changing now... it really is... and if you can energize this
Chairman now and put the resource where it needs to be so that people can see that it is
changing... they will take that message for only so long... and if not, it will only
slip back... and I really do think that making sure that the clinical leads know that
an executive member of the board has taken a keen role in this and filtering it
back with the odd email and things along those lines
Anesthetic What you tend to find is that you have the same surgeon and the same
Delivery anesthesiologist working together in building a relationship and they work
Manager together regularly, the efficiency of that list tends to run better, because they
know the types of patients that are coming and they know how a surgeon
operates.
Main ORs I genuinely believe that the reason for the communication breakdown... is that if
Coordinator they give you a reason for why they didn't do it, it excuses them... "Oh this is the
NHS, what do you expect?". Instead of saying "I am accountable". This happens
because there isn't any penalty for failure.
Anesthetic It depends who the individual is, the seniority of that individual, and the
Delivery management style of that person. The consultants tend to relate to the [SCC
Manager division director]]. They relate to that level of management. His style is very
direct, he makes decisions, and some people don't like that... But you might have
other hospital managers that have different styles. The general manager sets the
tone of the way in which the care group works.
SCC More recently because of some of the capacity crunch on the Trust, I don't know
Division if it is a complaint, but there certainly have been far bigger issues and tensions
Director around how do we find more time for neurosurgery
Lean Team To be blunt I think the management lead in theatres, [Main ORs Coordinator],
Director has been a significantly weak presence all the way through. We have just never
managed to get past that. So we bumbled along... keep doing stuff... keep
tinkering... but we never really got to the big issues.
ORMB You need a theatre coordinator there... and the problem is that there is nobody
Chairman there whose designated job it is to be on the floor of that theatre complex, day in,
day out, running around, coordinating between emergency theatres and elective
theatres. [Main ORs Coordinator] is in her office stuck up to her eyeballs in paper
work. [Main ORs Matron] likewise. [...] What I asked is who would be best
placed to be a theater coordinator to liaise, so that when a theater list goes down,
at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, who liaises with the anesthetic consultant in the
emergency theater, and that consultant anesthesiologist and say "hey, we can take
an appendix on our list now" and not for the theaters teams to go, keep their head
down, we finished early, we are not here.
SCC Main theatres is much better as a crude indicator but if you actually drill down,
Division well I think we have made some pretty big behavioral.. .I don't want to use the
Director phrase culture because it is thrown about willy nilly and it is far more complex
than people think. But behaviorally we have made it so that it is not acceptable to
start late and it probably was ten months ago. People know we are looking at this
stuff.
SCC Sometimes they will imply "who the bloody hell are you to tell me what to do?"
Division but I say "look I am the divisional manager, and believe me this is not a clinical
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issue, it is a misconduct issue". So in a sense I have had to be very firm and I
suspect a little bit in the past that that was not what people thought.
Who designs theater lists... I firmly believe that the theater list should reside in
the hands of the surgeon and anesthesiologist who actually go do that list. I, in
fairness, do not want a manager booking my list because the variables about that
list are finite. I know the case, I know how long it is likely to take, I know
whether I have a trainee with me in theatre that day, I know where the patient
came from, all of these sorts of things... That might be specific to my specialty
but I am sure it is relevant to other specialties.
But the rewards are there and actually it might be that people want to work 2 days
and have a third day off because it suits there child care facilities, etc. But
theatres have been used to run from 8 to 5, and people have gone into that line of
work because it suits them in their family commitments. [...]If you are on a ward
you are doing a shift pattern all the time. You are on days... you are on nights...
The theatres, trying to get people to work outside those hours, there is a big brick
wall there because they are not used to it, it is not the way they were brought up
"This is our target for today." A meeting in the morning [with] surgeon,
anesthesiologist, theatre staff, this is the task that is above us, we want to get
through this today. We'll incentivize you to do four cases as opposed to three.
Not to give you overtime and string it out. If people know that they are going to
get some incentive for actually putting through more work through a given time
they'll do it.
ORMB you also got to be able to reward those people who do well... and it is not that
Chairman they spent that length of time in a job, it is actually whether they are good at it.
[...]And we've seen lots of people leave because they haven't had the
opportunities to progress up the ladder and because, quite honestly, there are
people who don't want to see them to progress up the ladder because it shows
them up for what they ear... they were senior to them but they don't do the extra
mile, and therefore they don't want to see someone come in and get the extra
point
Main ORs Nothing stays static because we have such a mobile workforce and changing
Coordinator workforce here... The junior doctors stay only for 6 months and they are the bulk
of doing a lot of this. You lose continuity when the junior doctor moves.
Administrative Support Services Knowledge View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
ORMB "I think it is good for [Hospital ABC]. By my very nature I like things when they
Chairman work well. I hate waste but I also want to make sure that people are reimbursed
and feel part of something that they are adding to. It has got to be a team culture.
It really has to be. And unfortunately there are several teams that are working in
theatres at the moment and what you are looking for is something that is going to
bring them all together. [...] There is a perception that there are things that keep
popping up that are common to everyone. So that might mean that we need more
recovery space across the board. It might be about how the pre admissions setup
is designated for all the critical care about how they can get these patients into on
day admissions. Reduce through anesthetic pre assessments the number of on day
cancellations. Speed things up with some generic things that might need a bit of
investment and actually someone with a bit of clout to say "I can see how this is
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going to improve it""
ORMB You need a theatre coordinator there... and the problem is that there is nobody
Chairman there whose designated job it is to be on the floor of that theatre complex, day in,
day out, running around, coordinating between emergency theatres and elective
theatres. [The Main ORs Coordinator] is in her office stuck up to her eyeballs in
paper work. [The Main ORs Matron] likewise. [...] What I asked is who would
be best placed to be a theater coordinator to liaise, so that when a theater list goes
down, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, who liaises with the anesthetic consultant in
the emergency theater, and that consultant anesthesiologist and say "hey, we can
take an appendix on our list now" and not for the theaters teams to go, keep their
head down, we finished early, we are not here.
SCC Well it was something else about what we started to do to incentives and
Division motivation and strategic imperatives, and performance management, and
Director supporting the staff, and picking up the "this isn't good enough"
Main ORs In First Choice we stipulated that one theater do a difficult case and another
Coordinator theater do an easy case. An example would be for orthopedics to do a hip in one
and a toe in another. They used to do it and it helped scheduling, but now they
seem to have forgotten because they don't open the first choice manual anymore.
So whichever anesthesiologist gets there first, he moves the patient first into the
anesthesiologist room, and that may mean a longer wait time if his case is more
difficult, and during that time the subsequent patient is waiting longer in the
holding bay.
Main ORs Once a month the Trust has what they call an Audit. It happens for a morning
Coordinator session 8am until 12am. In theatres we use that time to have our team meetings,
information sharing, etc. [...] Once a month is not enough. However in a world
where we are trying to achieve 18 weeks targets, it is precious resources to stand
down. If you think about it, once a month all our theatres stop one morning.
Administrative Support Services Information View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Anesthetic There are so many different systems that don't speak to one another and this is a
Delivery problem in general with the NHS IT system.
Manager
Anesthetic This is our annual leave diary [paper] for all our clinicians. [...] Things that I will
Delivery look out to produce the anesthetic schedule roaster, I use the ROTASTAR
Manager system, I would look at the scheduling spreadsheets that [the Main ORs
Coordinator] manages and coordinates, I would also double check with [Main OR
system], I wouldn't enter or change anything in [Main OR system], but I would
use it as a reference point. I would use our own internal systems of leave,
booking, so I know who is available to work, but without any robust IT system.
Anesthetic The staffing system ROTASTAR is not shared with everyone.
Delivery
Manager
Anesthetic It all depends on the relationship between the surgeon and the admissions team
Delivery are having. And they all work differently. And you would hope there is always a
Manager very open communication channel but you don't know where all the information
is held
Anesthetic There are good relationships between the theater teams, the surgeons, and the
Delivery junior doctors, and they do communicate, but if you were look at it as a system it
Manager would appear very ad hoc. Then if you put in place something very rigorous as a
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I system they are worried that that will remove the flexibility to adapt.
"Each Cares Group Admission Team... this is the Care Group of Surgery and
Critical Care, so the surgical specialties that sit with this care group are general
surgery, orthopedics, ophthalmology, and urology. Neuro surgery has their own
team and systems of admissions. Liver has their own team and systems of
admissions. Surgery has their own team and systems of admissions. So there is
lots of different systems... There is not a central admissions resource in this
Trust."
From a systems point of view, the entire trust, we have a system called galaxy
that could be used for electronically scheduling patients, people's [consultant's
paper] diaries are still used and it is a big request of mine because what it would
mean is that you would be able to give access to, or front view access, to anybody
that could log on and see what the list was. So theatres and admission wouldn't
have to have papers going back and forth. It would save in administration's time,
it would spare junior doctors going all around writing up the list for the next day,
permission to get into theatres and then have to spend an hour and a half typing in
medical lines, etc whereas if we had people actually directly inputting it into [the
Main ORs system] I think that would make a big difference. [Main ORs system]
already has the capability to do this.
The list schedule has a coloring system where it can be green, which means a
session is reserved for a surgeon but no patient is booked yet, it can be yellow,
which means a patient is booked by the surgeon, it can be orange, which means
that the surgeons are on leave, and it can be red, which means the session isn't
staffed for. All the surgeons have to give six weeks notice of them going on
leave. So the first three weeks the specialty has got to use their resource within
their specialty, and if they can't do so, then they come to me, or I check on them,
and that means that there are three weeks still for another specialty to use them. I
advertise it in an email for all the specialty managers "these are up for grabs,
these are the deadlines, come back to me if you can use it". Then there is some
take up to that. Then two weeks before the list starts, if I haven't heard from
anybody, I go into the system and I make it red, and I stand down the staff. And I
cut the cost because they have given me enough notice. Sometimes, when it is
pink it means that I have been given too short notice and I am not going to cough
the cost, they are, because they have given me less than three weeks notice, and
then they go "hum, ah, hum, oh we have gotten a wasted session!"
What do we need to know? In order to make these [OR] lists to run correctly,
promptly, and adequately, we need to have advance notification of what is being
scheduled into it. [...] The final version [of the OR list] is made available at 3pm
the day before. But prior to that we have the [Main ORs] system, and all
specialists, neuro, cardio, gyn, general, everybody [can use it, but] that does not
happen here! [...] They can do it whenever they want. The rule in the country is
that if you were treating your elective patients correctly, the guidelines say that
you should give patients at least three weeks notice. So if we are going to tell Ms.
Bloggs to come in three weeks prior, shouldn't she be on the system? Why
should it be a grand surprise? This also impacts the patient experience.
a decision is made that the person needs to go to theatre today sometime, and at
that point Joe Blogs who is junior doctor [staffed at the ward] will need to come
physically to the theatre and book the patient a theatre slot. At that point we give
him [junior doctor] a form to answer all these questions and if he answers "no" to
one of them we say "sorry matty we don't take your booking because the patient
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has not been prepped and ready to be operated on, or else we are just queuing
up". And guess what the junior doctor does? He ticks "yes" to all the questions
even though half of them the answer is "no".
Main ORs [The Main ORs information system] was a new system for the Trust and it is
Coordinator meant to be a patient information and management system, and yet, it does not
have the capacity to give us data on the top ten procedures for each surgeon. Each
person inserts data differently. For instance cataracts they could put "cataract left
eye" or they could put "left eye cataract", or they could put "inter ocular lens plus
cataract left eye". So the spelling is incorrect and we can't analyze data.
ORMB If we say that the criteria is that you cannot wait for more than 2 hours for a
Chairman certain procedure, and you've got this length of operating on the list, then you
either got to jump the list or you are going to have to open another theater. We
don't have that level of information at our finger tips.
c. Cardiac ORs
Cardiac ORs External / Policy View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Cardiac ORs Cases are booked according to the national target of 18 weeks. Consultants will
Coordinator share cases between them in order to make sure that they meet the target.
and Nurse
Cardiac ORs Strategy View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Cardiac ORs the hospital is risk averse... the NHS is risk averse... the management of this like
Surgeon every other big trust is risk averse... that is changing a bit under foundation status
and with surpluses and with things like that but they are risk averse. Meaning that
you have to go through a million business cases and try and prove almost the
unprovable...
Cardiac ORs There are a couple of phrases that appear a lot at [Hospital ABC] and in emails as
Surgeon well, and they are to do with the understanding of the organization and the formal
pathway... so it will say something like "we have a strategic pilot project for X in
department Y and having sorted that out we will then roll it out to all areas" and it
won't happen! That wave will roll very short and may trickle out by the time it
gets to 3 departments beyond that. It won't go everywhere.
Cardiac ORs Service View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Cardiac ORs The patient arrives in the corridor. I explain to them what is happening. I think
Clinical they are more worried about what will happen after the surgery. I explain
Coordinator everything, how long the surgery takes, how they get back to the ward, you won't
be able to talk because you will have a tube in your mouth, lots of lines attached
to monitor, you don't need to worry about going to toilet because there should be
a catheter, the nurse will take care of you.
Cardiac ORs I don't favor 24 hour working. No patient wants to be called down at 3 o'clock in
Surgeon the morning to have a routine screw taken out of their elbow or something... that
is not life, that is not the way people live...
Cardiac ORs Patients don't comment much on the operating environment... they want to
Surgeon survive and they wanted it to go well... and they are about to have a anesthetic
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and even when they are awake afterwards, they won't remember what you said to
them. Just as an aside, one of the common problems in surgery is that patient says
"you never told me anything about" whatever afterwards, and the truth is that we
tell them repeatedly, but the patient does not remember because of the drugs....
So tell the patient again and again and tell the family.I~ I
Cardiac ORs Consultants interact a lot with patients... maybe not immediately before the
Surgeon operations... but certainly in the outpatient [setting] and in the wards... and awful
lot. And that is the same case for the residents.
Cardiac ORs Every patient goes to CRU and then HDU and then the ward. [...]We already
Clinical have a bed in recovery before the procedure starts.
Coordinator
Cardiac ORs I send the patient for the morning at 7.20am. The porter will go and get the
Clinical patient or one of the ward staff. Patient arrives in the corridor, I check in the
Coordinator patient, then I bring the patient to the theater table, and then I hand over
everything to [the] anesthetic nurse. My policy is that all the patients should be
inside the theater at 8 o'clock. Anesthetics should start by 8 o'clock.
Cardiac ORs I was not happy with all that the First Choice program had decided so I tried to
Clinical change all of that. For example, once they used to finish the cardiac case they
Coordinator used to have the anesthetic nurse and the scrub nurse take the patient to recovery.
Why should we take the patient to recovery? I decided the registrar for surgical
care practitioner should take the patient to the CRU [Cardiac Recovery Unit] so
that we can save the time for 20 to 30 minutes. By the time they return we will
have cleaned the theater and prepped the patient.
Cardiac ORs I suppose in America you are familiar with an awful lot more technicians and non
Surgeon nurses and non doctors... we are moving that way. And our group in cardio
thoracic surgery is way ahead of the others. We have two operating assistants
who are nurses, and we have two ward assistants who are nurses but not doctors
but they are doing the doctor. So they are like PAs in America, they are
Physician's Assistant. [They go to the] ward the night before and say your patient
is going to have X tomorrow and we'll need this and this... it is not just to see the
patient, get consent, etc but to talk to the ward as well... this is what it is likely to
be, this is what we will need, if you have your patient cleaned, washed, ready,
and in a gown at 9, we are likely to call at 10, but could you please have the
patient fully ready for 9. Instead they [the Main ORs] adopted a just in time
approach, oh I think it is 10, lets try to get him ready at 5 to 10, and more often
than not it is 10 past 10, and the call comes and they say "oh he is not ready yet...
we... we... weren't sure when you were coming in" that sort of thing.
Cardiac ORs Process View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Cardiac ORs We don't have to get bits and pieces... we have what is called a procedure pack
Clinical for each consultant... so just get the instruments and put them in the procedure
Coordinator pack. [...] Anybody can prepare the kit for the next day... usually they finish
preparing the kit by 4.30 or 5 o'clock. They finish the shift at 5.30, so before they
go home they make sure that both theaters are ready for the next day. And they
prepare theater 1 just in case for emergency during the night. [... ]If anything is
missing for the next day they leave me a note, because they know that I will be in
by 6.3Oam and make sure it is here before we send for the patient.
Cardiac ORs I check everything before I send for the patient. Do I have enough staff? All the
Clinical trays are ready? I usually send for the patient at 7.20am.
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Cardiac ORs once they used to finish the cardiac case they used to have the anesthetic nurse
Clinical and the scrub nurse take the patient to recovery. Why should we take the patient
Coordinator to recovery? I decided the registrar for surgical care practitioner should take the
patient to the CRU [Cardiac Recovery Unit] so that we can save the time for 20 to
30 minutes. By the time they return we will have cleaned the theater and prepped
the patient.
Cardiac ORs the nurse in charge of that room should not only be saying "send for the patient
Surgeon now", they should be ringing an hour ahead "we will be sending for you".
Because you see, when we say send, we call the holding bay, and the porter gets
the ticket and goes and get it. There is nothing wrong with that. But we all ought
of done is call the ward an hour before.
Cardiac ORs We have a scorecard care group meeting with all consultants, head of the nursing
Surgeon in cardiac surgery, business manager, head of perfusion, and we all of a
discussion and agree. We meet once in every four weeks to check all the
improvements and what is missing.
Cardiac ORs Organization View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Cardiac ORs The final point which is really the damaging one... Like other hospitals we have
Surgeon a total centralized system, 20 years ago... there was management, there were
departments, etc but the money, the this, the that, it all came from there... and
then about 20 years ago they divided it up into what we call Care Groups,
Clinical Director, I don't care what you call them... Now these aren't
Departments because we have always had specialties but they are semi
autonomous financial management hubs within the different groups. So we have
never fully reconciled this centralized government and this devolved regional
government that we have.
We do have a sort of constitution about it... we do know who does what... but
the real damage is that if one Care Group decides this is how we are going to do
our business there is no compulsion on them to do it any other way as long as
their bottom line fits with what the central government say we have to do. And
the same thing applies to all these little initiatives, or even big initiatives, ...
Cardiac ORs They allow different systems to develop all over the place because of this degree
Surgeon of almost autonomy of these different areas and knowledge does not get shared,
best practice does not get shared, economies of scale, or whatever... but also on
top of that there is a feeling of relevant independence... there is no sense that this
is the way we do things at [Hospital ABC]. Now I don't mean dictatorial bossing
of everything everywhere but there ought to be a style, a way, a standard, a
behavior, and you notice I am not just talking medicine, I am talking attitudes and
relationships. This is the way we think is good, this is the way we do it.
Cardiac ORs There are a couple of phrases that appear a lot at [Hospital ABC] and in emails as
Surgeon well, and they are to do with the understanding of the organization and the formal
pathway... so it will say something like "we have a pilot project for X in
department Y and having sorted that out we will then roll it out to all areas
and..." it won't happen! That wave will roll very short and may trickle out by the
time it gets to 3 departments beyond that. It won't go everywhere. And if
something is really good then it should be good for everybody. But they counter
that by saying "But we are different here!" and my answer is "Oh you are
different... you do a different thing... but the principles still apply... it is
Page 748 of 759
Cardiac ORs
Surgeon
irrelevant whether you are a gynecologist, a dentist, or a heart surgeon... yes all
your specifics are different but the basics are the same" but that gets lost.
I don't get told what my financial return for this institution last year was... I
would like to. All surgeons would like to because they know they generally make
money. I am supposed to under the ABC program but that hasn't become real in
the way that it should yet and it has been taking so long now... over three years.
A lot of things would tie together on that... If you saw my activity... if you saw
my economic impact, you could see whether it is dipping up or dipping down...
or you could say that you are a really good chap, or that you are not a really good
chap... That does not haten in real time.
Cardiac ORs The adverse of that is if you say you must do this tomorrow... I don't care what it
Surgeon is... you must save 2% of your budget instantly or were in trouble... they all
think "hey you, buzz off, leave me alone". So there are tensions then between the
board and the divisions, and the divisions and the board, and the people below
them relate to their own care group much more than they do to the central
objectives of the board... and I think that is a real weakness. Because things don't
happen...
Cardiac ORs "There are some surgeons that who are fast... there are some surgeons who are
Surgeon slow... there are some surgeons who are very good... and there are some who
might not be so good... but they are not the same four groups. We have very slow
surgeons who are very good with very good results. Should they be penalized for
being slow? I am not so sure. Do their patients go home with less complications
and less readmission? Possibly. [...] carving them [surgeons] into minutes that
really isn't going to work."
Cardiac ORs I am hippy enough to say that all you have to do is bring people together around
Surgeon the shared core objective which is patient care. [...] If we share the same
objective and when there is real trouble is when there is cultural conflict between
the objectives of everybody in the team. [...] the second worse thing that can
happen to an operative patient, other than the operation not going well, is
cancellation.
Cardiac ORs Sometimes if there is shortage of staff I do 3 cases [myself] per day. I am not
Clinical going to cancel the case because I have shortage of staff.
Coordinator
Cardiac ORs Waste matters! Waste time... silent space... dead air... that matters. If the list
Surgeon starts at eight then start at eight. If there is to be a second, a third, a fourth patient
there should be little change between them. Shortest possible time between this
patient and the next one. Unless there is some infection control issue.
Cardiac ORs "I personally think our theatres should run from 7 in the morning to 9 at night,
Surgeon not necessarily with the same surgeon, you wouldn't fly a plane like that either,
but we should maximize the use of the plant."
Cardiac ORs we all have been in this for a long time... "What can we do today? We have
Surgeon always done 5 of them." So provided that what was asked in the first place is
reasonable...
Cardiac ORs In cardiac surgery there are few cases and very long. There are two lists and your
Surgeon first one overran by two hours. People who will want to go home early will often
say "well it is too late now, you know, it is 3pm in the afternoon, we are not
going to send for a 5 hour operation". She never does that. Within reason she
says, this is what we are doing.
Cardiac ORs We have a new theater manager for the last year or so, and the one thing that she
Surgeon made clear at the start, and she has not given up on since, is that she will do
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whatever she can to do our reasonable quota of work and avoid cancellations.
[...] If people take the piss and persistently abuse the system she will tell them
this is not the way we ought to do it, this is not reasonable, etc.
Cardiac ORs if it is an overloaded list I can say that I am not happy to do that list because I
Clinical cannot accommodate that much cases in one day. I can speak with the consultant
Coordinator and say that I am not able to do 7 cases in one day, rather than cancelling on the
day. Usually 99% of the time we are okay but I always check to see if there is a
problem with the list.
Cardiac ORs I say "if anybody not happy to follow my lead, you can go anywhere". I can tell
Clinical them to go somewhere else. It is not my decision to say whether they can work
Coordinator here or not, but I let them know that perhaps it is best for them to think of
working somewhere else.
Cardiac ORs Specially where behaviors are inappropriate or persistently inappropriate... by a
Surgeon little element of exposure, not of them, but of exposure of the general
environment, and what other people can be like, they are encouraged to subtly
modify their behavior.
Cardiac ORs
Clinical
Coordinator
I planned for 6 months how to change things... it is all culture... for years people
do something and they don't want to change suddenly. So I have to plan my own
each of the steps I should do each month. I can't change everything together.
I did speak to the clinical director and explained my plan as to how the
department should be run. They used to do hardly one or two cases a day, and we
started doing three cases per day in one theater!
He [the medical director] knew what I was capable of doing for the past 2
months. Then whatever you say they will trust you. It is trust, you have to get it
from everybody. I do at least one case a week with each one of the consultants, so
I do 6 cases, because they need to see that I am part of them. Sometimes if there
is shortage of staff I do 3 cases [myself] per day. I am not going to cancel the
case because I have shortage of staff.
[ ... ]
The first big problem was that the staff didn't know what was expected
sometimes. I had an interior meeting with all the members of the staff and told
them "tell me what you feel and how long have you worked in this place?". "Tell
me your experience working here for three years?" and they usually say "I don't
have coffee break... I don't have lunch break... every day we need to stay
back... there is no organization... things are missing". Everybody had their own
complaints. So I collected everybody's complaints and what they thought was
positive as well. I met all of them separately.
[ ...]I
Still there might be a change during nighttime when I am not here. I come
everyday at 6.30am to 6.45am to check. My duty starts at 7.30am but I will come
much earlier.
Cardiac ORs [JF: Do you have consultants that say "I want this nurse"?]
Clinical No. That does not work here. There is no choice for any consultant. I decide who
Coordinator should do the case.
Cardiac ORs I am in charge of the whole cardiac theatre. It is my responsibility to make sure
Clinical that all the cases are booked going through safely, make sure the equipment are
Coordinator fine, that all the staff are trained and with adequate knowledge, and all the safety
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checks. [...] 99% of the time I solve the problem my own, and may resort to a
main theatre Matron.
Cardiac ORs We have our own cardiac recovery bay. One of the anesthetics, it can be the
Clinical consultant or the registrar, and the cardiac registrar or surgical care practitioner
Coordinator will take the patient around, and they will handover the patient.
Cardiac ORs I would ask the consultant to talk to my staff and say what he expects from my
Clinical scrub nurse. That will make a big difference. I don't want them to teach cardiac
Coordinator surgery. What do you expect from scrub nurse? That is what the nurses should
learn. This is what already happens today. Consultants teach nurses what their
expectations are.
Cardiac ORs I know who my team are. And I know whom my colleagues on that team are, and
Surgeon who my nurses are, and they know who I am. And in our area it should include
recovery as well, because that is an integral part of our process, we have our own
recovery area which is pressurized.
Cardiac ORs There is serious team work available in operating theatres, and if you allow that
Surgeon team to be a team, and you have it well led, great things can happen. That is a
very characteristic feature.
Cardiac ORs Four months ago they started the theater Nurses Award. In March I got the Best
Clinical Nurse Award.
Coordinator
Cardiac ORs It is all the other things about work. Are they going to be persistently abused and
Surgeon persistently late? No. Is there a shift system that accounts for that with a little late
stagger to handle it? Are their training opportunities good? Are there
opportunities for promotion good? Is this whole self worth element of the job.
She looks after that. If you look after that then you can do this sort of thing.
Cardiac ORs I personally think our theatres should run from 7 in the morning to 9 at night, not
Surgeon necessarily with the same surgeon, you wouldn't fly a plane like that either, but
we should maximize the use of the plant. [There is] lack of will. Lack of clear
financial benefit to somebody.
Cardiac ORs I do reward my staff for work. I send them to international studies in training for
Clinical new products in Switzerland and France. You don't need to pay anything because
Coordinator the companies usually provide for everything. I just provide them a study date
and I do their clinical time to send them away.
Cardiac ORs Knowledge View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Cardiac ORs When you get any staff the first week I teach them what I expect from them, what
Clinical should be the attitude if you want to be a good cardiac nurse. [ ... ] I make new
Coordinator staff think... first few weeks I do that... then automatically they brush their teeth
every day morning... it is routine. I also give them lots of books to read... I don't
want anybody sitting around. [...]
I want you to familiarize yourself with the surroundings first... only after do you
learn the equipment and cardiac surgery things. First you need to familiarize
where things are, and that there are different color codes, etc. If you want to be a
good scrub nurse you need a good foundation.
Cardiac ORs Some people say they only learn from seniors, that is not true, you can also learn
Clinical from junior doctors, or junior nurses.
Coordinator
Cardiac ORs The education system is very poor in this country.
Clinical
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Coordinator
Cardiac ORs 80% of the patients see the consultant before they are put to sleep.... But if not
Clinical the consultant they will see the registrar.
Coordinator
Cardiac ORs I noticed that the first thing we needed to change in the staff was to change their
Clinical attitude. They didn't have any idea of why they were here. They were just coming
Coordinator in, do a couple of cases, and then going home. That is what they though nursing
was. That is not nursing. Anybody can do that. If I tell a monkey to do that it will
do that. I don't need trained people to do that. Then I explained that that is not
our role, we should have adequate knowledge and skills, everything.
Cardiac ORs This is typical of [Hospital ABC] because, there are possibly, and I say possibly
Surgeon because I only know of 3, there are possibly 5 groups trying to do the same thing
in their own area at the same time and that is one of the big symptomatic things
about [Hospital ABC], because several things follow from that.
Lets just say that there are 3 groups all think that are doing the same thing...
maybe in a different area... one that is a waste of duplication, because if there is
knowledge, if there is learning, the soon you share it with the core, whatever...
Then when it comes to implementation the output will be different... it might
have the same objective but the output will look and feel different... so you end
up then with 3 sections of the hospital having believed they improved something,
having believed they have changed something, but the outcomes are totally
different or significantly different.
They are not able to pinpoint the outcomes of the changes because other things
are changing around them.
Cardiac ORs A lot of things would tie together on that... If you saw my activity... if you saw
Surgeon my economic impact, you could see whether it is dipping up or dipping down...
or you could say that you are a really good chap, or that you are not a really good
chap... That does not happen
Cardiac ORs the nursing team... the scrub nurses... the operating nurses in the specialists areas
Surgeon have long experienced long understanding of that area and of that procedure. That
doesn't trickle down... it is top down... because when you come as a trainee to
that area, you get incorporated into that system... that works well
Cardiac ORs I teach them what is important about our profession. How we should look after
Clinical our patients. How we will be safe to run our places? How efficient we should be?
Coordinator How do you get the skills and knowledge? How do you communicate among care
givers and the patients?
Cardiac ORs I was massively in favor of the timeout. In our cardiac theatres we never do a
Surgeon case without the timeout. Full stop. [...] I have noted though when I go to other
theatres occasionally, or work with other surgeons, it doesn't always happen and
then I make a point of saying it. I haven't noticed in neuro, and I don't go down
there often, but I go down there 3 or 4 times a year [... ]they don't think it is
necessary... its free independent state of neuro surgery.
Cardiac ORs There is no situation on a regular basis, and I am very keen on "regular", because
Surgeon if it is irregular it is usually problem based, something happened, so we all meet.
And we either agree to fight over it, or to ignore it, or maybe to change it.
[...]The reason I say we meet regularly is so that there are no tensions and no
issues, and also so that relationships are built up in a formal environment, that
carry over into the work day, so that when a problem arises at lOam on Tuesday,
you already know and understand everybody, and it never gets to the heat that it
should.
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Cardiac ORs You must see that in the [leadership project] thing... you come up with a good
Surgeon idea... and people don't say "that is such a good idea, we are going to do that
tomorrow". I doubt that they ever, ever, say that at [Hospital ABC]. They really
say that if we are just nice to this girl [analyst from internal lean team] for a while
she will go away like all the others and we can still do more or less what we want
to do.
Cardiac ORs [Project X] is perceived as an instrument by the board... Where they appear and
Surgeon where they meet people... people meet people... people like them... and they see
value unless they are completely disenchanted and depressed with what they are
supposed to be working at... people liven up to it... You can say on the good side
that they are putting little plots of improvement around the building... You might
even say that they are just putting fires out around the building...
Cardiac ORs There are some surgeons that who are fast... there are some surgeons who are
Surgeon slow... there are some surgeons who are very good... and there are some who
might not be so good... but they are not the same four groups. We have very slow
surgeons who are very good with very good results. Should they be penalized for
being slow? I am not so sure. Do their patients go home with less complications
and less readmission? Possibly. [...] carving them [surgeons] into minutes that
really isn't going to work.
Cardiac ORs What works well is knowledge. When you have a core of people who know the
Surgeon surgery... know the people... know what they are doing.
Cardiac ORs Information View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Cardiac ORs Evening 4 o'clock I go check the list on what is happening the next day... I bring
Clinical the copy of the list for my staff and tell them to prepare both theaters for next
Coordinator day's morning cases. [...]Still there might be a change during nighttime when I
am not here. I come everyday at 6.30am to 6.45am to check. My duty starts at
7.30am but I will come much earlier. [...] Then I will see the final list in the
morning.
Cardiac ORs Every Friday I get the list of patients to be operated the following week. The
Clinical cardiac administrator [she is a secretary] sends me the list. [...]This information
Coordinator is sent to me via email on Friday. The registrar then fills out the daily list by hand
and go and give it to the main theater reception by 3.30pm.
Cardiac ORs We don't have to get bits and pieces... we have what is called a procedure pack
Clinical for each consultant... so just get the instruments and put them in the procedure
Coordinator pack. [...] Anybody can prepare the kit for the next day... usually they finish
preparing the kit by 4.30 or 5 o'clock. They finish the shift at 5.30, so before they
go home they make sure that both theaters are ready for the next day. And they
prepare theater 1 just in case for emergency during the night.
d. Neuro ORs
Neuro ORs External / Policy View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Neuro ORs Unlike in the US where you can turn away somebody because you don't have
Anesthesiologist time to operate them, here if someone gets referred to you by its GP you can't
turn them away.
Neuro ORs As you see the European Work Directives coming in... the amount of
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Anesthesiologist responsibility being pealed away... the amount of hours being pealed away...
the night call being pealed away...
Neuro ORs In neurosurgery we have set up systems which haven't necessarily improved
Anesthesiologist efficiency but have made the process slightly more robust. So I wouldn't
dream about doing a complicated spinal procedure without having a spinal
surgeon standing next to me.
Neuro ORs There has been small change in the way private insurance works for
Anesthesiologist orthopedic surgeons... if you are an orthopedic surgeon and you do some
spinal work your malpractice insurance goes up very substantially... so if you
drop your small amount of spinal work in the private sector you pay much
less. So over the last 3 years or so, many orthopedic surgeons have stopped
doing spinal in the private sector. Within NHS work we are insured and we
can do what we like... within reason within the hospital.
Neuro ORs It is a real problem with the way that training has changed... essentially the
Surgeon requirements for actual training time for trainees has increased, the hours that
they are working have decreased, and decreasing further next year, so when I
started as a registrar I was doing a 96 hour week on the residence in the
hospital throughout. Now it is dropping down to 48 hours, and in fact when I
started here as a trainee there were 6 trainees and now there are 11 ... there is
the pressure of doing more cases with 18 weeks... there is no doubt that I do
one of my standard procedures in about half the time my senior trainee
takes... so they get much less time to do some
Neuro ORs Strategy View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Neuro ORs Get simple patients through an infrastructure designed for complicated patients.
Surgeon We have assumed that all patients are massively complicated.
Neuro ORs there is the pressure of doing more cases with 18 weeks... there is no doubt that I
Surgeon do one of my standard procedures in about half the time my senior trainee
takes... so they get much less time to do some
Neuro ORs Service View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Neuro ORs There is some cultural thing here because you can't have the patient waiting
Surgeon outside the operating room because it is uncomfortable for the patient, which
doesn't make any sense doing because patients are pretty much happy in
waiting outside to have the operation. What that does is that it introduces an
unpredictable amount of time for the patient to be sent... it is hard to predict
how and that can lead to delays in theatres...
Neuro ORs there are a couple of cancellations in the same day a couple times a week
Surgeon
Neuro ORs It is not only that you are missing a [18 week] target but it is also that
Anesthesiologist somebody will come in months and months after they presented with
symptoms and their symptoms have changed... maybe they have gotten worse
or better... they are seen by a different surgeon who first assessed them...
Neuro ORs We continue to have some cancellations due to change in symptoms and that
Surgeon is partially due to the fact that we still have long waiting lists.
Neuro ORs Blood drawing is a little chaotic... frequently patients will come to us and
Anesthesiologist their second blood sample has not been done. Because the house officers are
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Neuro ORs
Surgeon
doing whatever they are doing they say they can't draw the sample, etc, so
we'll have the anesthesiologist do it. Houseman does not do his job because it
is too late, he is overworked, or had to go home, so the workload gets shifted
to consultant
You are on a 48 hour week, so two thirds of the time people are not here...
The European Work Directive is such that the people doing the operations are
not the same doing the morning round on the operated patients, and there are
several times where the information is lost in terms of what is meant to be
done for patient recovery. [...] That process does not work well... There
aren't good, robust handover arrangements in place, and we would like to
think that the nurses have them, but of course they don't either, because the
information about the operation note said that Mr. Blog can get up today
which never actually get into the patient notes.
Neuro ORs You don't get your demarcation lines which means that when neurosurgery
Surgeon gets referred a case from general medicine for an opinion we don't really want
to go down there, and we don't talk to their physicians, they don't talk to us,
and we don't care, and that is the mentality that is setup by not having any
cross specialty talk. You have the same difficulty within neuroscience,
neurology, and neurosurgery, almost the same specialty really becomes pulled
apart mostly because we operate on different days, there is no discussion, so
we end up with curt referrals by fax and it doesn't work well.
Neuro ORs Process View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Neuro ORs Things seem to go surprisingly wrong sometimes... you think if you would
Surgeon have the same list and cases all the time that they would have enough kit,
operating equipment, and stuff like that, but sometimes you will find that some
things are missing, and that things are disorganized
Neuro ORs Blood drawing is a little chaotic... frequently patients will come to us and
Anesthesiologist their second blood sample has not been done. Because the house officers are
doing whatever they are doing they say they can't draw the sample, etc, so
we'll have the anesthesiologist do it. Houseman does not do his job because it
is too late, he is overworked, or had to go home, so the workload gets shifted
to consultant
Neuro ORs You are on a 48 hour week, so two thirds of the time people are not here...
Surgeon The European Work Directive is such that the people doing the operations are
not the same doing the morning round on the operated patients, and there are
several times where the information is lost in terms of what is meant to be
done for patient recovery. [...] That process does not work well... There
aren't good, robust handover arrangements in place, and we would like to
think that the nurses have them, but of course they don't either because the
information about the operation note said that Mr. Blog can get up today
which never actually get into the patient notes.
Neuro ORs The nursing staff at [Hospital ABC]work really hard, they are understaffed
Anesthesiologist and under trained, they get confused, they don't seem to run terribly smoothly
as they are inconsistent from one ward to the other.
Neuro ORs Organization View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Neuro ORs nurses are working way over time... we have completely filled our lists as best
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Anesthesiologist we can...
Neuro ORs The difficulty with management is that it is massively time consuming... I feel
Surgeon that I have to make a choice... Either you are a clinician or you are one of
them... there is no halfway house... and I am struggling with that at the
moment because I went into medicine to become a surgeon not a manager...
and yet I think there is a requirement for clinical leadership.
Neuro ORs The dual management system between the upper business management group
Anesthesiologist and the clinical management group. In the US there is a lot more cross over
between the two, whereas here you step out of one into the other
Neuro ORs Neuroscience purchases the theater slot from Critical Care, and the cost of that
Surgeon includes the cost of the anesthetic agent, and that sort of thing. If we don't use
it, they save money, we of course don't generate any income because we are
not putting patients through it, so of course we lose money. [...]The failure of
having one group with a single success criteria will interfere always with the
way theatres are run.
Neuro ORs The adverse feature here is that we have very different management structures
Surgeon and I think that it a real central problem in theatres, in that, in order to get a
patient to theater we need ward staff, we need porters, we need some sort of
reception process in theatres, we need theater nurses, we need theater ODAs,
we need anesthesiologists and we need a surgeon. All of those have
completely separate management structures. So if there is a problem with the
interface between the porters and the theatre reception, I could do nothing
about it without going up my management structure, across to theirs, and then
down again. So there is almost no way of dealing with these cross role
problems.
Neuro ORs To improve the communication between the ward and the theatres I think the
Surgeon care group manager should be in the field more and they should let people on
the wards get a sense that there is somebody directing other than the person
that is one level above them
Neuro ORs There is more specialization of anesthesiologists in cardiac and so they are
Surgeon more wedded to cardiac as I understand it, whereas many of our
anesthesiologists are also orthopedic, or gynecology, or whatever, so while
they do one or two neuro sessions a week they will do three or four other
sessions.
Neuro ORs I think there is a level playing field across theatres because there doesn't seem
Anesthesiologist to be a tremendous hierarchy like there is in the US. In the UK the surgeons
are in the same salary scale as the anesthesiologists, nobody is paid by the case
unless there is private ones. [...]
People are in a level playing field so that helps in the interaction between the
surgeons and the anesthesiologists.
Neuro ORs [In our own neuro theatres] we have the flexibility of late finishes because it is
Surgeon a small group. We are not going to overrun multiple theatres but if one theatre
ones to overrun it is okay to do that. The general feeling is that we are all on
the same side
Neuro ORs It has been interesting to see how poor theatre utilization has been up there...
Surgeon we are averaging 1.8 cases for all day lists there, compared with about 2.6
cases in the downstairs theatres, and even more so that upstairs has a simpler
case mix, so it is extremely poor usage.
Neuro ORs We have been given additional theater capacity because we don't have enough
Surgeon capacity, in one of the other general theatres and that works disastrously
Page 756 of 759
poorly for a whole variety of reasons. First of all nobody [from our team]
wanted to work there from our point of view outside our comfort zone, so
there is a lack of enthusiasm about it.
Neuro ORs in the UK you are taken back to an old surgeon anesthesiologist relationship,
Anesthesiologist you are assigned a fixed session, on a fixed day, to a fixed surgeon, to do a
fixed list, therefore your experience to theatres in general is actually limited to
your one list which you do every week and every day
Neuro ORs I would measure the number of cases in the year or in the month... I think that
Surgeon is a very easy one... and that would be very effective. [...] I think profit
sharing arrangements would work well.
Neuro ORs I hate to say it but this relates to the people whom I have come across,
Anesthesiologist certainly at consultant level here, and it is almost uniquely financially driven.
They will do it for the money [...][If we say] we have targets and we are
falling short of the targets, we have to look better in terms of clinical care,
there is no interest... [then] they will give 850 pounds a day if you work, right
on board.... It is unbelievable...
Neuro ORs Operations was very clearly their [Arizona hospital he visited] unit of
Surgeon currency, the more operations the more money, and everything was designed
around that. I think we struggle slightly in what our unit of currency is.
Neuro ORs There is no consultant sitting room which sounds very elitist, and it is not
Surgeon really how the Trust likes to view itself which is why it was closed down and
has not been reinstituted across specialties, which means that there is no
discussion across specialties, and that is undoubtedly a big problem in this
hospital.
Neuro ORs Knowledge View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Neuro ORs As you see the European Work Directives coming in... the amount of
Anesthesiologist responsibility being pealed away... the amount of hours being pealed away...
the night call being pealed away... the concern of the faculty here is that they
are being deskilled or in some sense detrained... There is a general feeling that
they are getting fewer hours on the ground and that when they get into the
positions of responsibility they won't quite have the same degree of
experience when they get out the other end.
Neuro ORs It is a real problem with the way that training has changed... essentially the
Surgeon requirements for actual training time for trainees has increased, the hours that
they are working have decreased, and decreasing further next year, so when I
started as a registrar I was doing a 96 hour week on the residence in the
hospital throughout. Now it is dropping down to 48 hours, and in fact when I
started here as a trainee there were 6 trainees and now there are 11... there is
the pressure of doing more cases with 18 weeks... there is no doubt that I do
one of my standard procedures in about half the time my senior trainee
takes... so they get much less time to do some.
Neuro ORs Keep everybody working, keep everybody in the OR, and I think that is not a
Anesthesiologist good thing in medicine.
Neuro ORs They will do it for the money. If I were to say that we need to start a journal
Anesthesiologist club so that everybody can keep up to date, there is absolutely no interest.
Neuro ORs I think we could work better with things like avoiding wrong side surgery or
Surgeon operating on the wrong side of the head. We have a system which is not very
robust to deal with that. We have a case like that at least once a year.
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Neuro ORs Information View
Interviewee Interview quote(s)
Neuro ORs "The key is the availability of the appropriate information at the bedside. That
Surgeon operation note exists and is filed in a set of notes like this [picks up big paper
medical record]... there they are, patient came back from theater, volume one, so
probably the operation note is in volume two which is somewhere else
[inquisitive voice]. But lets find an operation note here... hopefully... there it
is... ah! Nothing written on it!!!!"
Neuro ORs You are on a 48 hour week, so two thirds of the time people are not here... The
Surgeon European Work Directive is such that the people doing the operations are not the
same doing the morning round on the operated patients, and there are several
times where the information is lost in terms of what is meant to be done for
patient recovery. [...] That process does not work well... There aren't good,
robust handover arrangements in place, and we would like to think that the nurses
have them, but of course they don't either because the information about the
operation note said that Mr. Blog can get up today which never actually get into
the patient notes.
Neuro ORs There is no consultant sitting room which sounds very elitist, and it is not really
Surgeon how the Trust likes to view itself which is why it was closed down and has not
been reinstituted across specialties, which means that there is no discussion
across specialties, and that is undoubtedly a big problem in this hospital.
Neuro ORs when neurosurgery gets referred a case from general medicine for an opinion we
Surgeon don't really want to go down there, and we don't talk to their physicians, they
don't talk to us, and we don't care, and that is the mentality that is setup by not
having any cross specialty talk. You have the same difficulty within
neuroscience, neurology, and neurosurgery, almost the same specialty really
becomes pulled apart mostly because we operate on different days, there is no
discussion, so we end up with curt referrals by fax and it doesn't work well.
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ii. Performance Scorecard Data
The following figure was captured from Hospital ABC's Performance Scorecard and
includes data specifically pertaining to the highest and lowest performing ORs, as well as
the Main ORs which represented the initial service unit of interest for exploratory
research.
Metric
Average Length of Stay
Elective
Non - Elective
New to Follow Up Ratio (YTD)
Readmissions (within 14 days)
Infection Control (YTD)
How are we doing?
Care Perceptions
Patient Engagement
Environment
Timely response to complaints
Admitted Patients Treated < 1 8 weeks
Non-Admitted Patients Treated < 18 weeks
Financial Contribution (YTD)
Income (YTD)
Expenditure (YTD)
Activity - Electives (YTD)
Emergency Inpatients (YTD)
Non-Elective Inpatients (YTD)
Outpatient Attendances (YTD)
Bed Utilisation Rate
Theatre Utilisation Rate
28 Day Cancellation Rule
DNA Rate
Coding Depth
Data Quality- Inpatients
Outpatients
IIUnits I
Days
Days
Ratio
1%
Cases
%
Spells
Spells
Spells
Number
%
%
Number
iRatio
%
%
Staff Sickness and absence
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Page 759 of 759
M
